98 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
JEMEAA - FEATURE
The Foreign Policies of Large
Democratizing African States
South Africa and Nigeria
Dr. Stephen F. BurgeSS
Abstract
Large country size (measured by gross domestic product), democratizing regime
type, and two exceptional leaders created sucient conditions for innovative for-
eign policy leadership by two African states, including the creation of regional in-
stitutions committed to democracy and human rights norms and the willingness to
intervene to stabilize war- torn states and uphold human rights and democratic
values. e global democratic wave of the 1980s and 1990s provided pressures
from outside and inside Africa for the promotion of democracy and human rights.
In the 2000s, South Africa’s abo Mbeki and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo led in
founding the African Union, the New Partnership for African Development, and
other institutions that included democratic and human rights norms. ese leaders
helped make similar innovations in the Southern African Development Commu-
nity and Economic Community of West African States respectively. eir nations’
relatively large country size provided the basis for “symbolic hegemony”—leader-
ship in creating norms and peacemaking. However, these states often have lacked
the power and leadership to pressure other countries to democratize and observe
human rights norms. In addition, less exceptional leaders in the 2010s accompa-
nied a recession in foreign policy leadership, including a diminished commitment
to democracy and human rights that coincided with the beginning of an autocratic
wave. e two cases demonstrate that large size, assertive leadership, and democra-
tizing regime type can produce innovative foreign policies that include limited
democracy and human rights promotion.
Introduction
e democratic wave of the 1980s and 1990s and collapse of Soviet- led social-
ism, mass protests in Africa, and democracy and human rights promotion helped
lead toward widespread democratization. Some African states moved toward de-
mocracy and beyond promoting regional solidarity with dictatorships and narrow
national interests, and toward adopting innovative, value- laden foreign policies.
Skillful democratic leaders of larger democratizing states used foreign policy re-
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EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 99
sources and state capacity to promote new institutions on a continental level and
in their subregions. However, tensions remained between the values of leaders and
the countries’ interests and limited power, producing inconsistent foreign policies.
In addition, autocratic states resisted pressures from large democratizing states,
producing outcomes that left dictators in power. Eventually, less skillful leaders
replaced skillful ones, and the democratic wave ended, lessening conditions for
innovative foreign policies and the promotion of democracy and human rights.
Instead, foreign policies narrowed to focus on assistance for economic growth.
Foreign policy innovation happens in the wake of wars, international crises, and
systemic changes, with exceptional leaders devising new approaches. Prominent
examples include the US “containment” of the Soviet Union, 1947–1992, with the
end of World War II and multipolarity and the beginning of the US–USSR con-
frontation, as well as the “new world order” and “enlargement” of the world of free
market democracies in the 1990s with the end of Soviet- led socialism. In Africa,
the 1980s economic crisis led to democratization in the 1990s with the aim of
accountability and “good governance” as a way to attract foreign aid and invest-
ment and produce economic growth and jobs.
1
is led to institutional innovation
in the creation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). e 1994 Rwandan genocide exposed
the weakness of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in conict resolution
and human rights maintenance, helping lead to the creation of a more interven-
tionist African Union (AU), which established mechanisms to prevent and pun-
ish massive abuses. In the 2000s, most African states became parties to the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) to try human rights abusers and agreed to the
“responsibility to protect” civilians (R2P) resolution adopted by the United Na-
tions (UN) General Assembly in 2005.
e popular rejection of military and one- party rule and wave of democratiza-
tion in Africa led to the innovation of norms supporting constitutional changes of
governments and sanctions against unconstitutional change. In addition, the UN
established democratic norms, including the stipulation that changes in govern-
ment take place through constitutional procedures and free and fair elections. is
was especially the case in UN peace operations, with eorts to hold free and fair
elections and human rights monitoring in postconict countries, many of which
were in Africa. However, foreign policy innovation and norm acceptance became
problematic in the face of resistance in the implementation phase.
Large states generally have foreign policy resources, including foreign aairs
bureaucracies and economic resources, which they can use for agenda- setting and
norm creation as well as diplomatic “carrots” and sizable militaries that can serve
as “sticks.” Large states with large GDPs that are democracies (or aspire to be) can
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aord to adopt foreign policies that go beyond national interests and toward pro-
moting democracy and human rights and that can credibly threaten multilateral
intervention against authoritarian human rights abusers.
2
However, in Africa,
large states may be ambitious in foreign policy innovation and can build consen-
sus but often lack the power to compel other states to change behavior. Autocratic
leaders of small, weak states can still resist intervention by playing the sovereignty
card, even in contiguous states.
South Africa is the strongest state in Africa, with an industrial economy and
diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power as well as companies
that operate throughout Africa. However, Pretoria still has limits on its inuence
and reach, operating in a large continent full of authoritarian leaders of weak
states, who are resistant to change and cling to power. Chris Alden and Maxi
Schoeman characterize South Africa as a “symbolic hegemon” with limited pow-
ers of implementation; they reference the failure to pressure neighboring Zimba-
bwe and eSwatini (Swaziland until 2018) to democratize as examples of such
limitations.
3
e symbolic hegemon moniker could also apply to Nigeria in West
Africa. e country is more limited in power than South Africa and is a petro-
state with a large population. It is important to note, South Africa and Nigeria,
with GDPs just above 300 billion USD, are far from being major powers, such as
China (12 trillion USD GDP) and India (2.5 trillion USD GDP).
4
A democratizing regime is one that demonstrates a commitment to a transition
from autocracy to democracy, even though it may continue to maintain limits on
political competition and civil liberties. Democratic waves diuse values to states
that then undergo democratization, and these states in turn pass the values on to
other states. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way observe that contiguous states in
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s were most eective in spreading de-
mocracy from one to another.
5
Seva Gunitsky identies four dierent types of
democratic diusion, including the “third wave”—“horizontal contagion” that
spread from Portugal to Latin America, 1974–1989—and the post- Soviet wave of
the 1990s—“vertical contagion” from the Soviet bloc to developing countries with
failing experiments in state- led socialism.
6
e collapse of the Soviet Union and
“hegemonic shock” meant that there was no longer an alternative development
model to that of Western free market democracy. In addition, the United States
and other Western countries adopted programs to spread democracy.
7
e US- led
“new world order” of assertive multilateralism through the UN produced a will-
ingness to intervene with peace operations to stabilize war- torn states in Africa,
stop human rights abuses, and assist in democratization. ere were a number of
successes, such as Sierra Leone and Mozambique, as well as high- prole failures,
such as Rwanda and Sudan.
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EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 101
Communism’s failure in Central and Eastern European states led to democra-
tization and then to foreign policies that included democracy and human rights
promotion (e.g., that of Václav Havel’s Czech Republic). e collapse of the So-
viet Union sent shock waves throughout Africa, accelerating democratization,
including in South Africa in 1994 and Nigeria starting in 1999. e democratic
wave led some states to adopt democracy and human rights norms in their foreign
policies.
8
Finally, the democratic wave helped propel African leaders and states to
conduct innovative foreign policies that led to NEPAD, the AU, and the adoption
of democracy and human rights norms. However, the combination of the demo-
cratic wave and democratizing states still had limited impact on autocratic re-
gimes, which resisted becoming more democratic and observant of human rights.
9
Concerning foreign policy innovation and leadership qualities, experience, edu-
cation, and personality play a role.
10
For example, Woodrow Wilson had the back-
ground, vision, and determination to promote the concepts of collective security
and self- determination in the 1910s. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his advisors
also had the experience and the ability to lead in building consensus during the
development of the UN and Bretton Woods in the early 1940s. George Kennan
had the vision and experience in Soviet aairs to generate the strategy of contain-
ment but not the leadership skills to implement his more diplomatic, Europe-
centered version. While Paul Nitze shared Kennan’s vision of containment, he was
a consummate insider with the ability to implement a global, militarized version.
11
George H.W. Bush developed the vision of the “new world order” after the Per-
sian Gulf War in 1991 and the foreign policy experience and ability to lead in
implementation. However, Bill Clinton defeated Bush in the 1992 elections, leav-
ing it to the Clinton administration to pursue its strategy of “assertive multilater-
alism” and “enlargement” of the world of free market democracies.
abo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo were both exceptional leaders. Mbeki
had a postgraduate education and foreign policy and political experience with the
African National Congress (ANC)-in- exile and as President Nelson Mandela’s
deputy president; he was also a supporter of democracy and human rights.
Obasanjo was military ruler, 1976–79, handed back power to civilians in 1979,
campaigned against military rule in the 1990s, and had the ability to lead and
willingness to promote human rights and democracy. In the 2000s, Mbeki and
Obasanjo took advantage of large state size and the democratic wave to do more
in foreign policy innovation than any other African leader since Ghana’s Kwame
Nkrumah. Before and after Mbeki and Obasanjo, there was markedly less foreign
policy innovation and support for human rights and democracy, with the excep-
tion of Mandela–Mbeki, 1994–99.
12
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My approach is to analyze the impact of regime type and varying levels of size,
democratization, and leadership on foreign policy innovation. I choose to focus
on the cases of South Africa and Nigeria, because they are the two largest states
in Africa and have the foreign policy resources that have made an impact.
13
In
addition, the democratic wave helped to propel them toward democracy and to-
ward enabling exceptional leaders to innovate foreign policies that included epi-
sodes of values promotion and the creation of regional institutions that included
democracy and human rights norms.
I analyze the eects of large size, pressures for democracy and human rights,
and leadership on foreign policies in three distinct decades—the transitional
1990s, the activist 2000s, and the declining 2010s. Comparing leadership in the
three periods, I demonstrate that a combination of the three factors brought for-
eign policy innovation and activism in the 2000s in contrast with the other de-
cades.
