Council Special Report No. 70U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
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Cover Photo: Women study the Quran at
the Maska Road Islamic School in Kaduna,
Nigeria, on July 16, 2014. The school
condemns the violent ideology of Boko
Haram. (Joe Penney/Courtesy Reuters)
Council Special Report No. 70
November 2014
John Campbell
U.S. Policy to
Counter Nigeria’s
Boko Haram
U.S. Policy to Counter
Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Council Special Report No.
November
John Campbell
U.S. Policy to Counter
Nigeria’s Boko Haram
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Foreword vii
Acknowledgments ix
Council Special Report
Introduction
The Political Context of Boko Haram
An Anatomy of the Boko Haram Insurgency
The Jonathan Government’s Response to Boko Haram
The United States and Nigeria
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
Conclusion
Endnotes 27
About the Authors 30
Advisory Committee 31
CPA Advisory Committee 32
CPA Mission Statement 33
Contents
vii
Foreword
Boko Haram, an Islamist separatist movement based in northern Nige-
ria, has captured the attention of policymakers in Nigeria and around
the world with its potent blend of religious fanaticism, social media
savvy, and cold-blooded violence. Its most notorious act was the kid-
napping of some two hundred girls from a school in Chibok in April
, but it has killed thousands through assaults on villages, car bomb-
ings, and mass killings of supposed political opponents.
Nigeria’s president, Goodluck Jonathan, calls Boko Haram a new
front in the global war on terror, one that demands a forceful response.
Yet the Nigerian military’s fight against Boko Haram has been under-
mined by accusations of incompetence, collusion, and cruelty nearly on
par with that of the terrorist group it seeks to defeat, and has done little
to curb the group’s spread.
In this Council Special Report, John Campbell, CFR’s Ralph Bunche
senior fellow for Africa policy studies, situates Boko Haram in the con-
text of Nigeria’s larger political situation and draws out consequences
for policymakers in Abuja and Washington. The terrorist group itself
he finds to be opaque, with few clear answers about its leadership, con-
nections to other jihadist groups, funding sources, or even political
goals. Its power and reach have grown mainly through its willingness
to brutalize and intimidate local populations. But it has also resonated
with a suspicion among some northern Muslims that Western educa-
tion and democratic institutions are secular, untrustworthy, and pos-
sibly forbidden by Islam.
Nigeria’s government, meanwhile, has not helped its own case. A
small political elite holds the keys to—and the financial benefits of—
political power. Corruption is common and rarely punished. And the
security services, often the most visible face of government, are reported
to commit violent acts with impunity. As the political establishment
viii Foreword
gears up for presidential elections in , Boko Haram and the govern-
ment response to it are likely to be major points of debate.
The United States, Campbell writes, has an interest in ensuring the
stability and democratic future of Nigeria, as both ends in themselves
and as a means to blunt the advance of Boko Haram. Unfortunately,
Washington’s ability to eect change is limited. Abundant oil income
means Nigeria is not reliant on U.S. aid, which is in any event modest.
In addition, its size and economic strength make it a dominant power in
regional institutions, a status that further tends to reduce U.S. leverage.
Nonetheless, Campbell oers a number of recommendations for
U.S. policy. In the short term, he calls for the consistent inclusion of
human rights issues in all American dealings with Abuja, including call-
ing for accountability for security service crimes; pressure for free and
fair elections in and beyond; facilitating humanitarian assistance in
northern Nigeria; and establishing a consulate in Kano. Over the longer
term, he recommends providing practical and diplomatic support for
government bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and individu-
als working to improve the practice of democracy and human rights in
Nigeria; using U.S. law to penalize corrupt ocials; and encouraging a
wholesale change in the culture of the military and the police through,
for example, inviting Nigerian participation in the U.S. government’s
International Military Education and Training program.
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram oers a sober assess-
ment of the security situation in northern Nigeria. It argues clearly that
the best route to stability is through the establishment of accountable
and eective democratic institutions. And it recommendations steps
U.S. policymakers can take to contribute to that end. It makes the case
that while Boko Haram may be the most headline-grabbing threat, the
long-term stability of Nigeria is a most serious U.S. and international
interest.
Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations
November
viii
ix
I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who made this
report possible. First, my thanks to CFR President Richard N. Haass
and Director of Studies James M. Lindsay for their support of this
project and their feedback throughout the drafting process.
I would like to thank this report’s advisory committee chaired by
Michelle Gavin for lending its expertise and providing indispens-
able input and feedback. Committee members were Pauline H. Baker,
Herman J. Cohen, Jean Herskovits, Ernst J. Hogendoorn, Princeton N.
Lyman, Geo D. Porter, Knox Thames, Alexander Thurston, George
Ward, and Jacob Zenn. They greatly improved the substance of the
report and sharpened its arguments. In addition, I am grateful to Ray-
mond W. Baker for his suggested lines of inquiry.
I am grateful for the assistance of Patricia Dor, Eli Dvorkin, and
Ashley Bregman in CFR’s Publications Department, who provided
unmatched editing support. Courtney Doggart, Tricia Miller Klapheke,
Jake Meth, and Karina Piser in CFR’s Global Communications and
Media Relations department provided invaluable guidance and help in
the marketing eorts for this report. I also appreciate the contributions
of the David Rockefeller Studies Program sta, including Amy Baker.
I would like to thank my colleague and Director of the Center for
Preventative Action (CPA) Paul B. Stares, who provided needed guid-
ance and insights. I would also like to thank the entire CPA team includ-
ing Helia Ighani, Anna Feuer, and Amelia Wolf, who helped guide me
through the development process.
Finally, I would like to thank the Africa policy studies team at CFR
for its help throughout this process. Many thanks to the Africa studies
interns, Charlotte Renfield-Miller, Amanda Roth, and Thomas Zuber,
for their administrative and research support. I am especially grateful
for the help and support of my research associates, Emily Mellgard,
Acknowledgments
x
Allen Grane, and Asch Harwood without whom this report would not
have been completed.
This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Cor-
poration of New York. The statements made and views expressed
herein are solely my own.
John Campbell
Acknowledgments
Council Special Report
Introduction
The April kidnapping of more than schoolgirls from Chibok in
northern Nigeria by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram—and the
lethargic response of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan’s govern-
ment—provoked outrage. But the kidnapping is only one of many chal-
lenges Nigeria faces. The splintering of political elites, Boko Haram’s
revolt in the north, persistent ethnic and religious conflict in the coun-
try’s Middle Belt, the deterioration of the Nigerian army, a weak federal
government, unprecedented corruption, and likely divisive national
elections in February with a potential resumption of an insurrec-
tion in the oil patch together test Nigeria in ways unprecedented since
the – civil war.
The United States cannot be indierent. Boko Haram poses no
security threat to the U.S. homeland, but its attack on Nigeria, and the
Abuja response characterized by extensive human rights violations,
does challenge U.S. interests in Africa. Nigeria has been a strategic
partner and at times a surrogate for the United States in Africa. With
million people equally divided between Christians and Muslims,
the benefit of Africa’s largest oil revenues, and in the past a relatively
modern military, Nigeria has had greater heft than any other Afri-
can country. The national aspiration for democracy survived a gen-
eration of military rule and served as an example for other developing
countries. But, if the country has been the “giant of Africa,” Nigeria’s
current challenges politically destabilize West Africa, potentially pro-
viding a base for jihadist groups hostile to Western interests, fueling
a humanitarian crisis, and by example discrediting democratic aspira-
tions elsewhere in Africa.
