TRUMP 'S JERUSALEM MO VE

EDİTED BY KADİR ÜSTÜN, KILIÇ B. KANAT

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

Making Sense of

U.S. Policy on

the Israeli Palestinian

Conﬂict

TRUMP’S

MOVE

JERUSALEM

Edited by Kadir Üstün, Kılıç B. Kanat

resident Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusa-

lem as the capital of Israel and move the U.S.

embassy to the city prompted this edited volume.

Trump had already promised to make this move

on the campaign trail but most of the foreign policy experts

did not expect him to go forward with the idea as quickly as

he did. Many judged that it would most likely be a prom-

ise unkept and the decades-old U.S. policy would hold. The

Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 recognized the city as the

capital of the State of Israel and called for Jerusalem to

remain an undivided city. However, all the U.S. administra-

tions left the issue to be resolved between the parties as

part of the final status negotiations. Prior to Trump’s de-

cision, most experts considered the peace process to be

real in name only with very little prospect for a two-state

solution. In this sense, Trump’s decision was essentially a

nail in the coffin of the peace process. The U.S. was finally

openly admitting what many critics argued for a long time,

that is, the U.S. would side with Israel.

9 786057 544926

Making Sense of

U.S. Policy on

the Israeli Palestinian

Conﬂict

TRUMP’S

MOVE

JERUSALEM

Edited by Kadir Üstün and Kılıç B. Kanat

Making Sense of

U.S. Policy on

the Israeli Palestinian

Conﬂict

TRUMP’S

MOVE

JERUSALEM

SETA Publications 58

First Published in 2019 by SETA

ISBN: 978-605-7544-92-6

No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form

or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in

writing from the publishers.

Cover and Layout: Hasan Suat Olgun

Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş.,

October 2019

SETA Publications

Nenehatun Cd. No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara Turkey

Tel: +90 312 551 21 00 | Fax: +90 312 551 21 90

www.setav.org | kitap@setav.org

FOREWORD 7

INTRODUCTION 11

CHAPTER 1

TAKING TRUMP SERIOUSLY

ON JERUSALEM 19

LARA FRIEDMAN

CHAPTER 2

WITH JERUSALEM RECOGNITION,

A MASK FALLS 51

YOUSEF MUNAYYER

CHAPTER 3

LATIN AMERICA AND

THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM 77

CECILIA BAEZA

CHAPTER 4

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

IN SOUTH AMERICA:

FALLING ON DEAF EARS? 111

GUILHERME CASARÕES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5

THE EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION

ON JERUSALEM AND

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 145

JACOB ERIKSSON

CHAPTER 6

TURKEY’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM AND

LEADERSHIP ON TRUMP’S

JERUSALEM MOVE 169

KADIR USTUN, KILIÇ B. KANAT

CHAPTER 7

MA JOURNEÉ CHEZ ARAFAT:

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISION

AND THE WAGES OF PAIN

IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 191

MARK PERRY

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 207

Jerusalem is a holy city for Muslims as well as for Jews and Chris-

tians. It has captured and inspired the imaginations of billions of

people around the world during its long history. It has also been

at the heart of the most signicant modern conict in the Middle

East. Jerusalem is not only a powerful symbol but a living city in its

own right with goals, dreams, and aspirations of its residents. It is

obviously impossible to describe Jerusalem’s political, religious, and

historic signicance in a meaningful way within the connes of this

short introduction. Nevertheless, we would not be doing any justice

to the topic of this book if we avoid highlighting what kind of a

powerful place Jerusalem occupies in the minds of so many people

from so many dierent backgrounds.

Jerusalem was under Ottoman control for many centuries until

the end of the First World War when the Ottoman Empire ceased

to exist as a single political unit. Mandate regimes imposed by colo-

nialist powers divided the Middle East into dierent states accord-

ing to their interests through articial borders. e result has been

the longest lasting conict that has torn apart the region for many

decades. Jerusalem has been the central issue for the Palestinians

and Muslims around the world. e failure to reach a lasting peace

agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians was closely re-

lated to the lack of an agreement on the status of Jerusalem. As the

Israeli occupation continues to deepen on a daily basis, Jerusalem

continues to be a symbol of resistance and hope against the con-

tinuing machinations of colonial and global interests.

FOREWORD

8 / FOREWORD

Under international law and repeated United Nations deci-

sions, East Jerusalem belongs to the Palestinians. Israel continues

to restrict the movement of the city’s residents while revealing its

plans to expand settlements and claim the entire city as its capital.

e Israeli governments have found a reliable ally in the Trump

administration to support their position on Jerusalem as the capital

of Israel. Yet, this support will likely achieve nothing more than ex-

posing the American duplicity and failure of the two-state solution

as we know it. e international rejection of the U.S. recognition of

Jerusalem as Israel’s capital was striking. anks to a big diplomatic

push led by Turkey, the U.S. and Israel were not only isolated in

the international arena but also exposed as not being committed to

lasting peace once again. We certainly did not need reminders of

this reality but the Trump administration chose this path.

is critically important book includes chapters both contex-

tualizing and discussing the U.S. administration’s Jerusalem dec-

laration in great detail. Various sections authored by American,

Latin American, European, and Turkish authors examine the inter-

national responses to the U.S. President Trump’s declaration. e

volume makes a crucial contribution to the literature on Jerusalem

by highlighting how the Jerusalem decision was so controversial and

touched on dierent political, religious and cultural nerves around

the world. Clearly, Jerusalem is not simply another city but it rep-

resents the crystallization of a conict with so many national, re-

gional, and global implications.

Jerusalem is at a historic moment. is edited volume forces

us to think about the signicance of this stage in the Israeli-Pales-

tinian conict as well as its importance for the rest of the Middle

East. is will register as the U.S. abandoning its responsibility as a

global power in order to align itself with a continued and deepening

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 9

occupation. Israel is well on its way to become an apartheid (if not

already so) and the Trump administration appears more than happy

to enable it. is can only sow the seeds of discord, conict, and

violence. e Islamic world came together against Trump’s decision

but it is doubtful that the reaction would be as strong if it were not

for Turkey’s leadership. Islamic countries have a much bigger role to

play that they fail to appreciate.

I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the editor of

this volume, Kadir Ustun, and distinguished expert contributors of

the book for making this publication possible. I am condent that

this book will serve as a serious contribution to our understanding

of the underlying conict and the status of Jerusalem.

Prof. Dr. Burhanettin Duran

General Coordinator

e Foundation for Political,

Economic, Social Research (SETA)

INTRODUCTION

President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital

of Israel and move the U.S. embassy to the city prompted this

edited volume. Trump had already promised to make this move

on the campaign trail but most of the foreign policy experts did

not expect him to go forward with the idea as quickly as he did.

Many judged that it would most likely be a promise unkept and

the decades-old U.S. policy would hold. The Jerusalem Embas-

sy Act of 1995 recognized the city as the capital of the State

of Israel and called for Jerusalem to remain an undivided city.

However, all the U.S. administrations left the issue to be resolved

between the parties as part of the final status negotiations. Prior

to Trump’s decision, most experts considered the peace process

to be real in name only with very little prospect for a two-state

solution. In this sense, Trump’s decision was essentially a nail

in the coffin of the peace process. The U.S. was finally openly

admitting what many critics argued for a long time, that is, the

U.S. would side with Israel.

The Jerusalem embassy move triggered a diplomatic push-

back energized by Turkey’s leadership in various international fora.

It also resulted in clashes on the ground and the killing of many

Palestinians by Israeli security forces during the official opening

ceremony of the embassy. Clearly, Palestinians were not in a posi-

tion to start yet another Intifada, as violence in previous Intifadas

cost them immensely and led to further deepening of the Israeli

INTRODUCTION

14 / InTRODUCTIOn

occupation. The Muslim leaders around the world joined Turkey

in condemning the Trump administration’s decision, however, the

international isolation of the U.S. remained largely in the diplo-

matic arena. Many Muslim countries avoided a serious clash with

the U.S. over the issue although they were apprehensive about po-

tential violence on the ground. Turkey mobilized the OIC and the

UN while calling for a recognition of East Jerusalem as the capital

city of Palestine. The importance of Jerusalem cannot be over-

stated for the Muslim world but the international mobilization

against Trump’s decision fell short of reversing the U.S. decision.

In this volume, we analyze the rationale and implementation

of President Trump’s Jerusalem decision, what it means for the

U.S. sponsored peace process, and the international reactions it

triggered. In the first chapter, Lara Friedman draws attention to a

fundamental failure of experts in not taking Trump seriously on

his pronouncements regarding Jerusalem. Friedman outlines the

history of U.S. policy on Jerusalem prior to Trump and demon-

strates how the policy evolved over the previous decades. Fried-

man shows it was not out of the blue for Trump to make the

Jerusalem declaration but rather that most of the experts refused

to listen and take him seriously. Friedman’s contextualization of

the decision within the Trump administration’s broader efforts to

redefine the peace process is a stark reminder that the Jerusalem

move has to be considered within this wider framework. Friedman

skillfully shows how the Trump administration systematically un-

dermined different aspects of the peace process as we knew it.

In the second chapter, Yousef Munayyer argues that the U.S.

policy on Jerusalem allowed successive U.S. administrations to

claim a mediator role while they were consistently supporting Is-

rael. Munayyer shows that Trump’s decision effectively ended this

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 15

already flawed claim and exposed the reality of the U.S. policy.

Having shown the internal contradictions of the decision, Mu-

nayyer focuses on the message sent to the Israelis and the Palestin-

ians. As the decision closes the Oslo era, according to Munayyer,

the U.S. policy is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from

the Israeli position. However, as the mask on the decades-old U.S.

policy falls, he foresees a fundamental shift in the U.S. policy in

the near future, partly owed to congressional action and partly to

developments on the ground.

In the third chapter, Cecilia Baeza discusses the Latin Amer-

ican responses to Trump’s Jerusalem decision. Baeza explains the

political, diplomatic, economic, and demographic reasons deter-

mining various Latin American countries’ policies toward Israel

as well as toward Trump’s decision. She argues that many Latin

American countries approach issues related to Israel in the context

of their relationships with the U.S. Her examination of individual

Latin American country positions reveals that their policies to-

ward Israel are strongly determined by whether or not they are a

right-wing or left-wing government. She also aptly demonstrates

how Latin American politicians may try to acquire political lever-

age domestically via the utilization of their diplomatic position on

the Jerusalem issue.

In the fourth chapter, Guilherme Casarões argues that

Trump’s decision was met with skepticism across South America.

Focusing on Paraguay and Brazil, countries that seemed to os-

cillate between siding with and going against Trump’s Jerusalem

decision, Casarões shows that the decision created frictions even

among politicians supporting it largely as a result of domestic po-

litical ramifications and economic relations with Arab countries.

In Brazil, for example, Bolsonaro ended up striking a middle road

16 / InTRODUCTIOn

with opening a trade office in Jerusalem instead of going forward

with moving the Brazilian embassy to the city. Casarões presents

a complex interplay of a variety of political and economic factors

for Paraguay and Brazil on the issue of Jerusalem.

In the fifth chapter, Jacob Eriksson explores how the Jerusa-

lem move played itself out among European countries. Pointing

out that Europe opposed the move from the beginning, Eriksson

outlines the growing divisions as well as the right-wing nationalist

populism’s increasing pressure to revise the European policy on Je-

rusalem. These difficulties have made it difficult to oppose Trump

on the matter as a united front, Eriksson argues, while Europe

tried to maintain its traditional position on the two-state solution

no matter how elusive. Eriksson’s analysis suggests that the EU

will continue to be divided between these forces (international

norms and rise of populism) in the near future thanks to the lack

of effective decision making.

In the sixth chapter, Kadir Ustun and Kılıç B. Kanat explain

the evolution of the Turkish policy toward Israel and identify the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a major determinant of the nature of

the Turkish-Israeli relationship. They argue that all Turkish gov-

ernments, regardless of their ideological alignments, have been

highly sensitive to the plight of the Palestinians since the 1990s

and earlier. Outlining the main developments in the Turkish-Is-

raeli relationship under the AK Party during the 2000s, they iden-

tify the Operation Cast Lead as a major turning point in Turkey’s

consistent critique of the Israeli policies against Palestine. Under

President Erdogan’s leadership, they analyze the Turkish efforts

to lobby the international community against Trump’s Jerusalem

decision at a time when Turkey was trying to also fix its relations

with the U.S.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 17

In the seventh chapter, Mark Perry recalls his encounters with

the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat who was under immense

pressure and physical siege by Israel in the early 2000s. Perry ar-

gues that the main contribution Arafat hoped to receive from the

U.S. was for them to “balance the scales” at a time they were heav-

ily weighing tilted in Israel’s favor. Debunking the myth of Arafat

as the responsible party for the failure of the peace talks, Perry

analyzes the emergence of a fundamental division between various

groups within Fatah. Nothing seems to summarize this division

and change within Fatah better than the one dierences between

Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, according to Perry. Perry ar-

gues that Trump simply made it crystal clear to everyone that the

U.S. was “not only Israel’s lawyer … but also its realtor.”

is volume includes a rich and diverse set of perspectives on

various aspects of Trump’s Jerusalem decision. It provides us with

an in-depth evaluation of the history and background of the deci-

sion, its implications for the U.S. policy, and the future of the

peace process. e two-state solution has never appeared so out of

reach as today. Ironically, some have welcomed the idea that the

U.S. will no longer be able to pretend as the neutral mediator that

can resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conict. ere is no doubt that

the decision is consequential for the U.S. policy but its implica-

tions for the rest of the world are also just as signicant. ere are

very few people who still think the two-state solution is a distinct

solution or even a possibility. Latin America, Europe, and the

Muslim world’s policies are all aected by this monumental

change in the status quo. As Israel is fast on its way to becoming

an apartheid, in the judgment of most observers, the international

community will need to craft a new approach in the absence of

true leadership by the U.S. Turkey’s leadership has been very crit-

18 / InTRODUCTIOn

ical in keeping the attention on the matter and even isolating the

U.S. and Israel in the international arena. At the same time, Turk-

ish eorts have to be supported by the Muslim leaders as well as

their European and Latin American counterparts to reach a just

solution in Palestine.

Kadir Üstün

October, 2019

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 19

TAKING TRUMP SERIOUSLY

ON JERUSALEM

LARA FRIEDMAN

President of the Foundation for Middle East

Peace (FMEP)

CHAPTER 1

20 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

INTRODUCTION

From the start of the 2016 presidential campaign in the United

States, through this writing (well into the third year of the Trump

presidency), observers and analysts of Israeli-Palestinian issues have

over and over made the same basic error with respect to trying

to understand the intentions of the Trump Administration and

to predict its policies and its actions: they have refused to take

President Trump and his surrogates at their word – including on

Jerusalem.

At the start of Trump’s campaign to become president,

then-candidate Trump entrusted his Israel-Palestine policy to a

core group of trusted advisors – his real estate lawyer, Jason Green-

blatt; his bankruptcy lawyer, David Friedman; and his son-in-law,

Jared Kushner – all of whom had well-established personal political

inclinations in this policy arena

. And notwithstanding many peo-

ple’s expectation that, if elected, Trump would replace the trio with

experienced foreign policy professionals, after winning the election

Trump handed them the reins of his Israel-Palestine policy.

While past Administrations included officials who carried

with them various ideological preferences on Israel-Palestine, such

officials were almost uniformly foreign policy professionals who

demonstrably adjusted their assumptions and their goals based

Josen Dolsten, “Meet the Jews in the Trump administration,” Times of Israel, January

28, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/meet-the-jews-in-the-

trump-administration/.

CHAPTER 1

22 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

on realities of actually having to carry out a real foreign policy

and political considerations, foreign or domestic, that emerged. In

contrast, it was clear from the start that the men leading Trump’s

Israel-Palestine policy were not foreign policy professionals; they

were, and remain today, ideologues.

In this context, it should have

been expected that once in office, they would act energetically to

implement the policies and promises articulated during the Trump

campaign – and where these policies and promises hit obstacles, it

should have been understood the result might be an alteration in

tactics or timing, but not an alteration in objectives.

This is precisely what has happened since Trump took office,

including on Jerusalem.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON

JERUSALEM BEFORE TRUMP

From the era before Israel became a state in 1948, until December

6, 2017, the United States maintained an unbroken policy, backed

by presidents from both parties, of refraining from recognizing the

sovereignty of any nation in any part of Jerusalem, regardless of

who was in control on the ground. Consistent with that policy,

dating back to 1844, until March 4, 2019, the United States main-

tained a Consulate General in Jerusalem – an independent dip-

lomatic mission responsible directly to Washington, not affiliated

with any embassy accredited to any sovereign nation.

Likewise,

based on its non-recognition policy in Jerusalem, from the time

the United States established diplomatic relations with Israel until

Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Settlement Sees Friendly Faces in Trump Administration,” New

York Times, February 15, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.

com/2017/02/15/world/middleeast/david-friedman-beit-el-west-bank.html.

“U.S.-Israel Relations: History of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem,” Jewish Virtual Li-

brary, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-of-the-u-s-con-

sulate-in-jerusalem.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 23

May 14, 2018, the United States maintained its embassy to the

state of Israel in Tel Aviv.

Those are the headlines; to appreciate the magnitude of the

changes in United States policy represented by the Trump Admin-

istration’s actions on Jerusalem requires a slightly deeper dive into

history.

On November 29, 1947, six months before Israel’s May 14,

1948 Declaration of Independence, the United States, under the

presidency of Harry S. Truman, voted in favor of United Nations

General Assembly Resolution 181.

With respect to Jerusalem, this

resolution stated:

The Cty of Jerusalem shall be establshed as a corpus separatum

under a specal nternatonal regme and shall be admnstered

by the Unted Natons. The Trusteeshp Councl shall be de-

sgnated to dscharge the responsbltes of the Admnsterng

Authorty on behalf of the Unted Natons.

In the wake of Israel’s declaration of independence and the

outbreak of the 1948 Israeli-Arab War (known to Israelis as the

“War of Independence”), the United States did not change its pol-

icy on Jerusalem, as noted in an August 13, 1948 memo:

We contnue to beleve that Jerusalem should not be placed un-

der the sole authorty of ether sde and that some degree of UN

responsblty stll essental...

Indeed, on October 14, 1948, in the context of the ongoing

presidential election campaign, President Truman issued a state-

ment on Israel asserting, among other things:

“U. N. General Assembly Resolution 181,” Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, No-

vember 29, 1947, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/israel/unres181.htm.

“Declassied Department of State memo,” Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Au-

gust 13, 1948, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_

collections/berlin_airlift/documents/PDFs/2-18.pdf.

24 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

We contnue to support, wthn the framework of the Unted

Natons, the nternatonalzaton of Jerusalem and the protect-

on of the holy places n Palestne.

Likewise, on December 11, 1948, the United States voted in

favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194. With

respect to Jerusalem, this resolution stated that:

n vew of ts assocaton wth three world relgons, the Jerusa-

lem area…should be accorded specal and separate treatment

from the rest of Palestne and should be placed under effectve

Unted Natons control.

The situation on the ground changed in 1949. The 1949 Ar-

mistice Line, agreed to by Israel and Jordan on April 3, 1949 as

part of the agreements that ended the 1948 Israel-Arab war, left

Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan, a status quo that held

for the next 19 years. Yet, the policy of the United States remained

unchanged: the United States, along with the United Nations and

most of the world, refused to recognize the sovereignty of either

nation in the city and instead continued to push for actions by the

United Nations in support of internationalization of the city.

Rejecting this position, in July 1952 Israel moved its Minis-

try of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem. Objecting strenuously to the

move, the United States embassy in Tel Aviv, acting under explicit

instructions from Washington, delivered an “aide memoire” to the

acting Israeli Foreign Minister reiterating that,

The Govt of the U.S. had adhered to and contnues to adhere to

the polcy that there shld be a specal nternatl regme for Jeru-

“Statement of the President on Israel,”, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, October

24, 1948, accessed March 28, 2019, https://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.

php?pid=2004.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) “Palestine – Progress Report of

the United Nations Mediator,” United Nations documents archive, December 11, 1948, ac-

cessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/A/RES/194%20(III).

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 25

salem whch wll not only provde protecton for the holy places

but whch wll be acceptable to Israel and Jordan as well as the

world communty…

[sc]

A decade later, a 1962 State Department memo reviewed in

detail United States policy on Jerusalem, noting that, “as frequent-

ly stated,” the United States policy is that:

the status of Jerusalem s a matter of Unted Natons concern

and no member of the Unted Natons should take any acton

to prejudce the Unted Natons nterest n ths queston. Our

objectve has been to keep the Jerusalem queston an open one

and to prevent ts beng settled solely through the processes of

attrton and fat accompl to the excluson of nternatonal nte-

rest and an eventual fnal expresson thereof presumably throu-

gh the Unted Natons.

In the course of the 1967 War, Israel took control of East Je-

rusalem (along with the rest of the West Bank). Commenting on

the new status quo in an address delivered on June 19, 1967

, Pres-

ident Lyndon Johnson outlined principles for peace between the

parties to the conflict, noting, with respect to Jerusalem, only that,

“there just must be adequate recognition of the special interest of

three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.” Nine days

later, on June 28 - when it became clear that Israel was on the verge

of de facto annexing East Jerusalem – Johnson issued a statement

going much further:

“Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, e Near and Middle East,

Volume IX, Part 1,” U.S. Department of State Oce of the Historian, p. 961, accessed

March 28, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/pg_961.

“281. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the

President’s Special Assistant for National Security Aairs (Bundy),” Department of State Of-

ce of the Historian, May 21, 1962, accessed March 28, 2019, https://history.state.gov/his-

toricaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d281.

“Address by President Lyndon Johnson,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aairs, June 19, 1967,

accessed March 28, 2019, https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook1/

pages/26%20address%20by%20president%20johnson-%2019%20june%201967.aspx.

26 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

It s one of the great contnung tragedes of hstory that a cty

whch s so much the center of man’s hghest values has also

been, over and over, a center of conflct. Repeatedly the passo-

nate belefs of one element have led to excluson or unfarness

for others. It has been so, unfortunately, n the last 20 years.

Men of all relgons wll agree that we must now do better. The

world must fnd an answer that s far and recognzed to be far.

That could not be acheved by hasty unlateral acton, and the

Presdent s confdent that the wsdom and good judgment of

those now n control of Jerusalem wll prevent any such acton.

That same day, Israel announced that it was applying its law

to East Jerusalem and adjacent areas – an act of de facto annexation

– and incorporating them into a single municipality with Israeli

West Jerusalem. In response, the United States doubled down on

its refusal to recognize Israeli sovereignty in any part of the city:

The hasty admnstratve acton taken today cannot be regar-

ded as determnng the future of the holy places or the status

of Jerusalem n relaton to them. The Unted States has never

recognzed such unlateral actons by any of the states n the area

as governng the nternatonal status of Jerusalem...

Less than a week later, on July 4, 1967, the United States ab-

stained on UN General Assembly Resolution 2254

, regarding

Jerusalem. In a July 5, 1967 message sent to U.S. diplomatic mis-

sions around the world regarding the abstention, the State Depart-

ment explained:

“e Department of State Bulletin, Volume LVII, Nos. 1462-U87, July 3-December

25, 1967,” Department of State Archives, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.archive.

org/stream/departmentofstat571967unit/departmentofstat571967unit_djvu.txt.

“e Department of State Bulletin, Volume LVII, Nos. 1462-U87, July 3-December

25, 1967,” Department of State Archives, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.archive.

org/stream/departmentofstat571967unit/departmentofstat571967unit_djvu.txt.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V). “Measures taken by Israel

to change the status of the City of Jerusalem,” July 4, 1967, accessed March 28, 2019, https://

unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A39A906C89D3E98685256C29006D4014.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 27

US vews on queston of Jerusalem reman as stated by USG

on June 19 and June 28 and agan by Ambassador Goldberg n

UNGA. We wll contnue to stress our opposton to any un-

lateral efforts to change the permanent poston n Jerusalem or

elsewhere, and to nsst that any such change be accomplshed

only by nternatonally effectve acton, takng full account of

nternatonal nterests. We do not recognze Israel measures as

havng effected changes n formal status of Jerusalem.

Speaking at the United Nations on July 14, 1967, U.S. rep-

resentative to the UN Arthur Goldberg again reiterated the U.S.

position on Jerusalem, this time in explaining the United States’

abstention on UN General Assembly Resolution 3354 (ES-V):

the Unted States does not accept or recognze these measures

as alterng the status of Jerusalem. My Government does not

recognze that the admnstratve measures taken by the Govern-

ment of Israel on 28 June can be regarded as the last word on the

matter, and we regret that they were taken, We [sc] nsst that

the measures taken cannot be consdered as other than nterm

and provsonal, and not as prejudgng the fnal and permanent

status of Jerusalem.

In the coming year, United States policy on Jerusalem was

repeatedly tested by Israel, leading the United States in 1968 to

vote in favor of two consecutive United Nations Security Council

resolutions (250

and 251

) opposing Israel’s actions in the city

“344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts, Subj: Jerusalem

Resolution in UNGA,” Department of State Oce of the Historian, July 5, 1967, accessed

March 28, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19 /d344.

“Statement of U.S. Representative to the UN Arthur Goldberg” Ocial records of the

UN General Assembly 1554

Plenary Meeting, July 14, 1969, accessed March 28, 2019,

paragraphs 91-115,

https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/66E65FB1AA7CFD3085257345004FFE4F.

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 250,” United Nations documents ar-

chive, April 27, 1968, accessed 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/250(1968).

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 251,”, United Nations documents ar-

chive, May 2, 1968, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/251(1968).

28 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

and to abstain on a third (252

). United States frustration with

Israeli policies on Jerusalem continued to play out in the United

Nations in 1969. On July 1, 1969, in response to Israeli actions

in Jerusalem, U.S. representative to the UN Charles Yost, told the

Security Council:

…as far as the Unted States s concerned such unlateral mea-

sures, ncludng expropraton of land or other admnstratve

acton taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be consdered

other than nterm and provsonal and cannot affect the present

nternatonal status nor prejudge the fnal and permanent status

of Jerusalem. The Unted States poston could not be clearer.

Two days later, on July 3, 1969, the United States voted in

favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 267, calling

on Israel to:

rescnd forthwth all measures taken by t to change the status of

the Cty of Jerusalem, and n future to refran from all actons

lkely to have that effect.

Two months after that, the United States voted in favor of UN

Security Council Resolution 271,

which, among other things,

reaffirmed UNSCRs 252 and 267 and condemned Israel’s failure

to comply with them.

United States policy on Jerusalem remained firm into the

1970s. For example, on September 25, 1971, the United States

voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 298, which

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 252,” United Nations documents ar-

chive, May 21, 1968, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/252(1968).

“Statements from U.S. Government Ocials Concerning Israeli Settlements,”

Churches for Middle East Peace, March 28, 2019, https://cmep.org/wp-content/up-

loads/2017/04/SettlementStatements.pdf.

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 267,” United Nations documents ar-

chive, July 3, 1969, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/267(1969).

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 271,” United Nations documents ar-

chive, September 15, 1969, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/271(1969).

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 29

among other things again reaffirmed the Council’s prior resolu-

tions (252 and 267) and confirmed:

n the clearest possble terms that all legslatve and admnstra-

tve actons taken by Israel to change the status of the Cty of

Jerusalem…are totally nvald and cannot change the status.

Similarly, on March 23, 1976, the United States representa-

tive to the UN reiterated, in response to unilateral Israeli actions to

change the status of Jerusalem, that:

The U.S. poston could not be clearer. Snce 1967 we have res-

tated here, n other fora, and to the Government of Israel that

the future of Jerusalem wll be determned only through the

nstruments and processes of negotaton, agreement, and ac-

commodaton. Unlateral attempts to predetermne that future

have no standng...

United States policy during the 1980s followed the same

course, regardless of what party held the White House.

• On March 1, 1980, the United States voted in favor of UN

Security Council Resolution 465, which noted that “all mea-

sures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demo-

graphic composition, institutional structure or status of the Pal-

estinian and other territories occupied since 1967, including

Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal validity…”

• On June 30, 1980, the United States abstained on UN Secu-

rity Council Resolution 476, which reaffirmed its previous res-

olutions on Jerusalem and reiterated that “all such measures

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 298,” United Nations documents ar-

chive, September 25, 1971, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/298(1971).

“Jimmy Carter Administration: U.S. Position on Settlements,” (March 23, 1976),”

Jewish Virtual Library, March 23, 1976, accessed March 28, 2019, http://www.jewishvirtu-

allibrary.org/jsource/History/us76.html.

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 465,” United Nations Documents ar-

chive, March 1, 1980, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/465(1980).

30 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

which have altered the geographic, demographic and historical

character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and

void and must be rescinded in compliance with the relevant

resolutions of the Security Council.”

• On August 20, 1980, the United States abstained on UN Se-

curity Council Resolution 478, which censured Israel for enact-

ing a “basic law” changing the character and status of Jerusalem

and for ignoring previous Security Council resolutions on the

issue, declared the action Israel had taken to be a violation of

international law, and declared that no UN member states

would recognize it and that countries that had opened diplo-

matic missions in Jerusalem should withdraw them.

• On September 1, 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared:

“...we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided,

but its final status should be decided through negotiations.”

• On March 5, 1990, the White House reported that President

George H.W. Bush, in a call with Jewish leaders, had “reiterated

that U.S. policy toward Jerusalem is unchanged. The United

States supports a united Jerusalem whose final status is deter-

mined by negotiations.”

