Understanding
Californias Property Taxes
MAC TAYLOR • LEGISLATIVE ANALYST • NOVEMBER 29, 2012
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CONTENTS
Executive Summary ..................................................................................................5
Introduction ..............................................................................................................7
What Is on the Property Tax Bill? .............................................................................7
How Are Property Taxes and Charges Determined? ..............................................8
What Properties Are Taxed? ...................................................................................14
How Is the Revenue Distributed? ..........................................................................17
Why Do Local Government Property Tax Receipts Vary? ....................................22
Are There Concerns About How Property Taxes Are Distributed? ......................24
What Are the Strengths and Limitations of Californias
Property Tax System? .........................................................................................26
Appendix 1:
The History of Californias Property Tax Allocation System ................................33
Tax Allocation Prior to Proposition13 ..................................................................34
Proposition13 and the States Response .............................................................34
Changes to the AB 8 System ..................................................................................37
Limits on the States
Authority Over Property Tax Allocation ...............................................................41
Looking Forward ....................................................................................................43
Appendix 2:
Property Tax and Local Government Publications ..............................................44
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
e various taxes and charges on a California property tax bill are complex and oen not well
understood. is report provides an overview of this major source of local government revenue and
highlights key policy issues related to property taxes and charges.
A Property Tax Bill Includes a Variety of Dierent Taxes and Charges. A typical California
property tax bill consists of many taxes and charges including the 1 percent rate, voter-approved debt
rates, parcel taxes, Mello-Roos taxes, and assessments. is report focuses primarily on the
1 percent rate, which is the largest tax on the property tax bill and the only rate that applies uniformly
across every locality. e taxes due from the 1 percent rate and voter-approved debt rates are based on
a propertys assessed value. e California Constitution sets the process for determining a propertys
taxable value. Although there are some exceptions, a propertys assessed value typically is equal to its
purchase price adjusted upward each year by 2 percent. Under the Constitution, other taxes and charges
may not be based on the propertys value.
e Property Tax Is One of the Largest Taxes Californians Pay. In some years, Californians pay
more in property taxes and charges than they do in state personal income taxes, the largest
state General Fund revenue source. Local governments collected about $43 billion in 2010-11 from the
1 percent rate. e other taxes and charges on the property tax bill generated an additional
$12 billion.
e Property Tax Base Is Diverse. Property taxes and charges are imposed on many types of
property. For the 1 percent rate, owner-occupied residential properties represent about
39 percent of the state’s assessed value, followed by investment and vacation residential properties
(34 percent) and commercial properties (28 percent). Certain properties—including property owned by
governments, hospitals, religious institutions, and charitable organizations—are exempt from the
1 percent property tax rate.
All Revenue From Property Taxes Is Allocated to Local Governments. Property tax revenue remains
within the county in which it is collected and is used exclusively by local governments. State laws control
the allocation of property tax revenue from the 1 percent rate to more than 4,000 local governments,
with K-14 districts and counties receiving the largest amounts. e distribution of property tax revenue,
however, varies signicantly by locality.
e Property Tax Has a Signicant Eect on the State Budget. Although the property tax is a local
revenue source, it aects the state budget due to the state’s education nance system—additional property
tax revenue from the 1 percent rate for K-14 districts generally decreases the state’s spending obligation
for education. Over the years, the state has changed the laws regarding property tax allocation many
times in order to reduce its costs for education programs or address other policy interests.
e State’s Current Property Tax Revenue Allocation System Has Many Limitations. e
state’s laws regarding the allocation of property tax revenue from the 1 percent rate have evolved over
time through legislation and voter initiatives. is complex allocation system is not well understood,
transparent, or responsive to modern local needs and preferences. Any changes to the existing system,
however, would be very dicult.
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California’s Property Tax System Has Strengths and Limitations. Economists evaluate taxes
using ve common tax policy criteria—growth, stability, simplicity, neutrality, and equity. e
state’s property tax system exhibits strengths and limitations when measured against these ve
criteria. Since 1979, revenue from the 1 percent rate has exceeded growth in the state’s economy.
Property tax revenue also tends to be less volatile than other tax revenues in California due to the
acquisition value assessment system. (Falling real estate values during the recent recession, however,
caused some areas of the state to experience declines in assessed value and more volatility than
in the past.) Although California’s property tax system provides governments with a stable and
growing revenue source, its laws regarding property assessment can result in dierent treatment
of similar taxpayers. For example, newer property owners oen pay a higher eective tax rate than
people who have owned their homes or businesses for a long time. In addition, the property tax
system may distort business and homeowner decisions regarding relocation or expansion.
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INTRODUCTION
For many California taxpayers, the property
tax bill is one of the largest tax payments they
make each year. For thousands of California local
governments—K-12 schools, community colleges,
cities, counties, and special districts—revenue from
property tax bills represents the foundation of their
budgets.
Although property taxes and charges play a
major role in California nance, many elements
of this nancing system are complex and not well
understood. e purpose of this report is to serve
as an introductory reference to this key funding
source. e report begins by explaining the most
common taxes and charges on the property
tax bill and how these levies are calculated. It
then describes how the funds collected from
property tax bills—$55billion in 2010-11—are
distributed among local governments. Last, because
Californias property taxation system has evoked
controversy over the years, the report provides
a framework for evaluating it. Specically, we
examine California property taxes relative to
the criteria commonly used by economists for
reviewing tax systems, including revenue growth,
stability, simplicity, neutrality, and equity. e
report is followed with an appendix providing
further detail about the allocation of property tax
revenue.
A California property tax bill includes a variety
of dierent taxes and charges. As shown on the
sample property tax bill in Figure1, these levies
commonly include:
e 1percent rate
established by
Proposition13 (1978).
Additional tax rates
to pay for local voter-
approved debt.
Property assessments.
Mello-Roos taxes.
Parcel taxes.
e Constitution
establishes a process for
determining a propertys
taxable value for purposes of
calculating tax levies from
the 1percent rate and voter-approved debt. In our
sample property tax bill, “Box A” identies the
taxable value of the property and “Box B” shows
the propertys tax levies that are calculated based
ARTWORK #120521
Property ID: 1234567
Mailing Address:
Doe, Jane
1234 ABC Street
Sacramento, CA 00000
2012-13 Roll
Land
Improvements
Total
Less Exemptions
Net Assessed Value
Assessed Value
$115,000.00
$242,000.00
$357,000.00
$7,000.00
$350,000.00
Secured Property Tax for Fiscal Year July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013
Property Owner Information
Property Valuation on Jan 1, 2012
Detail of Taxes Due
Sample Annual Property Tax Bill
Agency
General Tax Levy
Voter-Approved Debt Rates
City
Water District
School District
Community College District
Direct Levies
Sidewalk District Assessment
Flood Control District Assessment
Street Lighting District Assessment
Mello-Roos District
School District Parcel Tax
Total Taxes Due
1st Installment
2nd Installment
Rate
1.0000
0.0201
0.0018
0.1010
0.0102
Amount
$3,500.00
$70.35
6.30
353.50
35.70
$9.36
64.39
12.71
86.51
125.00
$4,263.82
$2,131.91
2,131.91
Figure 1
B
C
D
A
Graphic Sign Off
Secretary
Analyst
Director
Deputy
WHAT IS ON THE PROPERTY TAX BILL?
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on this value. Levies based on value—such as the
1percent rate and voter-approved debt rates—are
known as “ad valorem” taxes.
Under the Constitution, other taxes and
charges on the property tax bill (shown in
“Box C”) may not be based on the propertys
taxable value. Instead, they are based on other
factors, such as the benet the property owner
receives from improvements.
As shown in “Box D,” the total amount due on
most property tax bills is divided into two equal
amounts. e rst payment is due by December 10
and the second payment is due by April 10.
HOW ARE PROPERTY TAXES
AND CHARGES DETERMINED?
Ad valorem property taxes—the 1percent rate
and voter-approved debt rates—account for nearly
90percent of the revenue collected from property
tax bills in California. Given their importance,
this section begins with an overview of ad
valorem taxes and describes how county assessors
determine property values. Later in the chapter, we
discuss the taxes and charges that are determined
based on factors other than property value.
Taxes Based on Property Value
e 1Percent Rate. e largest component
of most property owners’ annual property
tax bill is the 1percent rate—oen called the
1percent general tax levy or countywide rate. e
Constitution limits this rate to 1percent of assessed
value. As shown on our sample property tax bill,
the owner of a property assessed at $350,000 owes
$3,500 under the 1percent rate. e 1percent rate
is a general tax, meaning that local governments
may use its revenue for any public purpose.
Voter-Approved Debt Rates. Most tax bills
also include additional ad valorem property tax
rates to pay for voter-approved debt. Revenue
from these taxes is used primarily to repay general
obligation bonds issued for local infrastructure
projects, including the construction and
rehabilitation of school facilities. (As described
in the nearby box, some voter-approved rates are
used to pay obligations approved by local voters
before 1978.) Bond proceeds may not be used for
general local government operating expenses,
such as teacher salaries and administrative costs.
Most local governments must obtain the approval
of two-thirds of their local voters in order to
issue general obligation bonds repaid with debt
rates. General obligation bonds for school and
community college facilities, however, may be
approved by 55percent of the school or community
college districts voters. Local voters do not
approve a xed tax rate for general obligation bond
indebtedness. Instead, the rate adjusts annually so
that it raises the amount of money needed to pay
the bond costs.
Property tax bills oen include more than one
voter-approved debt rate. In our sample property
tax bill, for example, the property owner is subject
to four additional rates because local voters have
approved bond funds for the city and water,
school, and community college districts where the
property is located. ese rates tend to be a small
percentage of assessed value. Statewide, the average
property tax bill includes voter-approved debt rates
that total about one-tenth of 1percent of assessed
value.
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Calculating Property Value for
Ad Valorem Taxes
One of the rst items listed on a property
tax bill is the assessed value of the land and
improvements. Assessed value is the taxable value
of the property, which includes the land and any
improvements made to the land, such as buildings,
landscaping, or other developments. e assessed
value of land and improvements is important
because the 1percent rate and voter-approved
debt rates are levied as a percentage of this value,
meaning that properties with higher assessed
values owe higher property taxes.
Debt Approved by Voters Prior to 1978
e California Constitution allows local governments to levy voter-approved debt
rates—ad valorem rates above the 1percent rate—for two purposes. e rst purpose is to
pay for indebtedness approved by voters prior to 1978, as allowed under Proposition13 (1978).
Proposition42 (1986) authorized a second purpose by allowing local governments to levy additional
ad valorem rates to pay the annual cost of general obligation bonds approved by voters for local
infrastructure projects. Because most debt approved before 1978 has been paid o, most voter-
approved debt rates today are used to repay general obligation bonds issued aer 1986 as authorized
under Proposition42.
Some local governments, however, continue to levy voter-approved debt rates for indebtedness
approved by voters before 1978. While most bonds issued before the passage of Proposition13 have
been paid o, state courts have determined that other obligations approved by voters before 1978
also can be paid with an additional ad valorem rate. Two common pre-1978 obligations paid with
voter-approved debt rates are local government employee retirement costs and payments to the State
Water Project.
Voter-Approved Retirement Benets. Voters in some counties and cities approved ballot
measures or city charters prior to 1978 that established retirement benets for local government
employees. e California Supreme Court ruled that such pension obligations represent voter-
approved indebtedness that could be paid with an additional ad valorem rate. Local governments
may levy the rate to cover pension benets for any employee, including those hired aer 1978, but
not to cover any enhancements to pension benets enacted aer 1978. Local governments may adjust
the rate annually to cover employee retirement costs, but state law limits the rate to the level charged
for such purposes in 1982-83 or 1983-84, whichever is higher. A recent review shows that at least
20 cities and 1 county levy voter-approved debt rates to pay some portion of their annual pension
costs. e rates dier by locality. For example, the City of Fresnos voter-approved debt rate for
employee retirement costs is 0.03percent of assessed value in 2012-13, while the City of San
Fernando’s rate is 0.28percent.
