Myth, Manipulation, and Minor League Baseball: How a Capitalist Democracy Engenders Income Inequality

University of Cincinnati Law Review University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volume 89 Issue 1 Article 3

October 2020

Myth, Manipulation, and Minor League Baseball: How a Capitalist Myth, Manipulation, and Minor League Baseball: How a Capitalist

Democracy Engenders Income Inequality Democracy Engenders Income Inequality

Phillip J. Closius

University of Baltimore School of Law

Joseph S. Stephan

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Myth, Manipulation, and Minor League Baseball: How a

Capitalist Democracy Engenders Income Inequality

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MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE

BASEBALL: HOW A CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY

ENGENDERS INCOME INEQUALITY

Phillip J. Closius*

Joseph S. Stephan**

I. INTRODUCTION

Dreams are the foundation of American culture.

Dreams have always

been with us: the early religious image of America as a “city upon a hill,”

the immigrant dream that education leads to a better life,

the ideal that

anyone can grow up to be President,

the belief that hard work will always

pay off,

America as the land of equal opportunity for all

—to name but

a few. This Article deals with one of America’s most deep-seated dreams:

the wish of a child—and frequently the child’s parents—to play a

professional sport. The dream of becoming a professional athlete has

engendered an industry of travel teams and specialized coaches catering

to the athletic development of grade school children.

As children

become adults, their love of the game turns them into fans who support

multi-billion dollar sports leagues.

Concepts of capitalism are as enduring as dreams in American culture.

Although the modern American economy contains socialistic programs

begun in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration,

the cultural dialogue

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law

** University of Baltimore School of Law, J.D. May 2020

. See Matthew Wills, James Truslow Adams: Dreaming up the American Dream, JSTOR

DAILY (May 18, 2015), https://daily.jstor.org/james-truslow-adams-dreaming-american-dream/.

. See John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630).

. See Vanessa Vallejos, Youth Voices: Life, Liberty, and Justice for All, HARV. EDUC. REV.,

Fall 2011, available at https://www.hepg.org/her-home/issues/harvard-educational-review-volume-

81-number-3/herarticle/_835.

. See RICHARD K. LAIRD, THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: WHEN LOYALTY MINIMIZES

LEARNING 210 (2019).

. See Scott Horsley, Obama's Own Story Defines His American Dream, NPR (May 30, 2012,

4:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/05/30/153994202/obamas-own-story-defines-his-american-

dream.

. See JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214 (1931).

. See Survey: Youth Baseball Participation on the Rise, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2019),

https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/27448703/youth-baseball-participation-rise.

. See Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21,

2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for-

2019/#172b58195d78.; Robert Kuenster, Why Fans Love the Game of Baseball, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2019,

10:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertkuenster/2019/01/18/why-fans-love-the-game-of-baseball/#7ef6115117a1.

. See Sven Beckert & Christine Desan, The New History of American Capitalism, HARVARD

BUS. SCH. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-new-history-of-american-capitalism.

. See Peter Canellos, What FDR Understood About Socialism that Today’s Democrats

Don’t, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/16/democrats-

socialism-fdr-roosevelt-227622.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 85

of today’s America remains overwhelmingly capitalistic. Americans are

suspicious of handouts and welfare.

The term “socialism” and the label

“socialist” are unpopular with a majority of Americans.

Capitalism has

earned its place in the cultural lexicon by providing Americans with an

efficient free market economy. In recent years, American wealth has

grown exponentially as technology has enabled capitalistic practices to be

adapted to the global economy.

However, this economic boom has

made the deficiencies of capitalism in America increasingly obvious. One

of the most glaring deficiencies is growing income inequality.

American dreams and values should be reflected in the federal

legislature, the most powerful branch of the republic created by the

Constitution.

The division of Congress into two chambers was intended

as a check on this power.

The population-based House of

Representatives was limited by the state-based Senate.

The Framers

intended this structure to make Congress a reflection of a rational

majoritarian will.

This reality is best illustrated by the legislative

implementation of The New Deal which transformed America from a

libertarian state-dominated republic into a quasi-socialist federal-

dominated democracy.

An overwhelming majority of the population

used Congress to reject a system that was not working and create the

foundation for modern America’s power and wealth.

More recently,

however, Congress has become increasingly manipulated by wealth

generated by capitalism, especially as the cost of running for office

soars.

Campaign contributions and political lobbying are two methods

by which the wealthy achieve their legislative goals. The political

influence of wealth has increased income disparity at a shocking rate.

. See Emily Ekins, What Americans Think About Poverty, Wealth, and Work, CATO

INSTITUTE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/what-americans-

think-about-poverty-wealth-work.

. See id. (“A majority (59%) of Americans have favorable views of the word ‘capitalism,’

while 39% have an unfavorable view of it. In reverse, 39% of Americans have a favorable view of

the word ‘socialism,’ while 59% view socialism negatively.”).

. See Jerry Harris, Globalization, Technology and the Transnational Capitalist Class, 17

FORESIGHT 194 (2015).

. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Capitalism Actually Generates More Inequality,

EVONOMICS (Aug. 11, 2016), https://evonomics.com/how-capitalism-actually-generates-more-

inequality/.

. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).

. See id.

. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.

. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).

. See Louis Menand, How the Deal Went Down, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2013),

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-down.

. See id.

. See Soo Rin Kim, The Price of Winning Just Got Higher, Especially in the Senate,

OPENSECRETS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/the-price-of-winning-

just-got-higher-especially-in-the-senate/; see supra Part IV.B.

. See As Inequality Grows, So Does the Political Influence of the Rich, THE ECONOMIST (July

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86 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

The wealthy have frequently exploited American dreams as a means of

increasing their resources. The manipulation of dreams by wealthy

capitalists is clearly illustrated in the context of American professional

sports. Professional sports generate billions of dollars for team owners,

as well as large incomes and public acclaim for elite professional

athletes.

However, the path to becoming an elite athlete runs through

fierce competition against thousands of other athletes in various age

brackets.

Professional sports are vicious competitions of attrition in

which the elite rise above the less talented and injured. As stated by Sara

Teristi, a gymnast who was a victim of Michigan State Dr. Larry Nassar:

“People don’t understand how many broken girls it takes to produce an

elite athlete.”

Elite athletes cannot be created or identified without the

cauldron of travel teams, AAU teams, high school teams, college teams,

and minor leagues. Without elite athletes, the enormous revenue

generated by professional sports will disappear.

Income inequality is evident in the financial realities of aspiring

professional athletes who do not reach the highest level of their sport. As

the major sports leagues generate billions of dollars, the economic plight

of the athletes who do not “make it,” but who support the developmental

system of those who do, is becoming increasingly obvious.

Wealthy

individuals who own major sports leagues increase their resources by

exploiting a dream and manipulating the law.

The plight of minor

league baseball (“MiLB”) players best exemplifies this reality.

The

dream of being a professional baseball player has long held a special place

in American culture.

Baseball owners exploit that dream by

21, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/07/21/as-inequality-grows-

so-does-the-political-influence-of-the-rich.