On August 11, 1992, during a press

conference with then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,

when asked directly if in a second term he would recognize Je-

rusalem as Israel’s capital and move the embassy, Bush stated,

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 476,” United Nations Documents ar-

chive, June 30, 1980, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/476(1980).

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 478,” United Nations Documents ar-

chive, August 20, 1980, accessed March 25, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/478(1980).

“e Reagan Plan,” Jewish Virtual Library, accessed March 28, 2019, http://www.jew-

ishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/reaganplan.html.

“Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on President Bush’s Telephone Conversation

With Seymour Reich of the Conference of Presidents of American Jewish Organizations,”

George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, March 3, 1990, accessed March 28, 2019,

https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/1617.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 31

“Let me just say that our policy on Jerusalem remains un-

changed.”

Even after 1993, when the United States’ energies shifted

into efforts that, if successful, would yield a solution on Jerusalem

negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians, the United States

policy on the status of Jerusalem remained firm. For example, on

September 28, 1996, the United States abstained on UN Security

Council Resolution 1073, which, among other things, recalled pri-

or Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem.

Moreover, this policy remained embodied most clearly in the

fact that the independent Consulate General remained the United

States’ diplomatic mission in Jerusalem, over time taking respon-

sibility for relations with the Palestinian Authority. In parallel, the

embassy representing the United States in Israel and to the Israeli

government continued to be located in Tel Aviv, despite the passage

in 1995 of Public Law 104-45

, known as the Jerusalem Embassy

Act, seeking to force the President to move it to Jerusalem (a law

President Reagan had threatened to veto in 1984

). From 1995-

2018, every U.S. president (until President Trump) refrained from

doing so, based on what each one argued was necessary to protect

the national security interests of the United States.

“e President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel in

Kennebunkport,” George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, August 11, 1992, accessed

28, 2019, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/4655.

“United Nations Security Council Resolution 1073,” 28 September 1996, United Na-

tions Documents archive, September 28, 1996, accessed March 28, 2019, https://undocs.

org/S/RES/1073(1996).

“e Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995” enacted 8 November 1995, accessed March 28,

2019, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ45/PLAW-104publ45.pdf.

William R. Doerner, “is Is a Most Unwise ing,” Time Magazine, April 9, 1984, accessed

March 28, 2019, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952383-1,00.html.

32 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

The consistency of the U.S. approach was also embodied in

the fact that since March 1964, as a matter of policy, United

States official documents like maps referred simply to “Jerusa-

lem,” rather than “Jerusalem, Israel” (prior to March 1964 the

city was recorded as “Jerusalem, Palestine”

), and official U.S.

documents issued by the Consulate noted the place of issuance

(or in the case of reports of birth abroad, the place of birth) as

“Jerusalem” rather than “Israel.” Successive U.S. presidents de-

fended this policy and practice, including President Clinton,

who in 1999 vetoed legislation

over language seeking to compel

the State Department to change the policy. In his veto statement

Clinton explained,

Provsons concernng Jerusalem are objectonable on consttu-

tonal, foregn polcy, and operatonal grounds. The actons cal-

led for by these provsons would prejudce the outcome of the

Israel-Palestnan permanent status negotatons...

Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama likewise

both defended the policy in the courts, after Bush allowed the

same provisions on Jerusalem vetoed by Clinton to pass into law

(Public Law 107-228

). Notably, when he signed the measure

into law, Bush issued a signing statement asserting that the pro-

vision on Jerusalem, “impermissibly interferes with the Presi-

“Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel,” March 14, 1964,

accessed March 28, 2019, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/d30.

HR 2670, “Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related

Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000” (vetoed), accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.con-

gress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/2670.

“Message from President Bill Clinton to Congress dated 25 October 1999 on veto of

HR 2670” October 25, 1999, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/congres-

sional-record/1999/10/26/house-section/article/H10835-1.

“Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003,” Public Law 107-228, Sep-

tember 30, 2002, accessed March 28, 2019, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-

107publ228/pdf/PLAW-107publ228.pdf.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 33

dent’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign

affairs…U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not changed.”

The

lawsuit challenging the non-implementation of the Jerusalem

provision

was originally filed in 2004, and eventually made its

way to the Supreme Court, which ruled on it - in the Executive

branch’s favor - in 2015.

JERUSALEM IN THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN

It is a truism of United States politics that virtually every president,

in the course of campaigning, has declared that Jerusalem is Israel’s

undivided capital, and has either promised or hinted that, if elect-

ed, he would move the embassy there.

President Trump was no different, declaring in March 2016 at

AIPAC’s annual Washington policy conference, “We will move the

American embassy to the eternal capital of the Jewish people, Je-

rusalem

.” What was different about Trump, however, is that even

during the campaign, it should have been clear that, in contrast to

his predecessors from both parties, he meant it.

Shortly before Trump appeared at AIPAC, David Friedman,

who was at that point already acting as one of Trump’s main surro-

George W. Bush, “Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,

Fiscal Year 2003,” e American Presidency Project, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-foreign-relations-authoriza-

tion-act-scal-year-2003.

Adam B. Lerner, “Supreme Court sides with Obama administration in Jerusalem pass-

port case,” Politico, June 8, 2015, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.politico.com/

story/2015/06/jerusalem-passport-case-supreme-court-ruling-118737.

“Donald Trump: What past US presidents have said about recognising Jerusalem as

Israel’s capital,” ABC/Reuters, December 6, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.abc.

net.au/news/2017-12-07/what-have-past-presidents-said-about-israel-and-jeru-

salem/9234736.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Full text of Donald Trump’s speech to AIPAC,” e Times

of Israel, March 22, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/donald-

trumps-full-speech-to-aipac/.

34 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

gates and advisors on Israel-related matters, published an op-ed in

a far-right Israeli media outlet examining how voters should deter-

mine who is truly the pro-Israel candidate. A longtime supporter

of and advocate for Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian

territories, Friedman wrote about the qualities that like-minded

people have learned to look for in choosing their elected officials,

including,

A recognton that Congress has mandated snce 1995 that the

US Embassy be housed n Jerusalem, Israel’s eternal captal, and

there s no good reason to further delay ths legslatve drecton.

In July 2016, as the campaign heated up, the Republican Na-

tional Committee – reportedly working in close coordination with

Friedman

– adopted a new policy with respect to Israel, dropping

any mention of support for peace efforts and adding explicitly that

“We recognize Jerusalem as the eternal and indivisible capital of

the Jewish state and call for the American embassy to be moved

there in fulfillment of U.S. law.”

This was a 180 degree shift

from the 2012 platform, which talked about Jerusalem only in

the context of peace efforts, noting: “we envision two democratic

states—Israel with Jerusalem as its capital and Palestine—living in

peace and security.”

David Friedman, “US presidents and Israel: Always expect the unexpected,” Israel Na-

tional News (Arutz Sheva), March 9, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019, http://www.israelnatio-

nalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/18526.

Andrew Kaczynski, “Trump Israel ambassador pick bragged of removing two-state solu-

tion from GOP platform at November event,” CNN, February 23, 2017, accessed March 28,

2019, https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/politics/kle-david-friedman-november-speech/

index.html.

“Republican Platform 2016,” website of the Republican Party, accessed March 28,

2019,https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FI-

NAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf.

“Republican Platform 2012,” American Presidency Project, accessed March 28, 2019,

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2012-republican-party-platform.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 35

In response to the platform change, Friedman and Trump’s

other key advisor on Israel-related matters, Jason Greenblatt,

co-published a no-punches-pulled statement noting,

Support for Israel s support for Amerca, so t s only rght that the

commttee has made t clear that our government must advance

polces that encourage and reflect our country’s commtment to

Israel, ncludng the recognton that Jerusalem s the eternal, un-

dvded captal of the Jewsh people and the Jewsh State of Israel.

A month later, in August 2016, Friedman confidently told an

Israeli paper,

I thnk one of hs frst acts s gong be to recognze Jerusalem

as the captal of Israel. I thnk the movement of the embassy to

Jerusalem s logstcally somethng that can’t be done on the frst

day (but) I thnk that wll happen n due course.

In that same vein, in October 2016, Trump’s daughter told vot-

ers in Florida that the chances were “100%” that her father would

move the embassy to Jerusalem.

That same month, appearing at an

event in Jerusalem, Friedman told the assembled Trump supporters:

In 1995, Congress enacted a law that requred the U.S. to move

the embassy from Tel Avv to Jerusalem. 1995, that’s 21 years

ago. It hasn’t happened. Why? Because the law provdes that

the requrement for the embassy to be moved can be waved at

the desre of the State Department. The same State Department

that has been ant-Semtc and ant-Israel for the past 70 years.

“Joint Statement from Jason Dov Greenblatt and David Friedman, Advisors to

Donald J. Trump on Israel,” Medium.com, July 12, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019,

https://medium.com/@jgreenblatt/joint-statement-from-jason-dov-greenblatt-and-da-

vid-friedman-advisors-to-donald-j-trump-on-israel-a8187a5c3f9d.

MediaLine, “Interview with Trump’s Israel advisor, a Jew who ‘truly loves Israel’,”

April 8, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.ynetnews.com/arti-

cles/0,7340,L-4837669,00.html.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Ivanka says Trump would ‘100%’ move US embassy to

Jerusalem,” October 28, 2016, accessed Marc 28, 2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/ivan-

ka-says-trump-would-100-move-us-embassy-to-jerusalem/.

36 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

Every presdent gets elected and he says to the State Depart-

ment – what about ths law, should we move the embassy from

Tel Avv to Jerusalem, and they say ‘absolutely not, absolutely

not. The lfers n the State Department are absolutely, postvely

commtted to never movng the embassy to Jerusalem. What’s

dfferent about Donald Trump? You all know Donald Trump. If

there s anybody n the world poltcs who could stand up to the

State Department t s Donald Trump. When Donald Trump

has hs frst meetng wth the lfers n the State Department

and they say, ‘Mr. Trump, wth all due respect, you have only

been presdent for a couple of days, we’ve been lvng here for

the last 20 years, we don’t do t that way, we do t ths way – we

don’t move the embassy, that’s been State department polcy for

20 years, the reacton from Donald Trump s gong to be, ‘You

know what guys, you’re all FIRED!’

Finally, on November 2, 2016, on the eve of the election,

Friedman and Greenblatt published a joint declaration offering

detailed promises of exactly what, if elected Trump would do with

respect to Israel. These included the unequivocal statement that,

“The U.S. will recognize Jerusalem as the eternal and indivisible

capital of the Jewish state and Mr. Trump’s Administration will

move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.”

THE TRANSITION:

DOUBLING DOWN ON JERUSALEM PROMISES

Some pundits and observers no doubt discounted Jerusalem-relat-

ed statements made by Trump and his surrogates during the cam-

paign, based on the premise that these statements were no different

Allison Kaplan Sommer, “Trump’s Envoy to Israel: We’ll Break With ‘anti-Semitic’

State Dept., Move Embassy to Jerusalem,” Haaretz, December 16, 2016, accessed March

28, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-trump-s-envoy-to-israel-

vowed-to-break-with-anti-semitic-state-dept-1.5474776.

“Joint Statement from Jason Dov Greenblatt and David Friedman, Co-Chairmen of

the Israel Advisory Committee to Donald J. Trump,” Medium.com, November 2, 2016,

March 28, 2019, https://medium.com/@jgreenblatt/joint-statement-from-jason-dov-green-

blatt-and-david-friedman-co-chairmen-of-the-israel-advisory-edc1ec50b7a8.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 37

from ones made by prior candidates. Based on this logic, it was

anticipated that once elected, Trump, like his predecessors, would

renege, either having never meant to carry out the promise in the

first place or, benefitting now from a better understanding of the

broader national security interests in play, coming to a different

conclusion about what was possible or desirable.

Yet, from the moment he was elected, it was already clear that,

with respect to Israel-related policy in general, and Jerusalem in

particular, Trump would not be the same as his predecessors.

In terms of policy promises, his campaign had gotten out in

front on Jerusalem to a degree that surpassed all previous candi-

dates. Moreover, the Trump campaign had bolstered its own pol-

icy promises by engineering a sea change in the Republican Party

platform, re-orienting it to erase any commitment to a negotiated

peace and to align it with the positions of the Trump campaign

and the Israeli far-right. And finally, immediately after the election

it became clear that the same core group of officials who had ad-

vised and spoken for Trump on Israel during the campaign – David

Friedman, Jason Greenblatt, and Jared Kushner – not only were not

about to be marginalized in the Trump Administration, but would

be elevated to the most powerful positions on this issue.

Focusing narrowly on Jerusalem, mid-December witnessed a

flurry of statements and concrete developments, all of which sug-

gested a serious intention to make good on Jerusalem-related cam-

paign promises. These included senior Trump advisor Kellyanne

Conway saying that moving the embassy would be a “very big pri-

ority” for the new president

; Israeli media reports that the Trump

Felicia Schwartz, “Trump: Moving U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem ‘Very Big Pri-

ority’,” Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.wsj.

com/articles/trump-considers-moving-u-s-embassy-in-israel-to-jerusalem-a-very-bigpriori-

ty-adviser-says-1481579944.

38 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

transition team was already scouting locations in Jerusalem for a

new U.S. Embassy

; and Trump announcing that Friedman would

be his nominee for ambassador to Israel.

If all of those signs weren’t clear enough, the New York Times

reported on December 15, 2016: “In a statement from the Trump

transition team announcing his nomination, he [Friedman] said he

looked forward to doing the job ‘from the U.S. embassy in Israel’s

eternal capital, Jerusalem.’”

TRUMP AS PRESIDENT:

A MAN OF HIS WORD, AT LEAST ON JERUSALEM

Trump was sworn in on January 20, 2017, amid speculation that

he might take immediate action to move the U.S. embassy to Je-

rusalem – but he didn’t. How close did Trump come to taking

action on Jerusalem in those earliest days? Opinions on the matter

differ

, but in an interview in mid-February 2017, then-chairman

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Corker (R-TN)

said “I think at one point they were ready to move the Embassy at

12:01 on January 20th…”

Some saw Trump’s failure to immediately act on Jerusalem as

a sign that now in office, his policy on the matter would, perhaps

grudgingly, fall in line with his predecessors. Such reassuring anal-

Tamar Pileggi, “Trump’s team already exploring logistics of moving embassy to Jeru-

salem,” Times of Israel, December 12, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.timesos-

rael.com/trumps-team-already-exploring-logistics-of-moving-embassy-to-jerusalem-report/.

Matthew Rosenberg, “Trump Chooses Hard-Liner as Ambassador to Israel,” New York

Times, December 15, 2016, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/

us/politics/donald-trump-david-friedman-israel-ambassador.html.

“To Move, or Not to Move (the Embassy), at Is the Question,” Terrestrial Jerusalem,

accessed March 26, 2019, http://t-j.org.il/LatestDevelopments/tabid/1370/articleID/826/

currentpage/11/Default.aspx.

Susan Glasser, “Sen. Bob Corker: e Full Transcript,” Politico, February 13, 2017,

accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/sen-bob-cork-

er-the-full-transcript-214767.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 39

ysis discounted Trump’s own pronouncements on the issue: inter-

viewed three days after his inauguration in Israel Hayom – the

Israeli daily owned by top Trump donor Sheldon Adelson,

Trump

was asked whether he remembered his promise regarding Jerusa-

lem. Trump responded: “clearly I did not forget,” and “of course I

remember what I said about Jerusalem,” and “You know that I am

not a person who breaks promises.”

In June 2017, Trump (who by then was already backing away

from the longstanding United States position of supporting a two-

state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

) faced his first for-

mal test of his promises on Jerusalem, when the previous waiver of

the Jerusalem Embassy Act, issued 6 months earlier by President

Obama, expired. Trump decided to renew the waiver, giving fuel to

those who were still arguing that under Trump’s presidency, Unit-

ed States policy on Israel was more or less business as usual (just

as some were still arguing, contra the facts, that Trump was not

changing United States policy on settlements

). In order to con-

tinue to make those arguments, however, they had to dismiss the

very clear official statement of intent that accompanied Trump’s

signing of the waiver:

Justin Elliott, “Trump’s Patron-in-Chief,” ProPublica, October 10, 2018, accessed

March 26, 2019, https://features.propublica.org/trump-inc-podcast/sheldon-adelson-casi-

no-magnate-trump-macau-and-japan/.

Alexander Fulbright, “Trump: ‘I did not forget’ Jerusalem embassy move pledge,”

Times of Israel, January 19, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/

trump-i-did-not-forget-jerusalem-embassy-move-pledge/.

Nicole Gaouette and Elise Labott, “Trump backs o two-state framework for Israeli-Pal-

estinian deal,” CNN, February 16, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.cnn.

com/2017/02/15/politics/trump-netanyahu-two-state-solution-israel-palestinians/index.html.

Dan Shapiro, “Trump Sounds Like Obama on Israeli Settlements,” Foreign Policy,

February 3, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/03/trump-

sounds-like-obama-on-israeli-settlements/; Elliott Abrams, “e Trump Administration Set-

tles In on Settlements,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), April 2, 2017, accessed March 28,

2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/trump-administration-settles-settlements.

40 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

Whle Presdent Donald J. Trump sgned the waver under the

Jerusalem Embassy Act…as he has repeatedly stated hs nten-

ton to move the embassy, the queston s not f that move hap-

pens, but only when.

Foreshadowing what would soon transpire, on September 29,

2017, David Friedman – by then the confirmed United States am-

bassador to Israel (who was also by then referring to the “alleged

occupation”

) told a reporter: “I do believe he will decide to move

the embassy and most importantly declare Israel as the eternal cap-

ital of the State of Israel and the Jewish people.”

A month later, Friedman told an audience at a far right-wing

U.S. gathering,

The Presdent has also made clear that he ntends to move the

Unted States Embassy from Tel Avv to Jerusalem – t s not

a queston of IF; only a queston of WHEN. I take hm at hs

word and I personally am commtted to do all I can to advocate

for ths move.

Friedman was speaking the truth: On December 6, 2017 –

less than one year after taking office – President Trump formal-

ly recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and announced that he

was “directing the State Department to begin preparation to move

“Statement on the American Embassy in Israel,” White House, June 1, 2017, accessed

March 28, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briengs-statements/statement-american-em-

bassy-israel/.

Peter Beaumont, “Trump’s ambassador to Israel refers to ‘alleged occupation’ of Pales-

tinian territories,” e Guardian, September 1, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.

theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/01/trump-ambassador-israel-david-friedman-al-

leged-occupation-palestinian-territories.

Loveday Morris, “U.S. ambassador breaks with policy: ‘I think the settlements are part

of Israel,’” Washington Post, September 29, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.

washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/29/u-s-ambassador-breaks-with-policy

-i-think-the-settlements-are-part-of-israel.

“Ambassador David Friedman remarks at the Zionist Organization of America (as pre-

pared),” U.S. Embassy in Israel, November 12, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://

il.usembassy.gov/ambassador-david-friedman-remarks-zoa-annual-event-prepared/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 41

the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.”

In so doing,

Trump overturned bipartisan United States policy dating back to

before the establishment of the modern state of Israel and ground-

ed in international law and United Nations Security Council res-

olutions.

Trump’s move was accompanied by a carefully drafted “procla-

mation,” which included a paragraph designed to assure the world

that this policy shift didn’t fundamentally change U.S. policy on

Jerusalem:

Today’s actons — recognzng Jerusalem as Israel’s captal and

announcng the relocaton of our embassy — do not reflect a

departure from the strong commtment of the Unted States to

facltatng a lastng peace agreement. The Unted States cont-

nues to take no poston on any fnal status ssues. The specfc

boundares of Israel soveregnty n Jerusalem are subject to fnal

status negotatons between the partes. The Unted States s

not takng a poston on boundares or borders.

That paragraph, however, was contradicted almost immedi-

ately by explicit statements from inside the Trump Administration

– first from Nikki Haley, Trump’s representative at the UN, who

days after the proclamation observed: “The president took Jerusa-

lem off the [negotiating] table.”

Within weeks Trump was public-

“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem,” White House, December 6, 2017, ac-

cessed March 28, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briengs-statements/statement-presi-

dent-trump-jerusalem/.

“Presidential Proclamation Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel

and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem,” December 6, 2017, ac-

cessed March 28, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proc-

lamation-recognizing-jerusalem-capital-state-israel-relocating-united-states-embassy-isra-

el-jerusalem/.

“Transcript: Nikki Haley on “Face the Nation,” CBS, December 10, 2017, accessed

March 28, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-nikki-haley-on-face-the-na-

tion-dec-10-2017/.

42 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

ly singing the same song, bragging, “We took it [Jerusalem] off the

table. We don’t have to talk about it anymore.”

Trump’s announcement immediately gave rise to expert anal-

ysis suggesting that it was, in fact, a clever rhetorical ruse designed

to placate Trump’s base while allowing Trump to postpone moving

the embassy for years, as he pursued his own peace efforts.

Those

theories were quickly proved baseless.

By January 2018, it was already being reported that by Ambas-

sador Friedman would be working out of an existing United States

diplomatic facility in Jerusalem by 2019.

That timetable proved

insufficiently optimistic: on May 14, 2018, barely 7 months after

Trump announced his new policy on Jerusalem, the new United

States Embassy to Israel was opened there.

The White House announced the official move in a press re-

lease entitled, “President Donald J. Trump Keeps His Promise To

Open U.S. Embassy In Jerusalem, Israel.” That press release noted:

After decades of past Presdents commttng to move the Em-

bassy to Jerusalem on the campagn tral, only to renege on tho-

se promses whle n offce, Presdent Trump has fulflled hs

promse to support one of Amerca’s strongest alles.

Noa Landau and Amir Tibon, “We Took Jerusalem O the Negotiating Table, Trump

Says Alongside Netanyahu in Davos,” Haaretz, January 25, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019,

https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-trump-netanyahu-meet-in-davos-1.5766434.

Martin Indyk, “Donald Trump’s Jerusalem move may prove too clever by half,” Finan-

cial Times, December 7, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/

fda1e7f8-da89-11e7-9504-59efdb70e12f.

Amir Tibon, “Report: U.S. Ambassador in Israel Will Work Out of Consular Oce

Building in Jerusalem by 2019,” Haaretz, January 19, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019,

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/report-u-s-ambassador-in-israel-will-work-from-j-lem-

oce-building-1.5746733.

“President Donald J. Trump Keeps His Promise To Open U.S. Embassy In Jerusalem, Is-

rael,” White House, May 14, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief-

ings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-keeps-promise-open-u-s-embassy-jerusalem-israel/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 43

LEARNING LESSONS FROM TRUMP’S

JERUSALEM POLICY

The move of the embassy is not the whole story with respect to

Trump’s policy shift on Jerusalem. Likewise, the recognition of

Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the move of the embassy are sig-

nificant not merely in their own right, but more so as a guide for

understanding everything else Trump has done on Israel-Palestine,

and where he is likely to take his policy in the future.

Back in November 2017, the Trump Administration executed

another historic shift in United States policy vis-à-vis the Palestin-

ians: for the first time since the start of the peace process, the United

States withheld a waiver that is required by law

in order to allow

the PLO to maintain an office – effectively, an embassy – in Wash-

ington, DC. In the months that followed, the Trump Administra-

tion nonetheless gave the PLO special dispensation to keep the of-

fice open and to leave its representative in place, ostensibly in order

to work with the Trump Administration to achieve progress towards

peace

. But on September 10, 2018, four months after the opening

of the new embassy in Jerusalem, the Trump Administration ended

that dispensation

and on October 10, 2018, under orders of the

Trump Administration, the PLO mission was shuttered.

Lara Friedman, “Understanding the PLO Mission Crisis – Key Documents,” Founda-

tion for Middle East Peace, accessed March 28, 2019, https://fmep.org/blog/2017/11/under-

standing-plo-mission-crisis-key-documents/.

Khaled Elgindy and Lara Friedman, “Locking Palestinians in a Flawed Peace Process,”

LobeLog, November 29, 2017, accessed March 27, 2019, https://lobelog.com/locking-pales-

tinians-in-a-awed-peace-process/.

“Closure of the PLO Oce in Washington,” Department of State press release, September

10, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/09/285812.htm.

Carol Morello and Ruth Eglash, “PLO mission in Washington is a ghost of an oce

2 weeks before closing,” September 21, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.wash-

ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plo-mission-in-washington-is-a-ghost-of-an-oce-

2-weeks-before-closing/2018/09/21/dba01b18-bdad-11e8-be70-52bd11fe18af_story.html.

44 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

Weeks later, on October 18, 2018, the Trump Administration

announced that it was also closing the United States Consulate

General in Jerusalem.

On March 3, 2019, the Consulate – in ex-

istence continuously since 1844, and since the mid-1990s acting as

the mission to the Palestinians – was closed, with its functions – in-

cluding dealing with the Palestinians – absorbed by the Embassy.

Taken together, these three developments embody a compre-

hensive restructuring of United States policy regarding the Pales-

tinians and the peace process:

Taking Permanent Status Issues “off the table”: The Oslo

peace process was predicated in large part on Israel and the PLO

agreeing that the most contentious issues at the core of the conflict

– Jerusalem, refugees, territory/settlements, and security – would

be resolved only in permanent status negotiations between the par-

ties. With its action on Jerusalem, President Trump shredded that

agreement, gloating that he had taken Jerusalem “off the table.” His

administration’s subsequent actions and statements on refugees

and the systematic shifting of United States policy to actively sup-

port Israeli settlements in the West Bank and to legitimize Israeli

control over West Bank land

, were logical corollaries to what is

effectively the post-Oslo approach unveiled in the Jerusalem proc-

lamation, i.e., an approach that does not recognize or expect Israel

to respect commitments made under Oslo.

“On the Merging of U.S. Embassy Jerusalem and U.S. Consulate General,” Statement

from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, October 18, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://

www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286731.htm.

“Merger of U.S. Embassy Jerusalem and U.S. Consulate General Jerusalem,” state-

ment by State Department Deputy Spokesman Robert Palladino, March 3, 2019, accessed

March 28, 2019, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/03/289851.htm.

Lara Friedman, “Taking Issues O the Table: First Jerusalem Now Refugees,” Hu-

ington Post, January 5, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.hungtonpost.com/

entry/taking-issues-o-the-table-rst-jerusalem-now_us_5a41c9e4b0f9b24bf31732.

Lara Friedman, “Not Breaking News: Trump Administration Does Not Believe in Oc-

cupation,” LobeLog, March 15, 2019, accessed March 28, 2019, https://lobelog.com/

not-breaking-news-trump-administration-does-not-believe-in-occupation/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 45

Downgrading U.S.-Palestinian Relations: The peace process

that was born in Oslo in 1993 was characterized by the establish-

ment of a new, direct bilateral relationship between the United

States and the Palestinian leadership, embodied by the PLO and

the Palestinian Authority. Under Trump, this bilateral relationship

has been undone. With the closure of the PLO mission in Washing-

ton, the closure of the Consulate in Jerusalem, and the moving of

responsibility for the Palestinian file to the United States Embassy

to Israel, the Trump Administration has, for all intents and purpos-

es, de-recognized the PLO and the PA. Moreover, even before Oslo,

the existence of the Consulate as an independent mission reporting

on and dealing with the Palestinians embodied a United States pol-

icy that recognized the Palestinians as a people living under Israeli

military occupation, whose interests and welfare were understood

separately from those of Israel, and towards whom the United States

maintained a policy based on international law and independent of,

and often in opposition to, the government of Israel. By closing the

Consulate and giving the Embassy authority for dealing with the

Palestinians, the Trump Administration has in effect recognized Is-

rael as the legitimate sovereign in the occupied territories, relegating

matters relating to the areas’ Palestinian residents to the status of an

internal Israeli issue, to be reported on and understood exclusively

through the lens of Israeli interests and concerns.

Jettisoning international law and the “Land-for-Peace”

formula: Likewise, the Trump Administration’s move to recognize

Jerusalem as Israel’s capital was an important first signal that it had

decided, already, to jettison the two key pillars that have until now

undergirded United States policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict: international law, which rejects the acquisition of land by

military force, and the notion of “land-for-peace,” upon which the

Oslo process was grounded. Based on his Jerusalem moves, Trump’s

46 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

March 2019 recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan

Heights should have surprised no one. Likewise, if in the coming

period Israel decides to move from de facto annexation of the West

Bank to formally asserting its sovereignty over all or part of that area

(as is highly likely), it should surprise no one if the Trump Adminis-

tration acts quickly to recognize and endorse the act.

In short, Trump’s moves on Jerusalem are about more than

the narrow issue of U.S. policy on this much loved, much disputed

city. They are emblematic of far-reaching, fundamental shifts in

United States policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians, implemented piece-

meal but together amounting to a sea change in the United States’

approach to Israel, to the Palestinians, and to the whole idea of

what it means to seek “peace” on the land stretching between the

Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

These shifts have been taken, openly and without apology, to-

ward the goals of once-and-for-all ending the Oslo process, erasing

its achievements and the legal foundations on which it was based,

and replacing it with a new Israeli-American approach characterized

by three key principles, that are shared by the Israeli right-wing:

• Israel has the right to retain permanent control over all the

land occupied in the 1967 War, deriving both from the histori-

cal Jewish claim to it (as referenced by Ambassador Friedman in

June 2019

) and from the principle - newly articulated in the

context of President Trump’s move to recognize Israeli sover-

eignty over the Golan Heights

and standing in direct contra-

vention of international law – that a country may keep territory

acquires in the course of a defensive war;

David Halnger, “U.S. Ambassador Says Israel Has Right to Annex Parts of West

Bank”, New York Times, June 8, 2019, accessed June 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.

com/2019/06/08/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-david-friedman.html.