State Water Project Payments. Local water agencies can levy ad valorem rates above the
1percent rate to pay their annual obligations for water deliveries from the State Water Project.
State courts concluded that such costs were voter-approved debt because voters approved the
construction, operation, and maintenance of the State Water Project in 1960. As a result, most water
agencies that have contracts with the State Water Project levy a voter-approved debt rate.
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Under Californias tax system, the assessed
value of most property is based on its purchase
price. Below, we describe the process county
assessors use to determine the value of local “real
property” (land, buildings, and other permanent
structures). is is followed by an explanation of
how assessors determine the value of “personal
property” (property not axed to land or
structures, such as computers, boats, airplanes, and
business equipment) and “state assessed property”
(certain business properties that cross county
boundaries).
Local Real Property Is Assessed at Acquisition
Value and Adjusted Upward Each Year. e
process that county assessors use to determine
the value of real property was established by
Proposition13. Under this system, when real
property is purchased, the county assessor assigns
it an assessed value that is equal to its purchase
price, or “acquisition value.” Each year thereaer,
the propertys assessed value increases by 2percent
or the rate of ination, whichever is lower. is
process continues until the property is sold, at
which point the county assessor again assigns it
an assessed value equal to its most recent purchase
price. In other words, a propertys assessed value
resets to market value (what a willing buyer would
pay for it) when it is sold. (As shown in Figure2,
voters have approved various constitutional
amendments that exclude certain property
transfers from triggering this reassessment.)
In most years, under this assessment practice, a
propertys market value is greater than its assessed
value. is occurs because assessed values increase
by a maximum of 2percent per year, whereas
market values tend to increase more rapidly.
erefore, as long as a property does not change
ownership, its assessed value increases predictably
from one year to the next and is unaected by
higher annual increases in market value. For
example, Figure3 shows how a hypothetical
property purchased in 1995 for $185,000 would
Figure 2
Property Transfers That Do Not Trigger Reassessment
Proposition Year Description
3 1982 Allows property owners whose property has been taken by eminent domain proceedings
to transfer their existing assessed value to a new property of similar size and function.
50 1986 Allows property owners whose property has been damaged or destroyed in a natural
disaster to transfer their existing assessed value to a comparable replacement
property within the same county.
58 1986 Excludes property transfers between spouses or between parents and children from
triggering reassessment.
60 1986 Allows homeowners over the age of 55 to transfer their existing assessed value to a new
home, of equal or lesser market value, within the same county.
90 1988 Extends Proposition 60 by allowing homeowners to transfer their existing assessed value
to a new home, of equal or lesser market value, in a different participating county.
110 1990 Allows disabled homeowners to transfer their existing assessed value from an existing
home to a newly purchased home of equal or lesser market value.
171 1993 Extends Proposition 50 by allowing property owners affected by a natural disaster to
transfer their existing assessed value to a comparable replacement property in a
different participating county.
193 1996 Excludes property transfers between grandparents and grandchildren (when the parents
are deceased) from triggering reassessment.
1 1998 Allows property owners whose property is made unusable by an environmental problem
to transfer their existing assessed value to a comparable replacement property.
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be assessed in 2012. Although the market value
of the property increased to $300,000 by 2002,
the assessed value was $200,000 because assessed
value grew by only up to 2percent each year. Upon
being sold in 2002, the propertys assessed value
reset to a market value of $300,000. Because of the
large annual increase in home values aer 2002,
however, the market value was soon much greater
than the assessed value for the new owner as well.
Property Improvements Are Assessed
Separately. When property owners undertake
property improvements,
such as additions,
remodeling, or building
expansions, the additions
or upgrades are assessed
at market value in that
year and increase by up
to 2percent each year
thereaer. e unimproved
portion of the property
continues to be assessed
based on its original
acquisition value. For example, if a homeowner
purchased a home in 2002 and then added a garage
in 2010, the home and garage would be assessed
separately. e original property would be assessed
at its 2002 acquisition value adjusted upward each
year while the garage would be assessed at its 2010
market value adjusted upward. e propertys
assessed value would be the combined value of the
two portions. (As shown in Figure4, voters have
excluded certain property improvements from
increasing the assessed value of a property.)
Market Value Can Exceed Assessed Value
Figure 3
ARTWORK #120521
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
$600,000
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Property Purchased in 1995
Assessed at acquisition value.
Assessed Value
Increases by up to
2 percent each year.
Property Sold in 2002
Reassessed to acquisition value, then
increases by up to 2 percent annually.
Market Value
Increases or decreases based
on local real estate conditions.
1996 1998 2000 2002 20122004 2006 2008 2010
Graphic Sign Off
Secretary
Analyst
Director
Deputy
Figure 4
Property Improvements That Do Not Increase a
Property’s Assessed Value
Constitutional Amendments Approved After June 1978
Proposition Year Type of Improvement
8 1978 Reconstruction following natural disaster
7 1980 Solar energy construction
31 1984 Fire-safety improvements
110 1990 Accessibility construction for disabled homeowners
177 1994 Accessibility construction for any property
1 1998 Reconstruction following environmental contamination
13 2010 Seismic safety improvements
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Assessed Value May Be Reduced When Market
Values Fall Signicantly. When real estate values
decline or property damage occurs, a property’s
market value may fall below its assessed value as set
by Proposition 13. Absent any adjustment to this
assessed value, the property would be taxed at a
greater value than it is worth.
In these events, county assessors may
automatically reduce the Proposition 13 assessed
value of a property to its current market value.
If they do not, however, a property owner may
petition the assessor to have his or her assessed
value reduced. ese decline-in-value properties are
oen called “Prop 8 properties” aer Proposition 8
(1978), which authorizes this assessment reduction
to market value. Figure 5 illustrates the assessment
of a hypothetical decline-in-value property over
time. e market value of the property purchased
in 1995 stays above its Proposition 13 assessed
value through 2007. A signicant decline, however,
drops the propertys market value below its
Proposition 13 assessed value. At this time, the
property receives a decline-in-value assessment
(equal to its market value) that is less than its
Proposition 13 assessment. For three years, the
property is assessed at market value, which may
increase or decrease by any amount. By 2012,
the propertys market value once again exceeds
what its assessed value would have been absent
Proposition 8 (acquisition price plus the 2 percent
maximum annual increase). In subsequent years,
the propertys assessed value is determined by its
acquisition price adjusted upward each year.
Homeowners Are Eligible for a Property
Tax Exemption. Homeowners may claim a $7,000
exemption from the assessed value of their primary
residence each year. As shown in “Box A” of the
sample property tax bill in Figure 1, this exemption
lowers the assessed value of the homeowner’s land and
improvements by $7,000, reducing taxes under the
Assessed Value Can Fall Below Proposition 13 Value
Figure 5
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
$350,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Market Value
Increases or decreases based
on local real estate conditions.
Property Purchased
Assessed at acquisition value.
Property Assessed
at Market Value
Proposition 13 Value
Increases by a maximum
of 2 percent each year.
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1percent rate by $70 and reducing taxes from voter-
approved debt rates by a statewide average of $8.
Two Types of Property Are Assessed at eir
Market Value. Two categories of property are
assessed at their current market value, rather than
their acquisition value: personal property and state-
assessed property. (We provide more information
about these properties in the nearby box.)
Combined, these types of properties accounted for
6percent of statewide-assessed value in 2011-12.
Most personal property and state-assessed property
is taxed at the 1percent rate plus any additional
rates for voter-approved debt.
Determining Other Taxes and Charges
All other taxes and charges on the property
tax bill are calculated based on factors other than
the propertys assessed value. For example, some
levies are based on the cost of a service provided
to the property. Others are based on the size of
a parcel, its square footage, number of rooms, or
other characteristics. Below, we discuss three of
the most common categories of non-ad valorem
levies: assessments, parcel taxes, and Mello-Roos
taxes. In addition to these three categories, some
local governments collect certain fees for service
on property tax bills, such as charges to clear weeds
on properties where the weeds present a re safety
hazard. ese fees are diverse and relatively minor,
and therefore are not examined in this report.
Assessments. Local governments levy
assessments in order to fund improvements that
benet real property. For example, with the approval
of aected property owners, a city or county may
create a street lighting assessment district to fund
the construction, operation, and maintenance of
street lighting in an area. Under Proposition218
(1996), improvements funded with assessments must
provide a direct benet to the property owner. An
assessment typically cannot be levied for facilities
or services that provide general public benets,
such as schools, libraries, and public safety, even
Properties Assessed at Current Market Value
Personal Property. Personal property is property other than land, buildings, and other
permanent structures, which are commonly referred to as “real property.” Most personal property
is exempt from property taxation, including business inventories, materials used to manufacture
products, household furniture and goods, personal items, and intangible property like gym
memberships and life insurance policies. Some personal property, however, is subject to the property
tax. ese properties consist mainly of manufacturing equipment, business computers, planes,
commercial boats, and oce furniture. When determining the market value of personal property,
county assessors take into account the loss in value due to the age and condition of personal
property—a concept known as depreciation. Unlike property taxes on real property, which are due
in two separate payments, taxes on personal property are due on July 3.
State-Assessed Property. e State Board of Equalization is responsible for assessing certain
real properties that cross county boundaries, such as pipelines, railroad tracks and cars, and canals.
State-assessed properties are assessed at market value and, with the exception of railroad cars, taxed
at the 1percent rate plus any additional rates for voter-approved debt. (As part of a federal court
settlement decades ago, railroad cars are taxed at a rate that is somewhat lower than 1percent. e
railcar tax rate varies each year and currently is about 0.8percent.)
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though these programs may increase the value of
property. Moreover, the amount each property
owner pays must reect the cost incurred by the
local government to provide the improvement and
the benet the property receives from it. To impose a
new assessment, a local government must secure the
approval of a weighted majority of aected property
owners, with each property owner’s vote weighted
in proportion to the amount of the assessment he or
she would pay.
Parcel Taxes. With the approval of two-thirds
of voters, local governments may impose a tax
on all parcels in their jurisdiction (or a subset of
parcels in their jurisdiction). Local governments
typically set parcel taxes at xed amounts per
parcel (or xed amounts per room or per square
foot of the parcel). Unlike assessments, parcel tax
revenue may be used to fund a variety of local
government services, even if the service does not
benet the property directly. For example, school
districts may use parcel tax revenue to pay teacher
salaries or administrative costs. e use of parcel
tax revenue, however, is restricted to the public
programs, services, or projects that voters approved
when enacting the parcel tax.
Mello-Roos Taxes. Mello-Roos taxes are a
exible revenue source for local governments
because they (1) may be used to fund infrastructure
projects or certain services; (2) may be levied
in proportion to the benet a property receives,
equally on all parcels, by square footage, or by other
factors; and (3) are collected within a geographical
area drawn by local ocials.
Local governments oen use Mello-Roos
taxes to pay for the public services and facilities
associated with residential and commercial
development. is occurs because landowners
may approve Mello-Roos taxes by a special
two-thirds vote—each owner receiving one vote
per acre owned—when fewer than 12 registered
voters reside in the proposed district. In this way,
a developer who owns a large tract of land could
vote to designate it as a Mello-Roos district. Aer
the land is developed and sold to residential and
commercial property owners, the new owners pay
the Mello-Roos tax that funds schools, libraries,
police and re stations, or other public facilities and
services in the new community. Mello-Roos taxes
are subject to two-thirds voter approval when there
are 12 or more voters in the proposed district.
WHAT PROPERTIES ARE TAXED?
Property taxes and charges are imposed on
many types of properties. ese properties include
common types such as owner-occupied homes and
commercial oce space, as well as less common
types like timeshares and boating docks. In the
section below, we describe the state’s property tax
base—the types of real properties that are subject
to the 1 percent rate and the share of total assessed
value that each property type represents.