Upcoming Nigerian elections will shape the country’s trajectory. The
electoral process—the campaign period, polling, and ballot counting—
is likely to be bitter, especially at the local and state levels. Splintered
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
elites are already violently competing for power and appealing to reli-
gious and ethnic identities.
If Nigeria’s civilian government is to forestall an implosion involving
Boko Haram and the elections, and to resume its positive regional
role, it needs to end ubiquitous human rights abuses by ocial entities,
orchestrate humanitarian relief to refugees and persons internally dis-
placed by fighting in the north, and ensure credible elections that do
not exacerbate internal conflict. If it achieves these goals, Nigeria could
resume its evolution into a democratic state that abides by the rule of
law and pursues a regional leadership role commensurate with its size
and supportive of goals shared with the United States.
Unfortunately, the United States and other outsiders have little
leverage over the Jonathan government. Nigeria’s principal exports
and economic drivers—oil and gas—command a ready international
market. The country’s size gives it an advantage over its neighbors, even
in its weak state. Neither the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) nor the African Union (AU)—the relevant security
organizations—is expected to pressure the Abuja government, because
Nigeria is the largest contributor to their budgets and presides among
African states as the continent’s leader.
1
The country receives minimal
assistance from international donors; U.S. assistance, about $ mil-
lion in , paled in comparison with government revenue.
2
Washington faces hard choices. Enhanced U.S. security cooperation
with Abuja against Boko Haram might limit the movement’s military
activities. Conversely, a visible U.S. military presence risks an anti-
Western backlash in the north and across the Sahel, where the govern-
ment of Jonathan, who is Christian, is suspected of being anti-Muslim.
In the run-up to the February national elections, Washington sup-
ports Nigerians working for credible polling in an environment free of
violence. But even with its strong financial and diplomatic support, U.S.
ability to influence the conduct of Nigeria’s elections is limited by the
country’s enormous size, diversity, and security challenges, not least
from Boko Haram.
Nigeria’s restoration of a democratic, regional leadership trajectory
should be a top Africa policy goal for the Obama administration. As in
the past, a restored partnership with Abuja could forestall the need for
deeper U.S. involvement in the Sahel when Washington is preoccupied
with pressing foreign policy challenges in other regions.
Introduction
The Boko Haram insurgency is a direct result of chronic poor gov-
ernance by Nigeria’s federal and state governments, the political mar-
ginalization of northeastern Nigeria, and the region’s accelerating
impoverishment. The insurgency’s context is a radical, Salafist Islamic
revival that extends beyond the movement’s supporters. Government
security service human rights abuses drive popular acquiescence or sup-
port for Boko Haram. Washington should follow a short-term strategy
that presses Abuja to end its gross human rights abuses, conduct credi-
ble national elections in , and meet the immediate needs of refugees
and persons internally displaced by fighting in the northeast. It should
also pursue a longer-term strategy to encourage Abuja to address the
roots of northern disillusionment, preserve national unity, and restore
Nigeria’s trajectory toward democracy and the rule of law.
The following steps should be taken in the short term:
Washington should pursue a human rights agenda with Abuja, press-
ing the Jonathan administration to investigate credible claims of
human rights abuses and to prosecute the perpetrators;
the Obama administration should pursue a democratic agenda,
including its support for credible elections in ;
the United States should facilitate and support humanitarian assis-
tance in the north; and
the Obama administration should strengthen its diplomatic pres-
ence by establishing a consulate in Kano, the largest city in northern
Nigeria.
The following steps should be taken over the long term:
Washington administrations should identify and support individual
Nigerians working for human rights and democracy;
the United States should revoke the visas held by Nigerians who
commit financial crimes or promote political, ethnic, or religious vio-
lence; and
Washington should encourage Nigerian initiatives to revamp the cul-
ture of its military and police.
Nigeria is divided into more than ethnic groups and its popula-
tion is split evenly between Christians and Muslims.
3
Christians are
predominant in the southern half of the country, Muslims are mostly
in the north, and religious and ethnic minorities can be found every-
where. Nigerian politicians exploit ethnic and religious identities,
especially around elections, and associated violence has accelerated
since the end of military rule in . Violence also tends to occur
where ethnic, religious, and land-use boundaries coincide. Few perpe-
trators of ethnic and religious aggression have ever been held account-
able in a court of law.
Although Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa, up to per-
cent of its population is categorized as “very poor.” In rural areas, the
rate rises to percent.
4
The federal government and its national oil rev-
enue have long since been captured by a tiny number of cooperating and
competing elites.
Politics have had little relevance to the Nigerian people outside elite
circles. Non-elite Nigerians appear to fear the government. The mili-
tary and the police, which, for most people, constitute the face of the
federal government, are routinely brutal.
5
The judicial system often
fails to provide justice, and accountability under the law is frequently
absent for elites. Corruption is pervasive and the common perception
is that it is getting worse.
Since the restoration of civilian government in , political power
in Nigeria has normally been exercised by elites using the ruling Peo-
ple’s Democratic Party (PDP) as their vehicle. Before the elec-
tions, much of the elite, following the principle of power alternation
between north and south and between Muslim and Christian, reached
a consensus on the presidential nominee, as per a arrangement
initially orchestrated by Nigeria’s military rulers. Elites then ensured
that the election was rigged in favor of their consensus candidate. If the
The Political Context of Boko Haram
president was Christian, then the vice president would be Muslim, and
vice versa.
6
Power alternation was not a matter of law. Rather, it was
an elite arrangement that promoted political stability in a country with
numerous ethnic and religious divisions.
7
Elites controlled the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC), which is responsible for the conduct of elections. Until ,
each national election since was worse than its predecessor, and
ballot stung, police intimidation, and counting irregularities were
common. Following the elections, the president appointed retired
Chief Justice Muhammadu Uwais to head a special commission (now
called the Uwais Commission) to make recommendations for improve-
ment. The commission did so, but the recommendations were never
completely implemented. President Jonathan also appointed nota-
ble reformer Attahiru Jega chairman of the INEC. But his authority
remains limited because governors still appoint other commissioners.
Boko Haram’s success has been facilitated by the ending of
the arrangement of presidential alternation between north and south.
When President Umaru Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, died in ,
Vice President Jonathan indicated that he would finish out the presiden-
tial term, but would not run in , because it was still the north’s turn
for the presidency under the eight-year power alternation rhythm.
8
But
in the elections, he ran and won nearly all the states outside the
predominately Muslim north, suspending power alternation. The elec-
tions lacked credibility for many northerners and widespread rioting
followed the announcement of the results.
With the south—much more economically and socially advanced
in Western terms—controlling the federal government, northern
elites faced the prospect of the political wilderness. Paradoxically, if
the elections alienated many of the northern elites from Abuja,
they also widened the gap between many northern Nigerians “on the
street” and their traditional Islamic leaders, some of whom accepted
payos to support Jonathan rather than the northern Muslim candi-
date, Muhammadu Buhari. As these traditional leaders lost author-
ity among the population, Boko Haram was well positioned to fill the
resulting vacuum.