. However, for many elite athletes, even their wealth is an illusion. Despite making

millions during their careers, many professional athletes experience financial difficulties shortly

after their retirement from sports. See Leigh Steinberg, 5 Reasons Why 80% of Retired NFL Players

Go Broke, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:51 PM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2015/02/09/5-reasons-why-80-of-retired-nfl-players-

go-broke/#1e4cb10678cc (It is “estimated that 80% of retired NFL players go broke in their first

three years out of the League.”).

. See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA,

http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-

athletics (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).

. Abigail Pesta, The Survivor, TIME, July, 29, 2019, at 48.

. See Dirk Hayhurst, An Inside Look into the Harsh Conditions of Minor League

Baseball, BLEACHER REPORT (May 14, 2014), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2062307-an-

inside-look-into-the-harsh-conditions-of-minor-league-baseball; see also Jon Solomon, The History

Behind the Debate over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INSTITUTE (Apr. 23, 2018),

https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/.

. See Hayhurst, supra note 26 (“[A]t its lowest levels, professional baseball is

exploitation. It has been for years—decades. So long, in fact, that it has become a victim of its own

belief system: that a player must sacrifice and succumb to unfair treatment as part of ‘chasing the

dream.’”); infra Part IV.

. See infra Part III.B.

. See DAVID LAMB, THE MINORS, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 146, 149 (1st

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underpaying MiLB players who have almost no chance of making a Major

League team.

Owners also use their political influence to deny MiLB

players many of the rights generally enjoyed by other Americans.

MiLB players dedicate their lives to perfecting their craft and chasing

their major league dreams. During the season, most MiLB players work

well over forty hours per week at a rate lower than the federal poverty

level.

Furthermore, their work is not limited to the baseball season, and

the players are not compensated for their mandatory participation in

workouts, spring training, and development leagues.

A former player’s

reflection on his professional baseball career in the minors illustrates the

plight of MiLB players:

I wasn’t lucky to be there, I earned it. I worked my ass off to get to that

point in my career and wouldn’t change a second of it. But, I was treated

like property. Speaking up now has taught me a lot about this country: I

should be grateful for the opportunity and keep my mouth shut about the

quality of life they present to me.

My 2017 season lasted seven months, March through September. March

was unpaid. April – unpaid. May – unpaid. Sixteen days in June – unpaid.

For 8-10 hours a day, six days a week, for sixteen weeks, I made $0. For

my short season (72 games), I was paid $45 per game, or $3 an hour for 70

hours a week. I was guaranteed two meals in my contract and rarely got

food to eat. I had to purchase my own equipment (bats, cleats, batting

gloves, first base mitt, etc.), rent, travel, and $80 a month for a group of

rich high schoolers to clean my jersey. I played in front of 8,000 people a

night and went to bed hungry. I made less money that summer than the

batboy and after seven months of work, I left with less money than I started,

and $2000 in credit card debt.

I was ultimately released after that season due to a back injury. I couldn’t

even walk as I received that phone call.

With wages below the poverty line and no mobility to market their

services, MiLB players are stuck in a broken system in which pre-existing

economic security is nearing the status of a prerequisite for a successful

ed., 1994).

. See infra Part III.B.

. See infra Part IV.

. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.

. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.

. Jeremy Wolf, I’ve Lived My Dream, BASEBALL & BUSINESS (June 6, 2018),

https://www.baseballandbusiness.com/ive-lived-my-dream/. The grind of minor league life, as

illustrated by Wolf, is also depicted by social media accounts dedicated to posting anonymous

player-submitted content showing horrifying minor league conditions from a humorous angle. See

Andersen Pickard, Talking About the Grind of Life as a Minor League Baseball Player with

“MinorLeagueGrinders”, MLB DAILY DISH (Oct. 10, 2018, 11:00 AM),

https://www.mlbdailydish.com/2018/10/10/17919590/talking-about-the-grind-of-life-as-a-minor-

league-baseball-player-with-minorleaguegrinders.

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88 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

baseball career.

For many players, the financial realities of everyday

life turn the pursuit of a dream into a financial nightmare.

Since the

dawn of free agency four decades ago, average Major League Baseball

player salaries have grown about 10,000%.

In the same period, average

MiLB pay has not even increased enough to cover inflation.

This broken system has developed, in part, as a result of Major League

Baseball’s ability to buy legislative favors that specifically exempt MiLB

from the strictures of federal antitrust law and the requirements of the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

Although the failures of the courts and

collective activity are also to blame, Congressional activity, bought and

paid for by Major League Baseball, has deprived MiLB players of the

ability to sue for both violations of the antitrust laws and the FLSA.

Major League Baseball and MiLB set new revenue records each year,

major league players share in the riches while their minor league brothers

languish in poverty. Baseball is therefore a microcosm of the income

inequality that afflicts the nation.

Part II of this Article explains the structure of the minor leagues and

the Rule 4 Draft.

Part III illustrates the income inequality present in the

minor leagues.

Part IV explains how Major League Baseball has used

the law to perpetuate the inequity plaguing the overwhelming majority of

minor league players.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

MiLB is divided into five classes: Triple A (“AAA”), Double A

(“AA”), Class A (“A” or “Single-A”), Class A Short Season, and

Rookie.

Furthermore, Class A is split into Class A Advanced (“High

A”) and Class A.

The Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA)

“provides industry stability” and binds Major League Baseball teams and

MiLB affiliates through a series of Player Development Contracts

. See infra Part III.

. See Amy Moritz, Playing America’s ‘War of Attrition,’ THE BUFFALO NEWS (July 3,

2016), https://buffalonews.com/2016/07/03/playing-americas-war-of-attrition/.

. See Ted Berg, $12,000 a Year: A Minor Leaguer Takes His fight for Fair Pay Public,

FTW.USATODAY.COM (Jan. 31, 2017,9:18 AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/01/minor-league-

baseball-pay-fair-labor-standards-act-minimum-wage-lawsuit-kyle-johnson.

. See id.

. See infra Part IV.

. See infra Part II.

. See infra Part III.

. See infra Part IV.

. Overview of Baseball’s Minor League Organization, THE SPORTS ADVISORY GROUP,

http://www.thesportsadvisorygroup.com/resource- library/business-of-sports/overview-of-

baseballs-minor-league-organization/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2018).

. Id.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 89

(PDCs).

Each season, there are approximately 6,500 players throughout

the minor league ranks.

The players, managers, coaches, trainers, and other staff throughout the

minor leagues are paid by Major League Baseball.

Each year, MiLB

teams pay a fee to Major League Baseball.

Under the current PBA,

MiLB pays a total of $20 million each season to Major League Baseball.

In 2018, Major League Baseball saw record gross revenues of $10.3

billion.

In 2019, Major League Baseball revenue increased again to

$10.7 billion.

MiLB is also prospering; merchandising revenue has

increased nearly every year over the past decade

and team valuations

have soared over the past few decades.

In the National Football League and the National Basketball

Association, most drafted players begin their careers making comfortable

salaries on the roster of the organization which drafted them in the next

season immediately after being drafted, without spending several years in

development leagues.

In contrast, players drafted by Major League

. Benjamin Hill, Minors Extend Agreement Through 2020, MILB (Mar. 8, 2011),

https://www.milb.com/milb/news/minors-extend-agreement-through-2020/c-16867482.