14
Concerning levels of analysis, I illustrate how South Africa and Nigeria
were able to build consensus at the continental level for the founding of the AU
and NEPAD and the inclusion of democratic of human norms and were able to
lead in promoting values in their respective subregional organizations. At the
global level, I explore how the two interacted with the United States, other pow-
ers, and the UN and responded to international pressures for democracy and hu-
man rights. In assessing to what extent they have included democratic and human
rights norms in their foreign policies, the two cases demonstrate conicting inter-
ests and varying ability and willingness to project power.
15
Comparing South
Africa and Nigeria demonstrates dierences in foreign policy resources and inu-
ence between an industrialized democracy with some resources versus a semi-
democracy with a large population and limited resources. However, even at the
subregional level, both encountered diculties in promoting democracy and hu-
man rights norms.
In the nal analysis, I provide sucient evidence that democratization, regime,
and leadership type produce foreign policies that exhibit commitment to democ-
racy and human rights. As is the case with other foreign policies, even that of the
United States, interests often contradict norms. I also assess alternative arguments
for the creation of the AU, NEPAD, and other instances of institution creation. I
assess countervailing cases—Ethiopia, Rwanda and Senegal—to explore the valid-
ity of the three factors in countries where one or more of these factors is missing.
The 1990s: Democratization and Foreign Policy Innovation
Before the 2000s, South Africa was going through a challenging democratic
transition with Nelson Mandela as president, 1994–99, and could only undertake
modest foreign policy innovation. Nigeria was suering through a kleptocratic
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military dictatorship, 1985–1999, and its only innovation was the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions to
enforce peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, partly to demonstrate that it was a
good international citizen despite an oppressive military dictatorship that ew in
the face of the democratic wave.
Before 1994, apartheid South Africa was a large pariah state that inuenced a
few states in the subregion and the wider African continent to seek recognition
and divide the OAU. In addition, the apartheid regime reached out to Western
powers and a range of developing countries to ward o sanctions. e country was
industrialized and had four times the GDP of all other Southern African states
combined and almost equal to all of Africa’s GDP. South Africa developed a large
and capable foreign policy bureaucracy to defend apartheid. In 1994, the ANC-
led government started to assume control of this bureaucracy.
16
Starting in the 1960s, the ANC gained experience that helped it take over the
state and develop an innovative foreign policy. e ANC- in- exile exhibited diplo-
matic skill in building a support network in Africa and abroad, gaining and taking
advantage of observer positions at the UN General Assembly, Non- Aligned
Movement (NAM), and OAU.
17
In the 1980s, the ANC was able to lead the forces
of resistance to apartheid South Africa by enlisting support from African states,
the Soviet bloc, and the NAM as well as pressing for US and West European sanc-
tions. e ANC- in- exile prepared for leadership by opposing the apartheid South
African security state and actively participating as an observer in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the Group of Front Line States,
with the aim of strengthening political and economic resistance to apartheid and
helping Southern African states to balance against the apartheid regime.
18
By the time the apartheid regime unbanned the ANC in 1990 and began the
process of negotiating a transfer of power, the ANC had reestablished itself inside
South Africa as the most popular movement for change. e ANC power base of
super- majority black support would be important in providing backing for the
post- apartheid regime’s foreign policy leadership and use of diplomacy in South-
ern Africa and Africa as a whole from 1994 onward.
e democratic wave helped to expose the ANC’s ideological divisions. e
South Africa- based United Democratic Front, the external Anti- Apartheid Move-
ment, and Nelson Mandela based their political positions on the 1955 Freedom
Charter, envisaging South Africa as a multiracial, multiparty democracy with equal
rights for all. e ANC’s ally—the South African Communist Party—and many
within the ANC leaned toward Soviet- led socialism. ere was also skepticism
about US- led democracy and human rights promotion during the Cold War, espe-
cially in the wake of the Reagan administration’s “constructive engagement” policy
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in cozying up to apartheid South Africa. is division would play a role in the new
South Africa’s foreign policy and Pretoria’s approach to democracy promotion.
With the collapse of the Soviet socialist bloc in 1990, the democratic wave, and
Nelson Mandela’s emergence from prison and assumption of leadership, the ANC
moved away from a socialist platform and toward tentative support for free market
democracy, which some saw as surrendering to Western neoliberalism.
19
In 1994, the emergence of a democratic South Africa with a relatively large state
and the ability to inuence African countries, combined with the democratic wave,
created conditions for foreign policy innovation. Nelson Mandela and the ANC
came to power as senior partners in a power- sharing arrangement with the Na-
tional Party in a transitional government. e “new South Africa” was cautious in
its foreign policy in the 1990s. e transitional government focused its attention
internally on implementing its Reconstruction and Development Programme and
developing education, jobs, and housing for the millions of black victims of apart-
heid oppression. e transition required considerable domestic focus and placed
limits on South African leadership in Africa, including in the OAU and SADC.
Furthermore, given the negative legacy that the apartheid regime had built particu-
larly in the Southern Africa region, the Mandela administration tried not to emu-
late the “bully” prole of apartheid South Africa and proceeded with sensitivity.
Despite a deliberate approach, Mandela led in some foreign policy innovation,
including democracy and human rights promotion.
20
He exhibited moral leader-
ship that derived from his record of opposition to the evils of apartheid and mag-
nanimous reconciliation with the National Party that proved attractive to global
public opinion and many world leaders.
21
He said, “this must be a world of de-
mocracy and respect for human rights, a world freed from the horrors of poverty,
hunger, deprivation and ignorance, relieved of the threat and the scourge of civil
wars and external aggression and unburdened of the great tragedy of millions
forced to become refugees.”
22
erefore, with Mandela at the helm, South Africa possessed “soft power” and
diplomatic capacity and at times eectively used the diplomatic, information,
military, and economic (DIME) instruments of power to play an important role
as regional leader in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole, especially with the
prestige and talents of Mandela. When the ANC assumed power, it had culti-
vated good relations with SADC and the rest of Africa and had no real enemies.
Antimilitarist voices dominated government thinking in the mid-1990s in a
backlash to the brutality of the apartheid military. e 1996 Defence White Paper
called for the judicious use of military power, only when vital South African in-
terests were at stake, and a broader denition of “security” to include human secu-
rity.
23
e voices and White Paper helped to create the basis for a foreign policy
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EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 105
that included developing the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as
a leader in peace operations and inculcating the security forces with concerns for
democracy and human rights.
24
e 1994 Rwandan genocide also had an impact,
driving thinking on how peace operations might react quickly, protect civilians,
and prevent future massive human rights abuses.
Concerning innovation at the African and global levels, one of South Africa’s
rst initiatives was leading African states in agreeing to the Treaty of Pelindaba in
1995 for an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which would commit state
parties to battle the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. irty years of
global leadership by the ANC’s Abdul Minty and the nuclear expertise of the
South African foreign policy bureaucracy—a reection of state size and past ex-
perience at dealing with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—were key
ingredients in diplomatic eorts for the treaty. South Africa continued to lead at
the global level in NPT review conferences held every ve years from 1995 on-
ward. In addition, South Africa fully rejoined the UN, including the Human
Rights Commission. e country negotiated with the European Union (EU) for
a trade deal. South Africa engaged with the United States in the binational com-
mission, led by Deputy President Mbeki and Vice Pres. Al Gore, 1994–99.
25
While Mbeki and Gore helped the two countries heal the divide created by the
Reagan administration’s constructive engagement, Mbeki remained skeptical
about US motives for promoting democracy and human rights.
e new South Africa innovated in peacemaking eorts in Africa, helping to
resolve conicts and holding out hope for the establishment of democracy and
human rights. e genocide in Rwanda started in April 1994, occurring at the
same time as Mandela and the ANC were campaigning for the 1994 elections.
Pretoria’s inability to act at that time led to the new South Africa’s commitment
to stop genocide as well as its support for the Rwandan Patriotic Front regime of
Paul Kagame and eorts to build a “new Rwanda.” In the latter half of 1994,
South African diplomacy helped to reverse a military coup in Lesotho and restore
democracy. At the same time, President Mandela intervened with Mozambican
leaders to persuade both political factions in that country to follow through with
multiparty elections and successfully save the United Nations Operation in Mo-
zambique (ONUMOZ) from failure. Mandela and South Africa mediated be-
tween the two sides in the Angolan civil war, 1994–99, with little success as ght-
ing resumed and intensied. In 1998, Mandela helped to persuade Libyan leader
Colonel Muʽammar al- Gadda to hand over suspects in the Lockerbie aircraft
bombing to end the damaging international sanctions on Libya’s oil and gas in-
dustry. In 1999, Mandela, Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and South African
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diplomats took over the peacemaking process in Burundi and shepherded it to
success in 2002.
26
In May 1997, South Africa took the initiative in negotiations to persuade the
longstanding dictator of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, to resign, after gaining the
trust of the leaders of an advancing rebel force, Laurent Kabila and Paul Kagame,
whose Rwandan Patriotic Army played the leading role.
27
In addition, SANDF
generals convinced Mobutu’s generals to end resistance to Kabila and Kagame’s
forces and dissuaded foreign allies of Mobutu from intervening.
28
After Mobutu’s
departure, Kabila established the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and
Mandela and other SADC leaders invited him to join the subregional organiza-
tion, especially given the close ties between Southern Africa and the DRC’s
mineral- rich Katanga Province.
In August 1998, Mandela and South Africa opposed Zimbabwe, Angola, and
Namibia’s intervention in the DRC at the invitation of President Kabila “in the
name of SADC,” because the three did not consult the other leaders of SADC for
approval.