The end of power alternation, a series of political mistakes by the
Jonathan government, pressure from Boko Haram, and the prospect
of a renewed insurrection in the oil patch inform the causes and con-
sequences of elite disunity. Many Nigerians believe that an opposition
The Political Context of Boko Haram
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
candidate could defeat President Jonathan in . This new aspiration
puts a premium on electoral conduct and results that are credible. Many
Nigerian civil organizations, however, are pessimistic about the state of
electoral preparation for .
President Jonathan argues that Boko Haram is a new front in the inter-
national war on terrorism. Accordingly, he says, Nigeria’s war on Boko
Haram requires international involvement.
9
Jonathan has had some
success in selling this perspective. The Obama administration, under
pressure from Congress, designated Boko Haram a foreign terrorist
organization, and has oered a multimillion-dollar reward for informa-
tion regarding the whereabouts of Abubakar Shekau, the best-known
Boko Haram warlord. The UN Security Council added Boko Haram
to the list of “Entities Associated with al-Qaeda” at Nigeria’s request.
10
Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic malam (teacher) based in the capi-
tal of the northern state of Borno, Maiduguri, organized the Congre-
gation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad,
now called
Boko Haram, around .
11
The group saw the government as evil
and considered participating Muslims to be infidels. Although it did
not eschew violence, killing was not its primary characteristic. Boko
Haram probably had political connections within the Borno state gov-
ernment.
12
In what was perhaps a response to police brutality, the group
launched a revolt in July that security forces suppressed, killing
some eight hundred members of the community. The police extrajudi-
cially executed Yusuf and several close relatives. The movement then
went underground.
Mohammed Yusuf had two deputies: Abubakar Shekau and
Mamman Nur; a third, close associate was Khalid al-Barnawi. Though
initially they worked together to reestablish Boko Haram after ,
Nur and al-Barnawi subsequently broke with Shekau because, they
said, he was killing too many Muslims. They organized the Vanguard
for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands, commonly called Ansaru.
Ansaru’s operations were directed primarily against Christians and the
security services rather than those Muslims who participated in the fed-
eral government. Ansaru probably had links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic
An Anatomy of
the Boko Haram Insurgency
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Maghreb, al-Shabab, and other radical groups. Ansaru may have intro-
duced suicide bombing and kidnapping to the struggle against the Nige-
rian government.
13
The relationship between Shekau and Ansaru is likely fluid. Ansaru
has been silent for many months, and it is possible that its operatives
have recently rejoined Shekau’s followers, potentially following an
obscure power struggle that resulted in a collective leadership. The kid-
napping of the Chibok schoolgirls has the characteristics of an Ansaru
operation, though Shekau claims Boko Haram is responsible for it.
There are remarkably few hard facts about Boko Haram. It has pub-
lished no political program and the structure of its leadership is largely
unknown. Abubakar Shekau is familiar through his videos, but it seems
likely that he now shares power within the movement.
14
In part because
of its mysteriousness, Boko Haram has become a political football in
the run-up to the elections. The degree of public support for Boko
Haram and the number of its operatives is also unknown.
15
Funding and
weapons are probably largely locally sourced, but if there is some inter-
national support, its origins and scope are unclear.
16
Boko Haram is brutal, fully exploiting the propaganda value of
violence. Its murder methods are grisly, featuring throat-slitting and
beheadings, which it sometimes captures on video for propaganda pur-
poses. Initially, most of its victims were members of the security forces,
persons associated with the government, and Muslims who actively
opposed the group. Now, however, victims include women, children,
and Muslims who merely do not actively support its agenda.
Boko Haram accelerated its attacks over the past year. In the cities of
Gwoza and Damboa in Borno state, Boko Haram murdered or expelled
Christians and all Muslims opposed to it, killing the respected emir
of Gwoza in May . As of September , Boko Haram was able
to operate freely in a territory about the size of Rhode Island and pro-
claimed Gwoza as part of a “caliphate.” It has now carried out bomb-
ings in Abuja and one in Lagos, far from its northeastern heartland.
17
The group regularly slaughters adolescent male students in schools
that it attacks, and kidnaps women and girls for ransom or slavery with
increasing frequency.
Is Boko Haram primarily an indigenous expression of a variety of
Islamic fundamentalism that has evolved into an insurgency against
the Nigerian political economy, or is it a part of the al-Qaeda terrorist
An Anatomy of the Boko Haram Insurgency
network that poses a direct threat to the West as President Jonathan
maintains? With so little hard evidence, the most convincing hypoth-
esis remains that Boko Haram is predominately a diuse, Islamist,
Nigeria-centered insurgency. Its rhetoric attests to its roots in the
widespread cultural opposition to “secularism” and “Westernization”
that the British introduced and that controlling elites have advanced
ever since. Other than rhetorical salvos, it appears uninterested in the
United States.
This perspective minimizes—without denying—the significance of
contacts and links between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, al-Shabab in Somalia, or the Movement for Unity and Jihad
in West Africa in Mali. But even if its character remains predominantly
indigenous, Boko Haram’s rhetoric is acquiring something of an inter-
national focus, especially as the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and
the United States continue to support the Abuja government. Shekau
now regularly demonizes President Barack Obama in his videos.
Until now, Boko Haram has acted more like a violent, apocalyptic,
millenarian movement than a political entity. The group appears funda-
mentally uninterested in economic development. Boko Haram shares
its anti-Western, antisecular, and antidemocratic stance with other
Nigerian Islamist communities that preach similar positions but do
not resort to violence.
18
Many northern Nigerians who do not adhere
to Boko Haram consider Western education fraudulent because it was
imposed on a Muslim population by Europeans and their Nigerian
successors, thereby undermining traditional Islamic values. From this
perspective, Western education promotes secularism and corruption
and makes materialism and hedonism the ultimate values. This agenda
is perceived as promoting an alternative god to Allah and therefore is
idolatry. Boko Haram draws on this grassroots sentiment.
Boko Haram’s rhetoric emphasizes justice for the poor through
the rigid application of sharia, or Islamic law. From its statements and
videos, Boko Haram claims to reflect the true Islam, and other Muslims,
especially those within the Nigerian establishment who support the
Abuja government, are considered apostates and infidels who deserve
to die. This accusation serves as the group’s justification for the whole-
sale killing of Muslims external to their movement. Thus far, Boko
Haram seems to be immune to the influence of outside, mainstream
Islamic institutions, such as the Organization of Islamic Countries.
Shekau stated the following in a recent video:
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
I am going to kill all the imams and other Islamic clerics in Nige-
ria because they are not Muslims since they follow democracy
and constitution. It is Allah that instructed us, until we soak the
ground of Nigeria with Christian blood, and so-called Muslims
contradicting Islam. We will kill and wonder what to do with their
smelling corpses. This is a war against Christians and democracy
and their constitution.
19
In another video, Shekau contends that “the concept of government
of the people, by the people, for the people cannot continue to exist. It
shall soon, very soon, be replaced by government of Allah, by Allah, for
Allah.” He rejects the Nigerian flag and national anthem as manifesta-
tions of the worship of the secular state.
20
Boko Haram will likely try to
sabotage the elections.
Boko Haram may be moving to create an alternative government
based on the rigid implementation of Islamic law. In a video released
in August, Shekau said that Boko Haram is establishing a caliphate
based in Gwoza, but provided no details. He praised the emergence of
a caliphate in territory controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), but said nothing about its relation to a Borno caliphate.