Vanessa Romo, “Trump Formally Recognizes Israeli Sovereignty Over Golan Heights,”

National Public Radio, March 25, 2019, accessed June 10, 2019, https://www.npr.

org/2019/03/25/706588932/trump-formally-recognizes-israeli-sovereignty-over-golan-heights.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 47

• The only legitimate national actor between the Jordan River

and the Mediterranean Sea is the Israeli government;

• Ethnic Arabs living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are

individuals for whose welfare Israel, the United States, and the

international community feel concern, but they are neither the

true “indigenous” population nor are they a recognized “people”

or national collective; as such, they have no legitimate national

identity, history, leaders, or objectives;

• Seeking “peace” means expediting the consolidation of perma-

nent Israeli control over East Jerusalem and the West Bank (in-

creasingly referred to by senior United States officials using bib-

lical term, long preferred by Israeli settlers, “Judea and Samaria”),

while delegitimizing and defeating Palestinian nationalism and

the quest for Palestinian self-determination once and for all.

All told, it should have been clear from the start that Trump’s

shattering of longstanding U.S. policy on Jerusalem was merely

the opening move in a broader strategy – which from the start has

been masquerading as a constantly-being-worked-on “peace plan”

– to fundamentally and irrevocably change U.S. policy vis-à-vis the

territories and the people Israel occupied in 1967.

And it should be crystal clear today that Trump and his team

of devoted “Greater Israel” ideologues are working relentlessly to

implement this broader strategy, seeking to ensure that whether or

not there is a second Trump term in office, there can be no return

to the Oslo-based two-state status quo ante.

YES, BUT WILL IT WORK?

So far, other than successfully shooting some sacred cows of U.S.

policy, the achievements of Trump’s policy shifts on Israel-Pales-

tine are, at best, mixed. On Jerusalem, strikingly few countries

(as of June 2019) have followed Trump in moving their embas-

48 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

sies (Guatemala, Paraguay) and others have talked about doing

so (Brazil, Hungary, Romania). More strikingly, Trump’s policies

– rather than taking Jerusalem “off the table” – have generat-

ed more focus on Jerusalem than at any time in recent years.

The refusal of the overwhelming majority of countries to even

talk about moving their embassies is notable, as has been the

backlash from Arab nations, including nations that the Trump

Administration thought it had in its pocket, like Saudi Arabia,

and nations with which Israel has peace agreements, like Jordan

(which, given its special role in Jerusalem, has had an unsurpris-

ingly strong reaction).

Likewise, the Trump Administration’s other Israel-Palestine

policy shifts have found little support in the international com-

munity. The United States remains isolated both in its recogni-

tion of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan and in its revisionist view

of international law regarding land taken in “defensive” wars. The

international community remains committed to the two-state

solution, opposed to Israeli settlement construction, and opposed

to Israeli annexation of West Bank land (as does most of the U.S.

Jewish community

). The Palestinian Authority remains the rec-

ognized address for the international community’s relations and

aid for the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jeru-

salem, and the PLO remains the recognized representative of the

Palestinian people. And plans to move forward with the “ultimate

deal” – which as of this writing are riding on a planned economic

“workshop” in Bahrain to be held in late June 2019 – are run-

American Jewish Committee, “AJC 2019 Survey of American Jewish Opinion”, June

2, 2019, accessed June 10, 2019, https://www.ajc.org/news/survey2019; and J Street, “J

Street 2019 Poll of Democratic Primary and Caucus Voters”, May 14, 2019, accessed June

10, 2019, https://jstreet.org/j-street-2019-poll-of-democratic-primary-and-caucus-voters/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 49

ning into a wall, with the Palestinian private sector boycotting

the event

, and both Arab states and Europe responding with

little enthusiasm

In short, since taking office, President Trump has gone a long

way already in transforming U.S. policy on Israel-Palestine. Yet,

so far, the Trump Administration’s accomplishments in this arena

are largely unilateral, and their impact on Israel-Palestine as an

issue in the international arena, remain limited. Actions like mov-

ing the embassy or recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan

Heights satisfied and energized “Greater Israel” advocates in the

U.S. and Israel, but they did nothing to eradicate international

support for the two-state solution or international recognition of

the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause (indeed, the Trump Ad-

ministration’s moves have arguably had the opposite effect).

Heading into the final stretch of this term in office, this is

the challenge that now faces the Trump Administration: how to

sufficiently alter not just U.S. policy but international consensus to

ensure that no future administration can ever restore U.S. policy to

anything resembling status quo ante. Overcoming this challenge –

whether through pushing its “peace plan” or other means – will be

the core goal fueling the Trump Administration’s Israel-Palestinian

policies for the remainder of this term in office (and the next, if

WAFA, “Palestinian private sector rejects invitation to US economic workshop in Bah-

rain”, May 28, 2019, accessed June 10, 2019, http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=qgYttna11

0502330312aqgYttn.

i24 News, “US waiting for more Arab countries to RSVP to Bahrain summit before

inviting Israel: report”, June 10, 2019, accessed June 10, 2019, https://www.i24news.tv/en/

news/international/middle-east/1560112080-us-waiting-for-more-arab-countries-to-rsvp-

to-bahrain-summit-before-inviting-israel-report; and Middle East Monitor, “Qatar says US

needs Palestinians on board for Middle East peace plan”, June 10, 2019, accessed June 10,

2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190610-qatar-says-us-needs-palestinians-on-

board-for-middle-east-peace-plan/.

50 / TAkIng TRUMP SERIOUSLy On JERUSALEM

there is a second one). David Friedman made clear in his March

2019 speech at AIPAC:

“Can we leave ths to an admnstraton that may not unders-

tand the exstental rsk to Israel f Judea and Samara are over-

come by terrorsm n the manner that befell the Gaza Strp after

the IDF wthdrew from ths terrtory? Can we leave ths to an

admnstraton that may not understand the need for Israel to

mantan overrdng securty control of Judea and Samara and

a permanent defense poston n the Jordan valley? Can we leave

ths to an admnstraton that may not recognze that under Is-

rael soveregnty, Jerusalem for the frst tme n 2,000 years has

become a dynamc and prosperous cty fully open to worshp-

pers of all three Abrahamc faths?

“Can we leave ths to an admnstraton that may not unders-

tand that n the Mddle East, peace comes through strength,

not just through words on a paper? Can we leave ths to an

admnstraton potentally wllng to penalze Israel for nothng

more than havng the audacty to survve n a dangerous negh-

borhood, falng to understand the threats that Israel faces or the

care and humanty t deploys to meet those threats.

“Can we run the rsk that one day the government of Israel wll

lament, why ddn’t we make more progress when U.S. foregn

polcy was n the hands of Presdent Trump, Vce Presdent Pen-

ce, Secretary Pompeo, Ambassador Bolton, Jared Kushner, Jason

Greenblatt, and even Davd Fredman? How can we do that?

“The answer s, we can’t.”

By now, hopefully, Israel-Palestine policy watchers have

learned to take Friedman and his fellow travelers at their word.

U.S. Embassy in Israel, “U.S. Ambassador to Israel David M. Friedman delivers re-

marks at the 2019 @AIPAC Policy Conference,” March 26, 2019, accessed June 10, 2019,

https://il.usembassy.gov/u-s-ambassador-to-israel-david-m-friedman-delivers-remarks-at-

the-2019-aipac-policy-conference/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 51

WITH JERUSALEM

RECOGNITION,

A MASK FALLS

YOUSEF MUNAYYER

Non-Resident

Scholar at the Middle East Institute (MEI)

CHAPTER 2

52 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

On December 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump did something

no US president had done before him: he recognized Jerusalem as

the capital of the state of Israel.

In doing so, he not only reversed

long-standing US policy on this all-important core issue, but he

also sent shockwaves throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds.

REVERSING LONGSTANDING US POLICY

US policy toward Jerusalem since the US vote in support of the

1947 United Nations partition plan had backed a separate status

for the city. This held true for many decades. After the start of the

peace process era, the US position on Jerusalem maintained the

principle of separation while noting that the final status of Jeru-

salem was subject to the outcome of negotiations between Israelis

and Palestinians.

For years, despite consistent US support for Israel, American

policies regarding Jerusalem and settlements acted as data points

in the argument that the United States could play a mediator’s

role. In fact, the American position on Jerusalem served as part of

the reason why the peace process, as we know it, was able to be-

gin. As a component of the prelude to the Madrid Conference in

“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem,” White House, December 6, 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briengs-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/.

Josh Ruebner, “Moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem: Historical, Legal and Policy

Considerations,” US Campaign for Palestinian Rights, April 2017, https://uscpr.org/cam-

paign/government-aairs/resources/jerusalem-policy-paper/.

CHAPTER 2

54 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

1991, American letters of assurances

to the Palestinians included

a guarantee that the United States would not take any position on

Jerusalem nor would any Palestinian claims to Jerusalem be di-

minished by engaging in these talks. The American guarantee was

central because the Israeli delegation had refused to agree to the

meetings if any members of the Palestinian delegation were from

Jerusalem. Accepting this Israeli position was seen by Palestinians

as tantamount to accepting Israeli claims on Jerusalem as well as

identifying who can and should speak for it or about it.

For this reason, US guarantees on this issue in particular were

central to ensuring Palestinian engagement in the process. Indeed,

American neutrality on Jerusalem is at the very foundation of the

entire Oslo peace process era. Now that this guarantee has gone

out the window and the US position on settlements has become

opaque under the Trump Administration, there is not even a fig

leaf to hold up to cover a shameful peace process. It is also prac-

tically impossible to see how any Palestinian leader can re-engage

with Washington.

WHAT EXACTLY IS THE NEW US POSITION?

The president recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and while that

had never been done before, the new position created a new set of

questions. Compounding this was the statement from the State

Department after the decision that its consular practices regard-

ing Jerusalem would not change. “Jerusalem, Israel,” for example,

would not appear on US passports or other consular documents.

The US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, added

to the confusion when she elaborated in a media interview that,

“James Baker’s Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians,” United States Institute of Peace,

October 18, 1991, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/les/le/resources/collections/peace_

agreements/letter_of_assurance.pdf.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 55

“We did not talk about boundaries or borders for a reason. And

that’s because whatever is East Jerusalem or any other part, that’s

between the Palestinians and the Israelis. That’s not for the Amer-

icans to decide. The Americans just said, we want our embassy in

the capital. And that capital in Jerusalem.” She would also say that

by making the declaration, President Trump “just took Jerusalem

off the table. He just took it off the table. So, now they get to come

together. They get to decide what the borders will look like. They

get to decide the boundaries. And they get to talk about how they

want to see Jerusalem going forward.”

How can we decipher the meaning of this? President Trump

recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but the United States

cannot say where Jerusalem begins and ends because the division

of Jerusalem is for the parties to address at the negotiating table—

even though the president now has taken the issue “off the table.”

That, of course, does not make any sense, nor does it mean that the

issue is no longer of concern to or a priority for Palestinians; but it

is the message emanating from Washington. The question is what

message will the parties involved actually take from this decision.

THE MESSAGE TO ISRAELIS

Israel, along with Russia, are the two countries where attitudes to-

ward the US president have become more positive since the tran-

sition from President Obama to President Trump. This move will

only make him more friends there, particularly with the Israeli

right. For Israelis, hearing this declaration from an American pres-

ident is a validation of their political claims, historical narrative,

Jennifer Rubin, “Trump’s Jerusalem decision is a foreign policy move without purpose,”

Washington Post, December 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/

wp/2017/12/11/a-foreign-policy-move-without-purpose/?utm_term=.cb947de3cc26.

56 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

and strategy vis-à-vis the Palestinians. The right will argue that this

only proves they were correct by not conceding anything, and that

the strategy of not conceding while laying claim to more Palestinian

land will ultimately be vindicated as well. The recent decision by

the Trump Administration to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the

Golan Heights will only buttress their argument. The president, in

his declaration, argued that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital

was a recognition of a reality on the ground. The problem with this

is that only one side, Israel, is capable of creating realities on the

ground because it is able to impose its will on the weaker Palestin-

ians, in violation of international law.

It is instructive here to recall the Clinton parameters from

the Camp David peace talks in 2000. The American position on

a division of Jerusalem was based on the principle of whatever

was Jewish would remain Jewish and whatever was Arab would

become Palestinian. That meant that the American position was

not based on the green line, which ran through the city; rather,

it was adjusted to present-day realities. This so-called recognition

of reality emboldens Israel to merely expand those realities on the

ground in occupied Jerusalem with the understanding that, in

the final arrangement, the American position would reflect them.

The Clinton parameters were not official US policy but merely a

proposal for a plan—if taken in its entirety and agreed to by the

parties—that could serve as a framework for an agreement. US

policy on Jerusalem did not change, but a message was sent to the

Israelis about how the Americans saw things working out, and this

conditioned Israeli behavior. The same can be expected of this an-

nouncement by Trump which, unlike the parameters, does in fact

change US policy and therefore will send a much stronger version

of the same message.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 57

THE MESSAGE TO PALESTINIANS

For Palestinians, what they are hearing is a White House that is

adopting an Israeli narrative in unprecedented ways. This message,

which touches on the very sensitive and emotional issue of Jeru-

salem in the Palestinian cause, will surely drown out any nuance

attempted by Washington in the aftermath of the Trump declara-

tion. But let us assume for a moment that the nuance is indeed part

of the policy and that the actual territorial boundaries of Jerusalem

are up for negotiation. What guarantee do the Palestinians have

that when the Israelis refuse to divide the city during future nego-

tiations, the Americans would step in with leverage—after giving

recognition of Jerusalem away now?

Most importantly, what Palestinians will hear is the failure of

their leadership to advance their cause. Ahead of the Trump dec-

laration, PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas was facing a public in

the West Bank and Gaza where 67 percent wanted him to resign.

The strategy of engaging with Washington under the premise that

it could deliver Israeli concessions in some remotely even-handed

way was already something viewed with deep skepticism among

Palestinians. Despite this and Trump’s nomination of a right-wing

settlement supporter to be his ambassador to Israel

, David Fried-

man, and even though Trump made campaign promises to move

the embassy to Jerusalem, Abbas still met with him in May of 2017

and declared,

“Now, Mr. President, with you we have hope.” The

“Poll: Majority of Palestinian public want Abbas to resign,” Ma’an News Agency, Sep-

tember 22, 2017, https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=779160.

Matthew Rosenberg, “Trump Chooses Hard-Liner as Ambassador to Israel,” New York

Times, December 15, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/politics/don-

ald-trump-david-friedman-israel-ambassador.html.

Merrit Kennedy, “Trump Says He Wants To Help Mediate Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Deal,” NPR, May 3, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/03/526747102/

trump-says-he-wants-to-help-mediate-israeli-palestinian-peace-deal.

58 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

biggest loser in all of this is certainly Abbas. He and his political

program have now been exposed as hopeless, even to those who

still had any shred of hope in Trump’s Middle East deal making.

One has to wonder how Washington can expect to gain the trust

of a Palestinian leader ever again.

WHERE DOES THE U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE POLICY

GO FROM HERE?

The most immediate concern should be for Palestinians living

in Jerusalem, as Israeli politicians who have sought to advance

policies aimed at re-engineering the demographics of the city will

now be emboldened by the Trump declaration proclaiming Jeru-

salem the capital of Israel. The Israelis have already announced

significant settlement expansion. “Following President Trump’s

historic declaration,” Israel’s housing minister stated as he an-

nounced thousands of new settlement units in occupied territory,

“I intend to advance and strengthen building in Jerusalem.”

Leg-

islation in the Israeli Knesset regarding Jerusalem may also pick

up steam. This includes bills that would redraw

the municipal

boundaries to exclude certain Arab neighborhoods as well as oth-

er legislation

that would bring massive Israeli settlements into

the municipality.

Regionally, the Jerusalem decision by President Trump brought

together many countries to speak in one voice for the first time

Raoul Wootli and Sue Surkes, “14,000 housing units planned for Jerusalem, 6,000 of

them over Green line,” Times of Israel, December 7, 2017, https://www.timesosrael.

com/14000-housing-units-planned-for-jerusalem-6000-over-green-line/.

Jonathan Lis and Nir Hasson, “Bill Would Allow Parts of Jerusalem to Be Transferred

to a New Israeli Local Authority, Haaretz, July 25, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/isra-

el-news/.premium-bill-would-allow-parts-of-jerusalem-to-be-transferred-to-new-israeli-lo-

cal-authority-1.5434517.

Tovah Lazaro, “Ministers To Vote On Bill To Annex 18 Settlements to Jerusalem,”

e Jerusalem Post, October 26, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Ministers-to-vote-

on-bill-to-annex-19-settlements-to-Jerusalem-508450.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 59

in years. The Arab League, along with the Organization of Islamic

Cooperation (OIC), which includes 57 Arab and Muslim states and

was founded because of Jerusalem, collectively condemned the de-

cision

; and on December 13, the OIC formally declared East Jeru-

salem as Palestine’s capital.

Trump’s declaration also brought Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, and Qatar

all into line behind one issue. To be sure, Trump has found a way

to bring together Arab and Muslim states; but instead of bringing

them together to embrace Israel and oppose Iran, he has brought

all Arab and Muslim states, including Iran, together to oppose him

and Israel. While Arab regimes are caught between regime interests

tied to relations with Washington and their own publics, they have

tried to navigate through these competing concerns by appeasing

them both if they can much as they have always done.

Importantly, however, condemnation of Washington’s de-

cision on Jerusalem is not only coming from Arab and Muslim

states but basically from everywhere else in the world. Members

of the United Nations Security Council rejected the United States’

position in an emergency session.

Rarely is so much unison in

condemnation of a Security Council member that prevalent. Nikki

Haley, the US ambassador at the time, told all of her UN coun-

terparts that none of them are in a position to judge the United

States, a line of argumentation most often heard in the chamber

from the Russians.

“Arab League condemns US Jerusalem move,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2017, https://

www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/arab-league-condemns-move-dangerous-il-

legal-171209185754563.html.

“Islamic Cooperation declares East Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital,” Hurriyet Daily

News, December 13, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/oic-agrees-to-recog-

nize-east-jerusalem-as-palestinian-capital-124064.

“Trump’s Jerusalem move roundly condemned at UN,” Al Jazeera, December 8, 2017,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/convenes-emergency-meeting-jerusalem-deci-

sion-171208162736190.html.

60 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

But Washington’s Western European allies strongly distanced

themselves as well. This might be one of the most interesting im-

plications. The Europeans have grown tired of a peace process they

are asked to finance but over which they have little say regarding

the outcome,

as the United States shields Israel while it colo-

nizes what remains of Palestine. Washington has been able, with

some success, to keep European objections quiet, but this might

be the last straw. The European Union, the United Nations, the

Russians, and the United States, which make up the Middle East

quartet, have understood the American role as essential because of

Washington’s relationship with Israel. But if the United States has

abandoned even the pretense of mediation, this might allow for the

Europeans and others to play more independent roles in relation to

the Israeli/Palestinian issue.

For Palestinians, this Trump declaration may provide oppor-

tunities for diplomatic achievements with states that are troubled

with the US role. How exactly they will seize this moment, if at all,

is unclear at this time. What is undeniably clear is that the Trump

declaration is a break from the past and the Oslo era has finally

drawn to a close.

A DECISION AMIDST MOUNTING PRESSURE

When President Donald Trump issued his now infamous declara-

tion recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and reversing de-

cades of American policy on the issue, he sent shockwaves not only

through the Middle East but around the world. As the fallout from

the announcement continues, it is important to recall the context

Arthur Neslen, “EU aid to Palestine ‘cannot continue indenitely’ without results,”

Euractiv, September 5, 2014,

https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/eu-aid-to-palestine-can-

not-continue-indenitely-without-results/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 61

in which the decision was made as it suggests a developing Amer-

ican strategy vis-à-vis the US relationship with the Palestinians.

Ahead of the Jerusalem decision there were a confluence of

events and reports that added pressure on the Palestinians to get

them to make concessions. This included threats to close the PLO

Delegation office in Washington, DC, the advancement of feder-

al legislation that would further condition American funding to

the Palestinian Authority, and the reported pressure put on PLO

Chairman Mahmoud Abbas by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed

bin Salman during an unscheduled visit to Riyadh last Novem-

ber.

The Crown Prince, whose close relationship with Jared

Kushner has been widely reported, had seemingly acted in tandem

with Washington in an effort to press Abbas but there are also signs

that him doing so is leading to internal tension in the Royal Court.

Washington reportedly wanted the Palestinians to accept a return

to the negotiating table with the Israelis on the basis of a Trump

Administration framework, the so-called “ultimate deal,” the out-

lines of which were far below the minimum Palestinian demands.

Both the White House and the Palestinians made their respective

positions clear to each other and, despite knowing the extent of

Palestinian objections to an American recognition of Jerusalem as

Israel’s capital, the White House went ahead with it anyway.

PLAYING HARDBALL

Taken together, the message sent by the Trump Administration

was that saying no to the president would have dire consequences.

“Saudi: Palestinian Abbas must endorse US’ plan or leave,” Middle East Monitor, No-

vember 14, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171114-saudi-palestinian-abbas-

must-endorse-us-plan-or-leave-resign/.

Anne Barnard, David M. Halbnger and Peter Baker, “Talk of a Peace Plan at

Snubs Palestinians Roils Middle East,” New York Times, December 3, 2017, https://www.ny-

times.com/2017/12/03/world/middleeast/palestinian-saudi-peace-plan.html.

62 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

There is a stream of thought in American Middle East peace pro-

cess policy circles which holds that the reason the Palestinians have

not yet signed an agreement with the Israelis is because they are in

too comfortable a position and need to be pressured. Despite the

fact that this hypothesis seems drawn from an alternate reality than

the one on the ground, where Israel is, in fact, overwhelmingly the

powerful state that is militarily occupying stateless Palestinians, the

mindset still has traction in certain Washington circles. Now it

seems that it has been adopted by the White House.

However, instead of responding with capitulation, the Pales-

tinian response to the Trump declaration was defiance. Indeed, the

Palestinians used their diplomatic connections in the Arab world

and beyond to isolate the United States and Israel before the in-

ternational community. At the United Nations Security Council,

the United States was forced to use its veto power to overcome the

opposition of 14 others while at UN General Assembly, a resolution

condemning the American decision passed by a wide margin. The

embarrassing spectacle left Washington attempting to spin the vote

numbers in a positive way. US Ambassador to the United Nations

Nikki Haley counted those who abstained from the vote along with

the handful of countries that voted against the resolution.

Others

pointed out that the vote totals actually show less international sol-

idarity with Palestinians than in previous years when the General

Assembly took up resolutions on Palestine. In reality, however, UN

General Assembly resolutions on matters dealing with Palestine con-

tinue to pass with an overwhelming majority of support. This partic-

“Trump administration threatens to shutter Palestinians’ D.C. oce,” CBS News, No-

vember 18, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-administration-threatens-to-shut-

ter-palestinians-d-c-oce/.

Julia Manchester, “Haley sends ‘friendship’ invites to countries that didn’t vote against

US Jerusalem decision,” e Hill, December 12, 2017, https://thehill.com/homenews/ad-

ministration/366137-haley-sends-friendship-invites-to-countries-that-didnt-vote-against.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 63

ular resolution was unlike previous ones because it was not focused

simply on affirming the rights of Palestinians under international

law or condemning Israeli action; rather, it was about condemning

an American action—the American recognition of Jerusalem.

CUTTING OFF THE PALESTINIANS

Nikki Haley invited representatives of the various UN member

states that voted against or abstained from voting on the Jerusalem

resolution to a “Friends of the US” reception she hosted on Jan-

uary 3rd, 2018. At a UN press conference, the day before, Haley

suggested that Washington would apply additional pressure on the

Palestinians.

A journalist asked her if the United States would

continue funding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency

(UNRWA), the UN agency tasked with providing humanitarian

aid for Palestinian refugees living in the occupied West Bank, Gaza,

and Jerusalem as well as in refugee camps throughout the region.

In light of Palestinian efforts at the United Nations to support the

votes at the Security Council and General Assembly, Haley replied

that it was the president’s view that the United States should not

be giving aid to the Palestinians until the Palestinians return “to

the negotiations table.” Shortly thereafter, President Trump made a

statement via twitter declaring:

It’s not only Pakstan that we pay bllons of dollars to for not-

hng, but also many other countres, and others. As an example,

we pay the Palestnans HUNDRED [sc] OF MILLIONS OF

DOLLARS a year and get no apprecaton or respect. They don’t

even want to negotate a long overdue peace treaty wth Israel.

We have taken Jerusalem, the toughest part of the negotaton,

off the table, but Israel, for that, would have had to pay more.

“U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley says Trump Wants to Withhold Funding to Palestin-

ians,” last modied January 2, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gj_BVE-YY3Q&-

feature=youtu.be.

64 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

But wth the Palestnans no longer wllng to talk peace, why

should we make any of these massve future payments to them?

With this statement, the President of the United States made

clear that the comments by Haley were not just an impromptu

response at a press conference but part of a calculated policy to

use monetary support for Palestinian civilians to force them into

negotiations with the Israelis. Over the years, however, the ways in

which the United States has supported the Palestinian Authority

(PA) financially have evolved.

A very small portion of US funding

went directly to the PA; these disbursements are aimed at support-

ing its security apparatus and coordination. The remainder of US

support for Palestinians is indirect. During the Obama Adminis-

tration, economic assistance that was previously earmarked to help

subsidize the PA’s deficit was changed to direct payments to specif-

ic Palestinian Authority creditors. In the 2017 budget, this support

was for “East Jerusalem hospitals and private sector fuel suppliers.”

There are two other streams of US monetary support for

Palestinians that do not involve subsidizing the PA’s debts. These

are USAID programs that fund a variety of projects sponsored by

private and nongovernmental organizations and entities on the

ground, including US support for UNRWA. The US State Depart-

ment notified UNRWA that it is “cutting its contribution by more

than half, to $60 million, while demanding a ‘fundamental reex-

amination’ of the social-service agency’s mission and funding.”

Donald Trump, Twitter Post, January 2, 2018, 5:37 pm, https://twitter.com/realdon-

aldtrump/status/948322496591384576?lang=en.

“U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians,” Congressional Research Service, December 12,

2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf.

Nick Wadhams, “U.S. Slashes Aid to Palestinians rough UN to $60 Million,”

Bloomberg, January 16, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-16/u-

s-aid-to-palestinians-through-un-cut-by-half-to-60-million.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 65

USAID funding, along with US financial support for UN-

RWA, not only do not go to the Palestinian Authority but they

predate the existence of the PA altogether. These funds are aimed

at supporting Palestinian society and alleviating the needs of state-

less Palestinian refugees in several countries. In Gaza in particular,

where refugees comprise 80 percent of the population, UNRWA’s

support is crucial to the vast majority of the population. Clearly,

this represents a shift in American policy which previously had not

tied humanitarian assistance to Palestinians to the PA’s behavior.

Now, Washington is saying that unless the Palestinian Authority

does as Washington pleases, the United States will cut aid to Pal-

estinian refugees and hospitals. This is, of course, extremely dan-

gerous, first and foremost for the civilian populations who will be

directly and negatively impacted by the lack of services and who

are already living in dire circumstances, particularly in Gaza. In

addition to the humanitarian impact, the economic impact will

increase the prospects of political instability as well. But this ap-

proach also suggests that the United States is grasping for indirect

leverage over the Palestinian Authority because direct leverage is

either unavailable or unworkable.

DETERMINING OUTCOMES, AND THE BLAME GAME

While the president’s tweet made clear Washington would be taking

further steps toward cutting aid to Palestinians, it also did two other

things that speak to where American policy now stands. Trump stat-

ed plainly that he took Jerusalem “off the table.” This clarified any

remaining confusing messaging around the intent of the Jerusalem

declaration. In the days after the announcement, US officials stated

that the decisions did not apply to the “boundaries of sovereignty”

and that those matters would be for “permanent status or final sta-

66 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

tus negotiations,” suggesting that Jerusalem was still very much an

issue on the table—though Trump’s tweet clearly stated otherwise.

This amounted not just to a reversal of long-standing US pol-

icy but also to Washington actually determining the outcome of

a final status issue by adopting the Israeli position. As the United

States announced cuts to UNRWA funding, officials were quoted

demanding that UNRWA’s operations and funding be “fundamen-

tally reevaluated.”

This language could be a hint that the United

States is taking the same approach to the issue of refugees as it

did with Jerusalem by predetermining an outcome and taking the

Israeli position. While the Israelis have been wary of the destabi-

lizing impact of cutting funds to URNWA, particularly in Gaza,

the Israeli prime minister has used the opportunity to hammer

political points assailing the Palestinian position on refugees. He

has also advocated to the United States to cut funds to UNRWA

based on the premise that the agency’s services to the descendants

of Palestinians forced from their homes in 1948 are supporting

“fictitious refugees.”

With a White House clearly disinterested in serious negotia-

tions, the Israelis are exploiting the opportunity to push for alter-

ing US positions so that they are in line with their demands on a

variety of issues—positions that they hope will carry over to future

administrations. First it was Jerusalem, then the refugee issue and

most recently the Golan Heights.

David M. Sattereld, “Brieng With Acting Assistant Secretary David M. Sattereld,”

U.S. Department of State, December 7, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

ps/2017/12/276349.htm.

“US to withhold $65m in aid for Palestinian refugees,” e Guardian, January 16,

2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/16/us-to-withhold-65m-in-aid-for-

palestinian-refugees.

PM or Israel, Twitter Post, January 7, 2018, 9:15 am, https://twitter.com/IsraeliPM/

status/950008018418139142.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 67

The last and perhaps most important part of the message

tweeted out by President Trump had to do with pointing the finger

at the Palestinians for the lack of progress on peace talks. Usually,

officials wait until peace talks start to engage in a blame game for

why they failed; Trump is getting ahead of the game. In response

to all these threats, PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas responded

by saying “Damn your money!”