Due to data limitations, we do not summarize
the tax bases of other taxes and charges. We note,
however, that the property tax base for other taxes
and charges is dierent from the tax base for the
1 percent rate. is is because the 1 percent rate
applies uniformly to all taxable real property,
whereas other taxes and charges are levied at
various levels and on various types of property
throughout the state (according to local voter or
local government preferences). For example, if
a suburban school district levies a parcel tax on
each parcel in a residential area, the owners of
single-family homes would pay a large share of the
total parcel taxes. Accordingly, the school districts
parcel tax base would be more heavily residential
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14 LegislativeAnalyst’sOfcewww.lao.ca.gov
than the statewide property tax base under the
1 percent rate (which applies to all taxable
property).
What Properties Are
Subject to the 1 Percent Rate?
Although most real property is taxable,
the Constitution exempts certain types of real
property from taxation. In general, these are
government properties or properties that are used
for non-commercial purposes, including hospitals,
religious properties, charities, and nonprot
schools and colleges. California properties that
are subject to the property tax, however, can be
classied in three ways:
Owner-occupied residential—properties
that receive the state’s homeowner’s
exemption, which homeowners may claim
on their primary residence.
Investment and vacation residential—
residential properties other than those
used as a primary
residence,
including
multifamily
apartments, rental
condominiums,
rental homes,
vacant residential
land, and vacation
homes.
Commercial—
retail properties,
industrial plants,
farms, and other
income-producing
properties.
Distribution of the
Tax Base for the 1Percent Rate
Owner-Occupied Residential. In 2010-11,
there were 5.5million owner-occupied homes
in California with a total assessed value of
$1.6trillion. As shown in Figure6, owner-occupied
residential properties accounted for the largest
share—39percent—of the state’s tax base for the
1percent rate.
Investment and Vacation Residential.
Although the majority of residential properties
are owner occupied, many others are investment
or vacation properties such as multifamily
apartments, rental condominiums, rental homes,
vacant residential land, and vacation homes.
(We classify vacant residential land and vacation
homes as investment properties because they are
an investment asset for the owner, even if he or
she does not receive current income from them.)
In 2010-11, there were 4.2million investment and
vacation residential properties. e assessed value
Share of Assessed Value for Properties Subject to the 1 Percent Rate
a
, 2010-11
a
Excludes personal property and state-assessed property.
Commercial
Owner-Occupied
Residential
Investment and
Vacation Residential
The Distribution of California’s Property Tax Base
ARTWORK #120521
Figure 6
Graphic Sign Off
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Analyst
Director
Deputy
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of these properties was about $1.4trillion, which
represents 34percent of the state’s total assessed
value.
Commercial. In 2010-11, there were
approximately 1.3million commercial properties
in California. is amount includes about
600,000 retail, industrial, and oce properties
(such as stores, gas stations, manufacturing
facilities, and oce buildings). It also includes
500,000 agricultural properties and 200,000 other
properties (gas, oil, and mineral properties and
the private use of public land). While commercial
properties represent a relatively small share of the
state’s total properties, they tend to have higher
assessed values than other properties. erefore,
as shown in Figure6, these properties (which have
a total assessed value of $1.2 trillion) account for
28percent of the state’s property tax base.
Has the Distribution of the
Property Tax Base Changed Over Time?
ere is little statewide information regarding
the composition of California’s property tax base
over time. Based on the available information,
however, it appears that homeowners may be paying
a larger percentage of total property taxes today
than they did decades ago. We note, for example,
that the assessed value of owner-occupied homes
has increased from a low of 32 percent of statewide
assessed valuation in 1986-87 to a high of
39 percent in 2005-06. (e share was 36 percent
in 2011-12.) It also appears likely that owners of
commercial property are paying a smaller percentage
of property taxes than they did decades ago. For
example, Los Angeles County reports that the share
of total assessed value represented by commercial
property in the county declined from 40 percent in
1985 to 30 percent in 2012. In addition, the assessed
value of commercial property in Santa Clara County
has declined (as a share of the county total) from
29 percent to 24 percent since 1999-00.
What Factors May Have Contributed to
Changes in the Property Tax Base?
Various economic changes that have taken
place over time probably have contributed to
changes to California’s property tax base. For
example, investment in residential property has
increased signicantly since the mid-1970s. Newly
built single-family homes have become larger and
are more likely to have valuable amenities than
homes built earlier. As a result, new homes are
more expensive to build and assessed at higher
amounts than older homes. Over the same period,
commercial activity in California has shied away
from traditional manufacturing, which tends to
rely heavily on real property. Newer businesses, on
the other hand, are more likely to be technology
and information services based. ese businesses
tend to own less real property than traditional
manufacturing rms do. (Technology and
information services rms, however, rely heavily
on business personal property—for example,
computing systems, design studios, and oce
equipment—that are taxed as personal property
and not included in the distribution of the state’s
real property tax base.)
It also is possible that Proposition 13’s
acquisition value assessment system has played
a role in the changes to Californias tax base.
Specically, under Proposition 13, properties
that change ownership more frequently tend to
be assessed more closely to market value than
properties that turn over less frequently. (Because
properties are assessed to market value when
they change ownership, properties that have not
changed ownership in many years tend to have
larger gaps between their assessed values and
market values.) It is possible that some categories of
properties change ownership more frequently than
others and this could inuence the composition
of the overall tax base. e limited available
research suggests that investment and vacation
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16 LegislativeAnalyst’sOfcewww.lao.ca.gov
residential properties
change ownership
more frequently than
commercial or owner-
occupied residential
property, indicating that
they may be assessed
closer to market value
than other types of
property.
How MucH
Revenue Is
collected?
In 2010-11, California
property tax bills totaled
$55 billion. As shown
in Figure7, this amount
included $43.2billion
under the 1percent
rate and $5.7billion from voter-approved debt
rates, making ad valorem property taxes one of
California’s largest revenue sources.
Comparatively little is known about the
remaining $6billion of other taxes and charges
on the property tax bill. From various reports
summarizing local government nances, elections,
and bond issuances, it appears that most of this
$6billion reects property assessments, parcel
taxes, and Mello-Roos taxes, though statewide data
are not available on the exact amounts collected for
each of these funding sources.
2010-11 (In Billions)
Property Tax Revenue Compared
With Other Major Revenue Sources
ARTWORK #120521
Figure 7
1 Percent Rate
Voter-Approved
Debt Rates
Other Taxes
and Charges
10
20
30
40
50
$60
Corporation Tax State and Local
Sales and Use Tax
Personal
Income Tax
Property Taxes
and Charges
Graphic Sign Off
Secretary
Analyst
Director
Deputy
HOW IS THE REVENUE DISTRIBUTED?
California property owners pay their property
tax bills to their county tax collector (sometimes
called the county treasurer-tax collector). e
funds are then transferred to the county auditor
for distribution. e county auditor distributes the
funds collected from the 1percent rate dierently
than the funds collected from the other taxes
and charges on the bill. Specically, the 1percent
rate is a shared revenue source for multiple local
governments.
is section describes the distribution of
revenue raised under the 1percent rate and
summarizes the limited available information
regarding the distribution of voter-approved debt
rates and non-ad valorem property taxes and
charges.
Revenue From the 1Percent Rate Is
Shared by Many Local Governments
e 1percent rate generates most of the
revenue from the property tax bill—roughly
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$43billion in 2010-11. On a typical property
tax bill, however, the 1percent rate is listed as
the general tax levy or countywide rate with no
indication as to which local governments receive
the revenue or for what purpose the funds are used.
In general, county auditors allocate revenue from
the 1percent rate to a variety of local governments
within the county pursuant to a series of complex
state statutes.
More an 4,000 Local Governments Receive
Revenue From the 1Percent Rate. All property
tax revenue remains within the county in which
it is collected to be used exclusively by local
governments. As shown in Figure8, property tax
revenue from the 1percent rate is distributed to
counties, cities, K-12 schools, community college
districts, and special districts. Until recently,
redevelopment agencies also received property
tax revenue. As described in the nearby box,
redevelopment agencies were dissolved in 2012, but
a large amount of property tax revenue continues
to be used to pay the former agencies’ debts and
obligations.
Figure 9 shows the share of revenue received by
each type of local government from the 1 percent
rate and voter-approved debt rates. (As described
later in the report, however, these shares vary
signicantly by locality.)
Property Taxes Also Aect the State Budget.
Although the state does not receive any property
tax revenue directly, the state has a substantial
scal interest in the distribution of property
tax revenue from the 1percent rate because of
the state’s education nance system. Each K-12
district receives “revenue limit” funding—the
largest source of funding for districts—from the
combination of local property tax revenue under
the 1percent rate and state resources. us, if
a K-12 districts local property tax revenue is
not sucient to meet its revenue limit, the state
provides additional funds. Community colleges
have a similar nancing system, in which each
district receives apportionment funding from
local property tax revenue, student fees, and state
resources. In 2010-11, the state contributed
$22.5 billion to K-12 revenue limits and community
college apportionments, while the remainder
($14.5 billion) came from local property tax
revenue (and student fees).
State Laws Direct Allocation of Revenue
From the 1Percent Rate. e county auditor is
responsible for allocating revenue generated from
the 1percent rate to local governments pursuant
to state law. e allocation system is commonly
referred to as “AB 8,” aer the bill that rst
Figure 8
How Many Local Governments Receive
Revenue From the 1 Percent Rate?
Type of Local Government Number
Counties
58
Cities
480
Schools and Community Colleges
K-12 school districts 966
County Offices of Education 56
Community college districts 72
Special Districts
Fire protection 348
County service area 316
Cemetery 241
Community services 201
Maintenance 136
Highway lighting 117
County water 100
Recreation and park 85
Hospital 64
Sanitary 60
Irrigation 46
Mosquito abatement 43
Public utility 43
Other
a
400
Redevelopment Agencies
b
422
Total 4,254
a
Thirty three other types of special districts report receiving
property tax revenue from the 1 percent rate. These include county
sanitation, municipal water, memorial, water authority, drainage,
and library districts.
b
Dissolved in 2012. A portion of property tax revenue continues to
pay these agencies’ debts and obligations.
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18 LegislativeAnalyst’sOfcewww.lao.ca.gov
implemented the system—
Chapter282, Statutes of
1979 (AB 8, L. Greene).
In general, AB 8 provides
a share of the total
property taxes collected
within a community to
each local government
that provides services
within that community.
Each local government’s
share is based on its
proportionate countywide
share of property taxes
during the mid-1970s,
a time when each local
government determined
its own property tax rate
and property owners paid
taxes based on the sum of
Most Ad Valorem Property Tax Revenue
Is Allocated to Schools and Counties
a
Figure 9
ARTWORK #120521
2010-11
a
As a percentage of total revenue from the 1 percent rate and voter-approved debt rates.
b
Redevelopment agencies were dissolved in 2012. Successor agencies will continue to use property
tax revenue to pay former agencies' debts and obligations.
K-14 Districts
Counties
Cities
Redevelopment
Agencies
b
Special
Districts
Graphic Sign Off
Secretary
Analyst
Director
Deputy
Redevelopment and Successor Agencies
More than 60 years ago, the Legislature established a process whereby a city or county could
declare an area to be blighted and in need of redevelopment. Aer this declaration, most property
tax revenue growth from the redevelopment “project area” was distributed to the redevelopment
agency, instead of the other local governments serving the project area. As discussed in our report,
e 2012-13 Budget: Unwinding Redevelopment, redevelopment agencies were dissolved in February
2012. Prior to their dissolution, however, redevelopment agencies received over $5billion in property
tax revenue annually. ese monies were used to pay o tens of billions of dollars of outstanding
bonds, contracts, and loans.
In most cases, the city or county that created the redevelopment agency is managing its
dissolution as its successor agency. e successor agency manages redevelopment projects currently
underway, pays existing debts and obligations, and disposes of redevelopment assets and properties.
e successor agency is funded from the property tax revenue that previously would have been
distributed to the redevelopment agency. As a result, even though redevelopment agencies have
been dissolved, some property tax revenue continues to be used to pay redevelopments debts and
obligations. Over time, most redevelopment obligations will be retired and the property tax revenue
currently distributed to successor agencies will be distributed to K-14 districts, counties, cities, and
special districts.