. Maury Brown, Minor League Ballplayers Would Lose Minimum Wage Rights As Part Of

$1.3 Trillion Spending Bill, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/

maurybrown/2018/03/22/minor- league-ballplayers-will-lose-minimum-wage-rights-as-part-of-1-

3-trillion-spending-bill/#41b0e47337fa.

. Maury Brown, Minimum Wage Exemption is the Culmination of a Battle over MLB and

Minor League Baseball Economics, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2018),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/ 2018/03/26/the-fragile-economics-between-mlb-the-

minors-and-the-minimum-wage-exemption/#47dfa383c219.

. Id.

. Eric Stephen, MLB’s Fight with Minor League Baseball is Getting Uglier, SB NATION

(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2019/12/17/21023144/minor-league-

baseball-negotiations-mlb-bernie-sanders-rob-manfred.

. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues of $10.3 Billion for 2018, FORBES (Jan. 07,

2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-record-revenues-

of-10-3-billion-for-2018/#2abb07865bea.

. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21,

2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for-

2019/#172b58195d78.

. See David Broughton, MiLB, Teams Had Record Merchandising Sales in 2018, SPORTS

BUSINESS JOURNAL (July 8, 2019),

https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/07/08/Research-and-Ratings/MiLB-

merchandise.aspx (“Minor League Baseball and its 160 clubs in the U.S. and Canada combined to

a record $73.9 million in merchandise sales [in 2018] . . . . That’s up 4% from 2017’s $70.9 million

and marks the category’s ninth straight annual increase.”).

. See Ray Glier, Minor League Baseball is Better Business, Not Bigger Business, USA

TODAY (May 8, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2017/05/08/minor-

league-baseball-better-business-not-bigger-business/101451572/ (“[T]he valuations of teams in

many markets has soared. Class AA teams that 30 years ago were worth $500,000 are now worth

$16 million to $25 million in some markets”); Sergei Klebnikov, Minor League Baseball’s Most

Valuable Teams, FORBES (July 8, 2016, 11:11 AM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2016/07/08/minor-league-baseballs-most-valuable-

teams/#6ff4581443b2 (“Minor League Baseball’s 20 most valuable teams are now worth an average

$37.5 million, up almost 35% from 2013 when FORBES last published its MiLB valuations”).

. See Topher Doll, How Long Does the Average Draft Pick Stick Around?, MILE HIGH

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Baseball teams begin their careers in MiLB. The Major League Baseball

First-Year Player Draft (known as the “Rule 4 Draft”) is forty rounds long

and results in over 1,200 players drafted each year from the United States,

Canada and Puerto Rico.

There are more than 240 MiLB teams

affiliated with the thirty Major League Baseball clubs.

If a player is

selected in the Rule 4 Draft, the Major League Baseball team which

drafted him holds the exclusive rights to sign him, and will assign the

player to one of the team’s minor league affiliates after signing him to a

contract.

If the player chooses to sign with the team who drafted him instead of

continuing his amateur career at the college level, or his collegiate

eligibility has expired, he is required by the Major League Rules (MLRs)

to sign a MiLB Uniform Player Contract (UPC).

If a player refuses to

sign the UPC, he is disqualified “from playing with the contracting Club

or entering the service of any Major or Minor League Club unless the

player is released or assigned.”

The UPC contains a reserve clause that

keeps a player under control of the Major League Baseball club for seven

seasons—effectively eliminating all of the player’s mobility and

bargaining power during that period.

This sort of control, paired with

the owners’ manipulation of the players’ dreams, breeds income

inequality that pervades throughout the minor leagues.

III. INCOME INEQUALITY IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

As required by the MLRs, all first-year players are compensated

equally, regardless of the classification of the MiLB team to which the

player is assigned.

There is a mandated maximum salary of $1,100 per

month for all players in their first contract season.

After the first season,

REPORT (May 13, 2014), https://www.milehighreport.com/2014/5/13/5713996/how-long-does-the-

average-draft-pick-stick-around.

. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book 47 (2019),

available at https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf, [https://perma.cc/GDM3-

5JMZ]. Although the Rule 4 draft has historically been 40 rounds, its future length is unclear. MLB

and the MLBPA agreed in March of 2020 that the 2020 Rule 4 draft would only be 5 rounds and the

2021 Rule 4 draft would be a minimum of 20 rounds.

. Teams by Affiliation, MILB, http://www.milb.com/ milb/info/affiliations.jsp (last visited

Dec. 26, 2018).

. See First-Year Player Draft Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last

visited Dec. 26, 2018).

. Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at 27-28.Foreign first-year players who are not

subject to the Rule 4 Draft are required to sign a similar UPC to begin their careers. Id.

. Id. at 40.

. Id. at 27-28.

. Id. at 29.

. Brandon Sneed, This is What It’s Like to Chase Your Pro Baseball Dreams…For 12 Bucks

an Hour, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 3, 2017), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2700299-this-is-

what-its-like-to-chase-your-pro-baseball-dreamsfor-12-bucks-an-hour. See also The Business of

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 91

the UPC empowers the MiLB team to reduce the player’s compensation

by 20% each season.

Salaries beyond the first season are also dictated

by the classification of a player’s assigned team.

Minimum salaries are

low, and the average salaries are not much higher than the minimum.

The weekly minimum salary for players at the rookie ball and Class A

levels is $290.

The weekly minimum increases to $350 at the Double

A level, and $502 in Triple A.

While on the road, players also receive

a $25 per diem.

Most drafted players will receive a signing bonus when they execute

the UPC.

This bonus is in addition to the weekly salaries noted above.

The signing bonuses drafted players receive varies drastically due to the

draft being forty rounds long.

The signing bonuses are usually, but not

always, tied to the round in which a player is drafted.

The signing bonus

can be millions of dollars for first round players but drops precipitously

as each round passes.

Signing bonuses also vary greatly within each

round.

Players drafted after the first ten rounds may receive signing

bonuses up to $125,000, which can increase if the team is willing to pay

the excess from its bonus pool allotment.

By the twentieth round of the

2019 draft, some players received $125,000, but others signed for as little

MiLB, MILB, https://www.milb.com/about/faqs-business (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).

. Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at at 209-10.

. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.

. The average monthly salaries for minor league players in 2017 was: $1,300 in Class A,

$1,600 in Class A Advanced, $3,000 in Double A, and $10,000 in Triple A. See Ronald Blum,

Baseball Players in Minors to Lose Minimum Wage Protection, AP NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018),

https://www.apnews.com/cb183f59e88948e8b9cd49ad07bde807. However, the Triple A average is

skewed by the few players who earn significantly more because they are on major league 40-man

rosters. See Sneed, supra note 63. The 40-man roster is the pool of players who can be added to the

typical 25-man major league active roster. This type of roster move typically occurs when players

on the active roster take paternity leave or are forced to miss extended time due to an injury. Those

players who are on the 40-man roster but not the 25-man active roster remain in the minors awaiting

the call. See also, infra note 67 (“For players on 40-man rosters on option to the minors, the

minimum is $46,000” for the 2020 season.). Because this unique situation skews the mean, the

median monthly Triple A salary of $5,000 is a more representative statistic. See Sneed, supra note

63.