Further, in a lengthy speech on

January 14, 2018, Abbas declared the Palestinians would no longer

accept US mediation. Thus far, therefore, the ultimate deal has

been an ultimate disaster.

WHAT IS NEXT FOR US POLICY?: MOVING THE

EMBASSY AND ENDING AN AMERICAN ERA

Since taking the helm of the US government, President Trump has

found new and creative ways to make the Israeli-Palestinian morass

he inherited exponentially worse. Instability is greater, US credibil-

ity has decreased, and the prospects for restarting a peace process

remain at zero. There is a chance the policymakers in Washington

might realize that the approach they have taken thus far—aiming

to squeeze the Palestinians into submission—is not going to yield

results. However, the United States may yet squeeze them further.

Although Donald Trump has tried to bring radical change to

many policies, his efforts to do so with Israeli-Palestinian peace-

making have only made things radically more difficult if not im-

possible to surmount. To be sure, US policy needed serious reeval-

uation at the end of the Obama Administration. Trump and his

David M. Halbnger, “Abbas Calls Oslo Accords Dead and Blasts U.S.: ‘Damn Your

Money!’,” New York Times, January 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/

middleeast/abbas-palestinians-trump.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmid-

dleeast&action=click&contentCollection=middleeast&region=stream&module=stream_

unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=sectionfront&_r=0.

68 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

cohorts seem to have done that but decided to keep going in the

wrong direction, and at a much more accelerated speed. The ques-

tions that remain are when, if at all, Trump and his circle are going

to realize the folly of their policies and the tremendous damage

they will inflict on the lives of innocent people.

There was a time not long ago when American officials on

a bipartisan basis worried about how the timing of their trips to

Israel would affect the peace process between the Israelis and the

Palestinians. The United States wanted to be seen as a credible

mediator; therefore, US diplomats considered the potential of de-

structive Israeli actions—which could appear as coordinated with

American policy—in undermining the US position. In short, the

optics mattered.

“Nothing has made my job of trying to find Arab and Pales-

tinian partners for Israel more difficult than being greeted by a new

settlement every time I arrive (in Israel),” James Baker, President

George H.W. Bush’s secretary of state, once famously told Con-

gress.

Vice President Joseph Biden was likewise frustrated when

he arrived in Jerusalem in 2010 only to find that on the same day,

Israel would announce the significant expansion of a settlement

there. He proclaimed: “I condemn the decision by the government

of Israel to advance planning for new housing units in East Jeru-

salem,” saying that it “undermines the trust we need right now.”

Those days are over. Washington is not even pretending anymore

to play the role of a trustworthy mediator.

Norman Kempster, “New Israeli Settlements Form Biggest Obstacle to Peace, Baker

Asserts: Diplomacy: e rare jab suggests U.S. may be ready to get tough with squabbling

parties in the Mideast,” Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/

la-xpm-1991-05-23-mn-3241-story.html.

Paul Richter, “Biden’s Israel visit takes a rocky turn,” Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2010,

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-09-la-fg-biden-israel10-2010mar10-

story.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 69

On May 14, 2018, the United States opened its new embas-

sy in Jerusalem with great fanfare.

President Donald Trump and

his administration could have chosen any other date, but instead

either callously disregarded Palestinian sentiment or deliberately

sought to add insult to injury by opening the embassy the day

before Palestinians mark the Nakba, or “catastrophe”—referring

to the expulsion of three quarters of a million Palestinians from

their homes 70 years ago, making way for the establishment of the

State of Israel. Just a short distance away, Israeli military snipers

were shooting Palestinian protesters in Gaza, killing some 60 peo-

ple.

Since March 30 2018, the protests in Gaza have continued

on a near weekly basis and have been repeatedly repressed by the

Israeli military. A recent United Nations report on an inquiry into

the killings have document Israeli snipers killing 183 people and

shooting some 6,000.

The Gaza massacre may well mark a crucial turning point:

the end of the peace process era. The split-screen images of Amer-

ican officials celebrating with Israelis while Palestinians were being

killed will eternally scar the Palestinians’ memory. Such images also

represent a microcosm of the American government’s historical role

in the denial of Palestinian rights, one no longer hidden behind a

facade of acting as an “honest broker.”

Ruth Eglash, “Under banner of peace, U.S. opens embassy in Jerusalem. Sixty miles

away, dozens of Palestinians are killed.,” Washington Post, May 14, 2018, https://www.wash-

ingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/jerusalem-gears-up-to-embrace-the-new-us-embas-

sy/2018/05/14/1d6707dc-5558-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_ter-

m=.1bbd6898b7e9.

Tamara Kharroub, “US Jerusalem embassy vs Nakba: A Moment of truth for world

leaders,” e New Arab, May 15, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/com-

ment/2018/5/15/us-jerusalem-embassy-vs-nakba.

“Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the 2018 protests in the OPT,” United

Nations Human Rights Council, February 28, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/

HRC/CoIOPT/Pages/Report2018OPT.aspx.

70 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

Throughout this so-called peace process era, the United States

commandeered the handling of the Palestinian-Israeli issue by re-

lentlessly using its veto in the Security Council to prevent any mul-

tilateral input or discussion. While doing so, and instead of trying

to mediate a just resolution between two sides unequal in power,

Washington continued to finance and support the stronger party,

encouraging Israel to impose its will on the weak and occupied

Palestinian population.

From the outset, the Trump Administration appeared to be

predisposed to supporting Israel over the Palestinians more than

any administration before it, even in the most destructive of ways.

The events the Jerusalem recognition should eliminate any doubts.

Today, statements and talking points of American envoys like Ja-

son Greenblatt and US Ambassador David Friedman are practi-

cally indistinguishable from those of Israeli government officials.

Greenblatt continues to parrot the Israeli government’s response to

international criticism of its actions in Gaza. For his part, Fried-

man has been making incendiary comments about US domestic

politics and media coverage that would be shocking coming from

an American diplomat under normal circumstances.

POPULAR MOBILIZATION VS. STATE REPRESSION

The coming era is likely to be characterized by more of what we

saw on the ground in Gaza in May of 2018 and many times since:

Palestinian popular resistance brutally repressed by overwhelming

Israeli force. With the flawed creations of the peace process, like

the stagnant Palestinian Authority (PA), and with Palestinian lead-

Oce of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding Reached

with Israel,” White House, September 14, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-

press-oce/2016/09/14/fact-sheet-memorandum-understanding-reached-israel.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 71

ership in limbo, popular mobilizations and other acts of civil dis-

obedience will continue to fill the void.

Nearly 30 years ago, the PA was billed as a vehicle to transi-

tion Palestinians to statehood. Instead, it is now seen by many as

part of the problem, perpetually keeping Palestinians in a holding

pattern. Today, polls show

that the largest single group of Pales-

tinian respondents support no particular political faction; indeed,

the entire idea of leaders governing while under foreign military

occupation or siege, as if they had the autonomy to effectively do

so, has been exposed as a farce. The failure of these institutions and

parties, however, does not mean Palestinians will stop demanding

their basic rights. The images of a far more powerful Israel using its

military might against stateless Palestinians armed with slingshots

and rocks will become increasingly familiar going forward.

This dynamic between Palestinian protest and Israeli repres-

sion will not be limited to Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusa-

lem—and it never was. Shortly after the “embassy day massacre,”

Palestinian citizens of Israel gathered in Haifa peacefully to protest

the killings in Gaza. Israeli police brutally quashed the gathering,

beating several protesters and arresting about 20. The head of a

civil rights organization, Jafar Farah, was arrested and ended up in

the hospital after his knee was broken by police while in custody.

When Ayman Odeh, the head of the Joint List of Palestinian cit-

“Public Opinion Poll No (67) Press-Release,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey

Research, March 20, 2018, http://pcpsr.org/en/node/723.

Noa Shpigel and Jack Khoury, “21 Israeli Arabs Arrested During Haifa Protest Against

Gaza Killings,” Haaretz, May 19, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/21-israeli-ar-

abs-arrested-in-northern-israeli-city-in-gaza-killing-pro-1.6097975.

Josh Breiner and Noa Shpigel, “’Go to Gaza, Terrorist’: Israeli Arab Protesters Say Po-

lice Abused em in Detention,” Haaretz, May 24, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/isra-

el-news/.premium-go-to-gaza-arrested-israeli-arab-protesters-accuse-po-

lice-of-abuse-1.6113949.

72 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

izens of Israel, the third largest party in the Knesset, went to the

hospital to visit Farah, where he was allegedly handcuffed to his

bed, Odeh was denied entry by Israeli police. Israel’s Defense Min-

ister Avigdor Lieberman responded in lock-him-up fashion, saying

that Odeh was a “terrorist” whose place is “not in the Knesset, it’s

in prison.”

IS IT TIME FOR A RETURN TO AN OLD ERA?

In many ways, this moment is very much a return to the era before

the peace process, to the spirit of the first intifada. The wide-scale

Palestinian uprising that took place from 1987 to 1993 featured

popular mobilizations, demonstrations, civil disobedience, and

boycotts. All this happened, and perhaps was only possible, be-

cause the PLO was not in Palestine at the time. It also forced the

start of the peace process because Israel understood that the costs

to its international image were increasing unsustainable and the

PLO understood that Palestinians on the ground were not going

to sit idly by and wait for their rights to materialize.

Now, however, we can look forward with the benefit of know-

ing the flaws of the peace process: that negotiations under occupa-

tion have been attempted and exhausted. Still, the Trump Admin-

istration continues to speak of a soon-to-be-released peace plan,

the so-called ultimate deal. If one listens closely to different officials

in the administration, however, it becomes clear that there is no set

timeline for its release—if any such peace plan exists. And even if

Toi Sta, “Liberman calls Arab party chief a ‘terrorist’ who belongs in jail,” Times of

Israel, May 20, 2018, https://www.timesosrael.com/liberman-calls-arab-party-chief-a-ter-

rorist-who-belongs-in-jail/.

Anders Persson, “What will Trump’s ‘ultimate deal’ mean for Palestinians?,” Al Jazeera,

Mary 28, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/trump-ultimate-deal-palestin-

ians-180327082942844.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 73

it did, it is hard to imagine that Trump and his team would find

people who would take it seriously. Most recently, there has been

increased reports about the release of the plan after an economic

conference in Bahrain which is supposedly geared toward raising

funds to strengthen the Palestinian economy. All indications are,

however, that the political component of the plan does not include

independence and sovereignty for Palestinians meaning all invest-

ment in the economy is for naught and the Kushner approach is,

at best, an attempt to bribe Palestinians into giving up demands

for freedom.

SHIFTING OPINION IN THE WEST AND

AROUND THE WORLD

This coming era will not only feature asymmetrical confronta-

tions between Israel and the Palestinians, but it will also include

growing confrontations between people of conscience around the

world and in Israel—the very necessary confrontations that the

peace process helped delay. With no peace process to create illu-

sions about the future, people around the world and Americans, in

particular, will increasingly have to deal with questions regarding

what comes next. For how long can Israel continue to rule over

millions of Palestinians while denying their rights? Individuals, in

particular, will ask themselves, how long can I continue to support

Israel’s policies? How long can my government continue to support

these injustices?

Confronting these questions has already begun. For years,

people have been turning away from Israel precisely because they

cannot bring themselves to support what it is doing to the Pal-

estinians. This new stage will catalyze this process. Increasingly,

carte blanche support for Israel’s oppressive policies has become a

74 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

right-wing issue in the United States. As progressives and people

who care about human rights and equality are becoming alienated,

those for whom Israel is an ideological or religious issue, like evan-

gelical Christians, are dominating pro-Israel opinion. Ideologically

and for many white evangelical Christians in particular, Israel is

something of a paragon of the “Judeo-Christian” fighting ethos in

its confrontation with Islam. Religious, many believe support for

Israel is a biblical commandment and a necessary precursor for the

second coming and the day of judgement. The support for Israel

in this community and the centrality of this community to Re-

publican party politics is the reason why the bigoted pastors John

Hagee and Robert Jeffress were chosen to play roles in the embassy

opening ceremony in Jerusalem, a city holy to three faiths, despite

their history of Islamophobic and anti-Semitic statements.

President Trump and his administration have further helped

crystallize America’s weakened position—and impending iso-

lation—in the world community regarding Israel and Palestine.

Signs of this were on display at the United Nations when an un-

precedented rebuke of American diplomacy unfolded. After fur-

ther killings in Gaza, the Security Council convened to consider

resolutions on the situation. Kuwait put forward a resolution con-

demning Israel’s actions and US Ambassador to the United Na-

tions Nikki Haley made clear she would oppose the resolution.

Instead, she offered her own. In her statement, Haley blamed the

Palestinians for the situation in Gaza and said that the Kuwaiti res-

olution “sides with terrorists over Israel.” She went on to say: “We

strongly encourage this Council to vote against Kuwait’s resolution

Matt Korade, Kevin Bohn and Daniel Burke, “Controversial US pastors take part in

Jerusalem embassy opening,” CNN, May 14, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/13/poli-

tics/hagee-jeress-us-embassy-jerusalem/index.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 75

and acknowledge the concerns of Hamas by voting for the U.S.

resolution. Each of you has a choice. You either support Hamas or

not. This vote will tell the story.”

When Kuwait’s resolution came up for a vote,

ten countries,

including Russia and France, supported it. The United Kingdom,

Poland, the Netherlands, and Ethiopia abstained; Haley kept her

promise and vetoed the resolution as the only no-vote. But most

interesting was the vote on the American resolution. Not only did

the council refuse to comply with Haley’s request on Kuwait’s res-

olution, but not one single member voted alongside the United

States on its own resolution. The United States was the only no-

vote on the Kuwaiti resolution and the only yes-vote on its own

resolution—alone even among allies. This embarrassing moment

of isolation

marked a new nadir in the international community’s

confidence in Washington’s diplomatic and peacemaking abilities.

WHAT COMES NEXT?

Eventually, this new era could culminate in a tipping point and

ultimately yield a much-needed shift in American policy, the

kind that actually holds Israel accountable for denying Palestinian

rights. The question is how much farther off into the future that

point will be, and how many more Palestinians will suffer in the

interim. We are beginning to see the seeds of this new era planted

Nikki Haley, “Explanation of Vote before Voting on Two Draft UN Security Council

Resolutions on Gaza,” United States Mission to the United Nations, June 1, 2018, https://

usun.state.gov/remarks/8465.

“Amid Middle East Violence, Security Council Fails to Adopt Competing Resolutions

on Israeli Force, Hamas Role in Conict,” Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, United Na-

tions, June 1, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13362.doc.htm.

Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Gaza, Fails to Win Second Vote on

its Own Measure,” New York Times, June 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/

world/middleeast/gaza-israel-palestinians-.html.

76 / WITH JERUSALEM RECOgnITIOn, A MASk FALLS

today with things like H.R. 2407, a bill introduced into Congress

that would condition US military financing Israel based on its

treatment of Palestinian children.

In the meantime, we are likely to see continued popular mo-

bilizations. It is possible that the Palestinian leadership in Gaza,

where Hamas is in control, is learning from the positions of the

grassroots movement there, which characterized some of the mass-

based actions of the first intifada. In the West Bank, the Palestinian

Authority, in coordination with Israeli occupation, has worked to

keep popular mobilizations and dissent limited. But with a dis-

credited and aging leadership in Ramallah, a serious lack of public

confidence in the PA, and a possible transition in leadership on

the horizon, it is unclear how much longer the West Bank can wait

before joining in wide-scale mass mobilizations akin to the march-

es that straddled the entirety of the demarcation line between the

Gaza strip and Israel. For Washington’s part, the Trump adminis-

tration has signaled its openness to Israel taking major paradigm

shifting steps, including annexation. Washington’s openness to this

is a clear sign of the end of the peace process era as it was known

and Israeli action on this front would make that clear to even the

most willfully blind holdouts still talking about a two-state out-

come achieved through the traditional process.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 77

LATIN AMERICA AND

THE QUESTION OF

JERUSALEM

CECILIA BAEZA

Research Associate at PUC-SP and Lecturer

in International Relations at Sciences Po Paris

CHAPTER 3

78 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

INTRODUCTION

Despite the international opposition, the Israeli Knesset on 30

July 1980 enacted the so-called “Basic Law on Jerusalem” by

which it proclaimed that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the

capital of Israel.” The response did not take long to come: On 20

August 1980, the United Nations Security Council (Resolution

478) censured the Jewish state for having enacted a law declaring

a change in the status of Jerusalem, which “constitutes a viola-

tion of international law.”

Though the law did not substantially

change the situation that had existed on the ground since Israel

had reunited the divided city in June 1967 by seizing East Jeru-

salem during the Six-Day War, the UN Security Council per-

ceived the move as a provocation and made a point of clearly

condemning it.

Countries that had established diplomatic missions in the

city were called upon to remove them. Notably, most of them

were from Latin America. 11 countries – Bolivia, Chile, Colom-

bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Pan-

ama, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Guatemala – which began opening

embassies there as early as the 1950s – shuttered their Jerusalem

embassies in 1980, following the UN Resolution. However, a

couple of years later, the presidents of Costa Rica and El Salvador

e resolution was passed with 14 votes to none against, with the United States ab-

staining. For the full text of the resolution: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.as-

p?symbol=S/RES/478(1980)

CHAPTER 3

80 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

broke with the international consensus and moved their embas-

sies back in Jerusalem, in 1982 and 1984 respectively. For more

than twenty years, they were the only two countries in the world

having done so.

History seems to repeat itself in some ways: since President

Donald Trump’s decision in December 2017 to move the US

embassy to Jerusalem, a handful of Latin American nations have

followed in his footsteps. The governments of Guatemala, Par-

aguay, and later Brazil were the first to declare their alignment

with Trump’s new policy on Jerusalem. Even though Paraguay

reversed its decision a few months later, the issue is far from

over in the region. Several governments and political leaders

continue to discuss the possibility of moving their embassy to

Jerusalem too.

These moves tell a complex tale in which international and

domestic interests are often intertwined. In 1977, Regina Shariff

argued that “Israel has always had a substantial stake in its re-

lations with the Latin American subcontinent on three levels:

the political/diplomatic, the economic and the demographic (as

a source of Jewish immigration).”

Even though Latin American

countries are not among the top destinations of Israeli exports,

commercial exchanges have been increasing over the past few

years to $1.6 billion in 2017. Furthermore, the economic growth

potential in emerging markets like Latin America makes it an at-

tractive destination for Israeli investors. The Israeli government

is currently endorsing long-term investment channels in Latin

America to take advantage of these developments. One of the

Sharif, R. (1977). Latin America and the Arab-Israeli Conict.Journal of Palestine

Studies,7(1), 98-122.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 81

most recent initiatives includes investing Israeli capital in region-

al infrastructure projects in partnership with the Inter-American

Development Bank.

From the Latin American perspective, additional factors must

be considered. First, the way Latin American countries engage

with Israel largely depend on their relationship with the United

States. Even though some countries, especially in South Ameri-

ca, have gained considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the United States

since the 2000s,

the question of how to cope with the American

leadership remains a highly politicized issue. From Mexico and

Brazil to Venezuela and Argentina, the definition of the foreign

policy towards the US power is periodically the subject of heat-

ed debates. Second, new interest groups have emerged in Latin

American political landscapes. In particular, the defense of Israeli

interests is today less about the influence of Jewish organizations

– although this varies from country to country – and more about

the growing political power of Evangelical churches, most of them

unconditional supporters of Israel (see Table 1). Finally, the at-

titude of the Arab diasporas towards the Palestinian issue, either

passive or politically mobilized, is another important variable. In

Chile, where the Palestinian diaspora is particularly influential

and active, having a flagrant pro-Israeli foreign policy would be

inconceivable.

Vigevani, T., & Cepaluni, G. (2007). Lula’s foreign policy and the quest for au-

tonomy through diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28(7), 1309-1326 and Russell,

R., & Tokatlian, J. G. (2003). From antagonistic autonomy to relational autonomy: a

theoretical reflection from the Southern Cone. Latin American Politics and Society,

45(1), 1-24.

Baeza, C (2016). Chilean Foreign Policy Toward Arab Countries: Between Trade Di-

plomacy and the Armation of Principles. In: Tawil, M. (ed). Latin American Foreign Policies

towards the Middle East. Actors, Contexts, and Trends. New York: Palgrave. 59-76

82 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF PROTESTANTISM IN LATIN

AMERICA (SOURCE: LATINOBAROMETRO, 2017)

Country Protestantism (%)

Guatemala 41

Honduras 39

Nicaragua 32

El Salvador 28

Brazil 27

Costa Rica 25

Panama 24

Dominican Republic 21

Bolivia 20

Venezuela 18

Colombia 14

Ecuador 14

Peru 12

Chile 11

Argentina 10

Uruguay 7

Mexico 5

Paraguay 5

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the positioning

of 9 countries in the region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador,

Honduras, Panama, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela,

and Argentina) on the question of Jerusalem after Trump’s contro-

versial move. This sample includes a larger number of countries

than those who chose to move their embassy to Jerusalem. It also

comprises countries whose recent voting behavior in the United

Nations has tended to tip in favor of Israel (Table 2) and countries

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 83

where prominent political leaders have made a pledge in favor of

moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

TABLE 2: LATIN AMERICAN VOTES

IN THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE 2017

United Nations General

Assembly resolution

ES-10/19

21 December 2017

United Nations General

Assembly resolution

ES-10/20

13 June 2018

Mexico A A

Guatemala N A

Honduras N A

El Salvador - Y

Nicaragua Y Y

Costa Rica Y Y

Panama A A

Dominican Republic A A

Cuba Y Y

Colombia A Y

Venezuela Y Y

Ecuador Y Y

Brazil Y Y

Peru Y Y

Bolivia Y Y

Paraguay A A

Uruguay Y Y

Argentina A A

Chile Y Y

Y = Yes (pro-Palestnan), N = No (pro-Israel), A = Abstaned (more favorable to Israel)

(source: UNISPAL).

Brazil and Paraguay are excluded, since they have been studied in this book by Guil-

herme Casarões.

84 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

It is worth noting that several of these countries were among

those who pioneered the recognition of Palestine as a state in the

late 2000s (Table 3). This reversal is largely due to the right turn of

much of the Latin American political landscape. While left-wing

governments had been rather supportive to the Palestinian cause

– Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua having even suspended their

diplomatic relations with Israel

–, right-wing leaders have vocally

expressed their will to resume and/or strengthen their relationship

with the Jewish state.

TABLE 3: DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF

THE PALESTINIAN STATE

Year

Mexico N

Guatemala Y (2013)

Honduras Y (2011)

El Salvador Y (2011)

Nicaragua Y (1988)

Costa Rica Y (2008)

Among those three, Nicaragua is the only one that renewed its diplomatic ties with Is-

rael. It did so in March 2017, after seven years of suspension in protest of the Israeli deadly

raid on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship that was attempting to break the naval blockade

on the Gaza Strip. e announcement was preceded by a year of clandestine meetings be-

tween representatives of both countries’ governments. According to senior foreign ministry

ocials who were involved in the secret talks, Israel promised economic assistance to the

Central American country. In October 2017, only a few months after the re-establishment of

ties, Rosario Murillo, Nicaragua’s vice president, used the Spanish word for “brother” to

speak of Modi Ephraim, head of Israel’s foreign ministry division to Latin America and the

Caribbean. Signicantly, she mentioned that the re-establishment of relations “was celebrated

especially by many brothers of the Christian churches of our country”. See Nicaraguan vice

president welcomes Israeli diplomat as ‘hermano”. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, October 29,

2017 https://www.jta.org/2017/10/29/global/nicaraguan-vice-president-calls-israeli-se-

nior-ocial-hermano. Notably, Nicaragua has the third largest presence of Evangelicals in

Latin America (32% according to the LatinoBarometro, 2017).

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 85

Panama N

Dominican Republic Y (2009)

Cuba Y (1988)

Colombia Y (2018)

Venezuela Y (2009)

Ecuador Y (2010)

Brazil Y (2010)

Peru Y (2011)

Bolivia Y (2010)

Paraguay Y (2011)

Uruguay Y (2011)

Argentina Y (2010)

Chile Y (2011)

MEXICO

Whereas it has maintained a discourse of “equidistance” and “fine

balance” between the parties,

Mexico has unquestionably strength-

ened its relations with Israel over the last decade. This resulted in

unprecedented business ties between the two countries (the trade

balance between both nations has reached 1 billion dollars per

year),regular high-profile visits, and changes in Mexico’s voting

pattern at the United Nations. Mexico is also one of the few coun-

tries in the region that have not officially recognized Palestine as a

state. It is in this context that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

visited the country in September 2017 – as part of a regional tour

including Argentina and Colombia – the first-ever visit by a sitting

Israeli prime minister to Latin America.

López Cafagg, C. E., Méxco y el concto árabe-sraelí, Nexos, December 1, 2016.

https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=30442

86 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

According to Dina Siegel Vann, the director of the American

Jewish Committee’s Belfer Institute for Latino and Latin American

Affairs (BILLA), “the relations between Israel and Mexico are really

now at a peak.”

The fields in which both countries collaborate

are agriculture, pharmaceutical, water treatment and technology

focused on security solutions, both physical and cybernetic.

It is then no surprise that on December 21, 2017, Mexico was

among the 35 countries that abstained from a vote in the emergen-

cy special session of the United Nations General Assembly during

which 128 members overwhelmingly condemned the US decision

to move the American embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Significant-

ly, Mexico abstained again in June 2018 in the vote in the same

body condemning Israel for the violence in Gaza and calling for

the “protection of the Palestinian civilian population.” In the past,

Mexico used to vote against Israel in these types of resolutions.

However, despite repeated calls by Israeli officials, including

Jonathan Peled, Israel’s ambassador to Mexico, and Fleur Has-

san-Nahoum, the deputy mayor of Jerusalem, who paid a visit

to Mexico City in August 2018, the Mexican government has

not recognized Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and has not an-

nounced any plans to move the Mexican embassy to that city.

This has been a disappointment to Israeli authorities, who hoped

that such a decision would contribute to a domino effect in the

Latin American region.

The election in July 2018 of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador,

an ardently left-wing and anti-establishment candidate, has raised

several new questions. The key question is whether he will contin-

Will Golden Age of Israel Mexico ties continues under Obrador?, Jerusalem Post, July

3, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Will-golden-age-of-Israel-Mexico-ties-contin-

ue-under-Obrador-561387

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 87

ue during his term in office (2018-2022) the policies of his prede-

cessor, Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018), or if he will harken back

to the time when Mexico supported the Palestinian cause as part of

the Third World and the non-aligned movement.

According to Dina Siegel Vann, several elements seem to

weighin favor of the continuation of the rapprochement with

Israel: “Relations between Israel and Mexico today are based not

only on values and history, but also on clear interests - there is a

lot of value added that Israel brings to the table for Mexico.”

That

“value added,” she explained, is that Mexico has invested heavily

in Israeli companies, and Israel has also invested in the Mexican

economy. For example, in 2017, the Mexican petrochemical giant

Mexichem bought Israel’s iconic drip-irrigation company Netafim

for some USD $1.5 billion, and in 2016 Israel’s Teva pharmaceu-

tical company bought Mexico’s pharmaceutical giant Rimsa for

USD $2.3 billion.

The question of Mexico’s relationship with Israel and Palestine

notably played no role in the presidential campaign. The groups

who could drive this debate in one direction or another have only

very little influence in the public sphere. With some 45,000 people,

the Mexican Jewish community is well organized but very small.

Around 1% of the Mexican population is allegedly of Arab descent

– Lebanese, Syrian, or Palestinian – but they do not participate in

local politics as a cohesive group of interests. Finally, Mexico is the

country in Latin America that has experienced the least growth of

the evangelical population (only 5%).

Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has himself no track record

on Israel, nor has he spoken widely about it. He has not travelled

Op.ct.

88 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

much outside of Mexico and has never visited Israel. Many ob-

servers have noticed that the new Mexican president seems un-

interested in foreign affairs. “The best foreign policy is domestic

policy,”

López Obrador often says. According to Mexican intel-

lectual Jesús Silva Herzog Márquez, López Obrador simply lacks

an international agenda. “He’s very experienced when it comes to

the domestic political brawl but has an absolute lack of knowledge

of the global arena.”

In that sense, Mexico’s foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Pal-

estinian issue is not likely to witness major changes in the coming

years. While moving the embassy to Jerusalem should not be on

the agenda of AMLO presidency, bilateral relations with Israel may

remain strong for some time. Palestinians might at best achieve the

recognition of the Palestinian state.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Guatemala

Guatemala was the first country to follow in the United States’

footsteps after President Donald Trump’s declared that Jerusalem

is the capital of Israel. Two days after the opening of the US Em-

bassy in the Israeli capital, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales

(2016-2019) inaugurated the Guatemalan Embassy in Jerusalem,

together with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“It’s not a coincidence that Guatemala is opening its embassy

in Jerusalem right among the first. You were always among the first.

La mejor polítca exteror es la nteror: AMLO, El Economsta, May 22, 2018 https://

www.eleconomsta.es/naconal-eAm-mx/notcas/9152666/05/18/La-mejor-poltca-exter-

or-es-la-nteror-AMLO.html

Krause, L. Why is AMLO not standing up to Trump? Arrogance and Delusion, Wash-

ington Post, April 4, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/04/why-is-

amlo-not-standing-up-trump-arrogance-delusion

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 89

You were the second country to recognize Israel,” Netanyahu said

at the ceremony, referring to its founding in 1948. Morales said his

country, Israel and the United States “share friendship, courage and

loyalty.”