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these rates. (e average property tax rate totaled
about 2.7 percent.) As a result, local governments
that received a large share of property taxes in the
1970s typically receive a relatively large share of
revenue from the 1percent rate under AB 8. (More
detail on the history of the state’s property tax
allocation system—including AB 8is provided in
the appendix of this report.)
Revenue Allocated by Tax Rate Area
(TRA). e county auditor allocates the revenue
to local governments by TRA. A TRA is a
small geographical area within the county that
contains properties that are all served by a unique
combination of local governments—the county, a
city, and the same set of special districts and school
districts. A single county may have thousands of
TRAs. While there is considerable variation in
the steps county auditors use to allocate revenue
within each TRA, typically the county auditor
annually determines how much revenue was
collected in each TRA and rst allocates to each
local government in the TRA the same amount
of revenue it received in the prior year. Each local
government then receives a share of any growth
(or loss) in revenue that occurred within the TRA
that year. Each TRA has a set of growth factors that
specify the proportion of revenue growth that goes
to each local government. ese factors—developed
by county auditors pursuant to AB 8—are
largely based on the share of revenue each local
government received from the TRA during the late
1970s.
Figure10 shows sample growth factors for
TRAs in two California cities. As the gure
indicates, 23percent of any growth in revenue from
the 1percent rate in the sample TRA for Norwalk
would be allocated to the county, 7percent would
go to the city, and the rest would be allocated to
various educational entities and special districts.
e percentage of property tax growth allocated
to each type of local government can vary
signicantly by TRA. For example, Walnut Creeks
K-12 school district receives 33percent of the
growth in revenue within its TRA while Norwalks
school district receives only 19percent from its
TRA. As noted above, this variation is based largely
on historical factors specied in AB 8.
Some Revenue Is Allocated to a Countywide
Account—ERAF. Most of the revenue from the
1percent rate collected within a TRA is allocated
to the city, county, K-14 districts, and special
districts that serve the properties in that TRA. State
law, however, directs the county auditor to shi a
portion of this revenue to a countywide account
that is distributed to other local governments
that do not necessarily serve the taxed properties.
e state originally established this account—the
Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund
(ERAF)—to provide additional funds to K-14
districts that do not receive sucient property tax
revenue to meet their minimum funding level. State
laws later expanded the use of ERAF to include
reimbursing cities and counties for the loss of
other local revenue sources (the vehicle license fee
and sales tax) due to changes in state policy. For
example, Figure 10 shows that 20percent of any
revenue growth within Norwalks TRA is deposited
into ERAF. It is possible that some or all of this
revenue could be allocated to a city or K-14 district
in a dierent part of Los Angeles County.
Most Revenue From Voter-Approved
Debt Distributed to Schools
Voter-approved debt rates are levied on
property owners so that local governments can
pay the debt service on voter-approved general
obligation bonds (and pre-1978 voter-approved
obligations). e state’s K-12 school districts receive
the majority of the revenue from voter-approved
debt rates ($3.1billion of $5.2billion in 2009-10).
e amount received by cities ($520million),
special districts ($470million), and counties
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20 LegislativeAnalyst’sOfcewww.lao.ca.gov
Figure 10
Allocation of Property Tax Growth in Sample Tax Rate Areas
Norwalk, Los Angeles County
a
Percent
Share
Los Angeles County 23%
Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund 20
Norwalk-La Mirada Unified School District 19
Los Angeles County Fire Protection District 18
City of Norwalk 7
Norwalk Parks and Recreation District 3
Los Angeles County Library 2
La Mirada Parks and Recreation District 2
Cerritos Community College District 2
Los Angeles County Flood Control District 1
Los Angeles County Sanitation District 1
Greater Los Angeles County Vector Control
b
Water Replenishment District of Southern California
b
Little Lake Cemetery District
b
Los Angeles County Department of Education
b
100%
Walnut Creek, Contra Costa County
c
Percent
Share
Mount Diablo Unified School District 33%
Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund 17
Contra Costa County 13
Contra Costa County Fire 13
City of Walnut Creek 9
Contra Costa Community College District 5
East Bay Regional Park District 3
Contra Costa County Library 2
Central Contra Costa Sanitary District 2
Contra Costa County Office of Education 1
Contra Costa County Flood Control 1
Bay Area Rapid Transit 1
Contra Costa Water District 1
Contra Costa County Water Agency
b
Contra Costa County Resource Conservation District
b
Contra Costa County Mosquito Abatement District
b
Contra Costa County Service Area R-8
b
Bay Area Air Management District
b
100%
a
Percentages indicate allocation of the growth in property taxes in Los Angeles County tax rate area 06764.
b
Less than 0.5 percent.
c
Percentages indicate allocation of the growth in property taxes in Contra Costa County tax rate area 09025.
($320million) is signicantly less. e amount
of taxes collected to pay voter-approved debt
varies considerably across the state. For example,
the average amount paid by an Alameda County
property owner for voter-approved debt rates is
about $2 for each $1,000
of assessed value, while
the average amount paid
in some counties is less
than 10 cents per $1,000 of
assessed value.
Limited Information
About Distribution
Of Other Property
Taxes and Charges
Less information
is available about the
statewide distribution of
the revenue from parcel
taxes, Mello-Roos taxes,
and assessments.
Parcel Taxes. Recent
election reports and
nancial data suggest that
parcel taxes represent a
signicant and growing
source of revenue for
some local governments.
Specically, between
2001 and 2012, local
voters approved about
180 parcel tax measures
to fund cities, counties,
and special districts, and
about 135 measures to
fund K-12 districts. e
most recent K-12 nancial
data (2009-10) indicate
that schools received
about $350million from
this source. We were not able to locate information
on the statewide amount of parcel tax revenue
collected by cities, counties, and special districts.
Mello-Roos Taxes. Mello-Roos districts are
required to report on their bond issuance, which
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provides some information about the types of local
governments that receive Mello-Roos tax revenue.
It is likely that local governments issuing a large
amount of Mello-Roos bonds also are collecting a
large amount of Mello-Roos tax revenue. Between
2004 and 2011, cities issued about 50percent of the
bonds issued by Mello-Roos districts in California,
followed by K-12 districts at about 30percent.
During the same time period, the issuance of
Mello-Roos bonds was concentrated in specic
regions, as more than 60percent of the bonds were
issued by local governments in four counties—
Riverside, Orange, San Diego, and Placer.
Assessments. Most of the property
improvements funded by assessments are provided
by cities and special districts. In 2009-10, cities and
special districts reported receiving $760million
and $650million, respectively, in revenue from
assessments. In contrast, counties reported
$11million in such revenues.
WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY TAX RECEIPTS VARY?
e share of revenue received by each type of
local government from the 1percent rate varies
signicantly by locality. County governments, for
example, receive as little as 11percent (Orange) and
as much as 64percent (Alpine) of the ad valorem
property tax revenue collected within their county.
As shown in Figure 11, revenue raised from the
1percent rate also varies considerably by locality
when measured by revenue per resident. Orange
County receives about $175 per resident, while
four counties receive more than $1,000 per
resident. Although cities, on average, receive about
$240 per resident in revenue from the 1percent
rate, some receive more than $500 per resident
and many receive less than $150 per resident.
School districts also receive widely dierent
amounts of property taxes per enrolled student,
with an average of just under $2,000. (As noted
above, the state “tops o” school property tax
revenue with state funds to bring most schools to
similar revenue levels.) Finally, special districts
also receive varying amounts of property tax
revenue, though data limitations preclude us from
summarizing this variation on a statewide basis.
ree factors account for most of this
variation in local government property tax
receipts. We discuss these factors below.
Variation in Property Values
California has a diverse array of communities
with large variation in land and property values.
Some communities are extensively developed
and have many high-value homes and businesses,
whereas others do not. Because property taxes
are based on the assessed value of property,
communities with greater levels of real estate
development tend to receive more property
tax revenue than communities with fewer
developments. For example, high-density cities
generally receive more property tax revenue than
rural areas due to the greater level of development.
Coastal and resort areas also typically receive
more property taxes due to the high property
values. Certain high-value properties—such
as a power plant or oil renery—also increase
property tax revenue. Alternatively, localities
with large amounts of land owned by the federal
government, universities, or other organizations
that are not required to pay property taxes may
receive less revenue.
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22 LegislativeAnalyst’sOfcewww.lao.ca.gov
Prior Use of Redevelopment
Prior decisions by cities and counties to use
redevelopment also inuences the amount of
property tax revenue local governments receive.
Prior to the dissolution of redevelopment agencies
in 2012, most of the growth in property taxes
from redevelopment project areas went to the
redevelopment agency, rather than other local
governments. A large share of property tax revenue
now goes to successor agencies to pay the former
redevelopment agencies’ debts and obligations. e
use of redevelopment varied extensively throughout
the state. In those communities with many
redevelopment project areas, the share of property
tax revenue going to other local governments is
less than it would be otherwise. In places with
large redevelopment project areas—such as San
Bernardino and Riverside counties—more than
20percent of the countys property tax revenue may
go to pay the former redevelopment agencies’ debts
and obligations.
State Allocation Laws Reecting
1970s Taxation Levels
Finally, the amount of property taxes allocated
to local governments depends on state property
tax allocation laws, principally AB 8. As discussed
earlier in this report (and in more detail in the
appendix), the AB 8 system was designed, in part,
to allocate property tax revenue in proportion
to the share of property taxes received by a local
government in the mid-1970s. Under this system,
local governments that received a large share of
property taxes in the 1970s typically continue to
receive a relatively large share of property taxes
today. Although there have been changes to the
original property tax allocation system contained
in AB 8, the allocation system continues to be
substantially based on the variation in property tax
receipts in eect in the 1970s.
is variation largely reects service levels
provided by local governments in the 1970s. Local
governments providing many services generally
collected more property taxes in the 1970s to
Figure 11
Property Tax Receipts From the 1 Percent Rate for Selected Local Governments
2009-10
Cities
Property
Taxes per
Resident Counties
Property
Taxes per
Resident Schools
a
Property
Taxes per
Student
Industry $2,541 San Francisco
b
$1,411 Mono $10,683
Malibu 559 Sierra 1,126 San Mateo 5,432
Mountain View 344 Inyo 876 Marin 5,213
Los Angeles 332 Napa 522 San Francisco 4,020
Long Beach 268 El Dorado 464 Orange 3,315
Oakland 250 Los Angeles 359 San Diego 2,760
State Average 242 State Average 320 State Average 1,960
San Jose 200 Alameda 301 Yolo 1,765
Fresno 183 Sacramento 286 Sacramento 1,344
Anaheim 167 Contra Costa 271 San Joaquin 1,163
Santa Clarita 140 San Diego 261 Los Angeles 1,142
Chico 129 Riverside 200 Fresno 810
Modesto 119 Orange 174 Kings 379
a
Countywide average for K-12 schools.
b
San Francisco is a city and a county.
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pay for those services. As a result, those local
governments received a larger share of property
taxes under AB 8. For example, cities and counties
that provided many government services, including
re protection, park and recreation programs, and
water services, typically receive more property tax
revenue than governments that relied on special
districts to provide some or all of these services.
ARE THERE CONCERNS ABOUT HOW
PROPERTY TAXES ARE DISTRIBUTED?
While no system for sharing revenues among
governmental entities is perfect, the state’s system
for allocating property tax revenue from the
1 percent rate raises signicant concerns about
local control, responsiveness to modern needs, and
transparency and accountability to taxpayers. We
discuss these concerns separately below and then
address the question: Could the state change the
allocation system?
Lack of Local Control
Unlike local communities in other states,
California residents and local ocials have
virtually no control over the distribution of
property tax revenue to local governments.
Instead, all major decisions regarding property tax
allocation are controlled by the state. Accordingly,
if residents desire an enhanced level of a particular
service, there is no local forum or mechanism
to allow property taxes to be reallocated among
local governments to nance this improvement.