29
When the three refused to withdraw, South Africa proposed a new
round of diplomacy to put an end to the renewed civil war. However, in 1998, some
observers saw South Africa as tilting toward Rwanda partly because of a sense of
guilt at Pretoria’s inaction during the 1994 genocide. Coincidentally, the following
month, South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho in the name
of SADC, deploying the SANDF to stop a military mutiny and preserve democ-
racy. e excessive use of force in the intervention tarnished the image of the new
South Africa as a benign hegemon and demonstrated that the country had much
to learn in the use of hard power in the cause of civilian rule and democracy.
30
In SADC, Mandela and South Africa proceeded cautiously. e entry of South
Africa into the SADC in 1994 threatened the regional power that Zimbabwean
president Robert Mugabe had accumulated and the civil war that Angolan presi-
dent José Eduardo dos Santos was waging to consolidate his rule. In 1996, the
SADC founded the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security to deal with civil
wars and other issues of instability. In opposition to Zimbabwe and Angola, which
wanted to create a military- oriented body that would be able to provide mutual
defense, South Africa worked with Botswana, Tanzania, and Mozambique to en-
sure that the new organization should be primarily a peacemaking body, commit-
ted to democracy and human rights.
31
Concerning democracy and human rights, the pressures of the democratic wave
and ANC human rights advocates clashed with the ANC’s traditionally strong
relations with NAM countries, producing a contradictory foreign policy that in-
cluded democratic and human rights promotion but also solidarity with dictators
who supported the ANC during the anti- apartheid struggle. Mandela’s govern-
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EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 107
ment featured a commitment to combined social justice, an acceptance of free
market democracy, and advocacy for social justice, democracy, and human rights
in African organizations and in relations with several African states.
32
However,
the South African government permitted arms sales to human rights abusers,
such as Syria; established close relations with Cuba and Libya and cordial rela-
tions with Iraq and Iran; and was reluctant to condemn human rights abuses by
Myanmar and Indonesia. In these cases, support for the ANC during the struggle
trumped the new South Africa’s democratic and human rights values. In addition,
a number of countries continued to contribute to the ANC’s coers after the
party came to power, which swayed government policies to some extent.
e most challenging democracy and human rights case for South Africa came
in 1995 with dictator Sani Abacha’s human rights abuses in Nigeria. Abacha had
imprisoned Obasanjo and the winner of the 1993 elections, M.K.O. Abiola, and
other democratic leaders, accusing them of coup plotting, and was set to execute
Ken Saro- Wiwa and eight other environmental and human rights activists in the
Niger Delta. Initially, South Africa conducted a campaign of “quiet diplomacy” in
the Commonwealth, OAU, and UN and bilaterally with visits by Mandela and
Mbeki to Abuja. Pretoria opposed oil sanctions, partly because Nigeria continued
to assist the ANC with nancial contributions even after it assumed power in
1994. However, Namibia and Zimbabwe had already condemned Abacha’s ac-
tions and called for the consideration of sanctions. erefore, expectations grew
that Mandela and the new South Africa would act. After his pleas for the lives of
the activists went unheeded and the Abacha regime executed them on 10 Novem-
ber 1995, Mandela reversed his position and supported the suspension of Nigeria
from the Commonwealth and the imposition of oil sanctions. However, Mandela’s
eorts to convince the OAU to suspend Nigeria and impose oil sanctions failed,
with no country supporting his position. Mandela and South Africa had failed to
conduct the necessary diplomatic work to win support from other African coun-
tries.
33
Some African leaders and observers saw Mandela’s moves as a sudden
overreach, while others saw it as evidence of the slow progress that democracy and
human rights norms were making in the OAU during the l990s. is episode
spurred on South African leaders to strengthen democracy and human rights
norms and enforcement powers in the AU in the 2000s.
us, South Africa in the 1990s exhibited a deliberate approach, with some
foreign policy innovation. e democratic wave, South Africa’s size (reected in
its established instruments of power), and the leadership of Mandela and Mbeki,
as well as the ANC’s relations with Africa, were responsible. However, Pretoria’s
failures in Nigeria and the DRC demonstrated that the new South Africa had
much to learn about African foreign policies.
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1990s Nigeria: Foreign Policy to Resist the Democratic Wave
After independence in 1960, Nigeria struggled to translate its large size in
population and oil wealth into foreign policy innovation and success. However,
the country was hobbled by domestic ethnic rivalries, the oil curse, and seven
military coups.
34
Concerning successes, foreign policy served to keep the country
from falling apart in the 1967–70 civil war, to strive to legitimate military rule,
and to demonstrate leadership in West Africa. Nigeria worked with the United
Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and most African states to counter
the Biafra secession and the rebels’ international supporters. e country led West
Africa in the founding of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) in 1975, convincing francophone states to collaborate in its creation
and development and basing the organization in the Nigerian capital. In late 1975
and 1976, General Murtala Muhammad and his successor, General Olusegun
Obasanjo, stood up to the United States over Angola and recognized the dos
Santos’s Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola–Partido do Trabalho
(MPLA) government, inuencing the deadlocked OAU. In 1980, Nigeria led the
rst OAU attempt at peacekeeping in Chad. With the rise of Libyan- sponsored
rebel movements in West Africa in Chad, Nigeria led ECOWAS states in nego-
tiating a mutual defense pact that was agreed to in 1981. In sum, Nigeria had
episodes of foreign policy success and developed an experienced foreign policy
bureaucracy.
35
However, the kleptocratic Babangida and Abacha military dicta-
torships, 1985–99, weakened the state and the diplomatic instrument of power.
With the return of civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria slowly emerged as a large state
with democratic features and regained a degree of foreign policy eectiveness.
e democratic wave helped bring changes in Nigerian foreign policy, as the
Babangida and Abacha dictatorships faced external and internal pressures to de-
mocratize and return to civilian rule. e two reacted by showing the international
community that Nigeria could lead in making peace and upholding democracy in
the region when no other country would. e self- styled “military president” Ibra-
him Babangida deployed troops in the ECOMOG mission to Liberia in 1990,
and his successor, Abacha, kept them there until 1997. Abacha deployed troops as
part of ECOMOG to Sierra Leone in 1997 to reverse a military coup, and escala-
tion by the Revolutionary United Front led to a siege on the capital, Freetown. In
sum, Nigerian military dictators sent troops to uphold democracy in Liberia and
Sierra Leone partly as a way of seeking international legitimacy for authoritarian
rule in the face of democratic pressures.
36
e democratic wave and internal and
external pressures on Nigeria in the 1990s nally achieved a breakthrough when
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EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 109
Abacha unexpectedly died in June 1998, and his successor, General Abdulsalami
Abubakar, began the transition to civilian rule.
us, Nigeria’s dictators in the 1990s used the country’s oil wealth and military
to strive for legitimacy by innovating in peace enforcement with the ECOMOG
operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the military rulers never
achieved the legitimacy that they sought. Instead, domestic opposition and inter-
national pressure helped lead to civilian rule, under which Nigeria could not af-
ford such large- scale military deployments as occurred in the 1990s. In contrast,
South Africa had a ve- year head start on Nigeria and achieved modest foreign
policy innovation. A competent foreign policy bureaucracy and Mandela and
Mbeki’s leadership helped achieve some gains in peacemaking.
2000s: Innovative Leadership, Institution- building,
and Norm Creation
37
e arrival on the scene of presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki set the stage for
major foreign policy innovation led by Nigeria and South Africa. Under their,
South Africa and Nigeria worked eectively to innovate in multilateral settings,
promoting ideas for African progress and change and persuading many countries
to commit to work toward good governance, democracy and human rights, and
more open, investor- friendly economies. South Africa and Nigeria’s leadership in
the generation of ideas and diplomacy led to the formation of new continental
institutions, the AU, the Pan- African Parliament, NEPAD, and the African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force (ASF).
38
South Africa and Nigeria sought to promote democracy and human rights norms
through NEPAD and the AU.
In May 1999, abo Mbeki became South African president after serving ve
years as deputy president. He had spent 1960–1990 in exile, building ANC rela-
tions with states and international organizations and conducting diplomacy
throughout Africa and the world.
39
As a result, he was more versed than Mandela
was in the dynamics and leaders of Africa. Mbeki’s connections, cosmopolitanism,
40
and ambition, as well as his foreign policy team enabled South Africa to become
more assertive in African aairs.
41
In 1998, Mbeki led in the launching of the “African Renaissance,” which aimed
to regenerate Africa’s place in the world and build on Senegal’s Cheikh Anta
Diop and Léopold Senghor’s vision of negritude, developed in the 1950s and
1960s, a movement aimed at raising and cultivating “Black consciousness” across
Africa and its diasporas. Mbeki also helped to found the African Renaissance
Institute that focused on education and the development of intellectuals and that
110 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
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emphasized artistic and scholarly freedom.
42
Mbeki also ensured that the African
Renaissance included a vision of how to restructure African institutions to make
them more eective, and he coined the Pan- Africanist rallying cry, “African solu-
tions to African problems.”
In 1998, South Africa and more than 100 other countries adopted the Rome
Statute of the ICC to try human rights abusers, which entered into force in 2002
and achieved its rst conviction in 2012. at same year, South Africa supported
the OAU in founding the African Court of Human and People’s Rights, which
opened in 2002 and delivered its rst judgment in 2009.
In 2000, Mbeki led in proposing the Millennium Partnership for the African
Recovery Plan (MAP), which sought to fulll Africa’s potential for social and
economic development based on reform eorts, including democratization and
respect for human rights. Using the MAP as a starting point, Mbeki joined with
Obasanjo and other African leaders in founding NEPAD.
43
is included the
APRM, which required African states to demonstrate progress to their peers in
governance, including the development of democracy and human rights, as a
means to attract foreign aid and investment and spur economic development.
rough NEPAD and the APRM, South Africa led in developing a continental
mechanism to impose standards of good governance and democracy.