In December 2017, Guatemala was already among the

9 countries which voted against the UN motion to reject the US

decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Guatemala is the most evangelical country in Latin America.

According to Latinobarómetro 2017, 41% of the population iden-

tifies with Protestantism. Jimmy Morales himself is an evangeli-

cal entertainer with a Baptist seminary degree. Morales and Vice

President Jafeth Cabrera officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s

capitalby citing prayer and prophesy as their motivation. Similarly,

Sarah Angelina Solis, Guatemala’s ambassador to Israel, declared in

aninterview with CBN that she felt that this decision was “a gift

from God,” that she knew “many blessings will come for Guatema-

la,” since this was “a promise in the Bible, in Genesis.”

Morales has prioritized Israel since his election, making the

country his first official visit outside of the Americas in November

2016. Due to his decision to officially recognize Jerusalem, Mo-

rales wasgiven an awardby prominent Christian Zionist Mike Ev-

ans, founder of the Friends of Zion Heritage Center in Jerusalem

and visited by dozens of leaders involved with the Latino Coalition

for Israel (LCI).

Guatemala opens embassy in Jerusalem, two days after U.S. move, Reuters, May 16,

2018 https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1IH139?feedType=RSS&feed-

Name=worldNews

is Is What Inspired Guatemala to Move Its Embassy to Jerusalem. e Christian

Broadcasting Network. January 26, 2018 http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/2018/january/ex-

clusive-this-is-what-inspired-guatemala-to-move-its-embassy-to-jerusalem

Founded in 2017, LCI’s mission is to mobilize the Latino Evangelical community in

support of Israel in the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean. See http://lci.global/

90 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

This support to Israel is not only the President’s political

whim; it finds resonance at the local level too. Four city mayors

(Guastatoya, San Diego, Tiquisate, and San José) have for example

decided to rename streets, squares and parks with the name “Jeru-

salem the capital of Israel.”

However, historical and religious ties only tell part of the

story; material and political interests are also at stake. According

to Eric Olson, the deputy director of the Wilson Center’s Latin

American Program, “the embassy move is really about trying to

curry favor with the United States (…).”

President Jimmy Mo-

rales has been peppered with accusations of illicit electoral financ-

ing, the prosecution of his son and brother for fraud, and expenses

of thousands of public dollars in luxuries and gifts. He is under fire

from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatema-

la (CICIG), a UN-backed international body investigating crime

and corruption in the country. Morales has resisted CICIG’s hard

work to investigate his campaign finances and some of his own

family members, and has made every possible effort to find sup-

port in the United States.

Furthermore, Guatemala, a country where half of the pop-

ulation lives in poverty, according to the UN Economic Com-

mission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), has also

long been financially dependent on the United States. The Unit-

ed States dedicated $257 million in foreign aid to the country in

2017

and 42% of Guatemalan exports go to the United States

Noack, R. Why some Latin American countries are rushing to open Jerusalem embas-

sies, too, Washington Post, May 16, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world-

views/wp/2018/05/16/why-some-latin-american-countries-are-rushing-to-open-jerusalem-

embassies-too/?utm_term=.75aa319d7cf8

For accessing USAID data, see https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/GTM

Data available at e Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT, 2017 https://oec.world/en/

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 91

This amount of aid is the highest contribution in Central America,

but funding decreased each year of the Trump administration.

Morales’s reward for the Jerusalem move has been high for

himself, but not that much for the country. When the Guatema-

lan President announced in early January 2019 plans to expel the

CICIG, giving its investigators 24 hours to shut their office, “the

US response was limited to a mild statement of concern about

corruption in Guatemala from the US Embassy.”

The statement

didn’t even mention the UN-backed commission. Jimmy Morales

clearly reaped the benefits of the alliance he forged with pro-Israeli

US conservatives, including President Trump, Vice President Mike

Pence, former UN Envoy Nikki Haley, and Senator Marco Rubio.

By contrast, the country is far from receiving from the Trump

administration a more favorable treatment. In March 2019, the

US President threatened to cut off all aid to Guatemala, Honduras

and El Salvador if those governments failed to stem unauthorized

migration to the United States. In June, the State Department

confirmed that the administration would stop the aid to the three

countries. As a consequence, one of Morales’s last acts was to au-

thorize an agreement with the Trump administration designating

Guatemala as a “safe third country,” which would permit Wash-

ington to send Honduran and Salvadoran asylum seekers who

passed through the country back to Guatemala. This spurred large

demonstrations to protest the agreement.

Jimmy Morales ended his term in office as one of the most un-

popular presidents in Guatemala’s history. In August 2019, Alejan-

dro Giammattei, a former prisons director from the conservative

Lynch C., Corrupt Guatemalans’ GOP Lifeline, Foreign Policy, February 5, 2019.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/05/trump-republican-lawmakers-weaken-u-n-anti-cor-

ruption-commission-guatemala-jimmy-morales-white-house-putin/

92 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

Vamos list, won the presidential election. The new president will

be under immense pressure from the United States to implement

the controversial migration pact.

Regarding Israel, Giammattei said late last month that “who

is Israel’s enemy is Guatemala’s enemy.”

Speaking to the Span-

ish-language bulletin of the US-based Israel Allies Foundation, he

said close bilateral relations with Israel would be a top foreign poli-

cy priority of his, adding that he would keep the country’s embassy

in Jerusalem.

Honduras

Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez (2018-2021) has

repeatedly signaled that his government was mulling moving the

Honduran embassy to Jerusalem. Speaking at the opening meeting

of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) con-

ference in Washington in March 2019, Hernandez even declared

that his country would “immediately” open an “official diplomatic

mission” in “Jerusalem, the capital of the state of Israel.”

Honduras and Guatemala follow similar trends. Honduras is

the second country with the largest presence of Evangelicals - 39

percent Protestant according to Latinobarómetro.Both countries

are also among the most violent and impoverished countries in

the Americas – 53,2% of Hondurans live in poverty (Statistical

Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018) – and de-

pend economically, to a significant degree, on US aid and in-

vestment. Finally, the leaders of the two countries have generated

Conservative, pro-Israel Giammattei elected Guatemala president, Times of Israel, Au-

gust 12, 2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/conservative-pro-israel-giammattei-elect-

ed-guatemala-president/

Honduras to move embassy to Jerusalem. Israel National News. March 24, 2019.

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/260812

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 93

significant controversy. Hernandez’ legitimacy was called into

question during his re-election bid in November 2017 after the

official vote count ground to a halt when he appeared to be head-

ed for defeat. After the count restarted, the trend turned against

his opponent and the electoral authority declared him victor. In-

terestingly enough, the State Department released a statement

backing Hernandez exactly one day after Honduras voted with

Guatemala and eight other countries against the UN resolution

denouncing President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Isra-

el’s capital. The US reward for Hernandez’s loyalty was clear and

sound. Since then, the US government has been a staunch sup-

porter of Hernandez’s government, pouring millions of dollars

into security cooperation.

Just after his declaration at AIPAC, Hernandez announced the

opening of a trade office in Jerusalem. In a statement issued by his

government, Hernandez presented it as a “first step.” “A second

step will draw a lot of attacks from the enemies of Israel and the

United States, but we will continue along this path,”

Hernan-

dez added. He finally inaugurated the office five months later, at

the end of august 2019. The Honduran foreign ministry said in a

statement that the office will be an extension of its existing embas-

sy and the complete move to Jerusalem is still being “analyzed and

evaluated in the international and national context.” Hernandez

declared “For me, it’s the recognition that Jerusalem is the capital

of Israel.”

Notably, Honduras hosts around 200.000 people of Pales-

tinian descent. Predominantly, the descendants of a pre-Nakba

Honduran president calls Jerusalem Israeli capital, not moving embassy yet, Reuters,

March 24, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-honduras-israel/honduran-presi-

dent-calls-jerusalem-israeli-capital-not-moving-embassy-yet-idUSKCN1R50R0

94 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

generation, mostly middle to upper class Christians, Hondurans

with Palestinian roots are today not only known for being suc-

cessful merchants and entrepreneurs, but many are also part of the

economic and political elite. The best examples are Carlos Rob-

ert Flores Facussé, the president of Honduras from 1998 to 2002,

and Salvador Nasralla, a Honduran with Palestinian parents, who

missed out on the Honduran presidency in 2017. However, this

community, that has maintained various features such as their re-

ligious affiliation and ethnic identification as “Arabs” or “Palestin-

ians,” is not politically mobilized, or very little, for the Palestinian

cause.

This large Palestinian presence is, therefore, hardly the rea-

son for explaining why Hernandez has not concluded the move of

the embassy yet.

Hernandez is probably trying to bargain with Israel and the

US administration. US-Honduran relations became recently tense

over immigration issues, specifically migrant caravans. President

Trump ordered the suspension of aid payments to Honduras and

decided to end deportation protections for 57,000 Hondurans

who lived in the United States for decades. That has set up Hon-

durans, already suffering from months of protests and economic

stagnation, for a flood of returnees it can ill afford to absorb. In

addition, Hernandez is haunted by new scandals. US federal court

recently released documents mentioning the Honduran President

as part of a group of individuals investigated by the DEA since

about 2013 for participating “in large-scale drug-trafficking and

money laundering activities relating to the importation of cocaine

into the United States.”

Gutiérrez Rivera, L. (2014) Assimilation or cultural dierence? Palestinian immi-

grants in Honduras. Revista de Estudios Sociales, 48, 57-68

Honduran president conrms he was investigated by the DEA, CNN, June 1, 2019.

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/31/americas/honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez-dea-intl/

index.html

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 95

Israeli officials said that “Honduras has requested Israel’s help

in warming relations with the Trump administration as one of its

conditions for moving its embassy to Jerusalem.”

A first trilateral

meeting was organized by Netanyahu with Hernández and Secre-

tary of State Mike Pompeo Tuesday in Brasilia on the sidelines of

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s inauguration in January 2019.

These discussions will probably continue until Israel and the Unit-

ed States until they get the result they are looking for.

EL SALVADOR

Foreign Minister Hugo Martinez said in December 2017 that El

Salvador will maintain its embassy in Tel Aviv and will not move

it to Jerusalem. “We will not move our embassy from Tel Aviv to

Jerusalem out of respect for the peace process in the Middle East

and particularly Israel and Palestine,” said Martinez in an interview

with a local TV channel, the Spanish-language Jewish news service

Aurorareported.

In 2006, El Salvador was the last nation to move its embassy

from Jerusalem in a bid to respect international resolutions. While

the Security Council Resolution 478 in August 1980 had called

upon member states to remove their diplomatic missions from Je-

rusalem, El Salvador took the opposite position a few years later: in

1984, the government of Alvaro Magaña brought its embassy back

to West Jerusalem. The military cooperation between Israel and El

Salvador during the Salvadoran civil war may have been the main

factor behind this decision.

Netanyahu helps Honduras warm ties with Trump, Axios, January 2, 2019 https://

www.axios.com/netanyahu-helps-honduras-warm-ties-with-trump-1546429074-c85b2b54-

3661-48da-97fa-780fe39d65f9.html

El Salvador no trasladara su embajada a Jerusalen, Aurora, December 29, 2017 http://

www.aurora-srael.co.l/el-salvador-no-trasladara-su-embajada-a-jerusalen

El acuerdo secreto del presdente Magaña, El Faro, August 21, 2006. http://archivo.

elfaro.net/secciones/noticias/20060821/noticias2_20060821.html

96 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

A US ally which has a small contingent of troops in Iraq from

2004 to 2009, El Salvador seemed to have taken some distance

with Israel over the last years. In early 2016, there were even ru-

mors that the country could close its embassy in Tel Aviv and move

it to Ramallah, in the West Bank, in retaliation for Israel’s decision

to close its embassy in San Salvador due to budget cuts.

This did

not happen, however.

El Salvador hosts the second highest population of Palestinian

descendants in Central America behind Honduras, with around

100,000 Salvadorans with Palestinian ancestry live in the country

out of a population of 6.5 million. As in Honduras, this commu-

nity is particularly well represented among political elites on both

sides of the political spectrum. Both Tony Saca, former conserva-

tive President (2004-2009), and Shafik Handal, longtime leader of

the Salvadoran left and former-guerrilla commander who fought

US-backed troops during the country’s 12-year civil war, are of Pal-

estinian descent. So is also Nayib Bukele, the candidate of a small

right-wing party, the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA),

who won the last presidential elections in February 2019. How-

ever, like in Honduras, this Palestinian community provides very

little support to the Palestinian cause. Bukele himself has been de-

scribed as “a fan of Israel” and has declared that he has no problem

in building relations with the Jewish state.

In February 2018,

Bukele paid an official visit to Jerusalem. While there, then-mayor

of El Salvador’s capital, San Salvador, met with his counterpart,

El Salvador denies it is moving embassy from Tel Aviv to Ramallah, Jewish Telegraphic

Agency, January 19, 2016. https://www.jta.org/2016/01/19/israel/el-salvador-denies-it-is-

moving-embassy-from-tel-aviv-to-ramallah

New Palestinian ‘Christian’ president is a fan of Israel. Gateway News. February 7,

2019. http://gatewaynews.co.za/new-palestinian-christian-president-is-a-fan-of-israel/

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 97

then-Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat. He also laid a memorial wreath

at Yad Vashem and prayed at the Western Wall.

Like in the rest of Central America, El Salvador has a grow-

ing Evangelical population (28% according to Latinobarometro

in 2017) and these churches play a central role in disseminating

Christian Zionism. Like in Guatemala, three towns (San Sebastián

Salitrillo, Candelaria de la Frontera and the Municipality of Teu-

cla) have inaugurated a street, a park, and a boulevard with the

name “Jerusalem - Eternal Capital of Israel.”

While Bukele hasn’t demonstrated any intention of changing

Salvador’s official position yet, the evangelical community in the

country and abroad, including the international Christian Zion-

ist organization Christians United forIsrael, continues to mount

pressure in favor of moving the embassy. As tensions around the

migrant crisis at the US southern border increases, Bukele could

attempt to use this card as a sign of his desire to reach out to the

Trump’s administration and work together in partnership.

Panama

In 2018, Panama’s President Juan Carlos Varela declared in an in-

terview with RFI in Jerusalem, where he was on an official visit,

that he did not intend to imitate other Latin American countries

such as Guatemala and move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem:

“We respect the decision of other States to establish embassies in

Jerusalem. But our decision is to remain in Tel Aviv with the rest

of the international community, in order to prevent the situation

from getting complicated and ending up delaying what we want,

which is to push for a peace agreement.”

http://es.r.fr/americas/20180518-panama-trasladara-su-embajada-jerusalen-solo-tras-

un-acuerdo-de-paz-segun-su-presi

98 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

Varela also said that “Panama is committed to dialogue with all

parties,” however, since the late 2000s, Panamanian governments

have been rather aligned with Israel. Panama’s steadfast support of

Israel at international forums, primarily the United Nations, began

with President Ricardo Martinelli and was ensured throughout his

presidency (2009-2014). In 2010, Panama distinguished itself by

voting alongside the US, Israel, Canada, Nauru, the Former Yugo-

slav Republic of Macedonia, and Micronesia against a UN resolu-

tion calling for investigations into allegations of war crimes com-

mitted during Operation Cast Lead, the 2008-09 Israeli assault

on Gaza (Goldstone Report).

Shortly after this vote, Martinelli

travelled to Israel to discuss free trade possibilities and other bilat-

eral ventures. According to the Jerusalem Post, Martinelli affirmed

eternal Panamanian solidarity with the Jewish state based on “its

guardianship of the capital of the world – Jerusalem”

and assured

Israeli President Shimon Peres that Panama’s size did not prevent

it from having “a big heart for Israel.” His visit was historic, as he

was the first Panamanian president to visit the Hebrew State. In

2012, Panama voted against the enhanced UN membership status

for Palestine. After a year and a half of negotiations, a Free Trade

Agreement between Panama and Israel was finally concluded in

November 2015.

e United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conict, also known as the

Goldstone Report, was established in April 2009 by the United Nations Human Rights

Council as an independent international fact-nding mission “to investigate all violations of

international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the occupying Power,

Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particu-

larly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression”. e Goldstone Report ac-

cused both the Israel army and the Palestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes

against humanity. It recommended that each side openly investigate its own conduct, and to

bring the allegations to the International Criminal Court if they failed to do so. e govern-

ment of Israel rejected the report.

Panamanian President received Israeli Praise, Jerusalem Post, March 2, 2010 https://

www.jpost.com/Israel/Panamanian-president-receives-Israeli-praise

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 99

Martinelli’s unconditional support for Israel was both about

projected economic gains and a result of his foreign policy strategy

of full alignment with the United States. It was also a personal

matter. In addition to ideological affinities and empathy with Zi-

onism, former Panamanian President was closely linked to Israeli

security companies. His government purchased Pegasus equip-

ment, a spyware created by an Israeli cyberarms maker, which was

used for illegal spying on political opponents, journalists, union

leaders, businessmen, and even Supreme Court judges. Martinelli

was arrested in June 2017 in Florida on an extradition request by

the government of Panama on political espionage and corruption

charge. He was extradited a year later.

Juan Carlos Varela’s decision not to follow Trump’s move on

Jerusalem was a way to distance himself from his predecessor’s full

alignment with Israel. Nevertheless, Panama maintains a very close

relation to Israel which has not been contested by any posterior

government. Laurentino “Nito” Cortizo, who recently won the

presidential race, will probably not change this orientation.

Dominican Republic

Relations between the Dominican Republic and Israel have in-

creased under the presidency of Danilo Medina (2012-2020).

While President Leonel Fernandez (2004-2012) had been among

the first in the region to recognize the Palestinian state (2009), to

visit the Palestinian Occupied Territories (2011), and to officially

receive Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (2011), Medina has

rather focused on strengthening the economic cooperation with

the Hebrew state. The two countries recently signed an air ser-

vices agreement that allows direct flights between both nations.

The agreement was signed in February 2019 by Foreign Minister

100 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

Miguel Vargas and his Israeli colleague Israel Katz, as part of the

official visit that the Dominican official paid to that nation focused

on promoting bilateral relations.

One of the most strategic dimensions of this bilateral coopera-

tion concerns the Israeli surveillance technologies. Illicit Trade at the

Haiti-Dominican Republic Border is a very hot topic for Dominicans

and the Israeli ambassador to Santo Domingo publicly announced

that his country was willing to collaborate to solve the problems at

the border: “We have all kinds of technologies and alternatives for the

border, [including] drones and satellite surveillance among the pos-

sible options to protect against smuggling and illegal immigration.”

Despite this alliance, President Medina has shown no desire

to move the Dominican embassy to Jerusalem. Part of this stance

can be explained by the fact that President Medina has made a

point of gaining relative autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, Do-

minican Republic’s main partner. Like Panama, this translated into

strengthening economic and political ties with China, after break-

ing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

This foreign policy orientation has been criticized by Evan-

gelical church leaders, including Domingo Paulino Moya, one of

the best-known evangelical voices in the Dominican media. Luis

José “Ramfis” Dominguez Trujillo, a prominent candidate for the

2020 presidential elections and the grandson ofthe dictator Rafa-

el Leónidas Trujillo (1930-1961), has also pledged to relocate the

Dominican embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. L. Ramfis Dominguez

Trujillo has promised to “restart” the country to confront corrup-

tion and insecurity, to return the “glory” to the Armed Forces, and

to rescue the nation from the “Haitian invasion.” He also declared

in an interview that moving his country’s embassy from Tel Aviv

to Jerusalem would be “one of the first things” he will do if he is

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 101

elected as president: “We have been talking with a lot of different

friends here and if President [Donald] Trump is also moving the

American embassy to Jerusalem, what’s the big deal? It’s a bilateral

move that makes sense.”

He promised to foster greater economic

cooperation between Israel and the Dominican Republic “to work

in technologies, drip irrigation, forestation, energy, and all those

things you know very well.”

Admittedly, L. Ramfis Dominguez Trujillo trails far behind in

the 2020 presidential race, with less than 5% of the electors who

declared in recent opinion polls they would vote for him. The rul-

ing PLD still leads the electoral preferences, albeit Luis Abinader,

the candidate of the center-left Partido Revolucionario Moderno

(PRM) who has Lebanese roots, is close behind. While the PLD

and the PRM would not change the current orientation of the

Dominican foreign policy, a surprise victory of Trujillo cannot be

completely discarded, since as with Brexit, President Trump’s vic-

tory, and recent Australian national elections, experts have proven

they could be wrong. The decision to move the Dominican embas-

sy to Jerusalem will depend on it.

SOUTH AMERICA

Colombia

Colombian president Ivan Duque, in office since August 2018,

declared during his electoral campaign that he would not rule out

“the possibility of placing [Colombia’s] diplomatic seat in Jerusa-

lem” and vowed to further improve already close tieswith Israel.

Camisar, A., Trump’s decision and its Latin American, Caribbean impact, Jerusalem

Post, January 18, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Trumps-Jerusalem-deci-

sion-and-its-Latin-American-Caribbean-impact-538168

New Colombian president open to moving embassy to Jerusalem, Times of Israel, June

18, 2018 https://www.timesosrael.com/new-colombian-president-open-to-moving-embas-

sy-to-jerusalem/

102 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

If anything, Colombia - Israel’s closest ally on the continent - was

next on the list of nations expected to move their embassy from

Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This has not happened, though.

Colombia’sstrategicrelationship withIsrael started with Pres-

ident Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010), a conservative politician closely

associated with the paramilitaries. According to the Stockholm In-

ternational Peace Research Institute, from 2002 to 2017, Colom-

bia was the sixth-largest market for Israeli arms. The paramilitaries

and the Colombian army have consistently used Israeli arms and

consulting services in brutal fighting against guerrilla groups. This

has been largely documented by researchers and NGOs

. Signifi-

cantly, when the Colombian army rescued presidential candidate

and media personality Ingrid Betancourt, who had been captured

by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2002

and held him prisoner for six years, the press in both Israel and Co-

lombia reported that Israel had been intricately involved in both

the planning and the execution of the rescue.

Besides being a loyal customer of Israeli defense exports, Co-

lombia has also been rather supportive of Israel in international

forums. In 2010 and 2011, Duque was an assistant to Uribe on

the Palmer Commission that investigated the 2010 Mavi Marmara

flotilla incident. The commission concluded that the blockade of

Gaza was legal, though it said Israel used excessive force in the inci-

dent. In parallel, high-level contacts between Colombian president

Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), the Israeli foreign minister Avig-

dor Lieberman, and Shimon Peres facilitated Colombia’s refusal to

join the rest of Latin America in recognizing the State of Palestine

See Field, L. W. (2017). e Colombia-Israel Nexus: Toward Historical and Analytic

Contexts. Latin American Research Review, 52(4), and Steinsleger, J., Israel in Colombia:

Death Do We Impart, Meeting Point, April 4, 2008

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 103

in the UN General Assembly. Not surprisingly, Colombia was one

of three countries thatPrime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited

in 2017 on his trip to the region. In December 2017, Colombia

abstained from the United Nations vote that condemned the US

decision to move the American embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

However, the relationship has recently known some setbacks

that weren’t expected by Israel. A few days before the inaugura-

tion of Duque’s presidency, Colombia’s outgoing foreign minister,

María Ángela Holguín, sent a letter to Palestinian Authority For-

eign Minister Riyad al-Maliki, informing him that the President

Santos had “decided to recognize Palestine as a free, independent

and sovereign state.” The news of Colombia’s decision wasrapid-

ly leaked to the media. It didn’t take long for the issue to make

international headlines. The incoming vice president and foreign

minister issued statements to the effect that the Palestine recogni-

tion was done legally, but that the new government would review

the decision.

Duque initially seemed to suggest that he was surprised to learn

that his predecessor had recognized Palestine in its very last days.

ButHolguín, the outgoing foreign minister, said in atelevision in-

terview that Duque, the new president, was not only informed but

gave his blessing to the demarche. Colombia’s new president, Ivan

Duque, finally announced that he would not reverse his predeces-

sor’s decision to recognize a Palestinian state: “Damage was done

by the fact that there was not more institutional discussion. [For-

mer] president [Juan Manuel] Santos told me that he had made

that decision, but it is irreversible.”

According to several sources, Santos, who won the 2016 Nobel

Peace Prize for his role in ending Colombia’s 50-year-long civil war,

was concerned about his legacy: “Yes, Santos is a friend of Netanya-

104 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

hu, but he agreed that Netanyahu doesn’t do anything to advance

peace. That’s why he decided it was time to recognize Palestine.”

Duque has also come as a disappointment to Israeli authori-

ties, as he has not showed any sign that he is about to move Colom-

bia’s embassy to Jerusalem.

Venezuela

In December 2017, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro attend-

ed a joint meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

and the Non-Aligned Movement in Istanbul to reject the United

States’ decision to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem. Maduro de-

scribed Trump’s decision as “a declaration of war against the Arab

Muslims” and as “imperialist aggression” against the Palestinian

people.

The Bolivarian Revolution led by President Hugo Chávez from

1998 and carried on today by his successor, Nicolas Maduro, has

become the most vocal support of the Palestinian cause in Latin

America. A symbol of the rise of the Pink Tide

in the mid-2000s,

Venezuela suspended diplomatic ties with Israel as soon as Janu-

ary 2009 for protesting the Operation Cast Lead. In the face of

the 2014 new brutal Israeli assault on Gaza, Venezuelan President

Nicolas Maduro launched an “SOS Palestine” campaign. As Angel

Blanco Sorio has pointed out, “the Palestinian cause is important for

the Venezuelan Arab community and the wider leftist movement in

the country. Confronting Israel polished Chávez’s anti-imperialist

Venezuela’s Maduro attends OIC summit in Istanbul, Yeni Safak, December 13, 2017

https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/venezuelas-maduro-attends-oic-summit-in-is-

tanbul-2890513

e Latin American “Pink tide” describes a turn towards left wing governments in

Latin American democracies straying away from the then more frequent neo-liberal eco-

nomic model. By 2009, nearly two-thirds of Latin Americans lived under some form of left-

leaning government.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 105

credentials and was also in line with the Iranian-Syrian position.”

A Palestinian diplomat indicated in 2011 that “rather than Pales-

tinian independence being a priority for Chávez,” it was “part of a

wider anti-imperialist stance against the US and its proxies.”

However, the country is in the midst of a social, political, and

economic collapse, and the future of Maduro’s government seems

extremely uncertain. Since the May 2018 presidential election,

whose process and results have been widely disputed, the nation

and the world are divided in support for Nicolás Maduro or Juan

Guaidó. In January 2019, Guaidó declared he was the interim

president of Venezuela, challenging Nicolás Maduro’s presidency

and starting the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis.

The relationship with Israel is part of the ideological battle.

Notably, in a recent interview with the Israeli newspaper Israel

Hayom, Guaidó declared: “we started working to renew relations

and I am happy to announce that the process of establishing re-

lations with Israel is in full swing, it is very important for us,

first we will renew relations, then we will announce the appoint-

ment of an ambassador in Israel and we have a great hope that

an ambassador of Israel will come to us.” Questioned about the

possibility of the Venezuelan Embassy being opened in Jerusalem,

Guaidó said: “It is part of the issues we are talking about, at the

right time I will announce the restoration of relations and the

location of the embassy.”

Blanco Sorio, A (2016), Venezuela and the Middle East Under Hugo Chávez

(1999–2013): Strategic Continuities and Ideological Preferences. In: Tawil, M. (ed). Latin

American Foreign Policies towards the Middle East. Actors, Contexts, and Trends. New York:

Palgrave. 99-134

Guadó: Renovaremos las relacones con Israel y estamos pensando abrr la embajada

en Jerusalén, La Aurora, February 12, 2019. http://www.aurora-israel.co.il/guaido-renovare-

mos-las-relaciones-con-israel-y-estamos-pensando-abrir-la-embajada-en-jerusalen

106 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

The journalist also asked the president of Venezuela about the

Jews of his country who now live in Israel: “There are many Vene-

zuelans in Israel and many Jews in Venezuela” and added that “it is

a very active and prosperous community that contributed much to

our society. I imagine they are happy that we are restoring relations

with Israel.”

Guaidó has repeatedly echoed comments from theTrump ad-

ministrationthat “all options” for removing Maduro are on the ta-

ble.

In fact, the United Stated has declared its support for Guaidó

after he went to a military base in the nation’s capital to proclaim

the end of Maduro’s regime and called for a military uprising. The

US dangles the prospect of economic recovery to Venezuelans if

they rally behind the opposition leader. This support is crucial for

Guaidó, and his promise to relocate the Venezuelan embassy to Je-

rusalem is a way to showcase his future alignment with the Trump

administration if he takes power.

Argentina

Relations between Argentina and Israel have warmed significantly

since the election of President Mauricio Macri in 2015. He re-

placed Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK), under whose lead-

ership bilateral ties were at a historic low. In 2010, Kirchner recog-

nized Palestine as a “free and independent state.”

Admittedly, President Macri has not followed in Trump’s

footsteps regarding Jerusalem, but Argentina was among the 35

countries in December 2017 that abstained from the UN vote

condemning the US administration for the embassy’s move from

Guaido seeks relations with US military in attempt to take power in Venezuela, e

Guardian, May 11, 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/11/guaido-madu-

ro-pentagon-trump-us-venezuela

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 107

Tel Aviv. This diplomatic stance was one more evidence of a shift

in Argentina’s position since 2015. During the governments of

Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who ruled

from 2003 to 2015, Argentina voted without hesitation in all

multilateral organizations in favor of Palestinian rights. Argentina

changed its position for the first time in October 2016, by refrain-

ing from supporting a draft resolution on “Occupied Palestine” at

the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UN-

ESCO). Argentina decided to abstain from supporting Palestine

using the argument of “active neutrality” held at the discursive level

by Rodolfo Terragno,

who was appointed ambassador to UNE-

SCO by the government of Mauricio Macri. This doctrine, which

is of most benefit to Israel, has been applied to the letter since. For

example, in June 2018, the Argentine Foreign Ministry issued a

statement that seemed to put the blame for clashes between the

Israeli military and Hamas squarely on the Palestinians, and the

country abstained again from the vote calling for the “protection

of the Palestinian civilian population” in Gaza.