For example, Orange County currently receives
a very low share of property taxes collected
within its borders—about 11percent. If Orange
County residents and businesses wished to expand
county services, they have no way to redirect
the property taxes currently allocated to other
local governments. eir only option would be
to request the Legislature to enact a new law
approved by two-thirds of the members of both
housesrequiring the change in the property tax
distribution. In other words, local ocials have no
power to raise or lower their property tax share on
an annual basis to reect the changing needs of
their communities. As a result, if residents wish to
increase overall county services, they would need to
nance this improvement by raising funds through
a dierent mechanism such as an assessment or
special tax.
Limited Transparency and Accountability
e state’s current allocation system also makes
it dicult for taxpayers to see which entities receive
their tax dollars. Property tax bills note only that a
bulk of the payment goes to the 1percent general
levy. Even if taxpayers do further research and
locate the AB 8 local government sharing factors
for their TRA, it is dicult to follow the actual
allocation of revenue because the fund shis
related to ERAF and redevelopment complicate this
system.
In addition to making it dicult for
taxpayers to determine how their tax dollars are
distributed, the AB 8 system reduces government
accountability. e link between the level of
government controlling the allocation of the tax
(the state) and the government that spends the
tax revenue (cities, counties, special districts,
and K-14 districts) is severed. For example, if a
taxpayer believes the level of services provided by
an independent park district is inadequate, it is
dicult to hold the district entirely accountable
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because the state is responsible for determining the
share of property taxes allocated to the district.
Limited Responsiveness to Modern
Needs and Preferences
An eective tax allocation system ensures that
local tax revenue is allocated in a way that reects
modern needs and preferences. In many ways,
Californias property tax allocation system—which
remains largely based on allocation preferences
from the 1970s—does not meet this criterion.
California’s population and the governance
structure of many local communities have
changed signicantly since the AB 8 system was
enacted. For example, certain areas with relatively
sparse populations in the 1970s have experienced
substantial growth and many local government
responsibilities have changed. One water district
in San Mateo County—Los Trancos Water
District—illustrates the extent to which the state’s
property tax allocation system continues to reect
service levels from the 1970s. Specically, this water
district sold its entire water distribution system to
a private company in 2005, but continues to receive
property tax revenue for a service it no longer
provides.
Changing the Allocation System Is Dicult
Over the years, the Legislature, local
governments, the business community, and the
public have recognized the limitations inherent in
the state’s property tax allocation system. Despite
the large degree of consensus on the problems,
major proposals to reform the allocation system
have not been enacted due to their complexity and
the dicult trade-os involved. Because California
has thousands of local governments—many
with overlapping jurisdictions—reorienting
the property tax allocation system would be
extraordinarily complex. Updating the AB 8
property tax sharing methodology would require
the Legislature to determine the needs and
preferences of each California community and
local government. is would be a dicult—if not
impossible—task to undertake in a centralized
manner. Alternatively, the state could allow the
distribution of the property tax to be carried
out locally, but there is no consensus about what
process local governments would use to allocate
property taxes among themselves. Whether done
centrally or locally, any reallocation is dicult
because providing additional property tax receipts
to one local government would require redirecting
it from another local government or amending the
Constitution. In addition, any signicant change
to the allocation of property tax revenue would
require approval by two-thirds of the Legislature
due to provisions in the Constitution added by
Proposition1A (2004). (ese issues are discussed
further in the appendix.)
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For many years, California’s overall property
tax system—the types of taxes paid by property
owners and the determination of property owner
tax liabilities—has evoked controversy. Some
people question whether the distribution of the
tax burden between residential and commercial
properties is appropriate and whether the amount
of taxes someone pays should depend, in part, on
how long he or she has owned the property. Other
people praise the nancial certainty that the tax
system gives property owners. From one year to
the next, property owners know that their tax
liabilities under the 1 percent rate will increase
only modestly. In this section, we do not attempt
to resolve this long-standing debate. Instead, we
review property taxes by looking at how they
measure according to ve common tax policy
criteria—growth, stability, simplicity, neutrality,
and equity. Using this framework, we highlight
particular aspects of the state’s property tax system,
both its strengths and limitations, for policymakers
and other interested parties.
Economists use the ve common tax policy
criteria summarized in Figure 12 to objectively
compare particular taxes. ese criteria relate to
how taxes aect people’s decisions, how they treat
dierent taxpayers, and how the revenue raised
from taxes performs over time. In practice, all
taxes involve trade-os. Sometimes the trade-os
are between two tax policy criteria. For example,
revenue sources that grow quickly may be less
stable from one year to the next than other revenue
sources. Other times, the trade-os are between
tax policy criteria and other governmental policy
objectives that may not be directly related to one
of the ve tax criteria. For example, one such
trade-o might be that ensuring that a property
owner’s taxes do not increase dramatically from
one year to the next (a reasonable governmental
policy objective) can result in a tax system in which
the owners of similar properties are taxed much
dierently (contrary to the equity criteria of tax
policy).
Revenue Growth
From governments perspective, revenue sources
that grow along with the
economy are preferable
because they can provide
resources sucient to
maintain current services.
is can help governments
avoid increasing existing
taxes or taxing additional
activities in order to meet
current service demands.
e Property Tax
Has Grown Faster an
the Economy. Personal
income in California—an
WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
OF CALIFORNIA’S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM?
Figure 12
Common Economic Criteria for Evaluating Tax Systems
9 GrowthDoes revenue raised by the tax grow along with the economy
or the program responsibilities it is expected to fund?
9 Stability—Is the revenue raised by the tax relatively stable over time?
9 Simplicity—Is the tax simple and inexpensive for taxpayers to pay and
for government to collect?
9 Neutrality—Does the tax have little or no impact on people’s decisions
about how much to buy, sell, and invest?
9 Equity—Do taxpayers with similar incomes pay similar amounts and do
tax liabilities rise with income?
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What Factors Aect Property Tax Growth Each Year?
Most of the annual change in property tax revenues is the result of large changes in assessed
value that aect a small number of properties, including:
Recently Sold Properties. When a property sells, its assessed value resets to the purchase
price. is represents additional value that is added to the tax base because the sale price of
the property is oen much higher than its previous assessed value.
Newly Built Property and Property Improvements. New value is added to the county’s tax
base when new construction takes place or improvements are made—mainly additions,
remodels, and facility expansions—because structures are assessed at market value the year
that they are built.
Proposition 8 (1978) Decline-in-Value Properties. ese properties contribute signicantly
to growth or decline in a county’s tax base because their assessed values may increase or
decrease dramatically in any year. A particularly large impact on assessed valuation tends
to occur in years when a large number of these properties transfer from Proposition 13
assessment to reduced assessment.
As shown by the dark bars in the gure below, recently sold, newly built, and decline-in-value
properties typically account for more than two-thirds of total changes in countywide assessed value
in Santa Clara County. Other properties, although they represent most of the properties in the
countys tax base, contribute less because the growth of these properties’ assessed values is limited to
2 percent per year.
(In Billions)
Components of Annual Change in
County Assessed Valuation in Santa Clara County
ARTWORK #120521
-5
5
10
15
20
$25
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Other Properties
Due to Recently
Sold, Newly Built,
or Decline-in-Value
Properties
0
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30%
Annual Percent Change
Property Tax Revenue Is Much Less
Volatile Than Personal Income Tax Revenue
Figure 13
ARTWORK #120521
-30
-20
-10
10
20
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Property Tax Revenue From the 1 Percent Rate
Personal Income Tax Revenue
0
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approximate measure of the size of the state’s
economy—has grown at an average annual rate
of 6.3percent since 1979. Over the same period,
revenue from the 1 percent property tax rate has
grown at an average annual rate of 7.3percent.
As we describe in the nearby box, much of the
growth in property tax revenue depends on new
construction and property sales.
e Growth of Parcel and Mello-Roos Tax
Revenues Depends on the Structure of the Tax. e
terms of parcel taxes and Mello-Roos taxes vary by
locality. Some local governments have taxes with
escalation clauses or other provisions that modify
the amount of the tax as local government costs
change. Other parcel taxes and Mello-Roos taxes are
set at xed amounts per parcel. Depending on their
structure, these taxes may or may not provide local
governments with a growing source of revenue.
Revenue Stability
Revenue sources that remain relatively stable
from one year to the next help governments manage
economic downturns, which tend to reduce revenue
and at the same time increase demand for certain
public services. Stable revenue sources also may help
governments plan more eectively for future needs,
including long-term investments in transportation,
education, and public safety.
e Property Tax Is a Stable Revenue Source.
Despite being linked to the volatile real estate
market, the property tax is California’s most stable
major revenue source. Since 1979, as shown in Figure
13, personal income tax revenue has been three
times more volatile, on average, than property tax
revenue from the 1 percent rate. During the same
period, statewide property tax revenue has declined
in only three years, 1994-95, 2009-10, and 2010-11.
e Property Tax Was More Stable an
Other Revenue Sources During the Recent
Recession. As shown in Figure 14, revenue from the
1 percent property tax rate
fared comparatively well
during the most recent
recession. (In the nearby
box, we discuss why the
property tax is stable.)
Changes in property
tax revenue tend to lag
economic trends by one
or more years because
of the state’s acquisition
value assessment system
and the lengthy period
between when most
properties are assessed
(January) and when
property tax payments are
due (December of that year
and April of the next).
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Parcel Taxes and
Mello-Roos Taxes Also
Are Stable. Because most
parcel and Mello-Roos
taxes are set at xed
amounts per parcel, there
is minimal year-to-year
uctuation in the revenues
that they raise.
Assessed Valuation
in Some Counties,
However, Has Declined
Signicantly. ough
statewide property tax
revenue has remained
comparatively stable
throughout the recent
recession, some areas of
the state have experienced
considerable declines
What Factors Aect Property Tax Stability?
Acquisition Value Assessment System Contributes to Revenue Stability. e main reason
Californias property tax revenue is stable is that the assessed value of most properties increases
each year by a maximum of 2percent. In any given year, only a small fraction of properties are
sold and reset to market value. is means that real estate conditions aect a relatively small
portion of the tax base each year, insulating property tax revenue from year-to-year real estate
uctuations.
Proposition 8 (1978) Decline-in-Value Properties Reduce Revenue Stability. As noted
earlier in the report, county assessors may reduce a property’s assessed value in the event that
its market value falls below its assessed value. Each year thereaer, the property is assessed at
market value until it rises above what its assessed value would have been had it remained at its
acquisition value adjusted upward each year at a maximum of 2 percent. During 2010-11, more
than one in four properties in California was temporarily assessed to market value. Because
these properties are assessed each year at market value, they link the property tax base more
closely to the local real estate market than other properties, thereby reducing the property tax’s
stability somewhat.
Percent Change 2007-08 to 2008-09
Personal
Income Tax
Corporation Tax
Sales and Use Tax
Property Tax
a
-25% -20 -15 -10 -5 5 10
Property Tax Revenue During the Recent Recession
Figure 14
ARTWORK #120521
0
a
Revenue from the 1 percent rate.
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in their property tax base. ese counties tend
to have a large proportion of their properties
under Proposition 8 decline-in-value assessments
and have high foreclosure rates. For example,
Riverside County had the second highest number
of foreclosures (17,000) among counties and more
than 400,000 decline-in-value properties in 2011.
Partly as a result of these trends, total assessed
value in Riverside County declined by 15 percent
between 2008 and 2011.
Simplicity
A well-designed tax system should be
simple for taxpayers to understand and easy
and inexpensive for governments to administer.
Complex tax systems can be expensive for
governments to administer eectively and may
be confusing, time-consuming, and costly for
taxpayers.
Most of the costs associated with administering
the state’s property tax system (ad valorem property
taxes, parcel taxes, and Mello-Roos taxes) reect
the activities by county assessors, tax collectors,
and auditors. While comprehensive data on
these costs are not available, total property tax
administration costs likely are between 1.5percent
and 2percent of collections, a somewhat higher
level than that of state tax agencies that perform
similar functions. A signicant component of
the property tax’s administrative cost is from
counties’ responsibility to allocate property taxes
to local governments pursuant to increasingly
complex state laws. County costs related solely
to determining property values, the other main
component of administration, were slightly less
than 1percent of total revenues collected in
2010-11—a percentage similar to that of state tax
agencies.