44
NEPAD,
the APRM’s prospect of increased aid, and investment were attractive to many
African leaders and states who signed on to them, expecting increased ows from
the West and multilateral nancial institutions.
Peer review came into eect in 2004, and the rst reviews took place mainly in
SADC states. e new international institutional setting divided those states and
leaders who were willing to undergo peer review and those who refused to move
outside the shadow of “sovereignty.” In addition, NEPAD and APRM also set the
stage for Mbeki and Obasanjo presenting the case for the doubling of aid to Af-
rica at the 2005 Gleneagles G-7 Summit and at other venues.
45
Ultimately, South
Africa continued to host the NEPAD secretariat, but the AU Political Commis-
sion took over NEPAD and APRM, reducing their autonomy and power to
monitor and enforce good governance norms.
Mbeki and South Africa played the leading role in transforming the largely in-
eectual OAU into the more authoritative AU. is proved to be the most signi-
cant instance of a large democratic state with skillful leadership innovating foreign
policy, which included building consensus on democratic and human rights norms.
In 1999, al- Gadda and Libya presented plans and provided funding in starting
the process, and Mbeki and South Africa joined. e AU would feature stronger
institutions, including those that would provide peace and security as well as de-
mocracy and human rights.
46
Soon afterward, South Africa took over the initiative
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and drove it away from al- Gadda’s vision of a “United States of Africa” with the
colonel as head of state. Instead, South Africa led in the drafting of the AU Char-
ter in 2000 and championed AU “non- indierence” to human rights abuses plus
sovereignty as the “responsibility to protect” (rather than “non- interference in in-
ternal aairs of member states”) as well as the right to intervene to stop genocide
and other crimes.
47
In addition, Pretoria led in gaining approval for two of the AU
Charter’s provisions—line seven (democracy) and line 8 (human rights), as well as
an African Charter of Human Rights. South Africa also led in establishing an AU
APSA Early Warning Center, which would alert member states to impending
conict and massive human rights abuses. South Africa joined with other states in
including AU provisions to suspend member states where unconstitutional changes
in government, especially military coups, took place.
48
In 2003, South Africa helped lead in generating the ASF construct, with six
deployment scenarios, including stopping genocide and ethnic cleansing and up-
holding human rights and democratic transitions. Subsequently, African military
leaders approved the ASF and began the process of trying to operationalize it.
ASF Scenario six held out the possibility that the force could intervene in another
Rwandan- style genocide to stop massive human rights abuses and protect civilians.
In 2005, South Africa and Nigeria supported the “Responsibility to Protect”
(R2P) at the UN World Summit and its four key concerns—to prevent genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
49
In 2007, the two
countries led in securing agreement on an African Charter on Democracy, Elec-
tions and Governance (ACDEG) that stood for free and fair elections and con-
stitutional procedures for changes of government and suspension of countries
from the AU that interfered with those procedures, such as military coups and
changing the constitution to eliminate term limits.
Mbeki dramatically expanded South Africa’s diplomatic role, playing a major
role in ending wars in Burundi, the DRC, and Sudan; promoting movements to-
ward democracy and human rights; and engaging in dicult negotiations in the
Côte d’Ivoire peace process. From 2003 to 2005, South Africa supported the Su-
danese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and human rights in southern
Sudan, as the civil war came to an end and as the Darfur genocide accelerated.
Mbeki and South Africa led in the Sun City negotiations that ended the interstate
war in the DRC in 2003, a conict involving almost a dozen dierent nations. e
agreement put in place a power- sharing agreement and road map for democratiza-
tion and protection of human rights. In 2006, the South African delegation’s quick
endorsement of the election of Joseph Kabila as DRC president subsequently el-
evated South Africa’s standing and demonstrated a combination of skillful diplo-
macy and support for economic interests. However, in the complex and turbulent
112 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
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eastern DRC, numerous guerrilla movements continued to clash with each other
over mineral resources and land issues and preyed upon the civilian population.
Mbeki committed the SANDF to a number of AU and UN peace operations.
Following on the heels of Pretoria’s diplomacy, South Africa provided a protection
force for leaders of the various factions to Burundi, then provided the backbone of
the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) peacekeeping force, and nally
was a major troop contributor to the United Nations Mission in Burundi (MI-
NUB). South Africa backed the peace agreement by the deployment of a protec-
tion force in 2001; then contributed peacekeepers to an AU mission (2002–04)
and then a UN mission (2004–06).
50
South Africa sent peacekeepers to the United
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in 2003.
51
South Africa also provided troops for peace operations in Darfur and Comoros
and deployed election support contingents to the DRC, Mozambique, and Tanza-
nia. All peacemaking eorts called for adherence to constitutional principles.
In the SADC, South Africa led the way in convincing other member states to
join a mutual defense pact in September 2003. e pact contained provisions on
the decision- making process to avoid squabbles over intervention in the name of
the SADC. In addition, South Africa led in securing agreement for a SADC
free- trade area in August 2008, with plans for a customs union leading to a com-
mon market and monetary union by 2016. However, nontari barriers continue to
hamper trade expansion. South Africa continued to develop its mixed economy
and interacted economically with Africa and the world. In the area of trade, post-
apartheid South Africa practiced nonreciprocity within the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU). In the 1990s, Pretoria’s main domestic imperative was
job creation and preservation, which explains why it was unwilling to extend
SACU arrangements immediately to the rest of the SADC. However, in the
2000s, South Africa gradually expanded nonreciprocity to the rest of the SADC.
In addition, Pretoria led the SADC in seeking a trade agreement with the EU,
which interfered with development of the SADC free- trade area.
Mbeki and South Africa undertook a number of diplomatic initiatives to bring
peace to troubled SADC countries, namely Zimbabwe, Angola, and eSwatini
(Swaziland), with the aim of power sharing, reconciliation, and democracy. Resis-
tance came from autocratic leaders who were fearful of South Africa’s promotion
of democracy and the right to intervene to stop massive human rights abuses. In
the case of Zimbabwe, 2002–08, Pretoria could have imposed sanctions but chose
solidarity and “quiet diplomacy” over democracy. Mbeki played the leading role in
negotiating with Mugabe and eventually arrived at a power- sharing agreement.
In 2000, Mugabe had issued orders to seize white commercial farms for redistri-
bution, which, over time, devastated the economy and resulted in catastrophic
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levels of hyperination. In March 2002, assaults on opposition party ocials and
white commercial farmers and the unfree and unfair presidential elections led to
EU and US sanctions and Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth,
which Pretoria believed worsened the chances for conict resolution. In 2002 and
2008, South Africa participated in SADC election monitoring teams to Zimba-
bwe, which tended to downplay election irregularities. Despite the agrant abuses
of democratic and human rights norms, Mbeki opposed sanctions and argued
that South Africa’s quiet diplomacy would end the crisis, which was a reection
of ANC solidarity with a leader and country that had provided support during the
liberation struggle. e end result was that Mugabe remained in power, and Mbeki
proved powerless to change his behavior. In the meantime, Mbeki helped prevent
Mugabe and Zimbabwe from holding any leadership positions within the
SADC.
52
e Zimbabwe crisis and Mugabe’s undemocratic and economically
disastrous behavior harmed the image of the NEPAD, Mbeki and South Africa,
and the SADC. In addition, Zimbabwe, in 2008, led in indenitely suspending
the SADC Tribunal that had ruled in favor of 79 Zimbabwean commercial farm-
ers whose land the government had seized.
In 2008, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won parliamentary
elections and the rst round of presidential elections. After massive repression and
fraud, Mugabe claimed victory in the second round. Finally, after fraudulent elec-
tions, Mbeki and other SADC leaders persuaded Mugabe and the opposition leader,
Morgan Tsvangarai, to agree on a power- sharing arrangement. While this seemed
to be a victory for democracy and human rights, Mugabe abused his position as the
senior partner in the government and undermined the MDC’s popularity.
Concerning other resistance, the monarchy in eSwatini opposed democratiza-
tion pressures from the South African government and civil society, even though
the small country was virtually surrounded by South Africa. Unlike Zimbabwe
and eSwatini, Angola did not share a border with South Africa and continued to
oppose Pretoria’s eorts to spread democracy, good governance, and human rights.
Resistance also came from further aeld in Africa, including Libya and Sudan.
e Sudanese military dictator, Omar al- Bashir, objected to South African sup-
port of the SPLM and criticism of massive Sudanese human rights abuses in
South Sudan and Darfur.
In 2007, the year before the nancial crisis and great recession, South African
Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel hosted the G20. Mbeki and Obasanjo par-
ticipated in several G7 summits, besides Gleneagles 2005, dealing with African
debt and development issues. South Africa’s relations with the United States de-
clined with the latter’s 2003 invasion of Iraq and the creation of US Africa Com-
mand (2007–08), and attempts to situate that command on the continent. Mbeki
114 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
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viewed the Bush administration’s democracy promotion as a cover for regime
change. While Mbeki gained international status for himself as a norm setter and
peacemaker, he lost some of the moral authority that Mandela had garnered. e
biggest detraction was Mbeki’s persistent denial that HIV causes AIDS. In Sep-
tember 2008, the ANC removed Mbeki from power.
e leadership of Mbeki, combined with the democratic wave and South Africa’s
disproportional power, led to signicant foreign policy innovation, including the
creation and transformation of African institutions that emphasized democracy,
good governance, and human rights as well as the right to intervene to stop mas-
sive human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. South Africa also achieved
signicant gains in peacemaking and peacekeeping under Mbeki. However, Mbeki
and South Africa were unwilling to use Pretoria’s economic and military power to
compel Zimbabwe, eSwatini, and other countries to abide by democratic and hu-
man rights norms. is was mainly due to deference for countries that had pro-
vided support for the ANC during its struggle during the apartheid era.