. Associated Press, MLB to Raise Minimum Salaries for Minor League Players in 2021,

SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/02/14/mlb-minor-league-

player-salary-increases-2021.

. Id.

. Blum, supra note 66.

. See infra note 72.

. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.

. See Justin Perline, Amateur Draft Bonus Analysis, BEYONDTHEBOXSCORE (Dec. 1, 2017,

12:00 PM), https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2017/12/1/16715898/amateur-draft-bonus-

analysis-slot-mlb.

. See Jim Callis, Here are the 2019 Draft Pools and Bonus Values, MLB (June 3, 2019),

https://www.mlb.com/news/2019-mlb-draft-pools-and-bonus-values.

. See id.

. See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.

. See id.

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92 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

as $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000.

By round 30, fewer players received

$125,000 and even more signed for $10,000 or less.

The cold reality of MiLB life is that the total baseball income,

excluding the signing bonus, that most players receive for the entire year

is less than $7,500.

Additionally, most MiLB players live below the

federal poverty level.

Of course, these values represent the

compensation that the players receive before taxes, rent, food, childcare,

clubhouse dues, and other expenses.

As a result, many players are forced to rely on their signing bonus to

support themselves and their families for years until they make the big

leagues (if they ever do). Many Americans (even fans who attend games)

assume that because they are professional athletes, MiLB players receive

large signing bonuses and annual salaries for their services.

In reality,

this assumption is an exception available only to the most coveted

prospects.

MiLB players are therefore divided into two groups — early

round draftees with large signing bonuses and a quicker path to Major

League Baseball

and the vast majority of the 6,500 minor league players

with lesser signing bonuses and even smaller chances of making it to

MLB.

This divide is exemplified by the careers of two players, each

chasing the same dream.

A. The Exception: Bryce Harper

The Washington Nationals selected Bryce Harper with the first overall

pick in the 2010 Draft and signed him to a contract that included a $6.25

million signing bonus.

Harper was one of the most coveted prospects

. Round 20, MLB 2019 Draft Tracker, SPOTRAC,

https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/draft/2019/round-20/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).

. Round 30, MLB 2019 Draft Tracker, SPOTRAC,

https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/draft/2019/round-30/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).

. Brown, supra note 48.

. Id. Unfortunately, the planned increase in minor league salaries scheduled to take effect

for the 2021 season will not change this disturbing reality. See Federal Poverty Level (FPL),

HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/ (last visited

Feb. 19, 2020); see also Associated Press, supra note 67.

. See Sneed, supra note 63. Clubhouse dues are “money for the clubhouse managers, known

as ‘clubbies,’ who handle player laundry and pre- and postgame food spreads, which are more like

cheap sandwiches (peanut butter and jelly, maybe deli meat on a good day or perhaps a sloppy joe)

and plain potato chips.” Id.

. See Id.

. See infra Part III.A.

. See infra Part III.B.

. Adam Kilgore, Washington Nationals Sign Bryce Harper to $9.9 Million Contract,

WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2010, 2:47 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/

article/2010/08/16/AR2010081605133.html?noredirect=on.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 93

in history.

At the age of 16, Harper appeared on the cover of a Sports

Illustrated magazine which described him as “the most exciting prodigy

since LeBron” and dubbed him “Baseball’s Chosen One.”

Harper’s

experience—receiving a large signing bonus and quickly rising through

the minor leagues to the big leagues—illustrates an unusual path available

to only the most talented top prospects.

Harper began his minor league career in 2011 with the Class A

Hagerstown Suns, and was promoted to the Double A Harrisburg

Senators by the end of the 2011 season.

Harper then began the 2012

season at the Triple A level, before making his major league debut early

in that season and playing in 139 of 162 games for the Nationals that

year.

As one of the most highly-regarded prospects of all-time, Harper’s

meteoric rise to the big leagues is atypical. A decade after appearing on

the cover of Sports Illustrated, Harper fulfilled the cover’s prophecy and

signed a record-breaking thirteen-year contract with the Philadelphia

Phillies worth $330 million guaranteed with an additional $10.4 million

in available bonuses.

Harper, who advanced to the big leagues quickly

and originally received a large signing bonus, did not endure many of the

hardships that most minor leaguers face.

B. The Rule: Kyle Johnson

The career of Kyle Johnson, who was drafted by the Los Angeles

Angels in the 25th round of the 2012 draft, more accurately illustrates the

experience of the majority of MiLB players.

While Bryce Harper was

a household name at age 16, most baseball fans have still never heard of

Kyle Johnson.

This phenomenon has led some to refer to minor leaguers

as “the invisible men of the sport.”

. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.

. Tom Verducci, Baseball’s LeBron, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 8, 2009, at cover (article

at page 62).

. Bryce Harper Fall & Minor League Statistics, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM,

https://www.baseballreference.com/register/ player.fcgi?id=harper002bry (last visited Dec. 24,

2018).

. Id.

. Mike Axisa, Bryce Harper Contract Details: Breakdown of the Salary, Bonuses, and Perks

in His 13-year Deal with the Phillies, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 1, 2019, 7:34 PM),

https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/bryce-harper-contract-details-breakdown-of-the-salary-

bonuses-and-perks-in-his-13-year-deal-with-the-phillies/; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.

Less than three weeks after Harper inked the record-breaking deal, Mike Trout shattered Harper’s

record by signing a 12-year extension with the Angels for $430 million. See Scott Allen, Mike Trout

Upstages Bryce Harper Again, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 11:47 AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/03/19/mike-trout-upstages-bryce-harper-again/.

. See Sneed, supra note 63; Verducci, supra note 88.

. See Verducci, supra note 88.

. Theodore McDowell, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of Baseball’s

Antitrust Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 J. HARV. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 1 (2018).

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94 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

Since only about 10% of MiLB prospects reach the major leagues, the

chilling reality for about 90% of minor leaguers resembles Johnson’s

bleak financial situation.

Johnson received a signing bonus of $5,000,

which came out to about $3,100 after taxes.

After signing his UPC,

Johnson began his professional baseball career in Utah at the Rookie level

with the Orem Owlz, where he received about $420 for his first biweekly

paycheck.

Johnson made about $2,500 in the first year of his

professional career, which he calculated to be about $35 per game.

Johnson spent the next few years of his professional career playing at

various levels.

He spent 2013 playing in Class A and Class A

Advanced, and played Double A for the entire 2014 season.

100

Johnson

split the 2015 season between Triple A, Rookie ball, and Class A

Advanced.

101

He then played Double A and Triple A during the 2016

season, which would turn out to be the final year of his professional

career.

102

For Johnson, who has a degree in economics and “exists in the top

0.001 percentile of talent in his field,” chasing his dream in the minors

meant relying on the roughly $30,000 his wife earned from multiple jobs

to keep their family afloat.

103

Johnson was also forced to borrow a vehicle

from his aunt and uncle for transportation, give baseball lessons for extra

income, and even intern at Northwestern Mutual in the offseason when

his unpaid offseason baseball obligations did not interfere.