President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the three northern
states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May , which he renewed
in November and May . He concentrated domestic military
assets in the three states and recalled others from international peace-
keeping missions. The military, the state security services, and the
police are consolidated into a Joint Task Force (JTF). Subsequently, in
, these forces were reorganized into the Seventh Division, which
reported directly to the chief of army sta, a close ally of President Jona-
than’s. In some places, irregular vigilantes known as the Civilian JTF
assist the division.
The army dominates the security services, which suer low morale
and poor leadership and are sapped by corruption. Despite a projected
defense budget of nearly $ billion, Boko Haram regularly outguns
security forces.
21
Jonathan has also said that Boko Haram has pene-
trated his government and many Nigerians believe it has also infiltrated
the army.
22
In some cases, unlocked gates or absent patrols have facili-
tated Boko Haram’s operations against military establishments, and
the high number of government armory weapons that Boko Haram
employs hint at collusion. Increasingly, army units melt away at Boko
Haram’s presence.
23
Amnesty International published a report in May
stating that the army had four hours’ notice that Boko Haram was
going to attack Chibok, the town where the kidnapped girls were gath-
ered to take their final examinations. Yet no steps were taken to aug-
ment security.
24
There has long been anecdotal evidence that the Nigerian security
agencies may have killed as many Nigerians as Boko Haram in certain
time periods.
25
Amnesty International released a report on October
, , based on its own investigations, revealing that more than
people died in military custody in the first six months of alone. The
Wall Street Journal also reported on its survey of the morgue records at
The Jonathan Government’s Response
to Boko Haram
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital. The findings armed
that soldiers routinely brought in large numbers of corpses from Giwa
Barracks, where detainees are held without charge.
26
Following a Boko Haram attack in March on Giwa Barracks,
there have been credible, though unconfirmed, allegations that govern-
ment security personnel killed up to one thousand detainees. The senator
representing Maiduguri said that percent of those detained and subse-
quently killed were “innocent” and not connected to Boko Haram.
27
On September , , PBS screened a documentary as part of its
Frontline series that included video clips from Boko Haram and from
the security services that showed equivalent butchery by both sides.
The Boko Haram videos clearly had propaganda intent; Frontline char-
acterized the security service videos as “trophies” taken by perpetra-
tors with cell phone cameras.
28
President Obama raised the issue of human rights abuses with Pres-
ident Jonathan when the two met in September . U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry had done the same with President Jonathan in May
. These exchanges appear to have had no eect on the Nigerian
government or on the behavior of the security services.
29
However,
President Jonathan asserts that human rights organizations’ allega-
tions are untrue.
In April , President Jonathan’s national security advisor, Sambo
Dasuki, published a strategy aimed at winning over the population of
the north. Its implementation would command significant Nigerian
government resources. The Jonathan government has yet to provide
the necessary support to this promising initiative. However, even were
it to do so, the Dasuki strategy addresses fundamental, long-term chal-
lenges such as inadequate education; it is not a short-term fix for Boko
Haram depredations in the election period.
30
It is dicult to see how Boko Haram will be defeated. In the past,
other millenarian religious movements in northern Nigeria have
burned themselves out only to reappear in dierent forms because the
rebellions’ social and economic drivers have never been addressed. The
group’s killing of Muslims may turn the population against it or revital-
ized security forces could drive it deep into the bush. Nevertheless, it is
hard to imagine that Boko Haram will vanish by the elections; the
group will likely do all in its power to sabotage the voting.
The George W. Bush administration paid minimal attention to Nige-
rian domestic political developments beyond expressing support for
“free and fair” elections. Washington failed to recognize the Nigerian
government’s growing administrative dysfunction and U.S. ocials
did little to address a cresting wave of corruption, staying mostly silent
when President Olusegun Obasanjo unsuccessfully sought an uncon-
stitutional third term.
31
Washington remained quiet about the blatant
rigging of the elections that placed Obasanjo’s hand-picked suc-
cessor, the ailing Umaru Yar’Adua, in the presidency and the inexperi-
enced Goodluck Jonathan in the vice presidency.
During President Umaru Yar’Adua’s terminal illness in , many
observers feared that a military coup would fill the vacuum in gov-
ernment authority. Washington, relieved that Goodluck Jonathan’s
interim presidency and subsequent election seemed to forestall a coup,
accorded the new president the benefit of the doubt.
The Obama administration’s policy toward Nigeria has been unde-
manding, with ocials only mildly denouncing publicly the human
rights abuses perpetrated by Nigerian security services in their struggle
with Boko Haram. Washington has not exacted a high political price
from Jonathan as these transgressions persist.
32
Pressed by U.S. public
opinion, the administration oered Jonathan assistance in the search
for the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls, but has not investigated the gov-
ernment’s detention of alleged Boko Haram wives and children without
charge or the large numbers of young men extrajudicially incarcerated
on the basis of mere suspicion.
However, President Obama did not visit Nigeria on either of his
two African trips, a sign of a new concern in his administration about
rigged elections, human rights abuses, and corruption. Nevertheless,
in its rhetoric and its actions, the Obama administration remains sup-
portive of the Abuja government. Accordingly, Jonathan continues to
The United States and Nigeria
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
identify himself with President Obama to appeal to his pro-American,
Christian base; his presidential campaign materials have featured pho-
tographs of him and Obama together.
33
As of March , there is a legal precedent for the U.S. Department
of the Treasury, working with the U.S. Department of Justice, to identify
illicit financial flows through the U.S. financial system to another coun-
try.
34
Those funds could then be frozen. That was done with respect to
$ million looted by the notoriously corrupt dictator Sani Abacha,
Nigeria’s de facto chief of state from to , which he then depos-
ited in banks in France and the Channel Islands.
35
This action may signal
a greater willingness by the U.S. government to deprive foreign political
figures of the fruits of their corruption.
Frustration over the failure to liberate the Chibok schoolgirls, the
Nigerian military’s manifest inadequacies for the task, and the Jona-
than government’s visibly weak political will has prompted some in
Congress and the media to call for U.S. military intervention to liber-
ate the girls.
Any such course is fraught with peril. In earlier kidnapping episodes,
eorts to free the victims by the use of force have led to their captors
murdering them—a possible fate for the schoolgirls in the event of a
military operation.
A campaign poster for Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan emphasizes his relationship with
U.S. President Barack Obama, in Abuja, Nigeria, January , . (Sunday Alamba/AP Photo)
The United States and Nigeria
Overt U.S. military intervention also risks further alienating the
Muslim population in Nigeria and across the Sahel. Already, north-
ern Nigerian field preachers have issued warnings in sermons against
European and American military boots on Nigerian ground.
36
Retired
general and former President Olusegun Obasanjo, probably echoing
widespread views among Nigerian ocers, has publicly criticized Pres-
ident Jonathan’s request for outside assistance against Boko Haram,
particularly from Europe or the United States.
37
So far, the U.S. military has trained only small numbers of Nigerians
to participate in international peacekeeping forces. The U.S. Depart-
ment of State’s budget request for International Military Education
and Training (IMET) for Nigeria in fiscal year is only $,.
38
(IMET is a vehicle for the provision of such U.S. training to a foreign
country.) Nigerian reluctance to accept further U.S. training with its
requirements for fiscal accountability and transparency has inhibited
the program’s expansion in the past. In addition, the Leahy amendment
prohibits U.S. military training of foreign units that violate human
rights with impunity.