Obasanjo and Nigerian Foreign Policy Innovation, 1999–2007
In 1999, with elections that were partially free and fair, President Obasanjo and
other Nigerian leaders claimed that the country had returned to democracy and
expected preferential treatment from the international community. is belief and
aspiration helped to drive the country’s foreign policy and promotion of democ-
racy and human rights.
53
Just as important, the election of Obasanjo led to foreign
policy innovation. Obasanjo had been an active player in Nigerian foreign policy
when he was military ruler from 1976 to 1979, and his leadership in handing
power back to civilian rulers through democratic elections in 1979 gained him
international approval. In the 1990s, he established international contacts with a
wide range of government and nongovernmental organization leaders, including
Mbeki and Mandela, during his resistance to the Abacha regime.
54
From 1999 to
2007, Obasanjo drove many of Nigeria’s foreign policy innovations and accom-
plishments.
55
However, Nigerian lawmakers criticized Obasanjo for not consult-
ing them and not using the Ministry of Foreign Aairs, with his foreign minister
playing mainly a supporting role.
56
Obasanjo’s principal goal was to rebuild Nigeria’s economy and political system
after the ruinous military regimes. He undertook extensive shuttle diplomacy to
reassure international partners that Nigeria was reforming. e most concrete
goal was to overcome the debt that Babangida, Abacha, and previous rulers had
left Nigeria. is meant economic diplomacy and working with the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom and through the Paris Club to reschedule the
country’s debt. Ultimately, his eorts paid o in October 2005, with a nal agree-
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EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 115
ment for debt relief worth 18 billion USD and reduction of Nigeria’s debt stock
by 30 billion USD that was completed in April 2006.
57
On the global level, Obasanjo led in refurbishing Nigeria’s image and elevating
it on the world stage.
58
Of particular importance was President Bill Clinton’s 2000
visit and support for Obasanjo and civilian rule and democratization. In the after-
math, Nigeria requested US support in peacekeeping training and equipment,
which the United States provided for four Nigerian Army battalions in Operation
Focus Relief. Nigeria deployed two battalions to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL). In addition, Washington instituted programs to help Nigeria in
developing democracy and human rights observance. e United States also pun-
ished the Nigerian military for human rights abuses; for example, suspending aid
in 2003, because the army killed hundreds of civilians in intervening between two
warring ethnic groups.
In 1999, Obasanjo joined Mbeki in promoting the African Renaissance, MAP,
NEPAD, and the process that led to the founding of the AU in 2002. Nigeria
provided funding for the NEPAD, and Obasanjo was personally involved, sitting
on the board. Subsequently, Nigeria and six ECOWAS states submitted gover-
nance to the APRM. In addition, Nigeria acceded to the Treaty of Rome and the
ICC and supported R2P at the UN World Summit. Despite this commitment to
human rights, the Obasanjo regime struggled to keep its security forces from
continuing to commit abuses.
President Obasanjo and Nigeria helped lead in negotiating the ECOWAS
Mechanism for Conict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security in December 1999 in Lomé, Togo. e mechanism established a security
architecture, including a Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. e pro-
tocol strengthened norms against military coups and other unconstitutional
changes in government, such as ending term limits. e new civilian government
in Abuja was fearful of another military seizure of power and was especially inter-
ested in the ECOWAS anti- coup norm.
59
e mechanism also included an
ECOWAS Peace and Security Council that established procedure for more le-
gitimate, orderly, and humane peace operations than those of the 1990s, as well as
an early warning mechanism and a Council of the Wise to mediate in disputes
and conicts. Starting in 2003, Nigeria led ECOWAS in steps toward developing
the West African Standby Brigade as part of the ASF.
Nigeria demonstrated leadership against coups and other unconstitutional sei-
zures of power. In 2003, Nigeria helped to reverse a military coup in nearby São
Tomé and Príncipe. In 2005, Abuja became involved in the transition process in
Togo after the death of the dictator Gnassingbé Eyadéma and an attempted
military coup. Because of pressure from Nigeria, ECOWAS, and other West Af-
116 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
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rican states, the military backed down and allowed free and fair democratic elec-
tions and a constitutional denouement. However, the result was that Eyadéma’s
son, Faure, won the election and carried on the dynasty. e Protocol on Democ-
racy set the stage for other interventions in the region.
60
Unlike his military dictator predecessors, Obasanjo and civilian- ruled Nigeria
had limited foreign policy and military resources. erefore, Nigeria could not af-
ford to pay for large- scale military expeditionary operations like ECOMOG. In
2000, Obasanjo withdrew Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone to cut costs and
hand over responsibility to UNAMSIL. However, he had to return troops after the
UN mission faced collapse, with the UN footing the bill and the US Operation
Focus Relief providing training and equipment. rough the skillful use of diplo-
macy and UN and US support, Abuja led in restoring a lasting peace and democ-
racy in Sierra Leone and Liberia at a lower cost. In addition, the UN paid much of
the cost of Nigerian peacekeepers deployed to the DRC, Darfur, and Liberia.
In 2003, Liberian rebel groups closed in on the capital Monrovia and the
former warlord cum president Charles Taylor. Obasanjo and Nigeria played the
leading role in negotiations to end the civil war. In the meantime, the United
States pressured Obasanjo to provide Taylor into exile to smooth the transition.
In September, Nigeria led a three- week ECOWAS (ECOMIL) intervention
that removed Taylor and replaced him with a transitional government. e UN
Security Council (UNSC) authorized the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) that took over from ECOMIL in October.
61
Nigeria played a leading
role in UNMIL; the transition to a democratically elected Liberian government
led by Pres. Ellen Johnson- Sirleaf; and security- sector reform, including provid-
ing generals to lead the new Liberian army. In 2006, the United States—after
pressuring Obasanjo to take Taylor in 2003—demanded that Nigeria hand Tay-
lor over to the Sierra Leone War Crimes Tribunal. After some resistance and US
sanctions, Nigeria complied.
In 2003–04, Nigeria intervened in the Darfur genocide to try to stop massive
human rights abuses and bring peace. At the same time, President Obasanjo was
AU chair and became a major actor in negotiating between the Khartoum govern-
ment and the SPLM and the Justice and Equality Movement that had started
ghting in February 2003. He and Pres. Idriss Déby of Chad attempted to stop the
escalation of tensions following a rebel attack on a military aireld in April 2003.
eir eorts led to the Intra- Sudanese Dialogue in September 2003, which even-
tually led to a peace talks in Abuja in August 2004. However, a new wave of ght-
ing led to mass killing, rape, and displacement by the Sudanese Janjaweed militia
backed by the Sudanese military, starting in November 2003. More interventions
by Obasanjo, the Nigerian government, and others led to a Humanitarian Cease-
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 117
re Agreement in April 2004. Nigeria led the Abuja Peace Talks and AU Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) and was the rst troop- contributing country in Darfur.
Obasanjo spent much of the year involved in Darfur as well as in working to
complete the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between southern Sudanese led
by the SPLM and the Khartoum government. Despite Obasanjo and Nigeria’s
eorts, the genocide continued. e AMIS lacked the capacity to stop the burn-
ing of villages and killing, rape, and displacement or rebel activity by several dif-
ferent groups. erefore, Nigeria took the issue to the UNSC to convert the
AMIS into a better- resourced and larger UN peacekeeping mission. After over-
coming Sudanese and Chinese resistance, the UNSC approved United Nations–
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) hybrid mission in 2007. Nigeria
became a major troop- contributing country and provided force commanders to
UNAMID.
Obasanjo accepted the verdict of the Nigerian parliament in denying him a
third term by refusing to amend the constitution. is led to Obasanjo’s elevation
in the international community. Within eight short years, Obasanjo had led Ni-
geria back to respect in the international community. After Obasanjo left oce,
he continued to engage in foreign policy activities, particularly through the AU
and ECOWAS’s Councils of the Wise, and intervened in a number of crises and
helped to bring about resolution.
Figure 1. Continued leadership. Former presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo discuss issues
at the 6th Tana High- Level Forum on Security in Africa, held in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, 22–23
April 2017.
118 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
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Both Mbeki and Obasanjo had international experience and leadership quali-
ties that enabled them to take advantage of large state size and the democratic
wave to lead in foreign policy innovation. Mbeki picked up where Mandela left
o and succeeded in achieving his Pan- Africanist vision. Obasanjo had to start
largely from scratch, though the ECOMOG provided useful lessons regarding
how Nigeria should handle peacemaking and peacekeeping. Burundi provided
the SANDF with the opportunity to correct the mistakes that it had committed
in Lesotho in 1998 and set the stage for SANDF deployments to several UN
peacekeeping missions.
2010s: Weaker Leaders, Internal Turmoil,
and Foreign Policy Decline
In 2007 and 2008, weaker leaders with limited foreign policy experience took
power in Nigeria and South Africa respectively, which coincided with a decline in
foreign policy innovation and support for democracy and human rights norms
that persisted through the 2010s. In addition, both countries experienced internal
turmoil that distracted attention from foreign policy matters. While the United
States and other Western countries continued to promote democracy, autocracies
were learning how to resist, and strongmen ended a number of democratic ex-
periments. While the AU and subregional organizations had established demo-
cratic and human rights norms, implementation and enforcement proved dicult.
After signing on to the ICC and R2P, a number of African states began to push
back against the ICC as an “anti- African institution” after the indictment of Su-
dan’s President al- Bashir and Kenyan leaders Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto.
Nigeria: Post- Obasanjo Decline
In 2007, Obasanjo picked Umaru Musa Yar’Adua as his replacement, once it
became clear that a third term was impossible. President Yar’Adua was inexperi-
enced and in poor health, and many considered him to be an Obasanjo puppet.
erefore, he was both physically and experientially unable to undertake the high
level of diplomatic activity that his predecessor achieved. Furthermore, Nigeria
had to deal with an ongoing insurgency in the oil- rich Niger Delta and its delete-
rious eects on the economy. erefore, innovative foreign policy ideas, such as
“citizen diplomacy,” gave way to economic diplomacy.