104

Johnson

played five seasons in the minors and advanced as high as the Triple A

level, but never made more than $11,500 in a season.

105

During spring

training heading in to his sixth season, Johnson felt financial pressures as

he pondered his future.

106

. See Matthew Durham, Minor League Compensation and the Save America’s Pastime Act

of 2018, THE NEV. LAW., Aug. 2018, at 17, 17; see also Nathan Sorensen, Minor League

Ballplayers' Path to the Bigs has Major Obstacles, so Family is No Small Thing, DESERET NEWS

(May 15, 2015, 4:25 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865628804/Minor-league-

ballplayers-path-to-the-bigs-has-major-obstacles-so-family-is-no-small-thing.html.

. Sneed, supra note 63.

. Id.

. Kyle Johnson Minor & Winter Leagues Statistics and History, BASEBALL-

REFERENCE.COM, https://www.baseball-reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=johnso005kyl (last

visited Jan. 3, 2018).

100

. Id.

101

. Id.

102

. Id.

103

. Berg, supra note 37; see Sneed, supra note 63.

104

. Sneed, supra note 63. Despite baseball obligations, many players must take flexible

offseason jobs—such as substitute teaching and waiting tables—to make ends meet. See Tom

Goldman, Fight Against Low, Low Pay In Minor League Baseball Continues Despite New Obstacles,

NPR (Aug. 3, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/03/635373608/fight-against-low-low-

pay-in-minor-league-baseball-continues-despite-new-obstacl.

105

. Sneed, supra note 63.

106

. See id.; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 95

Before spring training, Johnson became the first active minor league

player “to publicly declare his part in an ongoing class-action lawsuit

against Major League Baseball over unfair wages and unjust labor

practices.”

107

Although the work was mandatory, Johnson was not even

being compensated for his work during spring training, as the UPC he

signed in 2012 specified that he was “obligate[d] . . . to perform

professional services on a calendar year basis, regardless of the fact that

salary payments are to be made only during the actual championship

playing season.”

108

At this time, Johnson was still under the control of

the New York Mets for two more years.

109

The Mets rejected his request

for a higher salary, leaving Johnson with only three options.

110

His first option was to play for the next two seasons until he would

become a free agent at the end of his UPC.

111

Otherwise, Johnson could

retire from professional baseball or ask to be released.

112

Burdened by

the cost of chasing his dream, Johnson asked for his release and the Mets

obliged.

113

The trying financial realities of the minor leagues and the

difficulty of supporting his wife and two young children led Johnson to

end his baseball career.

114

Johnson’s story is a familiar tragedy to most

minor league players and represents the effects of Major League

Baseball’s longstanding manipulation of the law to increase its own

profits to the detriment of thousands of MiLB players.

115

IV. HOW MLB MANIPULATES THE LAW AND DREAMS TO PERPETUATE

THE INEQUALITY OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

The situation that minor leaguers face has developed as a result of three

predominant factors: decisions by the United States Supreme Court, laws

passed by Congress, and the lack of collective will to unionize.

A. The Failure of the Supreme Court

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contracts or

107

. Sneed, supra note 63.

108

. See Major Leage Baseball, supra note 56, at 207-09. The “actual championship playing

season” includes only the schedule of regular-season games; it is five months long and does not

include spring training. See id. at 205-06.

109

. Sneed, supra note 63. Minor league players are considered employees of the major league

team. Blum, supra note66.

110

. Sneed, supra note 63.

111

. See Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at 183.

112

. Sneed, supra note 63.

113

. Id.

114

. See id.

115

. See infra Part IV.

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96 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

conspiracies in restraint of trade.

116

The Supreme Court has interpreted

this prohibition to encompass only unreasonable restraints of trade.

117

Application of the Sherman Act therefore does not guarantee a plaintiff a

win.

118

The challenged practice only violates the Act if the

precompetitive benefits do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects.

119

However, the plaintiff does not have to win such a balancing test if the

practice fits into one of four judicially declared per se violations.

120

One of the most useful, and most disturbing, tools that Major League

Baseball uses to pay MiLB players like Johnson such low wages is the

antitrust exemption that was manufactured by a trio of twentieth century

Supreme Court cases commonly known as “the Supreme Court’s baseball

trilogy.”

121

If taken out of the context of professional baseball and

implanted into nearly any other American industry, the Rule 4 Draft and

required UPCs would violate antitrust law as illegal restraints of trade.

122

However, in 1922, Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion for the Court

in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, held that the business,

“giving exhibitions of baseball,” was a “purely state affair[].”

123

The

Court acknowledged that baseball clubs travelled among the states, but

held that the business of baseball did not constitute interstate

commerce.

124

The Court noted that “a firm of lawyers sending out a

member to argue a case . . . does not engage in [interstate] commerce

because the lawyer . . . goes to another State.”

125

Thus, professional

baseball did not trigger federal antitrust law, and the antitrust exemption

was born.

126

Federal Baseball, however, was consistent with the limited

interpretation of interstate commerce and federal power that permeated

Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the revolutionary change in

perspective in 1937.

127

Surprisingly, even after the vast expansion of the American

understanding of interstate commerce in the FDR era, Federal Baseball

116

. 15 U.S.C. § 1(2018).

117

. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

118

. See id.

119

. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.

REV. 1375, 1386 (2009).

120

. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)(listing price fixing, division of

markets, tying arrangements, and group boycotts as per se violations).

121

. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See infra notes

123–134 and accompanying text.

122

. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see also supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.

123

. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).

124

. Id. at 209.

125

. Id.

126

. See id. at 208.

127

. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109

(Foundation Press, 18th ed. 2013).

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 97

persisted.

128

In Toolson v. New York Yankees, the Court reaffirmed

Federal Baseball “so far as that decision determines that Congress had no

intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the

federal antitrust laws.”

129

In its 1953 opinion, the Court noted that:

Congress has had [Federal Baseball] under consideration but has not seen

fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having

prospective effect. The business has thus been left for thirty years to

develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust

legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with

retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there

are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust

laws it should be by legislation.

130

The Court, therefore, did not apply its own expansive interpretation of

interstate commerce to baseball and decided Toolson’s case entirely on

the authority of Federal Baseball.

131

The Court reaffirmed its belief that legislative, not judicial, action was

the proper avenue to apply antitrust laws to professional baseball in Flood

v. Kuhn.

132

The Court, describing the antitrust exemption as an

established “aberration,” noted that it did not apply to other professional

sports and stated that professional baseball is indeed a business engaged

in interstate commerce pursuant to post–1937 Supreme Court

decisions.

133

Nonetheless, the Court stated that it “continue[d] to be loath,

50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to

overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction,

has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and . . . has clearly

evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”

134

Ironically, the

Supreme Court also concluded that state antitrust law did not apply to

baseball because it was engaged in interstate commerce.

135

The Flood decision was not well received by the legal community.

136

Dreams of baseball were of such importance in American culture that the

Supreme Court ignored decades of established precedent regarding the

definition of interstate commerce to give baseball its own exemption.

137

128

. See id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

129

. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).

130

. Id. (alterations added).

131

. See id.

132

. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).

133

. Id. at 282–83.