Relations between Argentina and the Middle East have been

part of the most emblematic political and ideological battles oppos-

ing Macri and CFK. Argentina is home to a large Jewish communi-

ty – Argentina’s Jewish population is the largest in Latin America,

and the third largest in the Americas (after that of the United States

and Canada) – and a sizable Syrian and Lebanese diaspora. Both

communities are divided, following Argentina’s political and social

polarization, but the most important Jewish organizations have

La Argentna cambó de postura y se abstuvo de votar en la Unesco un texto sobre Pa-

lestna, La Nacón, October 15, 2016. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-argenti-

na-cambio-de-postura-y-se-abstuvo-de-votar-en-la-unesco-un-texto-sobre-palesti-

na-nid1947312

108 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

been very hostile to CFK and her foreign policy. In June 2014,

Mauricio Macri, then still Buenos Aires mayor, traveled to Israel

to participate in an international mayors’ conference in Jerusalem.

Macri took this opportunity to tell Israeli Prime Minister Benja-

min Netanyahu that Argentina’s treatment of Israel would change

for the better and that cooperation between the two countries was

expected to improve in case of his victory in the presidential elec-

tions. He also promised the leaders of the World Jewish Congress

that he would work to cancel the agreement signed in 2013 with

Iran to jointly investigate bombings against Israeli and Jewish tar-

gets in Argentina’s capital in the early 1990s, which left 114 people

killed and more than 500 wounded.



As the Jerusalem Post put it, “Macri victory in Argentina is

unequivocally good for Israel and the Jews”. Indeed, no sooner was

he elected, the Argentine President began to deliver his promises.

In January 2016, he met with Benjamin Netanyahu at the World

Economic Forum in Davos, where they agreed on increasing in-

vestments in technology, security, defense and food. According to

the Israeli Prime Minister, Macri told him unequivocally: “We are

starting a new slate with Israel. Our interests and values make this

partnership necessary and therefore a new era has begun.”

The memorandum of understanding signed by Argentina and Iran stipulated the

creation of a joint “truth commission” made up of five independent judges from third-

party countries to investigate the bombing, two chosen by each country and one agreed

upon by both. It also allowed for Iranian suspects in the case to be questioned. How-

ever, Argentina’s courts had already found Iran culpable, and even issued Interpol war-

rants against five Iranians and a Lebanese for the attack, including Iranian Defense

Minister Ahmad Vahidi. Israel feared that the commission would result into an Iranian

manipulation for exonerating itself. President Macri finally cancelled the memo-

randum in July 2016.

Netanyahu: Argentina has gone from hostility to friendship with Israel, Jerusalem

Post, September 13, 2017. https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Netanyahu-Argenti-

na-has-gone-from-hostility-to-friendship-with-Israel-504986

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 109

At the beginning of May 2016, this program took more con-

crete form as officials and security experts met in Buenos Aires for

an Argentina-Israel binational conference on security. Its objective

was to design joint strategies “to combat organized crime and ter-

rorism” and establish a framework for “intensive cooperation.”

Sixteen Israeli security companies, including Rafael (high-tech de-

fense systems for air, land, sea and space applications), SK Group

(world leader in small arms), RT LTA Systems (aerostats for use

in intelligence and surveillance) and Israel Aerospace Industries,

attended the conference, as part of a road show.

However, everything could change again by 2010. General

elections will be held in Argentina on October 2019, to elect the

president of Argentina, members of the national congress and the

governors of most provinces. Incumbent president Mauricio Macri

is running for re-election. Alberto Fernández, cabinet chief under

the Kirchners, is Macri’s main rival. After months of economic

turmoil – in 2018, the peso halved in value, inflation hit its highest

levels since the early 1990s, an incipient recovery vanished into re-

cession – and UDS $56 billion IMF bailout, opinion polls suggest

Macri’s re-election bid is in danger. However, anti-Kirchnerism is

still strong, mainly due to perceptions of corruption during the

Kirchner era. Who will win the election will define the fate of Ar-

gentina’s future relationship with Israel. While rather unlikely, a

second government of Macri would probably not completely dis-

card the possibility of moving Argentina’s embassy to Jerusalem,

depending of the economic situation and its political needs at the

international and domestic levels.

Con un semnaro, reforzarán la alanza con Israel en matera de Segurdad, Clarn,

May 24, 2016 https://www.clarn.com/poltca/semnaro-reforzaran-alanza-srael-segu-

rdad_0_SyVOvsuPml.html

110 / LATIn AMERICA AnD THE QUESTIOn OF JERUSALEM

CONCLUSION

This overview shows that the political orientation of the gov-

ernment is a prevalent factor in shaping Latin American foreign

policies towards Israel. Right-wing leaders and political aspirants,

and in particular new far-right populists supported by Evangelical

churches, are more likely to declare their alignment with Trump’s

new policy on Jerusalem. Their determination to break with the

rapprochement with Palestine led by their left-wing predecessors

or opponents, their will to strengthen their relations with the Unit-

ed States, and the influence of pro-Israeli Evangelical groups are

important explanatory variables. Their affinities with the security

orientation of Israel – a pillar of its exporting industries – also

contribute to make Latin American right-wing politicians keener

to foster their relations with the Jewish state.

However, the decision to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to

Jerusalem is not only a matter of political and religious beliefs. The

cases overall confirm that personal interests are at stake too. The

political leaders who are most in need of the US support, either

because they are strongly contested at home (like Jimmy Morales

in Guatemala and Juan Orlando Hernandez in Honduras) or be-

cause they are entangled in a political dispute (like Juan Guaido

in Venezuela), are using this gesture as anodinthe direction of

Trump. They also try to use it as a bargaining tool for asking the

Israeli government to act as a broker between them and the US

administration, a role that Israel has been embracing as evidenced

by the Honduran case. Mostly, even when these leaders get the re-

ward they were waiting for, their country at the end of the game is

the loser: not only democracy is often weakened, but the economic

and political gains are poorer than expected.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 111

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM

MOVE IN SOUTH AMERICA:

FALLING ON DEAF EARS?

GUILHERME CASARÕES

Professor of Political Science and

International Relations, Escola de

Administração de Empresas de São Paulo/FGV

CHAPTER 4

112 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

INTRODUCTION

The status of the city of Jerusalem has probably been the most con-

troversial issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. United Nations

Resolution 181 (II), which partitioned Palestine between a Jew-

ish and an Arab state, established Jerusalem “as a corpus separatum

under a special international regime and shall be administered by

the United Nations.”

The resolution’s provisions, however, were

never implemented; a war broke out between Arab countries, who

did not accept them as legitimate, and the recently-independent

state of Israel in May 1948.

Ever since, Jerusalem passed from the hands of Jordan, who

kept control of the eastern part of the city (which included the

Old City) after the 1949 Armistice, to Israel, whose conquest and

occupation of all its metropolitan area in the aftermath of the 1967

Six-Day War is considered by the Israeli as the ‘reunification’ of Je-

rusalem. On 30 July 1980, the Israeli Knesset passed the Jerusalem

Law, which determined that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is

the capital of Israel.”

A month later, UN Security Council Reso-

lution 478 condemned the attempt at changing the character and

status of the Holy City as a ‘violation of international law.’ It also

United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 181 (II), “Future Government of Pales-

tine”. 29 November 1947. Available at https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0

AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253

e Knesset. “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”. Available at https://www.

knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm

CHAPTER 4

113

114 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

called upon member states to withdraw their diplomatic missions

from Jerusalem.

Out of the 16 states that had their ambassadors stationed

in the city, eleven were from Latin America. Bolivia, Chile, Co-

lombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Uruguay, and

Venezuela immediately pulled out their embassies in accordance

with Resolution 478. It took two more years for Guatemala and

the Dominican Republic to follow suit. In that same year, how-

ever, Costa Rica and El Salvador returned their representations

to Jerusalem.

All South American countries, on the other hand,

remained committed to the international legal provisions on the

status of Jerusalem.

With the exception of Bolivia and Venezuela, who broke

diplomatic relations with Israel over the 2009 Gaza war,

South

America has traditionally adopted an even-handed approach to

Israel and Palestine. They enjoy friendly relations with Israel – Ar-

gentina and Brazil are home to two of the ten largest Jewish com-

munities in the world – and have recognized the sovereignty of

the Palestinian people in recent years. When the United Nations

decided to upgrade Palestine to the status of non-member observ-

er state in November 2012, only two South American nations

abstained – Colombia, thanks to its close relations with Washing-

ton and Tel Aviv, and Paraguay, who had a right-wing provisional

government at the time.

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 478. 30 July 1980. Available at https://

undocs.org/S/RES/478(1980)

Baeza, Cecilia. “América Latina y la cuestión palestina (1947-2012)”. Araucaria, vol.

14, no. 28, 2012, pp. 111-131.

CNN, “Venezuela, Bolivia cut ties to Israel over Gaza”. 14 January 2009. Available at

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/01/14/bolivia.israel/

ABC Color, “Palestina: Paraguay se abstuvo de votar”. 30 November 2012. Available at

http://www.abc.com.py/internacionales/palestina-paraguay-se-abstuvo-de-votar-484196.html

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 115

President Donald Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Israeli

embassy to Jerusalem in December 2017 was met with skepticism

across South America. In the UN vote that condemned the uni-

lateral measure as ‘null and void,’ all countries in the region voted

against the U.S., except for three who abstained: Argentina, Co-

lombia, and Paraguay. The first two, who had become Washing-

ton’s foremost regional allies, fiercely criticized Trump’s embassy

move, arguing that it ran counter to a 70-year-old international

consensus.

Paraguayan president Horacio Cartes, on the other

hand, immediately stirred controversy by announcing that it would

move its Israeli embassy to Jerusalem no later than May 2018. One

year later, Brazil’s President-Elect Jair Bolsonaro boasted he would

also move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem as a sign of renewed

friendship with Trump’s America.

By mid-2019, none of the promises have been fulfilled. Par-

aguay indeed moved its embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018, only

to see it return to Tel Aviv four months later, as the new president,

Mario Abdo Benítez, took office. Brazil’s Bolsonaro did not even

go as far as Paraguay and announced the opening of a trade of-

fice in Jerusalem with no diplomatic status, a move that frustrated

many of his supporters, but served to appease the more pragmatic

and trade-oriented forces in the Brazilian government.

This chapter’s goal is to analyze the complex decision-making

processes that led two countries to embrace the embassy move as

a major foreign policy act – and to soon change course. While

there is a common geopolitical thread to Cartes’s and Bolsonaro’s

motivations, which relate to their desire to strengthen ties with the

United States and Israel, I argue, first of all, that the embassy trans-

fer would hardly be considered if not for domestic factors.

El País, “Colombia no reconocerá a Jerusalén como capital de Israel, disse Cancillería”.

21 December 2017.

116 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

With a weakly institutionalized foreign policymaking struc-

ture,

the Paraguayan decision was directly influenced by the per-

sonal ties between the President and individuals who were close to

the Israeli government. In the Brazilian case, the embassy promise

stemmed mainly from the growing political power of Evangelical

Christians, both as lawmakers and voters. They were one of the

main forces behind Bolsonaro’s successful presidential bid in late

2018, who suggested he would break with Brazil’s long-standing

diplomatic traditions to favor his closest supporters.

The nature of the political struggle behind the embassy move

in each country explains how the decision quickly got reversed.

Paraguay’s Abdo Benítez saw no political reward in keeping the

embassy in Jerusalem and took the opportunity not only to dis-

tance himself from his predecessor but also to improve relations

with emerging markets of the Islamic world, with potential gains

for the country’s agricultural exports. On his part, Bolsonaro, who

was adamant that he should follow Donald Trump’s steps, was

curbed by members of his own cabinet, notably the military and

the agrobusiness sector, who feared, among other things, that the

embassy move would hurt Brazil’s position as the world’s largest

exporter of halal meat and chicken.

PARAGUAY:

THE ORIGINS OF THE JERUSALEM MOVE

Paraguay’s embassy move announcement came as a surprise to

many, who did not expect a South American nation to abandon the

region’s tradition of even-handedness towards the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict and its commitment to the two-state solution. Under left-

Coronel Correa, Liz Haydee. “Evolución del Servicio Diplomático y Consular del Par-

aguay y su Sistema Jurídico”. Rev. Secr. Trib. Perm. Revis., vol. 5, no. 9, 2017.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 117

wing president Fernando Lugo, Paraguay was also part of a large

group of neighbors, led by Brazil, who recognized Palestine as a ‘free

and independent state’ between 2010 and 2011.

However, the rise

to power of conservative president Horacio Cartes in mid-2013,

after a year of turbulence following Lugo’s impeachment, marked

a change in Paraguay’s broader foreign policy direction. Relations

with the U.S. became the centerpiece of the new Paraguayan ad-

ministration, as Cartes distanced itself from Brazil and Mercosur.

The tiny landlocked South American country served Wash-

ington’s interests in at least three respects. First, Paraguay could

strengthen U.S. trade with the region by moving closer to the Pa-

cific Alliance and deepening the divide between the highly U.S.-in-

fluenced Pacific and the Brazil-led Atlantic. Second, it could boost

U.S. military presence in the continent by allowing the establish-

ment of a military base at South America’s heart under the guise

of fighting transnational drug trafficking

and terrorist networks,

particularly at the tri-border area between Paraguay, Argentina, and

Brazil.

Third, Paraguay’s longstanding relationship with Taiwan

helped keep Chinese political presence in South America at arm’s

length, in spite of China’s growing trade flows with the region.

Amorim, Celso. “Let Us In”. Foreign Policy, 14 March 2011. Available at https://for-

eignpolicy.com/2011/03/14/let-us-in/, Although the formal recognition was made in Jan-

uary 2011, Paraguay was the rst South American country to ocially establish diplomatic

relations with the state of Palestine, in March 2005.

Tase, Peter. “Paraguay y Estados Unidos: fortaleciendo una nueva estrategia de coop-

eración”. Eurasia Hoy, 31 March 2014.

Resumen Latinoamericano, “Estados Unidos apuesta por Paraguay como lugar clave

para su imperio”. 16 March 2015. Avaliable at http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.

org/2015/03/16/estados-unidos-apuesta-por-paraguay-como-lugar-clave-para-su-imperio/

Neumann, Vanessa. “O Hezbollah pode dominar o PCC”. Defesa Net, 7 December

2018. Avaliable at http://www.defesanet.com.br/pcc/noticia/31423/Vanessa-Neumann---O-

Hezbollah-pode-dominar-o-PCC-/

Taiwan News, “Taiwan ally Paraguay could be next to fall to China: US senator”. 16

May 2015. Available at https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3432071

118 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

Cartes also considered Israel a source of political and econom-

ic opportunities. The first step towards closer ties with the country

was to reopen the Paraguayan embassy in Tel Aviv in 2014, twelve

years after it had been closed in response to Israel shutting down

its representation in Asunción (as well as in several other capitals

and major cities).

One year later, Israel also reopened its embassy

in Paraguay, depicting it as an attempt to “make up for a mistake”

made in 2002.

It seemed clear that Paraguay’s strategy was to curb Brazilian

influence in the country by aligning itself with two extra-regional

players that had strained ties with Brazil. While the relationship

between Brasilia and Washington went through one of its most

dramatic periods between 2013 and 2014, thanks to a row over

allegations of U.S. espionage,

ties between Brazil and Israel had

greatly deteriorated after Brazilian criticism over Israel’s military

offensive in Gaza in the summer of 2014 and Rousseff’s silence

over the appointment of former settler leader Dani Dayan as Isra-

el’s ambassador to Brazil in mid-2015.

In July 2016, Cartes became the first Paraguayan president to

pay an official visit to Israel. His three-day trip to Jerusalem was

mostly about trade and cooperation. Agreements signed on secu-

rity and agriculture technologies challenged two areas of consider-

able Brazilian influence over Paraguay.

On top of it, Cartes took

Paraguay.com, “Paraguay reabre embajada en Israel”. 19 May 2014. Available at

http://www.paraguay.com/nacionales/paraguay-reabre-embajada-en-israel-108544

Agencia de Información Paraguaya, “Mercado israelí se mantiene como destino estable

de la carne paraguaya”. 5 November 2018. Available at https://www.ip.gov.py/ip/para-

guay-mantiene-volumen-de-exportacion-de-carne-a-israel/

e Guardian. “Brazilian president: US surveillance a ‘breach of international law’”.

24 September 2013. Avaliable at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/24/bra-

zil-president-un-speech-nsa-surveillance

Hoy, “Intercambio cientíco y de educación con Israel, rman Cartes y Netanyahu”.

19 July 2016. Available at https://www.hoy.com.py/nacionales/intercambio-cient-

co-y-de-educacin-con-israel-rman-cartes-y-netanyahu

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 119

the opportunity to compare the Jewish Holocaust with the alleged

genocide perpetrated by Brazil (and, to a lesser degree, Argentina

and Uruguay) against the Paraguayan population in the war of the

Triple Alliance (1865-1870).

Trump’s election in late 2016 and his pledge to improve re-

lations with Israel through the formal recognition of Jerusalem

as the Israeli capital were seen by Cartes as a unique chance to

further deepen ties with both countries. In September 2017, the

Paraguayan president met with Benjamin Netanyahu in Buenos

Aires, as part of the Israeli prime-minister’s four-day tour in Latin

America.

According to the Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Af-

fairs, Eladio Loizaga, it was Netanyahu who asked for the meeting

with Cartes, who flew to the Argentinian capital especially for the

bilateral event.

On December 21, Paraguay abstained in the vote that con-

demned Trump’s embassy move at the UN General Assembly.

It was one of the earliest signs that Cartes was ready to change

Paraguay’s position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ar-

gentina, Colombia, and Mexico also abstained, as well as many

Central American countries. They all received a public thank you

note from Ambassador Nikki Haley, who said the U.S. appreciat-

ed “these countries for not falling to the irresponsible ways of the

UN.”

On Christmas Eve – less than a week after the UN con-

Infobae, “Horacio Cartes y Benjamin Netanyahu rmaron acuerdos bilaterales en Is-

rael”. 20 July 2016. Available at https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2016/07/20/

horacio-cartes-y-benjamin-netanyahu-rmaron-acuerdos-bilaterales-en-israel/

Middle East Monitor, “Netanyahu begins four-day tour in Latin America”. 11 Sep-

tember 2017. Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170911-netanyahu-be-

gins-four-day-tour-in-latin-america/

La Nación, “Cartes se reúne hoy con Macri y Netanyahu, en Buenos Aires”. 12 Sep-

tember 2017. Available at https://www.lanacion.com.py/politica/2017/09/12/cartes-se-re-

une-hoy-con-macri-y-netanyahu-en-buenos-aires/

https://twitter.com/AmbNikkiHaley/status/943921549333204992

120 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

demnation of the U.S. – President Jimmy Morales announced that

he would also move the Guatemalan embassy to Jerusalem.

Morales’s decision immediately spurred expectations among

Israeli diplomats that other countries, such as Honduras and Para-

guay, would soon follow suit.

That perception was reinforced by

official Israeli sources some months later, which declared that both

countries could move their embassies – but so long as Benjamin

Netanyahu paid them official visits.

As Romania and the Czech

Republic became the first two European countries to manifest their

desire to follow Trump’s steps, Netanyahu doubled the bet and of-

fered a deal to the first 10 countries that moved their embassies to

Jerusalem, granting Israel’s most loyal partners favorable real estate

conditions and preferential diplomatic treatment.

Time was running short for Cartes as presidential elections

approached in Paraguay. Critics such as former foreign minister

Héctor Lacognata claimed that the question of Jerusalem should

be addressed by the new government, as Cartes would not have

enough political legitimacy to move the embassy at the dawn of

his administration.

Moreover, the incumbent president probably

would not have been able to live up to his promise in case the op-

position had won.

YNet News, “Honduras, Paraguay expected to join embassy move to Jerusalem”.

Available at https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5061703,00.html

Aurora, “Honduras y Paraguay están listos para abrir sus embajadas en Jerusalén, si

Netanyahu los visita”. 11 March 2018. Available at http://www.aurora-israel.co.il/hondu-

ras-y-paraguay-estarian-listos-para-abrir-sus-embajadas-en-jerusalen-si-netanyahu-los-visita

El País. “Rumania se suma a la carrera del traslado de embajadas a Jerusalén”. 20

April 2018. Available at https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/04/20/actual-

idad/1524250292_276017.html

HispanTV, “Rechazan traslado de embajada de Paraguay a Al-Quds”. 21 March

2018. Available at https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/paraguay/371925/embajada-jeru-

salen-trump-israel-lacognata

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 121

The election of Mario Abdo Benítez, although a political ri-

val of Cartes within the Colorado party, seemed like the perfect

opportunity for the President to move his agenda forward. On

April 26, three days after the election results, at a ceremony that

celebrated Israel’s 70th anniversary in Asunción, Cartes reinforced

his commitment to moving the Paraguayan embassy to Jerusalem

before the end of his term. Emmanuel Nahshon, spokesman to

the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, received Cartes’s words as

“very positive”, but with some caution.

After all, four months

after Trump’s announcement, only Guatemala had confirmed its

decision, which was scheduled to enter into force one day after the

U.S. opened its Jerusalem embassy.

Paraguay’s decision was further reiterated by foreign minister

Loizaga on May 5. Two days later, Nahshon announced that Cartes

planned to travel to Jerusalem later that month to launch the new

Paraguayan embassy, information that was confirmed by the Is-

raeli ambassador to Paraguay, Ze’ev Harel.

Indeed, on May 21

– a week after Israel’s 70th anniversary – President Cartes flew to

Jerusalem and stated that the decision of opening the embassy ex-

pressed “the sincere friendship and the utter solidarity of Paraguay

toward Israel.” Netanyahu, who attended the ceremony, thanked

Paraguay for taking brave steps to “debunk numerous lies against

Israel” and to support it in international organizations.

ABC Color, “Israel valora con positiva cautela la declaración de Cartes”. 29 April

2018. Available at http://www.abc.com.py/internacionales/israel-valora-con-positiva-caute-

la-declaracion-paraguaya-de-traslado-embajada-1698109.html

El Comércio, “Israel: Paraguay trasladará su embajada a Jerusalén este mês”. 7 May

2018. Available at https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/diplomacia/israel-paraguay-trasladara-em-

bajada-jerusalen-mes-noticia-518374

Ultima Hora, “Cartes inaugura Embajada em Jerusalén pese a críticas internas”. 21

May 2018. Available at https://www.ultimahora.com/cartes-inaugura-embajada-jeru-

salen-pese-criticas-internas-n1148752.html

122 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

THE ROLLBACK OF PARAGUAY’S DECISION

Critics abroad immediately slammed Cartes’s decision. When Par-

aguay confirmed the move on May 7, Palestinian President Mah-

moud Abbas said, at a bilateral meeting with Nicolás Maduro in

Caracas, that he hoped no country in the Americas would follow

Trump’s steps as it ran counter to international legal obligations.

The day before the embassy launch, senior Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO) official Hanan Ashrawi reinforced Abbas’s

words and called the Paraguayan move “provocative and irresponsi-

ble.”

Her position was seconded by Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Sec-

retary-General of the Arab League, who also warned that the move

would have a negative impact on ties between Paraguay and the

Arab world, which could include political and economic measures.

Opposition politicians attacked Cartes on similar grounds.

Frente Guasú, led by former President Fernando Lugo, issued a

statement calling the President’s decision “irresponsible.” Senator

Desirée Masi of Partido Democrátrico Progresista (PDP) tweeted

that “fanaticism, ignorance, and likely bribery along the way have

put Paraguay in the middle of an international conflict.”

The reference to bribery alluded to the relationship between

the Paraguayan president and two controversial figures, Darío

Messer and Ari Harow. Messer, known in Brazil as ‘the master

DW, “Abbas pide desde Caracas no trasladar las embajadas a Jerusalén”. 7 May

2018. Available at https://www.dw.com/es/abbas-pide-desde-caracas-no-trasladar-las-em-

bajadas-a-jerusal%C3%A9n/a-43693843

UOL, “OLP critica abertura de embaixada do Paraguai em Jerusalém”. 20 May 2018.

Available at https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/efe/2018/05/20/olp-critica-abertu-

ra-de-embaixada-do-paraguai-em-jerusalem-provocadora.htm

Xinhua Net, “Arab League chief slams opening of Paraguay’s embassy in Jerusalem”. 22

May 2018. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/22/c_137195870.htm

Paraguay.com. “Castiglioni sobre embajada en Israel: Cartes debía hablar com Marito”.

15 May 2018. Available at http://www.paraguay.com/nacionales/castiglioni-sobre-embaja-

da-en-israel-cartes-debia-hablar-con-marito-177862

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 123

black-market dollar dealer’ for his involvement in corruption scan-

dals brought to light by the Car Wash graft probe, is sought by

Interpol and moved to Paraguay in 2014 to dodge investigations.

Considered a ‘soul brother’ by Cartes thanks to long-standing fam-

ily ties, Messer accompanied the President in his official trip to

Israel and is said to have benefitted from presidential decrees on

real estate, which sparked criticism from opponents and supporters

on the eve of the 2018 race.

Five years before, back when Cartes decided to run for pres-

ident, it was the Brazilian dollar dealer who called Ari Harow,

former Netanyahu’s bureau chief, asking him to talk to the Para-

guayan businessman and help “instill a warm place in Horacio’s

heart for the State of Israel.”

Harow’s consultancy firm H3 Glob-

al advised Cartes during the campaign and after his election in

2013, and he is said to have played a decisive role – together with

two other former Netanyahu advisers, Yechiel Leiter and general

Meir Kalifi – in the rapprochement between Paraguay and Isra-

el.

According to one account, Harow – who became Netanyahu’s

chief of staff in 2014 – was responsible for the decision to reopen

the Israeli embassy in Asunción, which ran counter to the profes-

sional recommendation of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

El País, “Dario Messer, o doleiro de todas as corrupções no Brasil e protegido pelo

presidente do Paraguai”, 4 May 2018. https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/05/03/po-

litica/1525376638_429844.html

Ari Harow, “e Backdrop of Paraguay’s Move to Jerusalem”. Jerusalem Post, 10

May 2018. https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/e-backdrop-of-Paraguays-move-to-Jeru-

salem-556133

ABC Color, “El presidente Cartes y sus asesores israelíes”. 21 May 2018. http://www.

abc.com.py/nacionales/cartes-y-sus-asesores-israelies-1704715.html

Iton Gadol, “Las relaciones Israel-Paraguay y el hombre de conanza de Netanyahu”.

13 March 2017. http://itongadol.com.ar/noticias/val/103069/las-relaciones-israel-para-

guay-y-el-hombre-de-conanza-de-netanyahu.html

124 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

When the Paraguayan president arrived in Jerusalem in mid-

2016, Harow was under house arrest on bribery charges. A year

later, he became a state witness in two corruption cases against

prime-minister Netanyahu.

The incoming government also showed its discomfort with

the embassy move. President-elect Abdo Benítez complained nu-

merous times that he had not been consulted on such a sensitive

issue.

His foreign minister, Colorado senator Luis Castiglioni, af-

firmed that Cartes’s ‘unilateral’ decision undermined the geopolit-

ical balance in the Middle East, as well as Paraguay’s relations with

both Israel and the Arab world. Asked whether they would back off

on the embassy transfer, Castiglioni said it was too early to tell.

Along the same lines, Abdo Benitez pled for caution and said that

despite Israel being “a good friend” of Paraguay, the new govern-

ment would maturely analyze the decision and eventually reverse

it.

In an interview that followed the embassy move, Cartes said he

hoped his successor maintained the decision and underlined that

he did not have to consult anybody because it was a ‘constitutional

prerogative’ of the Paraguayan president.

However, it would be just a matter of time before the new

president reversed the embassy move. On September 5, less than

Haaretz, “Paraguay Ocially Moves Embassy to Jerusalem”. 21 May 2018. Avail-

able at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/after-the-u-s-guatemala-paraguayan-embas-

sy-to-move-to-jerusalem-1.6099346

Times of Israel, “Paraguay becomes third country to open embassy in Jerusalem”. 21

May 2018. Available at https://www.timesosrael.com/paraguay-becomes-third-coun-

try-to-open-embassy-in-jerusalem/

ABC Color, “Traslado de la Embajada en Israel genera malestar”. 9 May 2018.

ABC Color, “Abdo quiere rever el traslado de la Embajada a Jerusalén”. 16 May 2018.

MSN Notícias, “Cartes cree que sucesor mantendrá embajada en Jerusalén pero no lo

consensuó”. 22 May 2018. Available at https://www.msn.com/pt-br/noticias/brasil/cartes-

cree-que-sucesor-mantendr%C3%A1-embajada-en-jerusal%C3%A9n-pero-no-lo-consen-

su%C3%B3/vp-AAxCN7Y

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 125

a month after being sworn in, the Paraguayan government issued

a statement saying the embassy would return to its previous loca-

tion in Tel Aviv. Reactions were immediate: a few hours after the

announcement, Netanyahu gave orders to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs to close down the Israeli embassy in Asunción. In a state-

ment, the Israeli government claimed it viewed “with utmost grav-

ity the decision by Paraguay, which will cloud bilateral relations.”