In 2009, Yar’Adua died, and Vice Pres. Goodluck Jonathan took power. He was
similarly inexperienced in foreign policy. In addition, he faced a number of issues
that prevented him from being active in foreign policy. Although Jonathan’s am-
nesty to militia ghters helped to end the Niger Delta insurgency, he had to deal
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 119
with the resurgence of the Boko Haram terrorist organization, which distracted
Nigeria from foreign policy. In addition, the Nigerian government continued to
focus on economic diplomacy.
62
Nigeria and the ECOWAS continued to deal
with unconstitutional changes in government. In 2009, the ECOWAS and AU
suspended Guinea- Conakry for a military coup; however, the organizations did
not suspend Niger for an unconstitutional change.
Global powers continued to assess Nigeria as second to South Africa in terms
of economic power. Nigeria was not invited to the rst G-20 heads of state sum-
mit in 2009 to deal with the global nancial crisis. In addition, Russia, China,
India, and Brazil chose South Africa over Nigeria as the African BRICS repre-
sentative. In 2011, the Arab League, the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom persuaded Nigeria and South Africa to vote for UNSC Resolution
1973, which called for “all means necessary to protect civilians” in Libya in the
spirit of R2P and protect civilians in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya from al-
Gadda’s forces.
63
e UN vote, the AU’s failure to convince al- Gadda to com-
promise, and al- Gaddha’s subsequent murder cast a shadow over the organiza-
tion and the leadership of Nigeria and South Africa.
In March 2012, Tuareg separatists took over northern Mali and declared the
Republic of Azawad. In response, Captain Amadou Sanogo led a military coup in
Bamako that caused the ECOWAS to suspend Mali. In June, extremist organiza-
tions took over the north and threatened to take over the rest of the country and
the Sahel. Nigeria participated in delicate diplomacy to persuade Sanogo and the
military to transition to a civilian government and agree to allow an ECOWAS
force—the African- led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)—to
guarantee the transition and restore Malian sovereignty in the north. In January
2013, Nigeria deployed air and ground forces to Mali, and a Nigerian general
commanded AFISMA. However, when the extremists began to advance toward
the Malian capital, AFISMA was incapable of stopping them, and France had to
intervene with Operation Serval, which defeated the militants. In August, as the
situation in northeast Nigeria deteriorated, President Jonathan announced the
withdrawal of Nigerian forces. Mali demonstrated the limitations of Nigerian
power and that of the ECOWAS.
64
After the Boko Haram insurgency escalated in 2009, the United States peri-
odically protested to Nigeria about military atrocities carried out in the northeast
and elsewhere. In 2014, as Washington ratcheted up the pressure, Nigeria sus-
pended security cooperation. In addition, US and global opinion mobilized after
Boko Haram seized 276 Chibok schoolgirls and increased pressure on the Jona-
than government to act. After four unfree and unfair elections starting in 1999,
Nigeria in 2015 executed its rst relatively clean election; the country moved a
120 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
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step closer to full democracy; and Muhammadu Buhari defeated President Jona-
than and assumed oce. President Buhari confronted Boko Haram and the Is-
lamic State–West Africa (ISWA) and falling oil prices and subsequently took
action against the extremists and corruption. His assurances led the United States
and Nigeria to resume full relations, including security cooperation. In acting
against Boko Haram and the ISWA, Buhari agreed to expand the role of the
Multinational Joint Task Force–Lake Chad Region that had existed since 1994.
is allowed Chad, Cameroon, and Niger forces to enter Nigerian territory.
65
In
addition, the fall in oil prices and subsequent recession forced Nigeria to focus
once again on economic diplomacy to attract foreign direct investment for the
petroleum industry and deal with a mounting debt crisis. However, Abuja failed
to attract foreign capital toward boosting the industrialization and manufacturing
to diversify the Nigerian economy.
66
In December 2016, Buhari and President Macky Sall of Senegal led the
ECOWAS in acting to restore President- elect Adama Barrow to his rightfully
elected position in Gambia and force out the dictator Yahya Jammeh. Senegal and
Nigeria led the way in deploying troops. e intervention demonstrated that Ni-
geria and the ECOWAS could succeed in acting to uphold democracy and hu-
man rights with a relatively modest operation. is contrasted with the AFISMA’s
failure in January 2013 to stop the advance of extremist forces in Mali.
67
us, the Obasanjo presidency was the one instance in which Nigeria engaged
in foreign policy innovation. At the same time, Obasanjo had to conduct eco-
nomic diplomacy to reconstruct Nigeria. Economic diplomacy became the main
focus of subsequent Nigerian leaders, as well as combating Boko Haram. Despite
having the largest economy in Africa, an analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy re-
veals the country’s inherent weakness.
South Africa: Post- Mbeki Decline
By the time the ANC removed Mbeki from oce in September 2008, South
Africa’s leadership role had already been established and institutionalized in the
AU and SADC. In 2009, Zuma became president and proved to be not as eec-
tive as Mbeki. Zuma did not have Mbeki’s international exposure and education
due to his incarceration in South Africa, 1962–72, and focus on ANC guerrilla
operations. However, Zuma managed to play a signicant role in making peace in
Burundi in the early 2000s. He also took a tougher line on Mugabe than Mbeki
had. Once Zuma became president, he focused on warding o corruption charges,
maintaining power internally, and economic diplomacy, especially with the G-20
and the BRICS and seeking foreign assistance and investment. e 2012 Mari-
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 121
kana mine massacre and outbursts of xenophobia marred Zuma’s presidency,
marking strains that remain today.
Under Zuma, South Africa focused on building strategic partnerships with the
G-20, dealing with the fallout from the 2008 nancial crisis and global recovery
issues in subsequent years. In 2011, Russia, China, India, and Brazil invited South
Africa to join the BRICS bloc of emerging economies as the African representa-
tive, even though the other four countries dwarfed it in terms of economic power.
In addition, South Africa strengthened relations with China, agreeing to a com-
prehensive strategic partnership in 2010.
68
South Africa’s failure to pressure Zim-
babwe, eSwatini, and other countries to democratize and respect human rights
and its inclusion in the G-20 and the BRICS signify that the international com-
munity values the country’s “soft power,” even though it is relatively weak. us,
Alden and Schoeman’s characterization of South Africa as a symbolic hegemon.
69
In 2012, one notable foreign policy success was the election of President Zuma’s
wife, Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma, as chair of the AU Commission, 2012–17.
70
She
spearheaded the launch of Agenda 2063—a long- term vision of where Africa
should proceed. Dlamini- Zuma managed to turn South Africa’s attention to con-
tinental issues for the rst time since Mbeki in 2008. However, she was criticized
for not spending more time at AU Headquarters and for not acting to defuse
crises in the DRC, Gambia, and elsewhere.
After Mbeki, there was less South African involvement in strengthening key
human rights and democracy institutions and instruments. For one, democracy
and human rights norms have not been part of the purpose of the BRICS consor-
tium. In addition, South Africa lapsed in its eorts to see that African states rati-
ed the ACDEG.
71
In 2011, after Libyan rebels killed al- Gadda, South Africa
revised its support for R2P, objecting to the use of military force to protect civil-
ians, because it could be arbitrary. At the time, South Africa was leading an AU
delegation trying to peacefully resolve the Libyan Civil War. Once NATO began
bombing Tripoli and inadvertently aiding the rebels, South Africa protested that
the United States and others were violating the spirit of the resolution and mar-
ginalizing the AU peacemaking eort.
72
In 2014, Zuma congratulated Bashar al- Assad of Syria on winning the 2014
presidential election. is was at a time in which al- Assad was leading his security
establishment in the killing of hundreds of thousands of citizens and the impris-
onment and torture of tens of thousands and the displacement of millions. In June
2015, the South African government failed to turn over Sudanese president al-
Bashir to the ICC. He had been convicted in absentia of ordering the Darfur
genocide and was in the country for an AU summit. e High Court ordered the
Zuma government to detain al- Bashir, but the government allowed him to board
122 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Burgess
a plane and leave the country. In the wake of the diplomatic crisis, the Zuma
government started measures to withdraw South Africa from the ICC and to
encourage other African states and the AU to do the same. However, the South
African Supreme Court blocked this executive action based upon South Africa’s
ratication into law of the Treaty of Rome that established the ICC.
Concerning foreign policy measures that supported democracy and human
rights, in 2009, South Africa helped lead the SADC and AU in suspending
Madagascar and imposing sanctions after a military coup. In 2014, the SADC
and AU lifted the suspension and sanctions after Madagascar implemented a
process to restore civilian rule. In 2013, South Africa led Mozambique and Tan-
zania in the UN Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern DRC to augment the
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUSCO) and defeat the M-23 rebels who were committing
massive human rights abuses and had captured the regional center of Goma. Pre-
toria also continued to deploy troops to several UN peacekeeping operations. In
2018, South African troops deployed to Lesotho along with other SADC troops
to stop another mutiny and coup.
A negative aspect of SANDF deployments occurred in January 2013, when 15
SANDF soldiers died at the hands of the Séléka militia in the Central African
Republic (CAR), which caused an uproar in South Africa due to the impression
that SANDF forces were there to protect ANC mining interests and were not
properly armed.
73
e forces had rst been deployed in 2007 to protect CAR
president François Bozizé and his regime against rival militias.