39
U.S. embassies and relevant bureaus in the
Department of State vet units for eligibility. If they are found ineligible,
American training is suspended until the host government brings to
justice those responsible for human rights violations.
The number of Nigerian units that can pass Leahy vetting is small
and shrinking. Military units are rotated through the north, making
them vulnerable to credible charges of human rights violations. There is
no public indication that a significant number of military perpetrators
of human rights violations have been brought to justice.
In May , the U.S. Department of Defense deployed twelve
active-duty U.S. soldiers to Nigeria to train a -man Nigerian ranger
battalion for combat operations that would presumably be free of the
taint of human rights violations. This was the first time in years that the
United States trained Nigerian military units for operations other than
peacekeeping missions. However, isolated trainings are unlikely to have
a lasting eect on Nigerian military culture. Abuja’s stance toward secu-
rity cooperation with the United States continues to be unenthusiastic,
despite President Jonathan’s request for assistance in the aftermath of
the Chibok kidnappings. Trainings, even if small, link the American
and Nigerian militaries and thereby risk tarring the United States with
the Nigerian security sector’s ongoing human rights violations.
Nevertheless, improving the professionalism of the Nigerian mili-
tary and other security services is in the interests of the Nigerian people,
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Nigeria’s neighbors, and the United States. Were Abuja to investigate
allegations of human rights abuses by the security forces, and were the
security services receptive, the door would open to greater U.S. assis-
tance that over time could improve their professionalism and thereby
their performance.
At the request of the Nigerian government, the United States is
deploying drones and surveillance aircraft concentrated on finding the
Chibok schoolgirls. That program may be expanded. The territory to
be searched is roughly the size of New England. How valuable the intel-
ligence acquired by such surveillance will be in finding and liberating
the Chibok girls remains to be seen.
The expanded surveillance option would require the United States to
deploy additional assets, which would likely require more support per-
sonnel, especially in a region that lacks basic infrastructure. Increased
deployment will make the U.S. presence more obvious to a Muslim
population that is already suspicious of the West.
The U.S. political response to Boko Haram continues to be hobbled
by a lack of understanding about the latter’s methods and goals. Given
Boko Haram’s threat to the Nigerian state and its potential for stronger
links to international terrorism, the United States needs to deepen its
understanding of the organization’s leadership, structure, funding, and
sources of support. U.S. eorts should be coordinated with other gov-
ernments that have significant on-the-ground knowledge of the Sahel,
perhaps by means of a contact group.
Given Nigeria’s current travails, the watchword for Washington
policy initiatives should be “first, do no harm.” An increasingly brutal
civil war between Islamist radicals and government security forces
capable of the most egregious human rights abuses poses potential
pitfalls. American missteps such as an overly militarized response in
northern Nigeria could compromise U.S. interests throughout Muslim
West Africa. Protecting those interests in Nigeria and in the Sahel will
require trade-os. For example, a stronger Washington stance on Nige-
rian human rights abuses could make Abuja less cooperative in such
venues as the UN Security Council, at least in the short term. But, it is
the policy with the best prospect for mitigating Boko Haram’s radical-
ization of West Africa’s largest Muslim population.
In the coming six months, Nigeria’s civilian government faces a pos-
sible implosion involving Boko Haram and the elections. It is in
the interests of the United States that Nigeria preserve its national unity
and resume its democratic trajectory so that Abuja once again can part-
ner with Washington on Africa’s strategic challenges. Yet Washington
has little leverage over the Jonathan government and the country’s frac-
tured political class. If Washington cannot be indierent to Nigeria’s
future, it can shape the outcome only at the margins.
Boko Haram is a security threat to Nigeria, and, as such, it retards
U.S. goals in Africa. But, Boko Haram at present poses no threat to the
security of the homeland of the United States. Boko Haram has under-
taken no operations against U.S. public or privately owned facilities, in
Nigeria or elsewhere. It has kidnapped no Americans. Unlike al-Sha-
bab, it enjoys no support from expatriates living in the United States.
Unlike the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, it has recruited as fighters no
U.S. citizens or nationals of other Western countries who could estab-
lish terrorist cells on returning home. The central al-Qaeda leadership
does not control Boko Haram and has openly criticized its brutality.
Boko Haram’s attention has been on Nigeria, not the furtherance of
an international jihad beyond the Sahel, despite President Jonathan’s
claims to the contrary.
With a defense budget approaching $ billion, the Jonathan admin-
istration is not short of resources. Rather than securing an enhanced
military capability, Abuja’s challenges are to address poor governance,
rebuild a national political consensus, and reduce the northern Muslim
sense of marginalization. Its immediate goal should be to neutral-
ize Boko Haram in the run-up to the national elections, even if it
cannot be defeated. Absent a political initiative, a robust U.S. security
package would be unlikely to tilt the scales against Boko Haram even
if Abuja were to accept it. Hence, Washington should urge and assist
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Abuja to undertake policy changes that will isolate Boko Haram and
reduce its regional appeal. Given Abuja’s human rights abuses, there is
little that Washington can do at present in the security realm against
Boko Haram in partnership with the Nigerian army and security ser-
vices. Were Abuja to take steps against those abuses, however, it would
likely help mitigate northern alienation and as well open the door to an
expansion of the U.S. IMET program.
Washington needs to recognize unpalatable realities as it devises its
Nigeria policy for both the short term in the run-up to elections and
for the long term afterward. As for political initiatives, it is too late
for Washington to urge Abuja to complete implementation of serious
reforms of the electoral process before , as recommended by the
Uwais Commission. Likewise, U.S. policy toward Nigeria after the
elections will depend on unpredictable factors such as the credibility
of polling and counting, the level of violence, the cohesion of the state,
and whether there is military intervention. Whatever unfolds in Feb-
ruary , addressing the drivers of the Boko Haram insurgency and
supporting a democratic trajectory in Nigeria will present long-term
challenges for Abuja and its potential partners.
SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
The Obama administration should hold the Abuja government
accountable for security service human rights abuses. It should call on
the Nigerian government to investigate credible claims by human rights
organizations and the media of security service human rights viola-
tions, publish the results, and prosecute the alleged perpetrators.
The White House and State Department should also deplore cred-
ible reports of human rights violations by the security services, just
as they do Boko Haram killings. In addition, senior U.S. elected and
administration ocials should include human rights violations on their
agendas for all meetings with Nigerian counterparts.
Washington should oer to expand IMET and any other appropri-
ate U.S. programs for the professionalization of the security services
should Abuja take concrete steps to address human rights abuses.
The regular meetings of the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission—a
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
vehicle for diplomatic consultation between Washington and Abuja—
oer a venue for this dialogue.
The Abuja government might respond by declining to cooperate on
those remaining issues of mutual concern, especially within the UN
Security Council. But, a weak U.S. human rights agenda in Nigeria rein-
forces the Muslim view that Washington is prepared to look the other
way when a Christian government is committing human rights abuses.
In the short term, the pursuit of a diplomatic human rights agenda
with Nigeria should not result in any additional financial costs to the
U.S. government. However, if an expanded IMET or other security
service training initiatives were to become possible, there would be
additional costs, the amount of which would depend on the size of
the program.