From the taxpayers’ perspective, the property
tax is generally a simple tax with which to comply.
Tax payments are due in equal installments twice
per year. And, in most years, the assessed value of
real property grows automatically by a maximum
of 2percent. Reassessments based on market value
(which taxpayers are more likely to appeal) occur
infrequently for most property owners.
e property tax assessed on personal property
is typically more administratively cumbersome
for owners and assessors. is is because personal
property is assessed annually at market value using
complex depreciation schedules. ese assessments,
therefore, are more likely to be appealed, a process
that can take more than a year to resolve.
Neutrality
Nearly all taxes alter taxpayer behavior to
some degree. Economists agree, however, that in
most cases the ideal tax system is one that alters
decisions—about what goods to buy, what products
to make, and where to work or live—as little as
possible. Economists prefer these “economically
neutral” taxes because they assume that people
and businesses are in the best position to make
consumption, savings, and investment decisions
that meet their economic and personal needs. Tax
policies that inuence what people buy and what
businesses produce tend to distance people and
businesses from their preferred choices, leaving
them less well o than they would be if the tax
system were economically neutral. Policymakers
design some taxes, on the other hand, to inuence
taxpayer behavior in a way that promotes or
discourages particular activities. In general,
these should be well targeted and have strong
justications so that they achieve their policy
goals with as little interference as possible in other
personal decision making. Below, we describe how
ad valorem property taxes may inuence taxpayer
behavior and then discuss the possible eects of
parcel and Mello-Roos taxes.
Some Homeowners and Businesses May
Move Less Frequently. Californias ad valorem
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property taxes may aect an individuals decision
to move because longer ownership results in a
lower eective property tax rate. (An eective
property tax rate diers from the 1percent basic
rate in that it is the amount of property taxes
paid divided by the current market value of the
property.) As shown in Figure15, eective tax
rates can vary considerably. New Owner A, for
example, has an eective tax rate of 1percent
because the assessed value of his or her property
is the same as its market value. Owners B and
C, who have owned their properties longer than
Owner A, have assessed values below their market
values because their market values increased by
more than 2percent each year (and therefore faster
than assessed values). As a result, most owners
who have owned a property for many years pay
an eective tax rate well below 1percent. For
those choosing to move, however, their eective
tax rate is reset to 1percent, producing a moving
penalty that may inuence some property owners’
relocation decisions. For example, established
rms that benet from their comparatively low
eective property tax rates could be dissuaded
from relocatingdecisions that, absent the moving
penalty, could benet the companies nancially.
(As we discuss below, diering eective tax rates
also aect the equity of the property tax.)
Homeowners and Businesses May Invest Less
in Property Improvements. When a property
undergoes improvements, the newly constructed
portion of the property is assessed at its full market
value. e existing property, on the other hand,
is typically assessed
below its current market
value, meaning that
improvements are taxed
at a higher eective rate
than existing property.
Because improvements
are subject to higher
eective tax rates, the return on investment that
businesses receive from new improvements is lower
and the taxes that homeowners pay on them are
higher than they would be if all property—new
and existing—were taxed uniformly. is may
lead some businesses and homeowners to invest
less than they otherwise would in new property
improvements.
Homeowners May Change Behavior in
Response to Assessment Exclusions. Voters
have approved ballot propositions that exclude
some types of property transfers from triggering
reassessment to market value. (ese exclusions are
summarized earlier in this report in
Figure 2.) For example, residential property
transfers between certain family members do not
trigger reassessment. ese exclusions could alter
decisions homeowners make about their property.
For example, a homeowner might transfer property
to his or her child (thereby passing on his or her
low eective property tax rate) when, absent the
exclusion, the owner might have sold the property to
a nonrelative. In turn, that child could nd it more
economical to rent the property (and benet from
the low eective property tax rate) than to sell (and
forego the benet of his or her low eective rate).
Equity
Equity relates to how taxes aect taxpayers
with dierent levels of income or wealth.
Economists use two dierent standards of
equityvertical and horizontal—to evaluate taxes.
Vertical equity occurs when wealthier taxpayers
Figure 15
Hypothetical Effective Property Tax Rates for Three Property Owners
Year
Purchased
Market
Value
Assessed
Value
Property
Tax Rate
Property
Tax Paid
Effective
Tax Rate
Owner A 2012 $300,000 $300,000 1% $3,000 1.0%
Owner B 2002 300,000 180,000 1 1,800 0.6
Owner C 1986 300,000 110,000 1 1,100 0.4
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pay a greater amount in taxes than less wealthy
taxpayers. Horizontal equity, on the other hand,
occurs when similar taxpayers—those with similar
incomes or wealth—pay the same amount in taxes.
Under an equitable property tax system (1) owners
of highly valuable property pay more in taxes than
owners of less valuable property and (2) the owners
of two similar properties pay a similar amount in
property taxes. Put dierently, an equitable system
would tax property owners at the same eective
rate. As we discussed in the previous section,
however, property owners oen are subject to
dierent eective tax rates. erefore, California’s
ad valorem property taxes, parcel taxes, and
Mello-Roos taxes oen do not meet these standards
of equity.
Equity Reduced by Acquisition Value
Assessment and 2Percent Assessed Value
Cap. California’s property tax system does not
consistently meet the standards of horizontal or
vertical equity. As discussed earlier in this report,
two owners with identical properties may pay
dierent amounts of property taxes if one owner
bought the property a decade before the other. In
a tax system with horizontal equity, both owners
would pay similar amounts. In relation to vertical
equity, the tax systems reliance on acquisition
value and the 2percent cap on assessed valuation
growth can result in owners of valuable property
paying less than owners of (recently acquired) less
valuable property. In a tax system with vertical
equity, owners of valuable property would pay
more in taxes because owners of valuable property
generally are wealthier than owners of less valuable
property.
Homeowners Who Are Mobile Pay Higher
Eective Tax Rates. Homeowners who move
oen—military families, younger homeowners,
or those with jobs that require them to relocate
frequently—tend to have higher eective ad
valorem tax rates than homeowners who move less
frequently because newly purchased properties are
assessed at market value. Relocation decisions may
result from circumstances that households may
not have foreseen, such as employment changes,
divorce, or other changes in family composition.
Under horizontal equity, in contrast, taxpayers
pay similar taxes unless their household income,
wealth, or consumption patterns dier.
Fixed-Rate Taxes Do Not Meet Vertical
Equity Standard. Parcel taxes and Mello-Roos
taxes typically meet the criteria of horizontal
equity but not vertical equity because property
owners typically are charged the same amounts—
regardless of their wealth or their properties’ value.
Summary
Our comparison of California’s property tax
system with common tax policy criteria found
mixed results. e ad valorem taxes generally
meet the goals of administrative simplicity and
providing governments with a growing source of
stable revenue, but oen do not meet the goals of
neutrality and equity. Specically, California’s
ad valorem tax system (1) may inuence decisions
property owners make about relocations and
expansions and (2) treat similar taxpayers
dierently and wealthier taxpayers the same as less
wealthy taxpayers.
Californias other property taxes (parcel taxes
and Mello-Roos taxes) generally perform well
relative to the goals of stability, administrative
simplicity, and horizontal equity, but may perform
less well in regard to the other objectives.
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APPENDIX 1:
THE HISTORY OF CALIFORNIAS
PROPERTY TAX ALLOCATION SYSTEM
Californias system
for allocating property
tax revenue from the
1percent rate among local
governments is complex
and has changed over
time. e most signicant
change was voter approval
of Proposition13 in
1978, which shied the
control over the allocation
of property taxes from
local communities to
the state. Since that
time the state has made
several major changes
that aect the amount
of property tax revenue
from the 1percent rate
distributed to counties,
cities, K-14 districts, and
special districts. Some
of these changes have
beneted the state scally
(by indirectly reducing
state costs for education).
Others have beneted
local governments or
taxpayers. is appendix
describes the evolution
of the state’s property tax
allocation system. e key events are highlighted in
FigureA-1, and described in more detail below.
Figure A-1
History of California’s Property Tax Allocation
1972 SB 90Establishes school “revenue limit” funding system, giving the
state a significant fiscal interest in the allocation of local property tax
revenue.
1978 Proposition 13Voters cap the basic property tax rate at 1 percent and
give the state new responsibilities for allocating property tax revenue.
SB 154State’s first law allocating property tax revenue. Amounts
based on share of property tax received prior to Proposition 13, with
state providing grants for some of local revenue loss.
1979 AB 8State changes property tax allocations in SB 154, establishes
system for allocating future growth in property tax revenue, and absorbs
costs of some local programs.
1992 First ERAF Shift—State permanently shifts some property tax revenue
from counties, cities, and special districts into a fund for K-14 districts.
1993 Second ERAF Shift—State permanently shifts additional property tax
revenue into a fund for K-14 districts.
2004 Triple FlipState uses some local sales tax revenue to repay
deficit-financing bonds. Reimburses counties and cities with property tax
revenue from ERAF and K-14 districts.
The VLF SwapState permanently shifts some property tax revenue
from ERAF and K-14 districts to reimburse cities and counties for the
state’s reductions to their VLF revenue.
Temporary ERAF Shift—State shifts some property tax revenue from
noneducational local agencies to K-14 districts for two years.
Proposition 1A—Voters restrict the state’s authority to shift property tax
revenue away from cities, counties, and special districts.
2009 Proposition 1A (2004) BorrowingState borrows $1.9 billion of
property tax revenue from cities, counties, and special districts as
authorized by Proposition 1A.
2010 Proposition 22Voters eliminate the states authority to borrow
property tax revenue and to shift redevelopment agencies’ property tax
revenue.
2012 Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies—Redevelopment agencies
are abolished. Over time, their share of the property tax will revert to
other local governments.
ERAF = Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund; VLF = vehicle license fee.
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TAX ALLOCATION PRIOR TO PROPOSITION13
Tax Allocation Determined Locally Until
1978. Prior to voter approval of Proposition13 in
1978, each local government authorized to levy
a property tax set its own rate (within certain
statutory restrictions). Each local government
annually determined the amount of revenue
necessary to nance the desired level of services
and set its property tax rate to collect that amount.
A property owner’s property tax bill reected the
sum of the individual rates set by each taxing
entity. Under this system, schools and community
colleges received over 50percent of statewide
property tax revenue, counties about 30percent,
and cities about 10percent. (At the local level,
however, the share of property tax revenue
supporting each type of local government varied.
Some communities, for example, provided a greater
percentage of total property tax revenue to schools
and others provided more to their county or city.)
Property Tax Allocation Linked to State
Budget in 1972. Although local governments had
control over the property tax during this period,
property tax revenue had an eect on the state’s
budget beginning in 1972. Chapter1406, Statutes
of 1972 (SB 90, Dills), started an education nance
system in which the state guarantees each school
district an overall level of funding. For K-12
districts, each district receives an overall level of
funding—a “revenue limit”—from local property
taxes and state resources combined. Community
college districts receive apportionment funding
from local property taxes, student fees, and state
resources. us, if a district’s local property tax
revenue (and student fee revenue in the case of
community colleges) is not sucient, the state
provides additional funds. If a districts nonstate
resources alone exceed the districts revenue limit
or apportionment funding level, the district does
not receive state aid and can keep the excess local
property tax revenue for educational programs
and services at their discretion. ese districts
are commonly referred to as “basic aid” districts
because historically they have received only the
minimum amount of state aid required by the
California Constitution (known as basic aid). is
system of school nance gives the state a signicant
scal interest in the distribution of local property
tax revenue.
PROPOSITION13 AND THE STATE’S RESPONSE
Proposition13 fundamentally changed
local government nance and assigned the state
responsibility for property tax allocation. Property
tax receipts fell by more than 60percent because
Proposition13 lowered the statewide property tax
rate to a constitutional maximum of 1percent.