134

. Id. at 283–84.

135

. See id. at 284–85.

136

. See, e.g., Kevin D. McDonald, There’s No Tying in Baseball: On Illinois Tool and the

Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2005, at 10

(“The result is a principle of antitrust law that is (1) indefensible as a matter of fact or policy, and

(2) an embarrassment to the Court.”).

137

. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–84.

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98 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

The tone of the opinion reflected baseball’s place in the American

dream.

138

The opinion begins with a discussion of the history of the game

as the nation’s pastime and an extensive list of baseball’s immortals.

139

The majority also cites with glee the opinion denying Flood’s preliminary

injunction, in which District Court Judge Cooper stated that “[b]aseball .

. . enjoys a unique place in our American heritage. . . . The game is on

higher ground; it behooves everyone to keep it there.”

140

In Flood, the

Supreme Court prevented the players from using the antitrust laws as they

were intended and preserved the owners’ control over the players and

their financial interests.

141

B. The Failure of Congress

Congress finally acted legislatively in response to the outrageous Flood

decision—albeit twenty-eight years after the case—by passing the Curt

Flood Act of 1998.

142

The Curt Flood Act stated that “the conduct, acts,

practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized

professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting

employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major

league level are subject to the antitrust laws.”

143

Congress effectively

overruled the Court and finally granted major league players the same

access to the antitrust laws that every American enjoys.

144

Since the

passage of the act, compensation packages for major league players have

risen even more dramatically.

145

However, the Curt Flood Act, without explanation, expressly states that

it does not apply to any actions of those “engaging in, conducting or

participating in the business of . . . [Minor League Baseball], any

organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft . . . any

reserve clause as applied to minor league players . . . or any other matter

relating to professional baseball’s minor leagues.”

146

Congress has

therefore decided that MiLB players cannot successfully challenge the

Rule 4 Draft and UPC reserve clauses as illegal restraints of trade under

138

. See id. at 260–64.

139

. See id.

140

. See id. at 266–67 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).

141

. See id. at 282–85.

142

. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (Codified at 15 U.S.C. §

26b (2018)).

143

. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a)(2018).

144

. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.

145

. See Cork Gaines & Skye Gould, The Salaries for Baseball’s Highest-paid Players have

Skyrocketed over the Past 20 Years, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:44 PM),

https://www.businessinsider.com/mlb-average-highest-paid-salary-2017-4.

146

. 15 U.S.C. § 26(b)(1) (2018).

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 99

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

147

Thus, MiLB players have

been, and will continue to be, unable to remedy their situation on antitrust

grounds even though Major League Baseball players can do so.

Why would Congress remove the exemption for those players who

make the most money and have the most resources while continuing the

exemption for those players with the least money and least resources?

148

The legislative history indicates a clear and consistent effort to ensure that

the Curt Flood Act would have no impact on the legal status of MiLB.

149

Congress was clearly protecting the economic interests of the Major

League Baseball owners by its inconsistent treatment of MiLB.

150

Because minor leaguers lack the star power of their major league

counterparts and the lobbying power of the owners, they are in most need

of legislative protection. However, the modern democratic process again

failed to protect the interests of those least able to defend themselves.

151

In light of the seemingly insurmountable hurdles posed by an antitrust

challenge, lawsuits challenging minor league compensation in recent

years have focused on alleged violations of the FLSA minimum wage and

overtime requirements.

152

MLB has traditionally relied on the FLSA

exemptions for “employee[s] employed in a bona fide executive,

administrative, or professional capacity” and for seasonal amusement or

recreational establishments in 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1) & (3).

153

Major

League Baseball, which has stated that “being a Minor League Baseball

player is not a career but a short-term seasonal apprenticeship[,]”

determined that a loss in court “would cost it approximately $110 million,

a figure that could double if the court assigned damages, and none of that

accounts for additional costs going forward.”

154

After spending $330,000 on lobbying expenses in 2015, Major League

Baseball increased its lobbying efforts by 300%, spending $1.32 million

in each of the next two years in response to class-action suits filed by

147

. See id.; see also McDowell, supra note 94, at 15.

148

. See supra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.

149

. See S. REP. NO. 105-118, pt. 2, at 4–5 (1997).

150

. See id.

151

. Nearly 28% of minor league players are foreign-born, about 80% of which come from

Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. J.J. Cooper, Numbers Game: Makeup of the Minors,

BASEBALL AMERICA (May 4, 2018), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/numbers-game-

makeup-of-the-minors/. At the major league level, a study by the Society for American Baseball

Research revealed that, in 2016, the racial composition of the major leagues was 63.7% White, 6.7%

African-American, 27.4% Latino, and 2.1% Asian. Mark Armour & Daniel R. Levitt, Baseball

Demographics, 1947–2016, SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL RESEARCH,

https://sabr.org/bioproj/topic/baseball-demographics-1947-2012 (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).

152

. See, e.g., Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F.Supp.3d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2015);

29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2018).

153

. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)(2018); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(2018); See Senne v. Kan. City Royals

Baseball Corp., No. 14-CV-00608-JCS, 2015 WL 6152476, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015).

154

. Berg, supra note 37; Brown, supra note 48.

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100 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

former minor league players.

155

As a result of this increased lobbying

effort, Congress passed legislation expressly exempting MiLB from the

requirements of the FLSA.

156

The ironically named “Save America’s Pastime Act,” (SAPA) which

was included on page 1,967 of the 2,232-page March 2018 Senate

appropriations bill, passed without a single co-sponsor or sufficient time

to debate.

157

The SAPA “saved” an eleven-figure industry by preying on

its powerless, invisible backbone that actually needs to be saved.

158

The

language of the 2018 SAPA nearly mirrors that of a stand-alone version

of the bill introduced in 2016.

159

Support for the 2016 SAPA was

withdrawn within days of its introduction after a quick and harsh public

uproar.

160

Commentators have described the enacted SAPA as “a

textbook piece of special-interest legislation[.]”

161

The Legislature’s

willingness to severely disadvantage a particular group of struggling

people at the whim of a $10 billion industry is alarming, especially when

the cost of vastly improving the plight of MiLB players is comparatively

small.

162

The enacted 2018 SAPA keeps MiLB players at the status quo by

nearly ensuring that they will be unable to remedy their situations on

FLSA grounds.

163

The impact of this momentous decision to give Major

155

. See Senne, 2015 WL 6152476, at *1; Blake Yagman, Senne v. Royals is the Case that

Could Change Major League Baseball, FANSIDED (Oct. 25, 2017),

https://fansided.com/2017/10/25/senne-v-royals-lawsuit-could-change-mlb/; Blum, supra note66.

156

. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(19)(2018).

157

. H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. §201 (2018) (enacted); see Durham, supra note 95, at 18.

158

. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(19)(2018); see supra note 51 and accompanying text; see supra

Part III.B.

159

. See Blum, supra note66.