In 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa, who had signicant foreign policy experience, took
over from Zuma, but has subsequently focused internally on repairing the domes-
tic damage caused by Zuma; the Gupta family’s “state capture,” in which this
business family leveraged private interests to signicantly inuence Pretoria’s
decision- making processes to their own advantage; corruption; and a stagnant
economy. Despite domestic pressures, President Ramaphosa and then- Minister
of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu promised a “new ap-
proach” to South African foreign policy in December 2018, when South Africa
voted with the majority in the UN General Assembly, condemning Myanmar for
genocide against the Rohingya minority. Pretoria announced this new approach
as South Africa began a two- year term as a nonpermanent member of the UNSC,
vowing to stress the issues of Palestine and Western Sahara.
74
South Africa as-
sumed the presidency of the council in October 2019 and brought forward issues
relating to women, peace and security, South Sudan and the DRC, and coopera-
tion between the council and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC).
75
South
Africa led the other 14 UNSC members to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for the An-
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 123
nual Joint Consultative Meeting with the AU PSC—in anticipation of South
Africa assuming the chair of the AU in 2020.
South Africa and Nigeria experienced declines in foreign policy leadership and
innovation in the 2010s, including democracy and human rights promotion. Al-
though the democratic wave ended, the reasons for the decline have more to do
with weaker leaders combined with increases in domestic challenges. While Ni-
geria under Buhari promised a fresh start and Gambia provided a glimmer of
hope, domestic issues and economic diplomacy continue to distract from foreign
policy leadership in the ECOWAS and AU. South Africa continues to experience
domestic challenges, but leadership change, Ramaphosa and Sisulu’s new ap-
proach, and positions at the UN, AU, BRICS, and G-20 hold out more hope for
a new wave of foreign policy innovation.
Conclusion
is article has demonstrated that large country size, democratizing regime
type, and exceptional leaders created sucient conditions for innovative foreign
policy leadership by two African states, including the creation of regional institu-
tions committed to democracy and human rights norms and the willingness to
intervene to stabilize war- torn states and uphold human rights and democratic
values. e global democratic wave of the 1980s and 1990s provided pressures
from outside and inside Africa for the promotion of democracy and human rights.
Mandela, Mbeki, and Obasanjo championed those norms in multilateral and bi-
lateral settings, though their nations’ interests often trumped values, leading to
inconsistent foreign policies. Mbeki and Obasanjo beneted from the wave in
founding and then leading the AU, NEPAD, and other institutions that included
democratic and human rights norms. However, implementing the norms has
proved to be dicult, given a large continent full of authoritarian leaders resistant
to change and clinging to power.
Concerning South Africa and Nigeria’s relatively large size and foreign policy
innovation, they have sizable GDPs or GDPs per capita and are respected in
Africa and their subregions. While they have provided leadership in peacemaking
and peacekeeping, they still have limits on inuence and reach, given the large
geopolitical space full of autocrats. us, the two countries’ relatively large size has
provided the basis for symbolic hegemony—leadership in creating norms—while
lacking the power and leadership to pressure other countries to democratize and
observe human rights norms.
Concerning leadership, foreign policy innovation and symbolic hegemony,
Mbeki and Obasanjo took advantage of large state size and the democratic wave
to do more than any other African leaders, especially in the promotion of democ-
124 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Burgess
racy and human rights. From 1994 to 1999, Mandela and Mbeki, as deputy
president, managed some innovation. After Mbeki and Obasanjo, there were less
capable leaders and less innovation, including a coinciding diminishment in com-
mitment to democracy and human rights. However, the AU, NEPAD, and other
institutions were already established, and the democratic wave had ended with the
beginning of an autocratic wave. In addition, less exceptional leaders accompanied
a recession in foreign policy leadership.
It is dicult to disentangle leadership qualities, state size, and democratization.
In analyzing the correlation among foreign policy innovation and size, leadership,
and democratization, one must take into account the fact that the rate of institu-
tion creation was at its peak, 2000–2003, for various reasons and that new institu-
tions logically could not be created after that. In addition, African conicts peaked
in the 1990s, and the rate of conict resolution peaked in the 2000s; thus, the
instances of peacemaking after that could not be emulated in the 2010s.
Other countries besides Nigeria and South Africa led in the creation of the AU,
NEPAD, and other institutions that included democracy and human rights
norms. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Senegal are cases of foreign policy innovation, in-
cluding human rights promotion, where one of the three explanatory variables is
missing. Ethiopia is a large state with an exceptional leader—Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi—that was swept along by the democratic wave but halted democ-
ratization in 2005. Especially before 2005, the country demonstrated foreign
policy innovation and activism, including some support of democracy and human
rights norms through the AU and NEPAD—siding with Mbeki over al-
Gadda—as ways to alleviate Ethiopia’s debt burden. After the 2005 crackdown,
Ethiopia’s commitment to AU and NEPAD norms waned. Rwanda is a small,
nondemocratic state with an exceptional leader—Paul Kagame—that the demo-
cratic wave touched but did not change. e United States and European powers
did not pressure Rwanda to democratize due to “genocide guilt” and impressive
socioeconomic development. Despite Rwandan government repression, the coun-
try supported human rights against genocide through the UN and AU, especially
by sending battalions for peace operations that protected civilians. However,
Kagame and Rwanda resisted democracy promotion. Senegal is a small democ-
racy with signicant leaders—presidents Léopold Senghor (1960–78), Adbou
Diouf (1978–2000), and Abdoulaye Wade (2000–12)—who eectively promoted
the African Renaissance and democracy and human rights in the NEPAD, AU,
and ECOWAS despite limited foreign policy resources.
While Nigeria demonstrated foreign policy innovation and promotion of de-
mocracy and human rights in the AU, NEPAD, and ECOWAS under President
Obasanjo, South Africa enjoyed a longer period that started with President Man-
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 125
dela in 1994 and continued with Mbeki. Subsequently, domestic challenges and
weak leaders weighed more heavily on Nigeria after 2007, as foreign policy fo-
cused on economic diplomacy to alleviate debt and depressed oil prices and diver-
sication. South Africa’s soft power and stronger economic standing attracted the
G-20 and BRICS, which enabled Pretoria to overcome the Zuma presidency and
other domestic challenges and continue some foreign policy innovation. e re-
moval of Zuma and installation of Ramaphosa have enabled South Africa to
launch a new wave of foreign policy innovation and democracy and human rights
promotion. While President Buhari brought hope that Nigeria could regenerate
Abuja’s foreign policy, domestic challenges and his authoritarian personality have
conned the country to economic diplomacy.
Dr. Stephen F. Burgess
Dr. Burgess has been a professor of international security studies at US Air War College since June 1999. He has
published books and numerous articles, book chapters, and monographs on Asian and African security issues, peace
and stability operations, and weapons of mass destruction. His books include The United Nations under Boutros
Boutros- Ghali, 1992-97 and South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. His recent journal articles include “Russia,
South Asia, and the United States: A New Great Game?,” Journal of Indo- Pacific Affairs 2, no. 3 (Fall 2019); “A Path-
way toward Enhancing the US Air Force–Indian Air Force Partnership and Deterrence in the Indo- Pacific Region,”
Journal of Indo- Pacific Affairs 2, no. 1 (Spring 2019); “Multilateral Defense Cooperation in the Indo- Asia Pacific Re-
gion: Tentative Steps toward a Regional NATO?” Contemporary Security Policy (December 2017); “Rising Bipolarity
in the South China Sea: The Impact of the US Rebalance to Asia on China’s Expansion,” Contemporary Security
Policy 37, no. 1 (April 2016); and “The US Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the US- India Strategic Partnership,” Com-
parative Strategy 34, no. 44 (July 2015). He holds a doctorate from Michigan State University (1992) and has been on
the faculty at the University of Zambia, University of Zimbabwe, Vanderbilt University, and Hofstra University.
Notes
1. Governance and Development, World Bank, 1992. e Bank promoted the concept of good
governance in the 1980s and 1990s as part of persuading states to ght corruption and make
themselves attractive to foreign investment.
2. Dennis Kumetat, “Gadda’s Southern Legacy: Ideology and Power Politics in Africa,” in
e Rise of the Global South: Philosophical, Geopolitical and Economic Trends of the 21st Century, ed.
Justin Dargin (Singapore: World Scientic, 2013), 125–52. In addition, relatively small but oil-
rich autocracies—Algeria and Libya—helped lead led in innovation in the late 1990s and early
2000s, as did Senegal, a small democracy.
3. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa’s symbolic hegemony in Africa,” Interna-
tional Politics 52, no. 2 (February 2015): 239–54.
4. In terms of the World Bank’s purchasing power parity measure, China’s GDP is 27 trillion
USD; India’s is 11.5 trillion USD; Nigeria’s is 1.2 trillion USD; and South Africa’s is 813 billion
USD. Nevertheless, South Africa is the African representative of the G-20 (Nigeria is excluded).
5. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of
Democracy 16, no. 3 (July 2005): 20–34.
6. Seva Gunitsky, “Democratic Waves in Historical Perspective,” Perspectives on Politics 16, no.
3 (September 2018): 634–51.
126 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Burgess
7. omas Carothers, Critical Missions: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).
8. In contrast to some democratizing states, India had been a large democratic state since 1947
and did not promote democracy and human rights in Asia or South Asia.
9. Nelli Babayan and omas Risse, eds. Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal
Regional Powers (New York: Routledge, 2016).
10. David Patrick Houghton, e Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-
making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
11. Nicholas ompson, e Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of
the Cold War (New York: Henry and Holt, 2009).
12. While South Africa and Nigeria were less innovative after 2008, both agreed to the use of
force to protect human rights in Libya, while Nigeria led in democratizing Gambia in 2016 and
South Africa in stabilizing Lesotho in 2018. In addition, it was dicult to create new African
institutions, as the AU, NEPAD, and APSA were already established.