Additionally, the measure required the state,
rather than local communities, to determine the
allocation of property tax revenue among the
local governments within a county. In response to
Proposition13, the Legislature enacted two major
bills: Chapter292, Statutes of 1978
(SB 154, Petris) and then Chapter 282, Statutes
of 1979 (AB 8, L. Greene). In general, these bills
established methods for allocating the new lower
amount of property tax revenue and shied certain
county and school district costs to the state.
First State Allocation System—SB 154
Shortly aer the passage of Proposition13,
the Legislature approved SB 154 in an eort to
avoid major local government service reductions
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and signicant scal distress from the decrease in
property tax revenue. Senate Bill 154 was the state’s
rst attempt to allocate property taxes among
counties, cities, special districts, and K-14 districts.
Under SB 154, a local government’s share of the
1percent property tax rate in 1978-79 was based on
the share of countywide property tax revenue going
to that local government before Proposition13.
For example, if a city received 10percent of the
property taxes collected by all local jurisdictions in
the county prior to the passage of Proposition13,
the city would receive 10percent of the property
taxes collected in the county at the 1percent rate.
is was a signicant change from the allocation of
property taxes prior to Proposition 13, when a local
government received property tax revenue only
from the properties located within its jurisdiction.
In addition, to partially oset the revenue loss
resulting from the reduction in the property tax
rate, SB 154 used state funds to relieve counties of a
portion of their obligation to pay for certain health
and welfare programs and to provide block grants
to counties, cities, and special districts.
The Current Property Tax
Allocation System—AB 8
A year aer enacting SB 154, the Legislature
adopted AB 8, a long-term policy to allocate
property taxes and provide scal relief to local
governments. e legislation (1) directed county
auditors to allocate 1979-80 property tax revenue
in a manner similar to SB 154 but with some
modications and (2) established a method for
allocating property tax growth in future years.
New Base Property Tax Allocation. Assembly
Bill 8 established a new base property tax allocation
for 1979-80. e new base allocations in AB 8
resembled those in SB 154—a local governments
share was based on the share of the countywide
property tax going to that local government
before Proposition13with some modication.
Specically, rather than continue the state block
grants included in SB 154, AB 8 increased the
base share of property taxes allocated to most
counties, cities, and special districts by reducing
the base share going to K-14 districts. (Under the
state’s school nance system, K-14 district losses
were in turn made up with increased state funds
for education.) For cities and special districts, the
increase in the base property tax allocation was
derived from the block grant amount provided in
SB 154. Cities received increased property taxes
equivalent to about 83percent of their
SB 154 block grant amount and special districts
95percent of their block grant amount. Counties
received a combination of increased property
taxes, reduced expenditure obligations for health
and social services programs, and a state block
grant for indigent health programs. e reduced
county expenditure obligations included complete
state assumption of the costs for Medi-Cal and the
State Supplementary Payment Program, as well
as an increased state share of costs for the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (the
predecessor to California Work Opportunities and
Responsibility to Kids). (ese changes resulted
in an increased share of property tax revenue for
most counties. As discussed in the box on page 36,
six counties ended up as so-called negative bailout
counties.) In summary, AB 8 shied property
tax revenue away from K-14 districts in order to
provide cities, special districts, and most counties
with a greater amount of property tax revenue than
they received the previous year under SB 154. As
shown in
Figure A-2 (see next page), this greatly reduced K-14
districts’ share of the statewide property tax.
New Method for Allocating Property Tax
Growth. Assembly Bill 8 also established a new
process for allocating growth (or decline) in
property tax revenue in future years. In contrast to
the property tax allocation process in 1978-79 and
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1979-80 (that distributed revenue on a countywide
basis without regard to where the property was
located), the legislation specied that future growth
in property tax revenue would be allocated only
to those local governments serving the property
where the revenue increase took place. Accordingly,
beginning in 1980-81, AB 8 required that each local
government receives the same amount of property
tax it received in the prior year plus its share of
any growth or decline in property tax revenue that
occurred in its jurisdiction.
To ensure that each local government receives
the property tax growth from the properties it
serves, each county is divided into tax rate areas
(TRAs). Each local government represented in a
TRA receives a share of the property tax growth
60%
ARTWORK #120521
a
As a percentage of total revenue from the 1 percent rate and voter-approved debt rates.
10
20
30
40
50
1976-77 1980-81 1984-85 1988-89 1992-93 1996-97 2000-01 2004-05 2008-09
K-14 Districts
Counties
Cities
SB 154,
AB 8
Permanent
ERAF Shifts
Enacted
Triple Flip,
VLF Swap,
Two-Year
ERAF Shift
b
Special districts and redevelopment agencies. Payments from redevelopment agencies to K-14 schools not included.
Major Changes in Allocation of California Property Tax Revenue
a
Figure A-2
ERAF = Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund; VLF = vehicle license fee.
Other Districts
b
Graphic Sign Off
Secretary
Analyst
Director
Deputy
What Are “Negative Bailout Counties?”
Assembly Bill 8 did not provide additional property tax revenue to six counties (Alpine, Lassen,
Mariposa, Plumas, Stanislaus, and Trinity). Under the provisions of AB 8, the increased share of
the base property tax allocation to counties was calculated as the value of the SB 154 block grant
plus a small adjustment for the cost of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program less
the amount of the indigent health block grant. In these six counties, the value of the indigent health
block grant was so great that it exceeded the value of the adjusted SB 154 block grant. In order for
these counties to be treated in the same way as all other counties, the amount of property taxes
allocated to these counties was reduced. Because these counties received a smaller percentage of
total property taxes collected aer implementation of AB 8 relative to their pre-Proposition13
shares, these counties are termed negative bailout counties.
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that occurs within that TRA. As required by
AB 8, county auditors developed a methodology to
determine the percentage of property tax growth—
known as TRA factors—to allocate to each local
government in each TRA. ese TRA factors
were based largely on the 1979-80 base allocation
established by AB 8 (including the shi of property
tax revenue from K-14 districts to other local
governments). In most counties, these TRA factors
remain constant. us, if a city received 25 percent
of the property tax revenue growth generated in a
TRA in 1980-81 (the rst year TRA factors were
used to distribute property tax revenue growth),
it continued to receive 25 percent of the growth
in property taxes in future years. As a result, the
distribution of property tax revenue among local
governments continued to closely resemble the
1979-80 distribution until the rst major changes
to the AB 8 system occurred in the 1990s.
In summary, the AB 8 property tax allocation
system provides each local government with the
same amount of property tax revenue it received
in the prior year (the base), plus its share of any
growth or decline in property tax revenue that
occurred in its jurisdiction in the current year.
CHANGES TO THE AB 8 SYSTEM
e state property tax allocation system set up
in AB 8 continues to be the basis for property tax
allocation among local governments today. Since
1979, however, there have been some signicant
changes to the original property tax allocation
system contained in AB 8. In most cases, the
changes reect the complex scal relationship
between the state and local governments. Because
of the state’s role in allocating property tax revenue
aer Proposition13 and in funding K-14 districts
and other local programs, decisions regarding
the state budget and other policy issues have led
the Legislature and Governor to occasionally
change how property tax revenue is distributed.
We highlight the major changes in property tax
allocation below. It is important to note, however,
that these changes in property tax allocation do
not explain the entire scope of the state-local scal
relationship—a relationship that also has involved
the realignment of many government programs and
changes in other revenue sources such as the sales
tax and the vehicle license fee (VLF). Some of these
decisions have beneted the state scally, and others
have beneted local governments or taxpayers.
No and Low Property Tax Cities
One change in property tax allocation relates
to so-called “no and low property tax cities.” Cities
that did not levy a property tax, levied only a very
low property tax, or were not incorporated as cities
prior to the passage of Proposition13 typically
received few property taxes under AB 8. During
the 1980s the Legislature directed county auditors
to modestly increase the amount of property taxes
going to some of these cities by shiing a share of
county property tax revenue to them.
Property Taxes Shifted to Schools
Ongoing Property Tax Shis Started in 1990s.
In 1992-93 and 1993-94, in response to serious
budgetary shortfalls, the Legislature and Governor
permanently redirected almost one-h of
statewide property tax revenue—over $3 billion in
1993-94—from cities, counties, and special districts
to K-14 districts. (e legislation also temporarily
required redevelopment agencies to make payments
to K-14 districts.) Under the changes in property
tax allocation laws, the redirected property tax
revenue is deposited into a countywide fund for
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schools, the Educational Revenue Augmentation
Fund (ERAF). e property tax revenue from
ERAF is distributed to non-basic aid schools and
community colleges, reducing the state’s funding
obligation for K-14 school districts.
e amount transferred into ERAF from each
city, county, and special district was based on many
factors, including the magnitude of the scal relief
that the state provided the local government in
AB 8 and, for counties, the level of taxable sales
within its borders. As a result, individual local
government ERAF obligations varied widely. For
example, the ERAF shis from cities formed aer
1978 typically were lower than those for older
cities because the newer cities did not receive any
AB 8 benets. Similarly, counties with many retail
developments typically had larger ERAF shis than
rural counties because the state anticipated that
extensively developed counties would receive more
relief from the states primary ERAF mitigation
measure: a half-cent sales tax for local public safety
(Proposition172, 1993). As shown in Figure A-2,
aer the ERAF transfer of the early 1990s, schools
and community colleges once again received more
than 50percent of the state’s property tax revenue,
while other local governments received less.
“Excess ERAF” Shied Back. In the late 1990s,
some county auditors reported that their ERAF
accounts had more revenue than necessary to
oset all state aid to non-basic aid K-14 districts. In
response, the Legislature enacted a law requiring
that some of these surplus funds be used for
countywide special education programs and the
remaining funds be returned to cities, counties,
and special districts in proportion to the amount of
property taxes that they contributed to ERAF. e
ERAF funds that are returned to non-education
local governments are known as excess ERAF.
Additional Temporary Property Tax
Shi. e 2004-05 budget package also shied
$1.3billion of property taxes from noneducation
local agencies (cities, counties, special districts,
and redevelopment agencies) to ERAF in 2004-05
and again in 2005-06. is temporary ERAF shi
reduced the state’s funding responsibilities for K-14
districts to help address the budget shortfalls in
those two years.
Changes to ERAF
e Triple Flip. In 2004, state voters approved
Proposition57, a decit-nancing bond to address
the state’s budget shortfall. e state enacted a
three-step approach—commonly referred to as
the triple ip—that provides a dedicated funding
source to repay the decit bonds:
Beginning in 2004-05, one-quarter cent
of the local sales tax is used to repay the
decit-nancing bond.
During the time these bonds are
outstanding, city and county revenue
losses from the diverted local sales tax are
replaced on a dollar-for-dollar basis with
property taxes shied from ERAF.
e K-14 tax losses from the redirection of
ERAF to cities and counties, in turn, are
oset by increased state aid.
e triple ip increases the amount of property
tax revenue going to cities and counties and reduces
the amount of ERAF provided to K-14 districts.
Overall, however, cities, counties, and K-14 districts
do not experience any net change in revenue from
the triple ip. Cities and counties receive more
property tax revenue, but this revenue gain is oset
by the reduction in sales tax revenue. K-14 districts
receive less property tax revenue, but this is oset
with increased state aid. e ip of sales taxes
for property taxes ends aer the decit-nancing
bonds are repaid (currently estimated to occur in
2016).
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e VLF Swap. e VLF—a tax on vehicle
ownership—provides revenue to local governments.
In 1999, the state began reducing the VLF rate and
backlling city and county revenue losses from
this tax reduction with state aid. e 2004-05
budget package permanently replaced the state
VLF backll by diverting property tax revenue
from ERAF and, if necessary, non-basic aid K-14
districts to cities and counties. In 2004-05, cities
and counties did not experience a change in overall
revenue from the VLF swap, as the amount of
property tax shied to them was equal to the VLF
backll amount. In subsequent years, state law
species that each local government’s VLF swap
payment grows based on the annual change in
its assessed valuation. As a result, most cities and
counties benet scally from the VLF swap because
assessed valuation typically grows more quickly
than VLF revenue. Similar to the triple ip, K-14
districts’ property tax revenue losses are made up
with increased state aid.