The Obama administration should publicly reiterate its support for
free, fair, and credible elections, and maintain modest funding for
electoral support, encouraging eorts by the International Republic
Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and other nongovern-
mental organizations to monitor the election campaigns, polling,
vote counting, and election’s aftermath. The Obama administration
should also avoid early comment on the quality of the elections. The
U.S. Embassy in Abuja and the consulate general in Lagos should
monitor political appeals to ethnic and religious identities in electoral
campaigns as possible harbingers for electoral violence. Moreover,
the State Department should revoke the American visas of those who
advocate or perpetrate violence.
Visa revocation is a cumbersome process, and there could be
bureaucratic push back from U.S. government agencies that are under-
resourced. However, many in the Nigerian elite place high value on
travel to the United States. Potential loss of a visa to do so could influ-
ence their behavior.
The Obama administration should encourage and assist the Jonathan
government to develop and lead a multilateral program of humanitarian
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
assistance for the displaced populations in the north and the Nigerian
refugees who have crossed into Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
The Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
has a formal structure in place to address internally displaced persons.
The Obama administration should direct the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) and other relevant U.S. agencies to
explore what technical assistance the United States could provide those
agencies to meet immediate emergencies.
Private organizations, ranging from the Red Cross/Red Crescent to
Christian and Islamic relief agencies, are present in the north, though
often with only a weak capacity. USAID should encourage and facili-
tate coordination of their eorts by providing occasions and venues
for their leaderships to meet. Refugees are the responsibility of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) based at the European
oces of the United Nations in Geneva. The U.S. Mission in Geneva
should open a dialogue with UNHCR on Sahelian refugee flows and
look for opportunities diplomatically to support its work, especially in
Niger and Cameroon.
Humanitarian assistance would require careful planning, given the
security challenges. As with any emergency relief program, there would
be costs, but in the past, the American public has supported food and
medicine deliveries. Humanitarian assistance to an Islamic population
could have a positive impact on the region’s view of the United States
and balance the widespread view that Washington uncritically accepts
Abuja’s record of poor governance.
..
The United States needs a diplomatic presence in the north in order to
understand and shape developments in that volatile region, particularly
as the elections approach. A consulate also becomes an important
instrument of American outreach to Nigeria’s Muslim population.
The opening of a consulate in Kano was approved by former U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during President Obama’s first
administration, but was shelved because the security risks and costs
were judged to be too high. Given the partisan rancor in Washing-
ton following the terrorist attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi,
moving forward with a Kano consulate requires political courage.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
The absolute security of a diplomatic establishment can never be
guaranteed. Nevertheless, the United States has successfully met ter-
rorist security challenges in Kandahar and Karachi, and could do so in
Kano. The financial costs will be high. But, the public diplomacy and
political benefits of a U.S. diplomatic presence in this volatile region
make the investment worthwhile.
Implementation of these recommendations is necessary for the
credibility of U.S. advocacy for human rights and democracy, not just
among Muslims in Nigeria but also in West Africa. Implementation will
also encourage and support Nigerians working for credible elections
and may discourage overt appeals to ethnic and religious hatred. But
the United States can assist only at the margins in containing the violent
pressures associated with the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian
government’s response to it, and national elections.
LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
If Nigeria successfully meets the challenges of the next six months, then
the government buys time to address the deeper causes of northern
alienation and impoverishment that drives Boko Haram. Although the
impetus for fundamental reform and transformation will need to come
from Nigeria’s political elites, the United States can usefully contribute
to this longer-term eort.
The Obama administration should encourage the Jonathan govern-
ment to launch a counterinsurgency strategy against Boko Haram
by oering technical support. That could include an expanded IMET
program to increase the professionalism of the security services if
Abuja meets the requirements of the Leahy amendment. The Obama
administration should also urge the Jonathan government to publicize
and implement the Uwais Commission’s recommendations for the
improvement of elections.
The U.S. Embassy in Abuja, the consulate general in Lagos, and a
consulate in Kano, when it is established, should increase their con-
tacts with Christian and Muslim religious leaders and traditional rulers
U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
working toward peace and reconciliation. They should also seek to
establish links with “field preachers” and increasingly influential indi-
viduals outside the traditional establishments.
American ocials should identify eective governors who provide
a model of good governance and publicize their eorts. USAID should
continue its strategy of working exclusively with state governments
with a good track record.
The Obama administration should encourage new trade and invest-
ment in the north. It should also draw attention to new, private Nigerian
investment in the region, perhaps in conjunction with organizations
such as the Corporate Council for Africa and the Business Council for
International Understanding.
Additionally, the United States should expand its Fulbright scholar
program and other exchange programs with Nigeria to highlight its
commitment to democracy and to building Nigeria’s civil society lead-
ership capacity.
To facilitate travel between Nigeria and the United States, the U.S.
Department of State should devote sucient resources to visa process-
ing to eliminate periodic backlogs. Understang of visa ocers at the
embassy, the consulate general, and of those who perform additional
reviews in the State Department in coordination with other federal
agencies can cause a waiting time of months. The National Security
Council should coordinate an executive branch review of procedures
that subject Nigerians and others with Islamic names to secondary
security checks, which delay their travel to the United States. The costs
of this recommendation would be modest.
To ensure that the perpetrators and profits of corruption find no safe
haven in the United States, the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, the consul-
ate general in Lagos, and the State Department’s Bureaus of African
Aairs and Consular Aairs should expand the revocation of visas of
those found to be corrupt as well as of those who perpetuate and advo-
cate political, ethnic, and religious violence. With respect to money
laundering and other financial crimes, the National Security Council
should publicly announce that it is directing the Treasury and Justice
Departments to identify and freeze the profits of corruption that have
passed through the U.S. financial system. Because these processes will
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
be time-consuming, the Obama administration may announce publicly
its intention well in advance of implementation.
A stable, democratic Nigeria requires changes in military and police
culture. In the United States, it has been a long-standing goal to
encourage military and police accountability to civil authority. In addi-
tion to the current small-scale U.S. programs with that goal, or even
an expanded IMET, relevant U.S. agencies should provide extensive
technical assistance to Nigerian institutions working toward security
service accountability. The National Institute for Policy and Strategic
Studies in Kuru and the Center for Peace Studies at Usman Danfodio
University in Sokoto, no doubt among others, have notable programs
that merit U.S. support.
Boko Haram is primarily an indigenous northern Nigerian response
to poverty and bad governance within the context of a breakdown of
regional power alternation and a radical Islamist worldview. Hence, it
would be a mistake for Washington to place Boko Haram in the context
of the international war on terrorism. There is little scope for a military
response by the United States.
Rather than a greater U.S. security role in Nigeria, Washington
should redouble its diplomatic eorts to persuade and encourage the
Abuja government to address the drivers of Boko Haram.
Implementing the recommendations outlined above would likely
result in a cooler bilateral relationship between Washington and Abuja,
at least in the short term. However, they could strengthen American
ties to the Nigerian people, especially civic organizations working for
democracy and good governance.
The United States can assist those in Nigeria working for a demo-
cratic trajectory only at the margins. But it is worth the eort. A demo-
cratic Nigeria characterized by the rule of law would promote economic
development, alleviate poverty, and address the people’s alienation
from their government. Boko Haram would be deprived of its oxygen.