160

. See H.R. 5580. See, e.g., Ted Berg, The ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ in Congress will

do Nothing of the Sort, USA TODAY (June 30, 2016, 10:30 AM),

https://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/06/save-americas-pastime-act-minor-league-minimum-wage-

lawsuit-mlb-salaries; Aaron Blake, After Outcry over Minor League Baseball Bill, Congresswoman

Can’t Disown it Fast Enough, THE WASH. POST (June 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost

.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/30/after-outcry-over-bill-on-minor-league-baseball-pay-

congresswoman-cant-disown-it-fast-enough/?utm_term=.df099baf8bf1; Ryan Fagan, Despicable

‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to Screw Minor Leaguers, SPORTING NEWS (June 29, 2016),

http://www.sportingnews.com/us /mlb/news/minor-league-save-americas-pastime-act-salaries-

antitrust-exemption-broshuis-congress/1jjn290g1ubcd18af2tjyb1u7l; Lindsay Gibbs, The ‘Save

America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to Keep Minor League Baseball Players in Poverty, THINKPROGRESS

(June 30, 2016, 5:10 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/the-save-americas-pastime-act-aims-to-keep-

minor-league-baseball-players-in-poverty-2f812a055701/.

161

. Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Legislation

Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1046 (2019).

162

. See Mueller, infra note 184 (“For an investment of $7.5 million per year, an MLB

organization could adequately pay their minor leaguers, which would allow those players to eat

better, get better housing during the season, and train better in the offseason.”); see also Berg, supra

note 37 (“A major league organization with 250 players in its minor league system could give every

single one of them a $30,000 annual pay spike for a total of $7.5 million, or roughly the cost of a

decent fourth outfielder on the free-agent market.”). But see McDowell, supra note 94, at Part V.

163

. See Brown, supra note 48; Durham, supra note 95, at 18.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 101

League Baseball legislative permission to skirt FLSA requirements is

already evident. After the passage of SAPA, Major League Baseball

proposed eliminating forty-two minor leagues teams in negotiations for

the next PBA.

164

News of this proposal quickly drew bipartisan

opposition from the very Congress that emboldened major league owners

by consistently allowing the league to act as if it is above the law.

165

Perhaps recognizing their own failure, some members of Congress

“launched the Save Minor League Baseball Task Force for a simple

purpose — to help ensure a level playing field in the negotiations between

Major League Baseball and MiLB so that they yield a fair resolution and

protect minor league baseball in communities across the country.”

166

This

task force is motivated by congressional self-interest, as it is focused on

preventing the elimination of teams that could negatively impact local

economies, rather than addressing past legislative missteps such as the

Curt Flood Act and SAPA, which have allowed the horrific conditions of

MiLB to germinate.

In reaction to the Congressional Task Force, the Major League

Baseball Commissioner’s Office sent a memo to the teams detailing plans

to raise MiLB minimum salaries in 2021.

167

However, this concession

was motivated by fear of Congressional action rather than a desire to

eliminate the plight of MiLB players. Even after this pay increase takes

effect, the majority of MiLB players will still live below the poverty

line.

168

Despite mandatory spring training and other offseason obligations

that frequently interfere with a player’s ability to maintain stable

offseason employment, players are still only paid during the season.

169

Although it is a step in the right direction, this pay increase is far from

adequate and would still result in FLSA violations if MLB had not

purchased the immunity granted by SAPA.

C. The Failure of Collective Activity

MiLB players also lack union representation as a means of improving

164

. Eric Stephen, MLB’s Fight with Minor League Baseball is Getting Uglier, SB NATION

(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2019/12/17/21023144/minor-league-

baseball-negotiations-mlb-bernie-sanders-rob-manfred.

165

. See Alex Gangitano, MLB, Congress Play Hardball in Fight over Minor Leagues, THE

HILL (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-

lobbying/481755-mlb-congress-play-hardball-in-fight-over-minor-leagues.

166

. Id.

167

. See Associated Press, supra note 67 (“Players at rookie and short-season levels will see

their minimum weekly pay raised from $290 to $400, and players at Class A will go from $290 to

$500. Double-A will jump from $350 to $600, and Triple-A from $502 to $700.”).

168

. See id.; see also Federal Poverty Level (FPL), supra note 80.

169

. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

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102 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

their financial situation.

170

In fact, the Major League Baseball Players

Association (MLBPA), which does not represent the minor leagues, has

used matters that affect minor leaguers as convenient concessions in their

own negotiations and have even made minor league conditions worse.

171

Unionization and the resulting ability to bargain collectively could be an

effective avenue to remedy the dismal conditions of the minor leagues.

However, the transient nature of the players, wide geographic dispersion,

and low salaries present major hurdles to unionization.

172

However, the

players’ fear of potential retaliation or “blackballing” presents perhaps the

most formidable obstacle to unionization.

173

This fear of retaliation is

another example of owners manipulating players’ baseball dreams.

Marvin Miller, the transformational former Executive Director of the

MLBPA, has even said that one of the obstacles to unionizing the minor

leagues is the “dreamy idealism of the players.”

174

In effect, a player is

concerned that participation in union activity will cost him his shot at

making it to the major leagues one day.

175

A final formidable obstacle to unionization is the split among the minor

league players who received large signing bonuses and those who did not.

Players with large bonuses not only have more resources but are also often

fast-tracked to the major leagues.

176

In the minors, their interests are

frequently aligned with major league management. The consistent refusal

of these minor league “stars” to join any unionization efforts have also

been a significant factor in the failure of all efforts to unionize minor

league players.

Collective bargaining would undoubtedly help improve the financial

condition of most MiLB players.

177

The potential benefits of a union are

illustrated by another group that is crucial to the MiLB ecosystem—the

umpires.

178

The minor league umpires, who are unionized, received a

myriad of perks under their new collective bargaining agreement,

including improved hotels and increased salaries and per diems.

179

The

per diems for umpires at every level are higher than the per diems the

170

. See Garrett R. Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects of Collective

Bargaining on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51 (2013).

171

. Id. at 90.

172

. Id. at 98–100.

173

. See id. at 100; see also Berg, supra note 37.

174

. Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (Apr. 3, 2012, 11:08 AM),

https://slate.com/culture/2012/04/minor-league-union-thousands-of-pro-baseball-players-make-

just-1100-per-month-where-is-their-cesar-chavez.html.

175

. See Broshuis, supra note 170, at 100; see also Berg, supra note 37.

176

. See supra Part III.A.

177

. See Broshuis, supra note 170, at 98–99.

178

. See Liz Roscher, Minor League Umpires are Getting Better Perks in Their New CBA,

YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 12, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/minor-league-umpires-

are-getting-better-perks-in-their-new-cba-155352828.html.

179

. See id.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 103

players themselves receive, and the umpires’ monthly salaries are higher

than the salaries of most MiLB players.

180

These perks are made possible

partly by the fact that MiLB is generating record levels of merchandising

revenue.

181

Additionally, the financial success of MiLB allows for teams to offer

free concessions to fans for an entire half inning.

182

This promotional

“Food Purge”—as it is advertised by the Lansing Lugnuts—ironically

juxtaposes the financial ability of the organization to offer fans free

concessions while many of the Lugnuts players the fans came to see

struggle to adequately feed themselves.

183

Advocates for minor league unionization point to the Professional

Hockey Players Association (PHPA) as evidence of its feasibility.