13. Both South Africa and Nigeria are relatively large in that they have over 300 billion USD
in gross domestic product (much higher in purchasing power parity terms).
14. In analyzing the correlation between foreign policy innovation and size, leadership, and
democratization, one must take into account the fact that the rate of institution creation was at its
peak, 2000–2003, for various reasons, and that new institutions logically could not be created after
that. In addition, African conicts peaked in the 1990s, and the rate of conict resolution peaked
in the 2000s, so the instances of peacemaking after that could not be emulated.
15. Freedom House has classied South Africa as “free” since 1994, even though the ANC has
dominated politics and government since then. Since 1999, Freedom House has classied Nigeria as
“partly free” with gradually improving political rights as opposed to gradually declining civil liberties.
16. Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s,” 239–54. e foreign policy bureaucracy underwent
reform after the Muldergate scandal of the late 1970s and became more professional.
17. Scott omas, e Diplomacy of Liberation: Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960 (Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 164.
18. omas, Diplomacy of Liberation, 164. e SADC was the Southern African Development
Coordination Committee (SADCC) from 1980 to 1994.
19. Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s,” 239–54.
20. James J. Hentz, South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2005). Adekeye Adebajo, et al., eds., South Africa in Africa: the post- apartheid era
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwazulu- Natal Press, 2007).
21. Peter Kagwanja, “Power and Peace: South Africa and the Refurbishing of Africa’s Multi-
lateral Capacity for Peacemaking,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24, no. 2 (May 2006):
159–86. In the 1990s and 2000s, the following SADC states—Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia,
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi, as well as the island states of Mauritius, Madagascar,
and Seychelles—aligned with South Africa for a number of reasons. Only Zimbabwe and Angola
and, to an extent, Namibia resisted.
22. Nelson Mandela, Notes to the Future: Words of Wisdom (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2012), 170.
23. South African Department of Defence, Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National
Defence (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1996).
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 127
24. Anthony McGrew, “Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism,” in
Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, ed. Anthony McGrew and David
Held (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002), 267–69; G. John Ikenberry, “An Agenda For Liberal Interna-
tional Renewal” in Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, ed. Michèle A. Flournoy
and Shawn Brimley (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2008), 45–59.
25. Deputy President Jacob Zuma succeeded Mbeki on the US–South Africa Binational
Commission, 1999–2001.
26. Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and
Burundi (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005).
27. D. Venter, “South African Foreign Policy Decision- making in the African Context” in
African Foreign Policies, ed. Gilbert Khadiagala and Terence Lyons (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
2001), 174.
28. Gilbert A. Lethwaite, “Mandela standing as Kabila’s ally: S. African leader drawing criti-
cism in U.S., at home,” Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1997.
29. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Foreign Policy Decision- making in Southern Africa’s Fading
Frontline” in African Foreign Policies, ed. Gilbert Khadiagala and Terence Lyons (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2001), 131–58.
30. eo Neethling, “Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas and
Beyond,” OJCPR, e Online Journal of Peace and Conict Resolution 2, no. 2 (May 1999), http://
www.operationspaix.net.
31. Horst Brammer, “In Search of an Eective Regional Security Mechanism for Southern
Africa,” Global Dialogue 4, no. 2 (August 1999), 21–22.
32. Karen Smith, “South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: From Champion to Scep-
tic,” International Relations 30, no. 3, (July 2016): 391–405.
33. abo Mbeki, “How Abacha humiliated Mandela,” politicsweb.za, 29 February 2016.
34. e oil curse refers to political and economic dysfunction caused largely by poor manage-
ment or investment of oil revenues by the governments of oil- producing countries.
35. A.S. Gusau, “Littering the Landscape: An Analysis of the Role of Nigeria in the Transition
of OAU to the African Union,” European Scientic Journal 9, no. 8 (2013): 165–80.
36. J. Shola Omotola, “From Importer to Exporter: e Changing Role of Nigeria in Promot-
ing Democratic Values in Africa,” in African Politics: Beyond the ird Wave of Democratisation, ed.
Joelien Pretorius (Cape Town: Juta, 2008), 37.
37. FreedomHouse.org. e democratic wave slowed in the late 1990s and began to recede,
starting in 2007. However, South Africa remained at the same level of freedom as in 2000, and
Nigeria successfully made the transition to civilian rule that was “partially free.” Both countries
remained ocially committed to good governance, democracy, and human rights for Africa, but
implementation of those principles proved problematic in practice, especially in Nigeria.
38. Kagwanja, “Power and Peace: South Africa,” 159–86.
39. Mark Gevisser, A Legacy of Liberation: abo Mbeki and the Future of the South African
Dream (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
40. Percy Zvomunya, “Moeletsi Mbeki: More than just the second son,” Mail and Guardian, 26
August 2011. abo and Moeletsi Mbeki were both educated and spent much of their lives abroad.
Achille Mbembe described them as two of the “most cosmopolitan” South Africans. is is in
contrast to presidents Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma and other ANC members who spent
most of their lives in South Africa.
128 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
Burgess
41. Laurie Nathan, “Consistency and Inconsistency in South African Foreign Policy,” Interna-
tional Aairs 81, no. 2 (April 2005): 361–72. See also, South African Department of International
Relations and Cooperation, Strategic Plan, 2003–2005, Website Host: Department of Foreign
Aairs, South Africa, http://www.dfa.gov.za.
42. W.A.J. Okumu, e African Renaissance (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002).
43. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and President Abdulazeez Bouteika joined with
Mbeki and Obasanjo in leading in the founding of the NEPAD.
44. Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, “South Africa and Nigeria as Regional He-
gemons,” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, ed. Mwesiga Baregu
and Christopher Landsberg (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 171–204. Adebajo and Lands-
berg characterize South Africa as a benign regional hegemon that established hegemonic stability.
45. Nicholas Bayne, “Managing Globalisation: e Commonwealth in the International
Economy,” in e Contemporary Commonwealth: An assessment, 1996–2009, ed. James Mayall (New
York: Routledge, 2010), 103.
46. T. Tieku, “Explaining the Clash of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African
Union,” African Aairs, 103 (2004): 249–67.
47. Smith, “South Africa and the Responsibility, 391–405.
48. Cyril Obi, “e African Union and the Prevention of Democratic Reversal in Africa:
Navigating the Gaps,” African Conict & Peacebuilding Review 4, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 60–85.
49. Smith, “South Africa and the Responsibility,” 391–405.
50. Bentley and Southall, An African Peace Process.
51. SANDF peacekeepers have served in the DRC in MONUC, 1999–2011 and MO-
NUSCO, 2011–present.
52. Nathan, “Consistency,” 361–372. In 2003, Mugabe was able to gain election to an African
Union pthe osition representing Southern Africa. In addition, a number of leaders outside of
SADC sided with Mugabe and opposed Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy.
53. Omotola, “From Importer to Exporter,” 37.
54. John Ilemona, “A Study of the Nigerian Foreign Policy under President Olusegun
Obasanjo, 1999–2007” (master’s thesis, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, June 2014).
55. John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleeld,
2013), 143–60.
56. Isiaka Alani Badmus and ‘Dele Ogunmola, “Re- Engineering Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in
the Post- Military Era: Olusegun Obasanjo’s Presidency and Nigeria’s African Foreign Policy,”
Journal of International and Global Studies 9, no. 1 (2015): 56–76.
57. Lydia Polgreen, “Nigeria Pays O its Big Debt, sign of an Economic Rebound,” New York
Times, 22 April 2006.
58. Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, 143–60.
59. Angela Ndinga- Muvumba and Abdul Lamin, “West Africa’s Evolving Security Architec-
ture: Looking Back to the Future” (Durban: Centre for Conict Resolution, 31 October 2006).
60. Ayodele Akenroye, “Ecowas and the Recent Coups in West Africa: Which Way Forward?”
IPI Global Observatory, 8 May 2012, http://globalobservatory.org/.
61. Omotola, “From Importer to Exporter,” 41.
62. Ramatu Jaji and A.Y. Ayontunde, “e Contours and Depth of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
under Goodluck Jonathan,” International Aairs and Global Security, 48 (2016): 13–17.
e Foreign Policies of Large Democratizing African States
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020 129
63. Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, “e African Union (AU), e Libya Crisis and the notion of ‘Afri-
can solutions to African problems’,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 31, no. 1 (2013): 117–38.
64. Jaji and Ayotunde, “e Contours and Depth,” 13–17.
65. Robin A. Hardy, “Countering Violent Extremism in Sub- Saharan Africa: What Policy
Makers Need to Know,” World Aairs 182, no. 3 (2019): 256–72.
66. Olowojolu Olakunle, “Mid Term Report of President Muhammudu Buhari’s Foreign
Policy,” Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society 9, no. 2 (2017), 8–9.
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Buhari’s Administration, 2015–2018,” SSRN, 5 August 2019.
68. Luanda Mpungose, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy under Zuma: Towards Greater Strategic
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69. Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s,” 239–54
70. Carien du Plessis, “Dlamini- Zuma’s failures, achievements as AU Commission chair, news24,
25 January 2017.
71. Ndubisi Christian Ani, “How Serious is the African Union about Democracy?” Institute
for Security Studies, 1 October 2018.
72. Smith, “South Africa and the Responsibility,” 391–405.
73. John Campbell, “Why Were South African Soldiers in the Central African Republic?”
Council on Foreign Relations, 2 April 2013.
74. Pelane Phakgadi, “SA Vote in Support of UN Resolution on Human Rights in Myanmar
Part of ‘New Approach’,” news24, 25 December 2018.
75. Gustavo de Carvalho and Priyal Singh, “South Africa Ends Its First Big Act on the UN
Security Council,” Institute for Security Studies, 29 October 2019.
Disclaimer
e views and opinions expressed or implied in JEMEAA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying
the ocial sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or
other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