The diplomatic and security partnership between Washington and
Abuja could then be reestablished, relieving the United States of the
need for a greater security presence in West Africa.
Conclusion
1. South Africa would claim that it, too, has the capacity for continental leadership.
2. Susan B. Epstein, Alex Tiersky, and Marian L. Lawson, “State Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs: FY Budget and Appropriations,” Congressional Research
Service, May , , http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/.pdf.
3. Estimates of the number of ethnic groups range up to three hundred and fifty. The lack
of precision reflects dierent definitions of “ethnic group” and how to separate them
from other categories, such as “clans.”
4. “Nigeria Economic Report,” World Bank, May , p. .
5. “Nigeria: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity as Violence Escalates in North-
east,” Amnesty International, March , .
6. Umaru Yar’Adua, elected president in , was a Muslim. His vice president, Good-
luck Jonathan, is a Christian. Although power alternation has been suspended follow-
ing the elections of , President Jonathan has a Muslim vice president.
7. Power alternation, which Nigerians call zoning, is described in detail and analyzed
in John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, ), chap. and .
8. President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian from southwest Nigeria, held oce from
to . Under the principle of alternation, a northern Muslim would hold the
presidency from to .
9. See Maïa de la Baume and Alissa J. Rubin, “West African Nations Set Aside Their Old
Suspicions to Combat Boko Haram,” New York Times, May , , and “President Jona-
than’s Speech in France at the Regional Summit on Security in Nigeria,” Vanguard, May
, .
10. At present, neither designation has much practical eect, though they may inhibit the
ability of third parties to negotiate with Boko Haram in the future.
11. Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad, or, in Arabic,
Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad.
12. “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency,” International Crisis
Group, Africa Report no. , April , .
13. For an extensive discussion of the murky relations among the leaders of Boko Haram
and Ansaru, see Jacob Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in
Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel, February , .
14. Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau: Dead, Deposed or Duplicated?”
Militant Leadership Monitor , no. , May , pp. –.
15. See Freedom C. Onuoha, “Why Do Youths Join Boko Haram,” United States Institute
for Peace Special Report , June . Onuoha, drawing on research by the CLEEN
Foundation (Lagos) that includes a mapping study and hundreds of interviews, ana-
lyzes why young men are radicalized, but he does not suggest how many there are.
The CLEEN Foundation was formerly known as the Center of Law Enforcement
Endnotes
Endnotes
Education in Nigeria.
16. Boko Haram robs banks and now benefits from ransoms, and many Boko Haram
weapons come from Nigerian army armories.
17. For a map indicating the intensity of Boko Haram, government, and sectarian violence
by state, see the Nigeria Security Tracker, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-
tracker/p. It is updated monthly.
18. Many of these communities are local in focus and oriented around a charismatic
leader.
19. Horace G. Campbell, “The Menace of Boko Haram and Fundamentalism in Nigeria,”
Pambazuka News, June , .
20. Michael Olugbode and Senator Iroegbu, “Shekau Appears in a Video, Says He’s
Alive,” This Day Live, September , . See also President Jonathan’s “Declaration
of Emergency Rule,” Vanguard, May , . Boko Haram has its own black flag, which
by June was flying in villages that it occupied.
21. Bassey Udo, “Jonathan signs Nigeria’s Budget as Defence gets percent,” Pre-
mium Times, May , .
22. See “Aiding Boko Haram: Army Court-martials Generals, Others,” Leadership,
June , ; “Where Is Safe in Nigeria?” African Seer, January , .
23. See Robyn Dixon, “In Nigeria, Distrust Hampers the Fight Against Boko Haram,”
Los Angeles Times, June , ; Chantal Uwimana and Leah Wawro, “Corruption in
Nigeria’s Military and Security Forces: A Weapon in Boko Haram’s Hands,” Sahara
Reporters, June , .
24. “Nigerian Authorities Failed to Act on Warnings About Boko Haram Raid on School,”
Amnesty International, May , .
25. For graphs of deaths caused by the conflict between the government and Boko Haram
and of related sectarian violence, see the Nigeria Security Tracker, http://www.cfr.org/
nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p.
26. For Nigerian security service abuses, see “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks
and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch, October , pp. –;
“Nigeria: More than , Killed in Armed Conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria in Early
,” Amnesty International, March , , pp. –; Adam Nossiter, “Bodies Pour in
as Nigeria Hunts for Islamists,” New York Times, May , ; Drew Hinshaw, “Hundreds
Killed in Jails Swelling with Islamist Suspects,” Wall Street Journal, October , .
27. Ibid.
28. PBS, “Hunting Boko Haram,” Frontline, September , , http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/hunting-boko-haram.
29. See “Readout of President Obama’s Meeting with Nigerian President Goodluck Jona-
than,” The White House, September , ; “State of Emergency and Fighting in
Northern Nigeria,” U.S. Department of State, May , .
30. Elizabeth Donnelly, “Boko Haram Will Continue to Rampage While Nigeria Tackles
Accountability,” Guardian, April , .
31. Campbell, Nigeria, p. .
32. The most significant political price was that President Obama declined to visit Nigeria
on either of his two African trips.
33. Caroline Dueld, “Nigeria’s ‘Cash and Carry’ Politics,” BBC, January , .
34. These funds could include those looted by heads of state or other senior ocials from
national treasuries or state-owned enterprises.
35. “U.S. Freezes $m Hidden by Former Nigerian Leader Sani Abacha,” Telegraph,
March , .
36. This point has been made to me repeatedly by northern Nigerian interlocutors.
Endnotes
37. Duro Onabule, “Chibok Girls So Near, Yet So Far,” Sun, May , .
38. U.S. Department of State, International Military Education Training Account Sum-
mary, http://www.stategov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c.htm.
39. The Leahy amendment has been a permanent part of the Foreign Assistance Act since
.
John Campbell is the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The second edition of
his book Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink was published in June .
He writes the blog Africa in Transition and edits the Nigeria Security
Tracker on CFR.org. From to , Campbell served as a U.S.
Department of State Foreign Service ocer. He served twice in Nige-
ria, as political counselor from to , and as ambassador from
to . Campbell’s additional overseas postings include Lyon,
Paris, Geneva, and Pretoria. He also served as deputy assistant sec-
retary for human resources, dean of the Foreign Service Institute’s
School of Language Studies, and director of the Oce of UN Politi-
cal Aairs. Campbell received a BA and MA from the University of
Virginia and a PhD in seventeenth-century English history from the
University of Wisconsin, Madison.
About the Author
Pauline H. Baker
Fund for Peace
Herman J. Cohen
American Academy of Diplomacy
Michelle D. Gavin
Jean Herskovits
State University of New York, Purchase
Ernst J. Hogendoorn
International Crisis Group
Princeton N. Lyman
Princeton Lyman and Associates
Geo D. Porter
West Point Combating Terrorism Center
Paul B. Stares, ex ocio
Council on Foreign Relations
Knox Thames
U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom
Alexander Thurston, ex ocio
Council on Foreign Relations
George Ward
Institute for Defense Analyses
Jacob Zenn
Jamestown Foundation
Advisory Committee for
Nigeria, Boko Haram, and the United States
This report reflects the judgments and recommendations of the authors. It does not necessarily represent
the views of members of the Advisory Committee, whose involvement in no way should be interpreted
as an endorsement of the report by either themselves or the organizations with which they are aliated.