At a news conference on that same day, Abdo Benítez regretted

Israel’s decision and pictured the reaction as ‘exaggerated’, urging

Israeli authorities to reconsider.

Pressure also came from Washington. U.S. Vice President

Mike Pence promptly called the new Paraguayan president to

discuss the embassy question. According to an official statement,

Pence strongly encouraged Abdo Benítez “to follow through with

Paraguay’s previous commitment to move the embassy as a sign of

the historic relationship the country has maintained with both Israel

and the United States.”

Abdo Benítez defended his position on

Twitter: “Paraguay is a country of principles. The spirit of the de-

cision is that the people of Israel and Palestine reach a broad, just,

and lasting peace. We will always respect international law.”

Meanwhile, the Palestinians cheered Paraguay’s decision and

tried to take some credit for the move by calling it a “Palestinian dip-

e Times of Israel, “Paraguay urges Israel to reverse ‘exaggerated’ Asuncion embassy

closure”. 7 September 2018. Available at https://www.timesosrael.com/paraguay-urges-isra-

el-to-reverse-exaggerated-asuncion-embassy-closure/

e White House, “Readout of Vice President Mike Pence’s Call with President Mario

Abdo Benitez of Paraguay”. 6 September 2018. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/

briengs-statements/readout-vice-president-mike-pences-call-president-mario-abdo-beni-

tez-paraguay/

BBC Mundo, “Paraguay regresa su embajada en Israel a Tel Aviv tras el polémico

trasladado a Jerusalén”. 5 September 2018. Available at https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noti-

cias-america-latina-45427674

126 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

lomatic achievement.”

Palestinian foreign minister Riyad al-Maliki

had attended Abdo’s inauguration and had met with Abdo Benítez

some weeks before and was said to have “exerted a big effort during

his meeting with the new president who instructed his foreign min-

ister to arrange the issue.”

Both Palestine and Turkey declared they

would open up embassies in Asunción. In early December, Turk-

ish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a historic one-day visit

to Paraguay in his return from the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires,

following the launch of the Turkish embassy.

Six months later, Par-

aguay reciprocated the gesture and opened its embassy in Ankara

The costs of moving away from Israel were allayed somewhat by the

renewed ties with the Arab and Muslim world.

Paraguay’s unprecedented diplomatic backtrack may be ex-

plained by its weakly institutionalized foreign policymaking struc-

ture. In this case, an individual decision made by Cartes – influ-

enced not just by geopolitical considerations, but also by personal

relationships – had the power to overrule longtime positions and

provoke policy turnarounds. The timing of the move made it rela-

tively easy for the new president, Abdo Benítez, to change his mind

and affirm himself not only as independent from his forerunner,

but also as a champion of new economic opportunities for Paraguay.

For a detailed account, see Al-Monitor, “Behind Paraguay’s decision to return its em-

bassy to Tel Aviv”. 10 September 2018. Available at https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig-

inals/2018/09/palestine-paraguay-emabassy-jerusalem-tel-aviv.html

e Telegraph, “Paraguay frustrates Israel by moving embassy from Jerusalem back to

Tel Aviv”. 6 September 2018. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/06/

paraguay-frustrates-israel-moving-embassy-jerusalem-back-tel/

Mercopress, “Turkey, Paraguay close ties with presidential meeting in Asunción”. 3

December 2018. Available at https://en.mercopress.com/2018/12/03/turkey-para-

guay-close-ties-with-presidential-meeting-in-asuncion

Anadolu Agency, “Paraguay opens its rst embassy in Turkey”. 2 May 2019. https://

www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/paraguay-opens-its-rst-embassy-in-turkey/1468334

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 127

BRAZIL: TRADITION ABOVE POLITICS?

The Brazilian case is more complex, mainly because of Brazil’s

long-standing diplomatic positions regarding the Israeli-Palestin-

ian conflict. When President Trump announced he would move

the U.S. embassy, Brazil’s reaction was immediate and swift. On

that same day, the country issued a press release reinforcing its un-

derstanding that the final status of Jerusalem “should be defined

in negotiations that ensure the establishment of two states living

in peace and security within internationally recognized borders

and with free access to the holy sites of the three monotheistic

religions, in the terms of the United Nations Security Council

Resolutions, such as Resolution 478 of 1980, among others.”

The very same text was reiterated on December 29, a few days af-

ter Brazil had voted in favor of the UNGA resolution condemning

Trump’s decision.

The Brazilian government’s position was all but surprising.

Brazil has historically been one of the staunchest advocates of the

two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was a Bra-

zilian diplomat, Oswaldo Aranha, who put the 1947 UN Partition

Plan for Palestine to a vote as the acting president of the General

Assembly. Brazil also sponsored Security Council Resolution 242,

which urged Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the

Six-Day War of 1967. Even Lula’s Workers’ Party, often accused

of taking sides with Israel’s enemies, maintained Brazil’s stance on

the need for two states. While Lula recognized Palestinian sover-

eignty and signed a controversial fuel-swap agreement with Tehran

Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Aairs, “Press Release no. 409”. 7 December 2017.

Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/18038-press-release-palestine

Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Aairs, “Status of Jerusalem Press Release no. 427”. 29

December 2017. Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/18140-sta-

tus-of-jerusalem

128 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

in 2010, trade relations with the Israelis reached an all-time peak,

as Brazil brokered negotiations for a free-trade agreement between

Mercosur and Israel.

Relations with the Israeli government have been strained since

2014, when the infamous ‘diplomatic dwarf’ crisis took place. The

episode was named after the nickname given to Brazil by Yigal Pal-

mor, spokesman for Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response

to the Rousseff administration’s criticism of the Israeli attacks on

Gaza as ‘disproportionate.’

Bilateral misunderstandings continued for the rest of Rous-

seff’s term and involved a diplomatic row around the appointment

of settler leader Dani Dayan as ambassador to Brasilia, whom the

Brazilian government refused to accept by keeping silent over his

name. While many assumed that Brazil’s refusal had to do with

the fact that Dayan represented illegal settlements in the West

Bank, which ran counter to Brazil’s diplomatic principles of the

rule of international law and Palestinian right to self-determina-

tion, Itamaraty’s official position was that they could not accede

to Dayan’s nomination because Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu had done it on his social networks, not through the

formal diplomatic means.

Casarões, Guilherme; Vigevani, Tullo. “O lugar de Israel e da Palestina na política ex-

terna brasileira: antissemitismo, voto majoritário ou promotor da paz?”. História, vol. 33, no.

2, 2014, pp. 150-188.

On July 17, 2014, as Israel launched a ground operation into Gaza, the Rousse ad-

ministration promptly issued a press release condemning the military action as ‘dispropor-

tionate’ and pulling out its ambassador from Tel Aviv for ‘consultation’. Yigal Palmor,

spokesman for Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Aairs, called Brazil a ‘diplomatic dwarf’, whose

‘moral relativism’ made it ‘an irrelevant partner’. Palmor even brought up Brazil’s humiliating

defeat in the World Cup (7-1 to Germany) to lecture Brazilians on ‘disproportionate results’.

While many brushed o the outspoken tone as evidence of Israel’s diplomatic truculence, the

message resounded loudly through the Brazilian government and triggered a crisis between

both countries. See Guilherme Casarões, “Who’s Afraid of the Diplomatic Dwarf?”. Open

Global Rights, 22 August 2014.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 129

In any case, by the end of Rousseff’s term, tensions with Israel

had mobilized important sectors of the Brazilian Jewish communi-

ty, of Evangelical Christians and of the Armed Forces against the

government. Evangelical groups – and particularly neo-Pentecostals

– have become the voice of Israel and of the Netanyahu adminis-

tration, not rarely opposing Brazil’s foreign policy positions.

The

explanation lies in a phenomenon called Christian Zionism, which

refers to the relentless defense of Israel – and the recognition of the

Holy City of Jerusalem as Israel’s ‘complete and united’ capital – as

part of the biblical prophecy of the second coming of Christ.

On the other hand, groups that maintained economic ties with

Israel, especially in high-tech sectors, started to fear that diplomat-

ic tensions could jeopardize the purchase of strategic components.

Having many defense contracts with Israeli military giants, the

Brazilian Airforce, for instance, did not hide their dissatisfaction

with President Rousseff as the Dayan crisis unfolded. That explains

former Foreign and Defense minister Celso Amorim’s public crit-

icism of Brazil’s growing dependence on Israeli avionics

- which

was somehow ironic, for most contracts had been signed during his

tenure at the Ministry of Defense.

In May 2016, as José Serra took office as Foreign Minister

after Rousseff’s impeachment trial, he immediately made a U-turn

regarding Israel. In a quite unusual statement, Itamaraty threat-

ened to change a pro-Palestinian vote at UNESCO that Brazil had

See, for instance, this article published by three prominent Evangelical politicians.

Crivella, Marcelo; Pereira, Marcos; Siqueira, Carlos. “Recusar Embaixador de Israel não é a

Solução”. Folha de São Paulo, 5 January 2016.

Folha de S. Paulo, “Veto a embaixador expõe dependência da Defesa com Israel, diz

Amorim”. 25 December 2015. Available at https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mun-

do/2015/12/1722979-veto-a-embaixador-expoe-dependencia-da-defesa-com-israel-diz-am-

orim.shtml

130 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

cast a few months before in case the organization did not revise the

terms of the resolution, which were considered ‘partial and unbal-

anced.’

Sometime later, Serra took a trip to Israel for the funeral

of former President Shimon Peres – but unlike his predecessors

(and successor), he did not visit any Arab country.

All these moves were part of a calculated decision of getting

closer to Israel for electoral purposes, which can be seen not only

in Serra’s desire of rooting out PT’s influence in foreign affairs,

but also in the São Paulo PSDB branch’s proximity with the local

Jewish community, whose institutions had long expressed their

desire for ‘normal’ relations with Israel,

and particularly in the

growing influence of Evangelical voters and leadership, who often

treated ties with Israel as sacred and biblical, as game-changers of

Brazilian elections.

Reality, however, has quickly imposed itself upon Serra’s Mid-

east plans. Realizing that the pro-Israel stance could risk Brazil’s

historically positive relations with the Arab world, President Temer

prevented Serra from changing the Brazilian diplomacy’s tradition-

al positions on Palestine in international organizations. That was,

to be sure, an unlikely tug of war between the president and the

foreign minister.

Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Decisão do Conselho Executivo da UNESCO

sobre o patrimônio cultural nos territórios ocupados”. 9 June 2016. Available at http://www.

itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/14191-decisao-do-conselho-executivo-da-un-

esco-sobre-o-patrimonio-cultural-nos-territorios-ocupados

Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Visita do ministro José Serra a Israel”. 30 de se-

tembro de 2016. Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-impren-

sa/14809-visita-do-ministro-jose-serra-a-israel

Federação Israelita do Rio Grande do Sul, “Com Alckmin, Serra e ministros da Justiça

e Educação, Conib homenageia Natan Sharansky”. 25 November 2016. Available at https://

www.firs.org.br/com-alckmin-serra-e-ministros-da-justica-e-educacao-conib-homenage-

ia-natan-sharansky/

is information was conrmed by a Brazilian diplomat in a private conversation on

16 June 2016.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 131

Besides the potential of political damage at the heart of the

government, the president’s decision to keep Brazil’s status quo on

Palestine came under heavy fire from the Brazilian Israelite Con-

federation (CONIB),

from prominent figures of the Jewish com-

munity, such as businessman Alexandre Nigri,

and from Evangel-

ical congresspeople, who even sent a rejection motion against the

government.

Naturally, Israel also expressed its disgust at Brazil’s

position. In Benjamin Netanyahu’s Latin America tour, in Septem-

ber 2017, he skipped Brazil under the justification that he could

not be certain, at the time the trip was planned, that President

Temer would remain in office, given the mounting corruption

charges against him and his closest ministers.

Aloysio Nunes’s tenure recovered a more balanced direction to

Brazil’s position. His decision to make an official visit to Israel in

March 2018 appeased some sectors of the Brazilian Jewry. CONIB

– whose president, Fernando Lottenberg, attended the foreign min-

ister’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu – obtained

Itamaraty’s commitment not to vote automatically against Israel in

international forums, which was portrayed as a ‘historic step.’

O Estado de S. Paulo, “Conib lamenta voto do Brasil em resolução da UNESCO”. 14

October 2016. Available at https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,conib-lamen-

ta-voto-do-brasil-em-resolucao-da-unesco-sobre-jerusalem,10000082169

Nigri, Alexandre. “O Brasil contra Israel e a história na Unesco”. Gazeta do Povo, 21

October 2016. Avaliable at https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/opiniao/artigos/obrasil-con-

tra-israel-e-a-historia-na-unesco-51w0dqd9y95xyy19dn8whqvdz/

Gospel Prime, “Deputados evangélicos repudiam voto brasileiro contra Israel”. 16

May 2017. Available at https://noticias.gospelprime.com.br/deputados-evangelicos-mo-

cao-voto-brasileiro-israel/

Casarões, Guilherme; Goldfeld, Monique. “Em Giro Latino, Netanyahu se esquiva de

política do Brasil”. Folha de S. Paulo, 16 September 2017.

Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo. “Visita de Aloysio Nunes a Israel tem al-

cance histórico”. 7 March 2018. Available at https://www.sesp.org.br/2018/03/07/visi-

ta-de-aloysio-nunes-a-israel-tem-alcance-historico/

132 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

Evangelical Christians, on the other hand, remained harsh

critics of Brazil’s position, not just because the Temer administra-

tion never challenged the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign

state, but also because there was no sign that Brazil would move

its embassy to Jerusalem, along the lines of President Trump’s an-

nouncement of December 2017. Congressman Victório Galli, one

of the most outspoken members of the evangelical caucus, attacked

Nunes as a ‘Marxist’ who obstructed the improvement of Brazil’s

relations with Israel. “We must join the Trump administration and

recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.”

THE GAME-CHANGER: JAIR BOLSONARO

As the October 2018 general elections approached in Brazil, one

presidential candidate stepped under the spotlight with a contro-

versial foreign policy platform. Retired Army captain Jair Bolson-

aro promised a diplomatic about-face regarding Brazil’s relations

with two key countries: The United States and Israel. Bolsonaro

never hid his admiration for Trump and always made clear that he

wanted to reproduce the US president’s electoral tactics and dis-

course, as well as his international strategy. His expressed desire to

become best friends with the US even rendered him the nickname

“Trump of the tropics.”

Israel also became part of Bolsonaro’s electoral strategy. The

most obvious target was the Evangelical vote. Almost two years

before launching his candidacy, in May 2016 the then-lawmaker

Gospel Prime, “Líderes evangélicos querem que Brasil transra embaixada em Israel

para Jerusalém”. 7 December 2017. Available at https://noticias.gospelprime.com.br/lide-

res-querem-que-brasil-transra-embaixada-em-israel-para-jerusalem/

e Guardian, “Trump of the tropics: the ‘dangerous’ candidate leading Brazil’s presi-

dential race”. 19 April 2018. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/19/

jair-bolsonaro-brazil-presidential-candidate-trump-parallels

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 133

traveled to Israel as part of a congressional delegation to learn about

irrigation and defense technology. Bolsonaro took the opportunity

to be baptized in the Jordan river by the hands of the president of

his own party at the time, the Social Christian Party, who is also a

well-known Evangelical pastor.

In the months that followed, he

made an effort to associate himself with an imaginary Israel, one of

conservative religious and political values, represented by the flag

of Israel waving side by side with the Brazilian one at all his rallies.

Bolsonaro’s declared love for Israel explains why, in virtually

every church Bolsonaro campaigned, he vowed to move Brazil’s

embassy to Jerusalem. His promise also helped him strengthen

ties with important sectors of the Jewish community, fueled by a

strong anti-PT sentiment and excited to have an openly pro-Israel

candidate. “His victory in the first round made us very joyful and

hopeful due to his friendship, love and bonds not only with the

State of Israel but with the whole Jewish people. He will be a great

president by having Jewish ethics and morals as his pillars,” said

Rio Jewish Federation President Ary Bergher.

Pleasing Evangelical and Jewish communities was not the only

goal of Bolsonaro’s pro-Israel stance. Much like the role played by

Steve Bannon in Trump’s campaign, Bolsonaro’s political positions

were shaped by a group of radical nationalists, or the so-called an-

ti-globalists. Inspired by the ideas of writer and self-proclaimed

philosopher Olavo de Carvalho, Brazil’s anti-globalists saw Israel

as the heart of a whole new foreign policy strategy for two reasons.

Extra, “Enquanto votação do impeachment acontecia, Bolsonaro era batizado em Is-

rael”. 12 May 2016. Available at https://extra.globo.com/noticias/brasil/enquanto-vota-

cao-do-impeachment-acontecia-bolsonaro-era-batizado-em-israel-19287802.html

e Jerusalem Post, “Far-right pro-Israel candidate wins rst round of Brazil’s elec-

tions”. 10 October 2018. Available at https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Far-right-pro-Israel-

candidate-wins-rst-round-of-Brazils-elections-569029

134 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

First, Netanyahu is seen as a key member of the emerging far-right

nationalist movement, having become a role-model regarding “the

resistance against the unwanted interference of globalists in coun-

try’s national sovereignties.”

Second, courting Israel would help Brazil strengthen its rela-

tionship with the U.S. on their common path towards saving the

West and its Judeo-Christian tradition. That was the argument put

forth by ambassador Ernesto Araújo in a controversial 2017 arti-

cle, which many believed led Bolsonaro to appoint him as foreign

minister.

On the way into becoming Brazil’s ‘tropical Trump’, the

day after Trump’s announcement of the embassy move, Bolsonaro

said in an interview that he would “do a Ctrl+C and Ctrl+V” of the

American president’s decree.

Mimicking the great neighbor of the

North would become part of a renewed Brazilian identity. Seeking

to reverse Lula’s foreign policy legacy, Bolsonaro also pledged to

break off with Palestine. “Is Palestine a country? Palestine is not a

country, so there should be no embassy here. You do not negotiate

with terrorists,” he said in an interview.

Bolsonaro’s election triggered immediate responses from

around the world. Conservative leaders as Trump, Netanyahu, and

Italy’s vice-premier Matteo Salvini publicly expressed their support

for the new Brazilian president. “Diplomatic dwarfism now be-

longs to the past,” celebrated Filipe Martins, Bolsonaro’s foreign

Martins, Filipe G. “A luta anti-globalista e o exemplo paradigmático de Israel”. Senso

Incomum. 8 December 2017. Available at http://sensoincomum.org/2017/12/08/anti-glo-

balista-exemplo-de-israel/

Araújo, Ernesto. “Trump e o Ocidente”. Cadernos de Política Exterior, vol. 3, no. 6, 2017.

Meio Retrô, “Conrmado: Jair Bolsonaro apoia Jerusalém como Capital de Israel”.

YouTube vídeo. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hy4QrPOIVSI

O Estado de S. Paulo, “Bolsonaro promete retirar embaixada da Palestina do Brasil”.

7 August 2018. Available at https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,bolsonaro-prom-

ete-retirar-embaixada-da-palestina-no-brasil,70002436161

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 135

policy advisor and an unwavering anti-globalist. In an interview

with Israel Hayom the day after his victory, the president-elect re-

inforced his commitment to move the Brazilian embassy to Jeru-

salem and said he would shut down the Palestinian embassy and

change Brazil’s voting pattern on Israel at the United Nations. On

Twitter, prime-minister Netanyahu congratulated Bolsonaro for

such bold promises – “a historic, correct and exciting step!”

Reactions across the Arab world were immediate. Hanan

Ashrawi, a lawmaker at the Palestinian National Council, called

Bolsonaro’s embassy decision ‘provocative and illegal.’

Hamas’s

spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said it was a “hostile step towards the

Palestinian people, the Arab and Islamic nations.”

In the days that

followed, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Coop-

eration, as well as the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,

issued statements condemning the move. Less than a week after

Bolsonaro’s victory, Egypt called off an official visit by a Brazilian

delegation of businesspeople and politicians, led by foreign minis-

ter Nunes, apparently out of disgust with the embassy promise.

Getting closer to Israel by offering the recognition of Jerusa-

lem, however, was not a consensus even among Bolsonaro’s closest

allies. The military, in particular, expressed their concern with the

political effects of the decision of moving the embassy. A few days

after the elections, vice-president-elect, retired general Hamilton

Mourão, said in an interview that the new government should be

https://twitter.com/netanyahu/status/1058230060988022786

Isto É, “Palestinos atacam decisão de Bolsonaro sobre Jerusalém”. 2 November 2018.

Available at https://istoe.com.br/palestinos-atacam-decisao-de-bolsonaro-sobre-jerusalem/

https://twitter.com/DSZuhri/status/1058232515603775488

Folha de S. Paulo, “Declaração de Bolsonaro faz Egito cancelar viagem de comitiva

brasileira”. 5 November 2018. Available at https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2018/11/

apos-declaracoes-de-bolsonaro-egito-cancela-viagem-de-comitiva-brasileira.shtml

136 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

cautious not to take sides on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or else

could become target of international religious terrorist groups.

The good working relationship between the military and Ita-

maraty’s diplomats also brought concerns among the government’s

generals that the break with Brazil’s traditional diplomatic posi-

tions, which included the utter respect for UNSC resolutions on

Jerusalem, could put the country’s international credibility at risk.

The agribusiness sector, a first-hour supporter of Bolsonaro’s

candidacy, was particularly dismayed by the embassy promise.

Even before being appointed as Agriculture Minister, former con-

gresswoman and leader of the agribusiness caucus Tereza Cristina

voiced her concern that an Arab retaliation would be devastating

for the entire sector.

After all, Brazil is the world’s leading pro-

ducer and exporter of halal meat and accumulates massive trade

surpluses with the Arabs.

In the last 15 years, Brazilian halal beef

and chicken exports skyrocketed from USD 706 million (2003)

to 3.65 billion (2017). In 2017 alone, Brazil supplied the 22 Arab

countries with 51.9 percent of their total animal protein imports.

Nevertheless, commodity trade was just a part of an even-greater

trade surplus of more than USD 7 billion in that same year, which

Folha de S. Paulo, “Não é o caso de comprar brigas que não podemos vencer, diz Ham-

ilton Mourão”. 23 November 2018. Available at https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/11/

nao-e-o-caso-de-comprar-brigas-que-nao-podemos-vencer-diz-hamilton-mourao.shtml

DW, “Reações árabes preocupam, diz líder da bancada ruralista”. 6 November 2018.

Available at https://www.dw.com/pt-br/rea%C3%A7%C3%B5es-%C3%A1rabes-preocu-

pam-diz-l%C3%ADder-da-bancada-ruralista/a-46182657

Hannun, Rubens. “Nosso país sempre atuou pela resolução de conitos”. Folha de S.

Paulo, 10 November 2018.

Época Negócios. “A aproximação entre Bolsonaro e Israel pode afetar o mercado bil-

ionário de carne halal no Brasil?”. 30 March 2019. Available at https://epocanegocios.globo.

com/Economia/noticia/2019/03/aproximacao-entre-bolsonaro-e-israel-pode-afetar-o-mer-

cado-bilionario-de-carne-halal-no-brasil.html

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 137

also included manufactured goods such as medical equipment and

civilian aircraft.

Anti-globalists and evangelicals, on the other hand, kept pres-

suring Bolsonaro for moving the embassy as soon as he took office.

They were behind Netanyahu’s decision to visit Brazil for Bolson-

aro’s inauguration, on January 1st. The former, represented by

Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, held a number of meetings with

Israeli ambassador to Brazil, Yossi Shelley – all made public on

social networks

, including one in which representative Bolsonaro

was awarded an Israeli medal of honor

– and reiterated Brazil’s

commitment to the embassy move.

As for the latter, on the eve of

the presidential inauguration ceremony, the Israeli prime-minister

met with Christian leaders and underpinned his commitment to

protect Christian interests: “We have no better friends in the world

than the Evangelical community. And the Evangelical community

has no better friend than the state of Israel.”

As the Brazilian president was sworn in, Netanyahu declared

that Brazil and Israel had just ushered in a new era of relations and

were off to a magnificent start.

Although the Israeli prime-min-

ister has never treated the recognition of Jerusalem as a precondi-

Goulart, Josette. “Fazendo a egípcia”. Revista Piauí, 14 November 2018. Available at

https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/fazendo-a-egipcia/

https://twitter.com/bolsonarosp/status/1013774870088421376

https://twitter.com/BolsonaroSP/status/1070805289853743107

Poder 360, “Mudança de embaixada em Israel está decidida, diz Eduardo Bolsonaro”.

27 November 2018. Available at https://www.poder360.com.br/governo/mudanca-de-em-

baixada-em-israel-esta-decidida-diz-eduardo-bolsonaro/

Agência Brasil. “Netanyahu diz que evangélicos são melhores amigos de Israel”. 30

December 2018. Available at http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2018-12/net-

anyahu-diz-que-evangelicos-sao-os-melhores-amigos-de-israel

UOL, “Netanyahu diz que Brasil e Israel iniciam “nova era” após posse de Bolsonaro”.

1 January 2019. Available at https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/efe/2019/01/01/

netanyahu-diz-que-brasil-e-israel-iniciam-nova-era-apos-posse-de-bolsonaro.htm

138 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

tion for improving relations with Israel,

he seemed eager for the

embassy move and decided to turn it into a fait accompli. Besides

attending Bolsonaro’s inauguration, an unprecedented gesture by

an Israeli acting premier, Netanyahu promptly sent a 130-member

rescue team to Brazil to help with rescue efforts following the col-

lapse of a tailings dam in Brumadinho, in the southeastern state

of Minas Gerais, which left more than 200 dead in late January

2019.

While many hailed Israel’s humanitarian aid as part of a

renewed relationship with Brazil

, critics belittled it as a ‘publicity

stunt,’ aimed at boosting personal ties between Bolsonaro and Ne-

tanyahu, as well as their nationalist-conservative agendas.

Bolsonaro’s promises also became vital for Netanyahu as elec-

tions approached in Israel. Ever since Trump announced the em-

bassy move, the Israeli premier, whose reelection bid was largely

based on breaking Israel’s diplomatic isolation, launched a cam-

paign for the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Hoping

that Brazil’s decision would spark a wave of pro-Israel positions

across Latin America,

Bibi strategically invited the Brazilian pres-

ident for a state visit to occur just days before the vote.

e case of the relationship between Israel and India is very eloquent in this regard.

See Burton, Guy. “Explaining India’s position on Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian con-

ict”. Middle East Institute, 13 March 2018. Available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/

explaining-indias-position-jerusalem-and-israeli-palestinian-conict

e Times of Israel, “Israel sends rescue team, aid to Brazil following dam collapse”.

27 January 2019. Available at https://www.timesosrael.com/israel-to-send-rescue-team-aid-

to-brazil-following-dam-collapse/

Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Aairs. “Collapse of the tailings dam in Brumadinho”.

Press release no. 25. 27 January 2019. Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-re-

leases/20005-r

Middle East Monitor. “A single Latu cartoon has provoked Israel into exposing its own

duplicity”. 5 February 2019. Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190205-a-

single-latu-cartoon-has-provoked-israel-into-exposing-its-own-duplicity/

Atlantic Council. “Israel’s Latin America Push”. 8 April 2019. Available at https://

www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/israel-s-latin-america-push

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 139

THE COMPROMISE:

BOLSONARO’S JERUSALEM TRIP

The decision of whether to move the Brazilian embassy had not

been made until Bolsonaro arrived in Jerusalem, on March 31.

There were high hopes that the Brazilian president would an-

nounce the transfer during the state visit. All signs pointed to it:

in the weeks before the trip, the anti-globalist foreign policy team

– foreign minister Araújo, international advisor Martins, and con-

gressman Eduardo Bolsonaro – turned down two invitations for

the President to meet with his Palestinian counterpart, Mahmoud

Abbas.

Brazil also changed its voting pattern towards the Israe-

li-Palestinian conflict at the UN Human Rights Council, aligning

itself with Washington and Tel Aviv in an attempt to do away with

an ‘unjust and spurious’ tradition of taking sides with Arabs and

Palestinians, in the foreign minister’s own words.

Instead, in a joint statement with prime-minister Netanyahu,

Bolsonaro announced the opening of an office in Jerusalem “for

the promotion of trade, investment, technology and innovation.”

Given that it lacked diplomatic status, the Brazilian office was no

different from the Czech House, launched in November 2018,

or from the Australian trade and defense office, opened ‘without

is information was conrmed by a Brazilian diplomat in a private conversation on

31 March 2019.

Bloomberg, “Palestinian Leader Invites Brazil’s Pro-Israel Leader to Visit”. 19 March

2019. Available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-19/palestinian-lead-

er-invites-brazil-s-pro-israel-leader-to-visit

https://twitter.com/ernestofaraujo/status/1109093954933403650

Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Aairs, “Joint Declaration on the occasion of the O-

cial Visit of President Jair Bolsonaro to Israel”. Press release no. 81. March 31, 2019. Avail-

able at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/20236-joint-declaration-on-the-occa-

sion-of-the-ocial-visit-of-president-jair-bolsonaro-to-israel-march-31-2019

e Times of Israel, “Czech House, feted as ‘rst step’ in embassy move, opens in Je-

rusalem”. 27 November 2018. Available at https://www.timesosrael.com/czech-house-fet-

ed-as-rst-step-in-embassy-move-opens-in-jerusalem/

140 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

fanfare’ a few days before Bolsonaro’s visit

. But it was certainly

not as ambitious as Hungary’s trade office, inaugurated in mid-

March 2019, which was promoted as a ‘branch’ of the Hungarian

embassy in Tel Aviv and a clear step towards the full recognition of

Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

That was a frustrating moment for Netanyahu, who wanted

the Brazilian president to work as his pitchman a week before the

Knesset elections. “I hope, one day, that the Embassy of Brazil will

arrive in Jerusalem,” said the Israeli premier.