184

The

PHPA is “a 50-year-old union that represents some 1,600 minor league

hockey players across the American Hockey League and the East Coast

Hockey League. The PHPA has successfully negotiated to guarantee its

members reasonable wages, in-season housing, adequate per diems, and

revenue sharing, among other benefits.”

185

MiLB teams play more games

per season and have higher average attendance per game, but the players

only receive about 25% of the minimum salary and 1/3 of the travel per

diem compared to their counterparts in the American Hockey League

(”AHL”).

186

Additionally, AHL players can earn postseason bonuses,

whereas MiLB players cannot.

187

In sharp contrast to MiLB players,

“[p]layers in the AHL are unionized and have a minimum salary of

$45,000, get a postseason bonus, and $72 per diem.”

188

While the need to unionize and bargain collectively is clear, the MiLB

players’ desperate financial situations, the widespread fear of retaliation,

and the reticence of stars to support the collective unit have consistently

delivered fatal blows to past unionization efforts.

189

Of these three

obstacles, improving the compensation of MiLB players may be the

easiest to change. The bleak prospect of unionization is unlikely to

180

. See id.

181

. See David Broughton, Appeal of MiLB Merchandise Continues to Grow; Sales Hit $70M

in 2017, SPORTS BUS. J., July 23, 2018, available

athttps://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/07/23/Research-and-Ratings/MiLB-

merchandise.aspx.

182

. See Minor League Baseball (@milb), INSTAGRAM (Feb. 5, 2019),

https://www.instagram.com/p/Btghc4EFViC/?utm_source=ig_share_sheet&igshid=19qdju20qr0vy

183

. See id.

184

. See Bobby Mueller, MLB and Minor League Salaries: The Ugly Business Side of

Baseball, CALLTOTHEPEN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://calltothepen.com/2018/03/22/mlb-minor-ugly-

business/; see also Berg, supra note 37.

185

. Berg, supra note 37.

186

. Id.

187

. Id.

188

. Mueller, supra note 184.

189

. See supra notes 173—175 and accompanying text.

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104 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

improve until the financial situation of the individual players improves.

The result is a vicious cycle in which the players’ poor financial

conditions perpetuate their lack of a union, and their lack of a union

worsens their financial conditions. If Congress were to remove both the

antitrust and FLSA exemptions, the financial condition of minor league

players would improve and collective activity would be more likely.

MiLB players have made some efforts to help themselves short of

unionization. In response to the SAPA, Jeremy Wolf founded More Than

Baseball, a 501(c)(3) public charity to support MiLB players.

190

Wolf, a

31st round draft pick by the New York Mets in 2016, started the

organization “as a way to help minor leaguers receive the housing,

equipment, and food they need to survive.”

191

More Than Baseball aims

to spread awareness to fans and uncover baseball’s best kept secret,

explaining on its website that “over 4000 minor league ballplayers are in

need of financial assistance[,]” and that the players “are subject to poor

working conditions and are on the hook for their own housing, equipment,

and nutrition.”

192

More Than Baseball “refuse[s] to allow any ballplayers go to bed

hungry and wake up on an air mattress only to play in front of thousands

of paying fans per night.”

193

The organization, which is available to all

minor leaguers, helps the players obtain essential baseball equipment in

addition to basic living necessities such as proper nutrition and affordable

housing.

194

Additionally, More Than Baseball provides career and

financial services to prepare players for life after baseball, which is

particularly important considering that only a small fraction of minor

leaguers advance to the big leagues.

195

While laudable, More Than

Baseball does not remedy the financial exploitation of MiLB players just

as a soup kitchen does not solve the problem of homelessness.

V. CONCLUSION

In a democracy, the legislature should reflect the concepts of fairness

and equality which the nation truly values. As Congress has become

increasingly influenced by uber-wealth, the growth of income inequality

has reduced the ideals of fairness and equality to their bare minimum.

This reality is easily identified in the plight of most MiLB players.

190

. Meet the Staff, , MORE THAN BASEBALL, https://www.morethanbaseball.org/about-us

(last visited Feb. 17, 2020).

191

. Id.

192

. Mission, MORE THAN BASEBALL, https://www.morethanbaseball.org/mission (last

visited Feb. 17, 2020).

193

. Id.

194

. Id.

195

. Id.; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.

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2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 105

Although Supreme Court decisions and the players’ own lack of

collective will has worsened the situation, it is Congress who has

perpetuated the appalling economic reality for the players who support

the foundation of Major League Baseball. Neither the House nor the

Senate has provided any rationale for explicitly preventing MiLB players

from suing Major League Baseball based on the nation’s antitrust laws

196

or the FLSA.

197

The only explanation is the influence of wealthy Major

League Baseball owners over Congress, as reflected by their increased

lobbying expenditures.

198

Given the public outcry against the first attempt

by Congress to exempt MiLB players from federal minimum wage laws,

Congress’ actions can also be characterized as counter majoritarian.

Congress should therefore repeal both the antitrust immunity and the

exemption from the FLSA it has given Major League Baseball and the

owners. The cost of doing so will not destroy major or minor league

baseball. The result will simply lift the majority of minor league players

from poverty by reducing the profits of Major League Baseball owners

only incidentally. The games will still flourish. In addition, such action

by Congress will make collective activity by MiLB players more likely.

As the nation’s pastime, the game of baseball “reflects a host of age-

old American tensions: between workers and owners, scandal and reform,

the individual and the collective.”

199

Baseball even had a key role in the

beginning of racial equality in America.

200

Baseball has been “a sort of

Rosetta stone for deciphering our still revolutionary experiment in

nationhood[,]” and the game “has realized—through individualized

brilliance or teamwork or racial harmony—the highest of our country’s

ideals.”

201

Baseball has advanced our nation, and the undeniable parallels

between the game and the law were acknowledged in the Federal

Baseball opinion.

202

In return, the law has largely turned its back on the

game’s most vulnerable.

203

By rectifying its past mistakes, Congress can

196

. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.

197

. See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.

198

. See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. Other sports capitalists understand the

value of lobbying congress. Because California passed a statue allowing its collegiate athletes to

profit from their name, image, and likeness, the NCAA and some conferences have dramatically

increased their lobbying expenditures in an attempt to get Congress to pass a law on the subject

favorable to their interests. See Cassandra Negley, NCAA, ACC, Big 12 Spend Nearly $1M to

Prevent Athletes from Profiting Off Own Likeness, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 10, 2020, 6:28 PM),

https://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa-acc-big-12-spend-nearly-1-m-to-keep-athletes-from-earning-

money-off-marketing-deals-232823064.html.

199

. Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, Where Memory Gathers, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED

HISTORY xvii, xvix (1st ed., 1994).

200

. See John Thorn, Why Baseball, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 58, 61 (1st ed.,

1994).

201

. Id. at 58.

202

. See id.; see supra note 125 and accompanying text.

203

. See supra Part IV.

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106 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89

provide a solution to baseball’s best kept secret—the treatment of

MiLB—and may truly save America’s pastime. In so doing, Congress

would also be taking a first step in realizing its own responsibility in

eliminating income inequality in America.

Closius and Stephan: Myth, Manipulation, and Minor League Baseball

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020