Peter Ackerman
Rockport Capital Inc.
Richard K. Betts
Council on Foreign Relations
Patrick M. Byrne
Overstock.com
Leslie H. Gelb
Council on Foreign Relations
Jack A. Goldstone
George Mason University
Sherri W. Goodman
CNA
George A. Joulwan, USA (Ret.)
One Team Inc.
Robert S. Litwak
Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
Thomas G. Mahnken
Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies
Doyle McManus
Los Angeles Times
Susan E. Patricof
Mailman School of Public Health
David Shuman
Northwoods Capital
Nancy E. Soderberg
University of North Florida
John W. Vessey, USA (Ret.)
Steven D. Winch
Ripplewood Holdings LLC
James D. Zirin
Sidley Austin LLC
Center for Preventive Action
Advisory Committee
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of the Center for Preventive Action
The Center for Preventive Action (CPA) seeks to help prevent, defuse,
or resolve deadly conflicts around the world and to expand the body
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Providing a source of expertise on conflict prevention to include
research, case studies, and lessons learned from past conflicts that
policymakers and private citizens can use to prevent or mitigate
future deadly conflicts.
Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation
Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps; CSR No. , June
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy: From Af-Pak to Asia
Daniel S. Markey; CSR No. , January
Afghanistan After the Drawdown
Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane; CSR No. , November
A Center for Preventive Action Report
The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces
Linda Robinson; CSR No. , April
Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies
Micah Zenko; CSR No. , January
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Countering Criminal Violence in Central America
Michael Shifter; CSR No. , April
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East
F. Gregory Gause III; CSR No. , December
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Partners in Preventive Action: The United States and International Institutions
Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko; CSR No. , September
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Justice Beyond The Hague: Supporting the Prosecution of International Crimes in National Courts
David A. Kaye; CSR No. , June
The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat
David A. Shirk; CSR No. , March
A Center for Preventive Action Report
UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests
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An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report
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Published by the Council on Foreign Relations
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Kay King; CSR No. , November
Toward Deeper Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons
Micah Zenko; CSR No. , November
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Internet Governance in an Age of Cyber Insecurity
Robert K. Knake; CSR No. , September
An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report
From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 2010 International Criminal Court
Review Conference
Vijay Padmanabhan; CSR No. , April
Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
Paul Lettow; CSR No. , April
An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report
The Russian Economic Crisis
Jerey Manko; CSR No. , April
Somalia: A New Approach
Bronwyn E. Bruton; CSR No. , March
A Center for Preventive Action Report
The Future of NATO
James M. Goldgeier; CSR No. , February
An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report
The United States in the New Asia
Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning; CSR No. , November
An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report
Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities: International Norms and U.S. Policy
Matthew C. Waxman; CSR No. , October
An International Institutions and Global Governance Program Report
Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action
Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko; CSR No. , October
A Center for Preventive Action Report
The Canadian Oil Sands: Energy Security vs. Climate Change
Michael A. Levi; CSR No. , May
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
The National Interest and the Law of the Sea
Scott G. Borgerson; CSR No. , May
Lessons of the Financial Crisis
Benn Steil; CSR No. , March
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
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Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis
Steven Dunaway; CSR No. , March
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Eurasian Energy Security
Jerey Manko; CSR No. , February
Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea
Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit; CSR No. , January
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Averting Crisis in Ukraine
Steven Pifer; CSR No. , January
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress
Anthony W. Gambino; CSR No. , October
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism
Michael A. Levi; CSR No. , September
China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security
Bruce W. MacDonald; CSR No. , September
Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences of American Indebtedness
Brad W. Setser; CSR No. , September
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt
Daniel S. Markey; CSR No. , July (web-only release) and August
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Avoiding Transfers to Torture
Ashley S. Deeks; CSR No. , June
Global FDI Policy: Correcting a Protectionist Drift
David M. Marchick and Matthew J. Slaughter; CSR No. , June
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Dealing with Damascus: Seeking a Greater Return on U.S.-Syria Relations
Mona Yacoubian and Scott Lasensky; CSR No. , June
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action
Joshua W. Busby; CSR No. , November
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe
Michelle D. Gavin; CSR No. , October
A Center for Preventive Action Report
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The Case for Wage Insurance
Robert J. LaLonde; CSR No. , September
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Reform of the International Monetary Fund
Peter B. Kenen; CSR No. , May
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and Risks
Charles D. Ferguson; CSR No. , April
Nigeria: Elections and Continuing Challenges
Robert I. Rotberg; CSR No. , April
A Center for Preventive Action Report
The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration
Gordon H. Hanson; CSR No. , April
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Robert Z. Lawrence; CSR No. , March
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Bolivia on the Brink
Eduardo A. Gamarra; CSR No. , February
A Center for Preventive Action Report
After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement From Iraq
Steven N. Simon; CSR No. , February
Darfur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities
Lee Feinstein; CSR No. , January
Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea
Terrence Lyons; CSR No. , December
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela
Richard Lapper; CSR No. , November
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right
Keith E. Maskus; CSR No. , November
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Foreign Investment and National Security: Getting the Balance Right
Alan P. Larson and David M. Marchick; CSR No. , July
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Challenges for a Postelection Mexico: Issues for U.S. Policy
Pamela K. Starr; CSR No. , June (web-only release) and November
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U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward
Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson; CSR No. , June
Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations
Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall; CSR No. , June
Peace in Papua: Widening a Window of Opportunity
Blair A. King; CSR No. , March
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security
Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto; CSR No. , March
Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy
Barnett R. Rubin; CSR No. , March
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism
Charles D. Ferguson; CSR No. , March
Getting Serious About the Twin Deficits
Menzie D. Chinn; CSR No. , September
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
Both Sides of the Aisle: A Call for Bipartisan Foreign Policy
Nancy E. Roman; CSR No. , September
Forgotten Intervention? What the United States Needs to Do in the Western Balkans
Amelia Branczik and William L. Nash; CSR No. , June
A Center for Preventive Action Report
A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World
Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan; CSR No. , May
Power-Sharing in Iraq
David L. Phillips; CSR No. , April
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Giving Meaning to “Never Again”: Seeking an Eective Response to the Crisis
in Darfur and Beyond
Cheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. , September
Freedom, Prosperity, and Security: The G8 Partnership with Africa: Sea Island 2004 and Beyond
J. Brian Atwood, Robert S. Browne, and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. , May
Addressing the HIV/AIDS Pandemic: A U.S. Global AIDS Strategy for the Long Term
Daniel M. Fox and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. , May
Cosponsored with the Milbank Memorial Fund
Challenges for a Post-Election Philippines
Catharin E. Dalpino; CSR No. , May
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Stability, Security, and Sovereignty in the Republic of Georgia
David L. Phillips; CSR No. , January
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Council Special Reports
Note: Council Special Reports are available for download from CFR’s website, www.cfr.org.
For more information, email [email protected]rg.
Council Special Report No. 70U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Council on Foreign Relations
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Cover Photo: Women study the Quran at
the Maska Road Islamic School in Kaduna,
Nigeria, on July 16, 2014. The school
condemns the violent ideology of Boko
Haram. (Joe Penney/Courtesy Reuters)
Council Special Report No. 70
November 2014
John Campbell
U.S. Policy to
Counter Nigeria’s
Boko Haram