Distributing ERAF
e triple ip and VLF swap further expanded
the use of ERAF and changed the priorities
governing how its resources are used. As shown in
Figure A-3, the original purpose of ERAF was to
supplement the property tax revenue of non-basic
aid K-14 districts. Under current law, however,
funding K-14 districts falls to the fourth priority.
As a result, non-basic aid school districts do not
receive any ERAF resources unless additional funds
remain aer the county auditor (1) returns excess
ERAF, (2) reimburses the triple ip, and
(3) make payments for the VLF swap. is change
in priorities has a signicant eect on the amount
of ERAF available for school districts. In 2010-11,
for example, auditors in 33 counties reported using
all ERAF resources for the rst three priorities,
leaving no ERAF for schools.
Figure A-4 (see next page) displays the complex
process county auditors follow to allocate ERAF
and to reimburse cities and counties for the triple
ip and VLF swap. is gure also shows that,
under certain circumstances, it is possible that the
auditor could determine that there are not enough
funds to fully compensate cities and the county for
the triple ip and/or the VLF swap. ese funding
insuciencies are referred to as “insucient
ERAF.”
Step 1: Return Excess ERAF. As shown in the
gure, the rst step is for each county auditor to
determine whether the funds deposited into the
countywide account exceed the amount needed by
all non-basic aid K-14 districts in the county, plus
a specied amount for special education. If so, the
excess ERAF is returned to cities, special districts,
and the county in proportion to the amount
of property taxes they contributed to ERAF.
is calculation of excess ERAF was modied
recently to reect the increased revenue that K-14
districts and ERAF receive from the dissolution of
redevelopment agencies. Specically, to maximize
the state scal benet related to redevelopment
Figure A-3
Uses of ERAF Listed in Priority Order
Priority Early 1990s Late 1990s to 2004 2004 to Present
First
Fund non-basic aid K-14 districts
Return excess ERAF Return excess ERAF
Second
Fund non-basic aid K-14 districts
Reimburse triple flip
Third Make payments for VLF swap
Fourth
Fund non-basic aid K-14 districts
ERAF = Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund; VLF = vehicle license fee.
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Process to Distribute ERAF and
Reimburse the Triple Flip and VLF Swap
ARTWORK #120521
Figure A-4
County auditors shift
property taxes from
counties, cities, and
special districts to ERAF.
Does the amount in ERAF
exceed the total amount needed
by K-14 districts?
(2) Use ERAF to
reimburse cities and
counties for triple flip.
(1) Return excess
ERAF to counties,
cities, and special districts.
Is ERAF sufficient to fully
pay for VLF swap?
(5) Distribute remaining
ERAF funds to
K-14 districts.
(4) Negative ERAF:
Use property taxes
from K-14 districts that
are not basic aid to
pay for VLF swap.
County is
experiencing
insufficient ERAF.
Are K-14 district property
taxes sufficient to fully
pay for VLF swap?
End.
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
ERAF = Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund; VLF = vehicle license fee.
Is ERAF sufficient to fully
reimburse for triple flip?
(3) Use remaining ERAF
to pay cities and
counties for VLF swap.
YES
NO
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40 LegislativeAnalyst’sOfcewww.lao.ca.gov
dissolution, Chapter 26, Statues of 2012 (AB 1484,
Committee on Budget) directs county auditors to
exclude property taxes related to the dissolution of
redevelopment agencies in the calculation of excess
ERAF.
Step 2: Reimburse Triple Flip. Following the
calculation and distribution of excess ERAF, state
law directs county auditors to reimburse local
governments for their revenue losses associated
with the triple ip. is reimbursement is shown
in the gure as step two. If the county auditor uses
all available ERAF, but determines that the local
governments have not been fully reimbursed for
the triple ip, the county has insucient ERAF. In
this situation, additional state action is required if
cities and counties are to be fully reimbursed for
the triple ip.
Steps 3 and 4: Pay for VLF Swap. Aer
reimbursing the triple ip, the next use of ERAF
is to make payments to local governments for
the VLF swap. If the county auditor determines
that ERAF resources are not sucient to fully
pay cities and the county for the VLF swap, the
county auditor redirects some property taxes from
non-basic aid K-14 districts for this purpose, as
shown in step 4. e redirection of school property
taxes is commonly referred to as negative ERAF
because it decreases K-14 property taxes rather
than supplementing them (the original purpose of
ERAF). If the amount of property taxes deposited
in ERAF and allocated to non-basic aid school
district is not enough to make the payments
required under the VLF swap, then the county
has insucient ERAF. In this situation, additional
state action is required for cities and counties to
receive the full VLF swap payment. In 2012-13, the
rst time this issue came before the Legislature,
the state included $1.5 million in the budget to
compensate the county and cities in Amador
County for insucient ERAF.
Step 5: Distribute Remaining ERAF to K-14
Districts. Any funds remaining in ERAF aer the
other uses have been satised are distributed to
schools and oset state education spending.
LIMITS ON THE STATE’S
AUTHORITY OVER PROPERTY TAX ALLOCATION
e state’s use of property tax shis to help
resolve its severe budget diculties—as well
as other actions aecting the state-local scal
relationship—have been a source of considerable
friction between state and local government.
In response, local government advocates have
sponsored initiatives to limit the state’s authority
over local nances, including two constitutional
measures reducing the state’s authority over
property tax allocation. As a result, much of the
authority granted to the state in Proposition13 and
used to establish AB 8, ERAF, the VLF swap, and
the triple ip is now restricted.
Proposition1A (2004)
In 2004, voters approved Proposition1A,
amending the State Constitution to prohibit the
state from shiing property tax revenue from cities,
counties, and special districts to K-14 districts.
e measure, however, provided an exception to
its restrictions. Beginning in 2008-09, the measure
allowed the state to shi a limited amount of local
property tax revenue to schools and community
colleges provided that the state repaid local
governments for their property tax losses, with
interest, within three years. e measure also
specied that any change in how property tax
An LAO RepORt
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revenue is shared among cities, counties, and
special districts must be approved by two-thirds
of both houses of the Legislature (instead of by
majority vote). For example, state actions that shi
a share of property tax revenue from one local
special district to another, or from the county to a
city, require approval by two-thirds of both houses
of the Legislature.
e state utilized Proposition1As exception for
shiing property tax revenue to provide state scal
relief in its 2009-10 budget package. Specically, the
state borrowed $1.9billion of property tax revenue
from cities, counties, and special districts—revenue
equal to roughly 8percent of each local agencys
property tax revenue. (Under Proposition1A, the
state was required to repay these funds by 2012-13.
Companion legislation, however, allowed local
governments to borrow against the state’s future
repayments so that local government budgets were
not negatively aected in 2009-10.) e 2009-10
budget package also required redevelopment agencies
to make payments totaling $1.7billion (2009-10)
and $350million (2010-11) to K-12 school districts
serving students living in or near their redevelopment
areas. Unlike the borrowing from cities, counties,
and special districts, the state did not reimburse
redevelopment agencies for these required payments.
Proposition22 (2010)
In 2010, voters approved Proposition22,
which, among other things, prohibits the state
from redirecting property tax revenue as it did in
2009-10. Specically, Proposition22 eliminates the
state’s authority to borrow property tax revenue
from local governments as previously allowed
under Proposition1A and prohibits the state from
requiring redevelopment agencies to shi revenue to
K-14 districts or other agencies. As discussed in the
nearby box, the prohibition on shiing redevelopment
funds contributed indirectly to the dissolution of
redevelopment agencies in February 2012.
The Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies
As discussed in our report, e 2012-13 Budget: Unwinding Redevelopment, redevelopment
had the overall eect of increasing state costs for K-14 education. For this reason, the state
frequently required redevelopment agencies to shi some funds to support K-14 education. Under
Proposition22 (2010), however, the state no longer had the authority to require redevelopment
agencies to shi property tax revenue to school districts. Facing considerable scal constraints and
not authorized to shi funds from redevelopment for state scal relief as it had done in the past, the
Legislature took a new approach as part of the state’s 2011-12 budget. Specically, the Legislature
approved and the Governor signed Chapter5, Statutes of 2011 (ABX1 26, Blumeneld), which
dissolved all redevelopment agencies. ey also approved Chapter6, Statutes of 2011 (ABX1 27,
Blumeneld), allowing redevelopment agencies to avoid dissolution by voluntarily agreeing to make
annual payments to school districts. e Supreme Court later ruled ABX1 27 unconstitutional,
meaning all redevelopment agencies were subject to ABX1 26s dissolution requirement. Under
the dissolution process, the property tax revenue that formerly went to redevelopment agencies is
rst used to pay o redevelopment debts and obligations and the remainder is distributed to local
governments in accordance with AB 8.
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LOOKING FORWARD
Proposition1A and Proposition22 limit the
state’s authority to change property tax allocation
laws. Measures that reallocate property tax revenue
among counties, cities, and special districts require
a two-thirds vote of the Legislature and measures
that change state laws to increase the percentage of
property taxes allocated to schools are prohibited.
Even without additional legislative action, however,
the distribution of property tax revenue will change
in the near future for two reasons.
End of Redevelopment. As the debts
and obligations of former redevelopment
agencies are paid o, property tax
revenue that previously was allocated to
redevelopment agencies will be distributed
to K-14 districts, counties, cities, and
special districts.
The End of the Triple Flip. We estimate
that the state’s decit-nancing bonds
will be paid o in 2016-17. At that time,
the state sales tax rate will decline by
one-quarter cent and the local sales tax
rate will increase by one-quarter cent.
Because the local sales tax rate is restored
in full, the property tax revenue currently
used to backll cities and counties for the
loss in sales tax revenue will be allocated
to K-14 districts. Although none of these
entities will experience any change in
overall revenue, cities, and to a lesser
extent counties, will receive a smaller share
of the property tax than they do today.
In addition, the property tax revenue
allocated to K-14 districts will reduce the
state’s education costs.
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APPENDIX 2:
PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Property Taxes
Property Tax Agents at the Local Level in
California: An Overview (June 20, 2012)
Discusses the role of property tax agents in
appealing property assessments.
Reconsidering AB 8: Exploring Alternative
Ways to Allocate Property Taxes
(February 3, 2000)
Examines the problems in the current property
tax allocation system and discusses the tensions
and trade-os inherent in ve reform proposals.
Reversing the Property Tax Shis
(April 2, 1996)
Explains the mechanics of the Educational
Revenue Augmentation Fund shi and the
formulas which implemented it.
Local Finance
Major Milestones: Over Four Decades of the
State-Local Fiscal Relationship
(November 29, 2012)
Provides a timeline summarizing major
changes in the state-local relationship.
Local Government Bankruptcy in California:
Questions and Answers (August 7, 2012)
Addresses some common questions about the
Chapter 9 process for local governments.
e 2012-13 Budget: Unwinding
Redevelopment (February 17, 2012)
Reviews the history of redevelopment agencies,
the events that led to their dissolution, and the
process communities are using to resolve their
nancial obligations.
e 2011-12 Budget: Should California End
Redevelopment Agencies? (February 8, 2011)
Examines the Governor’s proposal to end
redevelopment.
Ten Events at Shaped California State-
Local Fiscal Relations (December 16, 2009)
Discusses key events and measures that
inuenced state-local relations.
Overview of California Local Government
(June 17, 2010)
Summarizes key issues related to local
government.
Understanding Proposition 218
(December 17, 1996)
Examines the constitutional requirements
related to property assessments and fees.
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LAO Publications
This report was prepared by Chas Alamo and Mark Whitaker, and reviewed by Marianne O’Malley. The Legislative
Analyst’s Ofce (LAO) is a nonpartisan ofce that provides scal and policy information and advice to the Legislature.
To request publications call (916) 445-4656. This report and others, as well as an e-mail subscription service,
are available on the LAO’s website at www.lao.ca.gov. The LAO is located at 925 L Street, Suite 1000,
Sacramento, CA 95814.
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