Bolsonaro made

no mention of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital either, al-

though his visit to the Wailing Wall – another unprecedented ges-

ture, given that foreign authorities usually avoid including the Old

City in their official itinerary, let alone accompanied by the sitting

prime-minister

– and the references to the historical bonds be-

tween Jerusalem and the Jewish people

100

could be interpreted as

a tacit recognition of Israel’s claims. Despite reiterated promises

that the embassy move would just be a ‘matter of time,’

101

how-

e Times of Israel, “Without fanfare, Australia opens trade and defense oce in Je-

rusalem”. 29 April 2019. Available at https://www.timesosrael.com/without-fanfare-austra-

lia-opens-trade-and-defense-oce-in-jerusalem/

e Times of Israel, “In rst for EU state, Hungary opens diplomatic trade oce in

Jerusalem”. 19 March 2019. Available at https://www.timesosrael.com/in-rst-for-eu-state-

hungary-open-diplomatic-trade-oce-in-jerusalem/

e Rio Times, “Bolsonaro Announces Opening of Representation Oce in Jeru-

salem”. 1 April 2019. Available at https://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/bol-

sonaro-announces-opening-of-representation-oce-in-jerusalem/

e Santiago Times, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro becomes rst head of state to visit the

Western Wall with an Israeli PM”. 2 April 2019. Available at https://santiagotimes.

cl/2019/04/02/brazils-bolsonaro-becomes-rst-head-of-state-to-visit-the-western-wall-

with-an-israeli-pm/

100

https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1112420504407863297

101

Folha de S. Paulo, “Bolsonaro frustra Netanyahu com escritório em vez de em-

baixada em Jerusalém”. 31 March 2019. Available at https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/

mundo/2019/03/bolsonaro-anuncia-a-criacao-de-escritorio-comercial-em-jerusalem.

shtml

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 141

ever, the absence of a tangible diplomatic triumph for Netanyahu

was one of the reasons that led Bolsonaro to cut his trip short.

102

Both friends and foes of the new Brazilian government seemed

distressed with the opening of a trade office. Many evangelicals

went to the social networks to express disgust at what they called

a ‘handout’, including congressman Marco Feliciano, a popular

neo-Pentecostal pastor and a loyal Bolsonaro supporter, who said

that Brazil is intervening in the domestic affairs of a friendly nation

by refusing to recognize the Holy City as Israel’s capital.

103

More-

over, Hamas immediately issued a press release calling on Brazil to

reverse the decision and stressing that “this policy does not serve

the stability and security of the region and threatens the Brazilian

ties with Arab and Islamic nations.”

104

On the other hand, the Pal-

estinian Authority, who threatened to recall its ambassador to Bra-

zil for consultations, ended up adopting a conciliatory tone, asking

the Brazilian administration to open up an office in East Jerusalem

to deal with Palestinian matters.

105

A week after Bolsonaro’s return to Brazil, it seemed the com-

promise had worked. Netanyahu’s tight reelection may bring fresh

air to the bilateral relationship. On the very day of the Israeli pre-

mier’s victory, the Brazilian president had dinner with ambassa-

102

Isto É. “Bolsonaro muda agenda em Israel e antecipa retorno ao Brasil”. 2 April

2019. Available at https://istoe.com.br/bolsonaro-muda-agenda-em-israel-e-antecipa-re-

torno-ao-brasil/

103

Folha de S. Paulo, “Evangélicos lamentam recuo de Bolsonaro ao anunciar escritório

em Jerusalém”. 1 April 2019. Available at https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/04/

evangelicos-lamentam-recuo-de-bolsonaro-ao-anunciar-escritorio-em-jerusalem.shtml

104

e Islamic Resistance Movement, “Press release on Brazilian President’s visit to Is-

raeli occupation”. 1 April 2019. Available at http://hamas.ps/en/post/2016/press-re-

lease-on-brazilian-president-rsquo-s-visit-to-israeli-occupation

105

Barbosa, Renan. ““O saldo da viagem de Bolsonaro a Israel: solução do impasse ou

prolongamento da agonia?” 3 April 2019. Available at https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/re-

publica/como-foi-viagem-bolsonaro-israel-jerusalem/

142 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

dors of 37 Arab and Muslim countries at the National Agricultural

Confederation. Promoted by agriculture minister Tereza Cristina,

the meeting was set up to allay concerns that the new Brazilian

administration was being hostile to the Palestinian cause or to in-

terests of the Islamic countries. By the end of the dinner, the Pal-

estinian ambassador told the Brazilian ministers and journalists:

“This conflict does not belong do Brazil. Please stay out of it.”

106

CONCLUSION

The experiences of Brazil and Paraguay reveal the complex deci-

sion-making processes behind the embassy move, which go much

beyond the U.S. regional influence. In both cases, we must con-

sider the interplay international alignments and domestic factors:

in Paraguay’s case, Horacio Cartes’s personal links with Ari Harow

and Dario Messer, as much as his desire to curb Brazilian regional

influence by reaching out to the United States; in Brazil’s case, Bol-

sonaro’s Evangelical and anti-globalist base, which ended up being

neutralized by other forces within his own administration, who

favored trade relations with Arab and Muslim countries.

As for the former, Cartes sought to improve ties with Israel

and the U.S. as a way to distance itself from Brazil and strengthen

his political position at home. Yet, Trump’s embassy move forced

the outgoing president to anticipate a costly concession before tan-

gible benefits came about. Given the possibility to improve trade

relations with some Arab countries – which were increasing consis-

tently since 2009

107

– and with Turkey, Abdo chose to return to the

106

Poder 360, “‘Fiquem fora disso’, diz embaixador da Palestina sobre conito com Is-

rael”. 11 April 2019. Available at https://www.poder360.com.br/governo/bolsonaro-discur-

sou-por-47-seg-em-jantar-com-representantes-de-paises-islamicos/

107

Cabral López, María Antonella. “Paraguay y los países árabes: una relación casi de-

sconocida.” Intellector, no. 12, vol. 13, 2016.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 143

status quo, even at the cost of straining relations with Israel and,

to a lesser extent, the United States. Finally, Abdo’s perspective of

building closer ties with Brazil, irrespective of the electoral results,

might also have reduced the impact of changing Paraguay’s geopo-

litical position.

Brazil took much longer to opt for the embassy move. Al-

though domestic pressure for greater ties with Israel had been in-

creasing since the late Rousseff years, mostly thanks to the weak-

ening of the left-wing coalition in power and to the consolidation

of Evangelicals at the heart of Brazilian politics, who progressively

opposed Rousseff’s Mideast policies, a solid diplomatic tradition

toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented governments –

left or right – from changing the country’s decades-old position

on Jerusalem. This had little to do with Brazil’s relationship with

Washington: Trump’s election and subsequent decision to transfer

the embassy to Jerusalem, which coincided with President Temer’s

desire to strengthen ties with the U.S., did not alter Brazil’s stance.

Not only did Bolsonaro’s election represent a break with Brazil’s

foreign policy guidelines, as it also brought to power anti-globalists

and evangelicals, to whom Trump and Netanyahu – and, therefore,

the embassy move – were top priorities. This explains the mutual

enthusiasm for a renewed Brazilian-Israeli friendship between the

October general elections in Brazil and the April elections in Isra-

el. However, the risk of hurting businesses with Arab and Islamic

countries, which frightened meat and chicken exporters, combined

with the potential political costs of the embassy transfer, pitted key

government actors against each other. The result was what neither

groups expected: the announcement of a trade office in Jerusalem

did not please Netanyahu and his supporters nor did it appease

critics, within or outside of the Bolsonaro administration.

144 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE In SOUTH AMERICA: FALLIng On DEAF EARS?

As Brazil and Paraguay are the only two South American coun-

tries to have considered moving their embassies to Jerusalem, two

questions are in order. First, from a geopolitical (or geoeconom-

ic) perspective, does Washington exert any greater influence upon

these two countries than in other parts of the continent? The answer

would be no for both. Paraguay is still highly dependent on Brazil –

politically, economically, and even socially. Brazil, on its part, as the

regional power of South America, has long sought to limit Ameri-

can presence in the region. In this sense, looking exclusively from

a global perspective, free trade partners as Colombia, Peru or Chile

would be much more susceptible to U.S. diplomatic pressure.

Therefore, we must look for answers in the domestic realm.

Do Brazil and Paraguay share characteristics at home might explain

their pro-Israel turn? A preliminary assessment points out, in the

Paraguayan case, the weak institutionalized diplomacy, which gave

the President much more freedom to abruptly change course of

the country’s foreign policy, according to his beliefs or personal

interests. The Brazilian case, on the other hand, involved a more

complex interplay between a strong diplomatic bureaucracy, which

is usually rather averse to change, and the newly-elected governing

coalition, which favored building up ties with Benjamin Netanya-

hu, but whose internal disputes have ultimately prevented Brazil

from moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

From a conceptual standpoint, the Jerusalem embassy ques-

tion begs for a more detailed assessment on the domestic drivers of

foreign policymaking – not only in the cases, as the ones presented

in this chapter, where the decision was either considered or effec-

tively made, but also to shed light on situations in which, despite

U.S. pressure or other external constraints, the move was not even

a possibility.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 145

THE EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION

ON JERUSALEM

JACOB ERIKSSON

Al Tajir Lecturer in Post-war Recovery Studies in the

Department of Politics at the University of York

CHAPTER 5

AND

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN

CONFLICT

146 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

INTRODUCTION

On 6 December, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump broke with

longstanding American policy on the status of Jerusalem by rec-

ognizing the city as the capital of Israel. Due to its political, reli-

gious, and social significance, Jerusalem is the beating heart of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a city that both sides lay claim to.

Both the sensitivity of the issue and the broader principles at stake

made this a significant decision. Traditionally, the US position

has been that the future status of Jerusalem should be determined

through negotiations with the Palestinians as part of a final status

agreement to end the conflict. This has also been the position of

the European Union (EU), and has represented a widely shared

international consensus based on international law, which does not

recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Eastern part of the contested

city occupied in 1967.

The differences between the Trump administration and the

EU on this issue were plain to see. On 5 December, the day be-

fore Trump’s announcement, EU High Representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, said after a meet-

ing with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that any action that

would undermine the resumption of a meaningful peace process

must be avoided: “A way must be found through negotiations to

resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of both states

CHAPTER 5

147

148 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

so that the aspiration of both parties can be fulfilled”.

In reac-

tion to the announcement, Mogherini commented that Trump’s

decision had “a very worrying potential impact” to “send us back-

wards to even darker times than the ones we are already living

in”, and that “this difficult moment calls for an even stronger

engagement for peace”.

The following week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Ne-

tanyahu became the first Israeli leader to visit EU headquarters

in Brussels in 22 years, seeking further endorsement of Trump’s

position. As expected, the EU declined and reiterated its vision of

Jerusalem as a shared capital of both Israel and a future Palestinian

state.

While the EU continues to officially maintain this position

and refuses to recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders other

than those agreed by the parties,

within the bloc there are signifi-

cant differences of opinion. Trump’s announcement has catalyzed

an unraveling of the old consensus as numerous member states are

altering their stance, chiefly the countries collectively known as the

Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia)

but also others like Austria and Romania. This chapter will analyze

the growing division within the EU on this issue and how right-

wing nationalist populism is galvanizing an alternative European

discourse on Israel and Jerusalem.

“Secretary Tillerson and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini Joint Statement to

the Media”, US Mission to the European Union, December 5, 2017, https://useu.usmission.

gov/secretary-tillerson-eu-high-representative-federica-mogherini-joint-statement-media/

“Remarks by HR/VP Mogherini on the announcement by U.S. President Donald

Trump on Jerusalem”, European External Action Service, December 7, 2017, https://eeas.eu-

ropa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36962/remarks-hrvp-mogherini-announce-

ment-us-president-donald-trump-jerusalem_en

Alan Cowell, “EU leaders reject Netanyahu on Jerusalem recognition”, e New York

Times, December 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/world/middleeast/

eu-netanyahu-israel-jerusalem.html

“Middle East Peace process”, European External Action Service, https://eeas.europa.

eu/regions/middle-east-north-africa-mena/337/middle-east-peace-process_en

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 149

Trump began his statement on recognition by acknowledging

that he entered office promising “to look at the world’s challeng-

es with open eyes and very fresh thinking. We cannot solve our

problems by making the same failed assumptions and repeating

the same failed strategies of the past. Old challenges demand new

approaches.”

Trump has shattered the international consensus on

Jerusalem but the novelty of his approach is questionable, and

it is unlikely to yield positive progress towards resolving the Is-

raeli-Palestinian conflict, as the Trump administration appears to

have little interest in addressing Palestinian political needs.

As Mogherini’s statements suggest, the EU is very concerned

about Trump’s approach and does not share his view that one-sid-

ed recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital fosters peace.

While

all EU member states continue to agree on the need for the two-

state peace paradigm, individual member states have their own

stances on Jerusalem specifically and strive to accommodate these

within this broader policy. Disunity on Jerusalem, however, is

limiting the EU’s ability to speak with one voice on the issue and

act as a normative counterbalance to the US position, further

weakening the advocacy for a peace agreement based on princi-

ples of international law. Continued frustration with this disunity

on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among powerful member states

can also have important implications for internal EU policymak-

ing procedures. Ultimately, if the EU continues to be unable to

formulate shared positions on key issues, its ability to influence

the trajectory of the conflict will only become weaker than it al-

ready is.

“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem”, e White House, December 6, 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briengs-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/

ibid

150 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

EUROPE, ISRAEL, AND JERUSALEM

As a leading international organization, the EU (and its precursor,

the European Community) has for decades sought to be an in-

fluential voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Key pronounce-

ments like the Venice Declaration of 1980, which recognized the

Palestinians’ right to exercise self-determination and called for the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to be included in any ne-

gotiations, have had a substantial impact on international thinking

about the nature of a peace settlement. Even though it was heav-

ily criticized at the time, it later came to be the widely accepted

consensus, with the subsequent Oslo Agreement in 1993 bearing

the hallmarks of Venice.

A similar intention motivated a joint

statement by EU foreign ministers in the Council of the European

Union in 2009 which referred to Jerusalem as “the future capital of

two states,” although this was not so much a case of being visionary

as much as trying to salvage an old proposition that is gradually

being rendered less and less feasible due to Israeli actions on the

ground.

Even though the EU has not been effective at realizing

the visions that it put forward, the parties to the conflict do none-

theless take EU positions seriously and continue to see the institu-

tion as a source of normative power and legitimation.

Anders Persson, e EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conict, 1971-2013 (Lanham, MD:

Lexington, 2015), 80-84; Rory Miller, Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians

since 1967 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 134

“Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process,” Council of the European

Union, December 8, 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/docu-

ments/wgme/dv/201/201012/20101215_5_council_conclusions_en.pdf. For analysis of

changes in Jerusalem, see “Extreme Makeover? (I): Israel’s Politics of Land and Faith in

East Jerusalem”, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 134, December 20,

2012.

Anders Persson, “Shaping Discourse and Setting Examples: Normative Power Eu-

rope can Work in the Israeli-Palestinian Conict”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.

55, No. 6, 2017

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 151

The same has traditionally been true of the US. The Obama

administration did not endorse or condemn the EU’s 2009 Jeru-

salem policy, but merely stated that it was a matter for negotia-

tion between the parties. Yossi Alpher has suggested that the EU

declaration actually reflected Obama’s position on Jerusalem, but

that he was politically unable to endorse it.

Although there was

friction between the EU and Obama regarding his management

of the conflict, such as the EU’s exclusion from the resumption of

negotiations in September 2010 and differences over the Palestin-

ian internationalization strategy at the UN, it appears to have been

predominantly a difference of methodology rather than goals.

This cannot be said of the Trump administration, which has

at best been ambiguous on the two-state solution and on the key

issue of Jerusalem.

In one sense, Trump’s wording on recognition

was straightforward: “… I have determined that it is time to offi-

cially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.”

However, this

brief, blunt statement failed to engage with the details of such a

complex and sensitive issue. Trump made no effort to define what

he meant by “Jerusalem.” Following its capture of Jordanian-oc-

cupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the 1967 Six

Day War, Israel significantly expanded the municipal boundaries

of Jerusalem to include 70 sq. km of these newly occupied terri-

tories, including East Jerusalem and 28 Arab villages.

Within

this territory, Israel built settlements like French Hill, Gilo, Neve

Persson, e EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conict, 88

Josh Ruebner, Shattered Hopes: Obama’s Failure to Broker Israeli-Palestinian Peace

(London: Verso, 2013), 114-115

Jacob Eriksson, “Master of none: Trump, Jerusalem, and the prospects of Israeli-Pales-

tinian peace”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2018, 54-55

“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem”.

“Extreme Makeover? (I): Israel’s Politics of Land and Faith in East Jerusalem”, Inter-

national Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 134, December 20, 2012

152 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

Yaakov, Pisgat Zeev, Ramot, and others. While Israel considers

these neighbourhoods of the city of Jerusalem, the vast majority

of the international community considers them illegal settlements

in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and has never rec-

ognized the legality of this municipal expansion or the subsequent

official Israeli annexation of the territory in 1980.

Trump refrained from specifically endorsing this Israeli vision

of a greater Jerusalem and did not use Israel’s preferred terminol-

ogy of an “undivided” or “indivisible” capital. However, Trump

also made no reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of a future

Palestinian state. In reference to the Palestinian claim, he said that

his decision did not seek to prejudge any final-status issues to be

negotiated: “We are not taking a position [on] any final-status is-

sues, including the specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in

Jerusalem, or the resolution of contested borders. Those questions

are up to the parties involved.”

Trump later contradicted his own statement about not pre-

judging the outcome of final-status negotiations when he tweeted,

“… We have taken Jerusalem, the toughest part of the negotiations,

off the table …,” sowing further confusion about the parameters

and implications of his recognition.

In a meeting with Netanya-

hu at Davos on January 25, 2018, Trump repeated, “We took Je-

rusalem off the table, so we don’t have to talk about it anymore.”

For a brief discussion of the legal dimension of this issue, see Ahron Bregman, Cursed

Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories (London: Allen Lane, 2014), xxxiii-

xxxvii. For a more detailed discussion, see Iain Scobbie with Sarah Hibbin, e Israel-Palestine

Conict in International Law: Territorial Issues (e US/Middle East Project, 2009).

“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem.”

“Donald J. Trump on Twitter,” Twitter, January 2, 2018, https://twitter.com/realdon-

aldtrump/status/948322497602220032?lang=en.

“Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel Before Bilateral

Meeting | Davos, Switzerland,” e White House, January 25, 2018, https://www.white-

house.gov/briengs-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-netanyahu-isra-

el-bilateral-meeting-davos-switzerland/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 153

Without further articulation in the long awaited US peace plan, it

remains unclear whether Trump’s recognition refers to Israeli sov-

ereignty in West Jerusalem only or, as his later statements suggest,

Trump is dismissing any Palestinian claim to Jerusalem whatsoever.

It is the latter eventuality that concerns the EU and, of course,

the Palestinians. During a visit by Palestinian President Mahmoud

Abbas to Brussels on January 22, 2018, Mogherini reassured him

that, just as she had communicated to Netanyahu a month earlier,

EU policy on Jerusalem had not changed and they remained com-

mitted to a shared capital as part of a two-state solution.

This

tradition continues to be championed by the vast majority of mem-

bers, including the likes of France, Germany, and the United King-

dom, who all agree that this remains a necessary compromise for

peace. Beneath this unity, however, there are significant differences

between member states on the issue, which were evident already in

2009 when the Jerusalem policy was adopted. A leaked draft pre-

pared by Sweden, who held the rotating presidency of the EU at the

time and led the initiative, specifically mentioned East Jerusalem as

the capital of the state of Palestine, but this initial formulation was

removed due to a lack of consensus among member states.

These divisions were immediately visible again in December

2017. Hours after Trump’s announcement, the Czech Republic

made a statement to the effect that they would recognise West

Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, an important distinction which

Andrew Rettman, “EU stands by Palestine on Jerusalem,” EUobserver, January 22,

2018, https://euobserver.com/foreign/140645.

Rory McCarthy and Ian Black, “Europe softens Middle East statement after condemna-

tion from Israel”, e Guardian, December 8, 2009; Barak Ravid, “Haaretz Exclusive: EU Draft

Document on Division of Jerusalem,” Ha’aretz, December 1, 2009; Persson, e EU and the

Israeli-Palestinian Conict, 86-87; Jacob Eriksson, “Swedish recognition of Palestine: politics,

law, and prospects for peace,” Global Aairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2018, 42; Jacob Eriksson, “‘With

friendly concern’: e turbulent relations between Israel and Sweden,” in Israel in a Turbulent

Region: Security and Foreign Policy (ed.) Tore T. Petersen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 178.

154 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

Trump did not make. Still, aware of their deviation from the line

of most other member states, the Czechs stressed that this was si-

multaneously consistent with the EU policy of a shared capital.

While the vast majority of EU member states voted in favour

of a UN General Assembly resolution entitled “Status of Jeru-

salem”, which rebuked US policy, called on states not to estab-

lish embassies in Jerusalem, and declared attempts to change the

status of the city null and void, six member states (Croatia, the

Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania) broke

from the shared EU position and abstained.

EU institutions

have been unable to produce a joint declaration condemning US

recognition; an initial draft was blocked by Hungary and another

designed to be released on the eve of the relocation of the US

embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018 was blocked by the Czech Re-

public, Hungary, and Romania. As a frustrated senior European

diplomat explained, “the Hungarians didn’t want to poke Trump

in the eye and the Czechs and the Romanians are considering to

move their embassies to Jerusalem against the EU position. This

is the state of the EU these days”.

Indeed, following the Czech

example, Romanian Prime Minister Viorica Dancila announced

at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 2019

Josh Delk, “Czech Republic recognizes West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital,” e Hill,

December 6, 2017, https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-brieng-room/363633-czech-repub-

lic-recognizes-west-jerusalem-as-israels-capital.

“General Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Asking Nations Not to Lo-

cate Diplomatic Missions in Jerusalem”, United Nations, December 21, 2017, https://www.

un.org/press/en/2017/ga11995.doc.htm. France and Germany were concerned about the

British position given their close relationship with the USA, but their vote was consistent

with the wider EU line. See Richard Gowen, “Separation anxiety: European inuence at the

UN after Brexit,” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2018

Barak Ravid, “Scoop: EU statement opposing U.S. embassy move is blocked,” Axios,

May 11, 2018, https://www.axios.com/hungary-czech-romania-block-eu-statement-against-

embassy-move-jerusalem-6b85f6bb-8861-4dab-8473-e542196d1368.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 155

conference that they too would move their embassy to Jerusa-

lem.

This was lent added significance by Romania then holding

the rotating presidency of the EU.

Political sensitivities, however, may render these decisions

difficult to implement. Although Czech President Milos Zeman,

an ardent supporter of Israel, has backed the move and described

the opening of the cultural and trade office Czech House in Je-

rusalem in November 2018 as a precursor to the relocation of

the embassy, he also told the Knesset that he “was not a dicta-

tor, unfortunately.”

Despite seemingly acceding to the move

in a September 2018 declaration, Prime Minister Andrej Ba-

bis has expressed opposition to it in deference to EU policy on

the subject.

Similarly, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis has

rejected the move based on compliance with UN resolutions

on the matter and international law. He responded scathing-

ly to Dancila’s announcement by saying, “The Prime Minister

shows complete ignorance regarding foreign affairs,” reminding

her that “the final decision about moving the embassy from Tel

Aviv to Jerusalem rests with me.”

As reported by the Jerusalem

Post, German Chancellor Angela Merkel lobbied Iohannis and

other European politicians against moving their embassies, and

Andrew Rettman, “Romania presidency shatters EU line on Jerusalem,” EUobserver,

March 25, 2019, https://euobserver.com/foreign/144489.

Raphael Ahren, “Czech House, feted as ‘rst step’ in embassy move, opens in Jeru-

salem”, e Times of Israel, November 27, 2018, https://www.timesosrael.com/czech-house-

feted-as-rst-step-in-embassy-move-opens-in-jerusalem/.

“Czech leaders endorse Israeli embassy move to Jerusalem,” e Times of Israel, Sep-

tember 12, 2018, https://www.timesosrael.com/czech-leaders-endorse-israeli-embas-

sy-move-to-jerusalem/.

Rettman, “Romania presidency shatters EU line”; Raphael Ahren, “With Romanian

PM powerless, celebration over embassy move premature,” e Times of Israel, March 24,

2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/with-romanian-pm-powerless-celebration-over-embas-

sy-move-premature/.

156 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

the decision is connected to domestic political conflicts in these

member states.

As Gordon and Pardo have argued, the local politics of mem-

ber states have an impact on the EU’s ability to exercise normative

power.

While they argue that disagreements may give a particu-

lar issue greater coverage and thereby maximise the normative im-

pact, it also limits the consensus achievable to the lowest common

denominator, thus limiting the normative impact. Their focus on

the local, both in Europe and in Israel, is critical to understanding

how these differences about Jerusalem have become so salient in

European discourse, and it is important to emphasise that these

local trends are not isolated but are deeply interconnected.

In response to concerns over immigration, multiculturalism,

and the political power afforded to EU institutions, Europe has

seen the rise of predominantly right-wing nationalist populist Eu-

rosceptic parties, particularly in the younger democracies of cen-

tral and eastern Europe where they are not just a prominent op-

position voice, as in much of western Europe, but members of the

ruling governments. Prominent examples include Milos Zeman’s

Party of Civic Rights in the Czech Republic, Viktor Orban’s Fi-

desz party in Hungary, Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice party

in Poland, and until May 2019 Norbert Hofer’s Freedom Party of

Austria in Austria. In his analysis of these movements, Brubaker

observes that they draw on Huntington’s concept of a “clash of

civilizations” and distil a Christian cultural identity, framed in

Herb Keinon, “Czech president in Israel, to begin moving embassy to Jerusalem,” e

Jerusalem Post, November 25, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Czech-president-ar-

rives-in-Israel-to-inaugurate-embassy-precursor-in-Jerusalem-572750.

Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo, “Normative Power Europe and the Power of the

Local,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2015

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 157

nationalist terms, which considers Islam a threatening enemy. The

refugee crisis of 2015 brought the issue to the fore, with Orban

railing against the threat to Christian identity, Kaczynski describ-

ing refugees as vectors for disease, and Zeman characterizing it as

an organized invasion by the Muslim Brotherhood to control Eu-

rope.

Simultaneously, liberalism is also portrayed as an external

and even anti-national force, brought with foreign capital acting

as a vehicle for foreign ideas (such as multi-culturalism and LGBT

rights), and personified by the EU and think tanks like the Open

Society foundation, a favorite target of Orban’s.

While Russian

President Vladimir Putin supports this illiberal nationalist trend

in order to weaken the EU and NATO, in some cases financially,

the parties are firmly rooted in domestic political issues rather

than being external constructs.

A similar ideological rapprochement exists between the Is-

raeli government and the Visegrad group on issues to do with lib-

eralism, nationalism, and security, specifically migration, terror-

ism, and Islam, which are all seen as interconnected.

In moves

Rogers Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist

moment in comparative perspective”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 40, No. 8, 2017, 1209

Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism”, 1208

Alina Polyakova, “Strange bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s far right,” World Aairs,

Vol. 177, No. 3, 2014; Fredrik Wesslau, “Putin’s friends in Europe,” Commentary, Euro-

pean Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/com-

mentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153; Adrienne Klasa, Valerie Hopkins, Guy Chazan,

Henry Foy & Miles Johnson, “Russia’s long arm reaches to the right in Europe,” e Finan-

cial Times, May 23, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/48c4bfa6-7ca2-11e9-81d2-

f785092ab560;

Joanna Dyduch, “e Visegrad Group’s Policy towards Israel: Common Values and

Interests as a Catalyst for Cooperation,” SWP Comment No. 54, German Institute for Inter-

national and Security Aairs, December 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/

the-visegrad-groups-policy-towards-israel/; Zeev Sternhell, “Why Benjamin Netanyahu

Loves the European Far-Right,” Foreign Policy, February 24, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.

com/2019/02/24/why-benjamin-netanyahu-loves-the-european-far-right-orban-kaczyns-

ki-pis-desz-visegrad-likud-antisemitism-hungary-poland-illiberalism/.

158 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

reminiscent of Hungary and Poland’s descent into authoritari-

anism,

Netanyahu’s government has sought to limit European

funding to human rights NGOs critical of Israeli policies towards

Israel’s Arab minority and the Palestinians under occupation.

It has also looked to minimize the power of the Supreme Court

– an institution seen by the right wing as a liberal bastion – to

challenge Knesset legislation and obstruct their preferred policies,

such as the protection and retroactive legalization of illegal out-

posts in the West Bank.

A shared antipathy towards liberalism

has even meant that Netanyahu was willing to countenance the

blatant anti-Semitism that Orban and Fidesz has repeatedly de-

ployed against philanthropist George Soros, founder of the afore-

mentioned Open Society foundation.

Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Penguin), p. 80;

Dalibor Rohac, “Hungary and Poland aren’t democratic. ey’re authoritarian.”, Foreign

Policy, February 5, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-ar-

ent-democratic-theyre-authoritarian/; Elisabeth Zerofsky, “Is Poland retreating from democ-

racy?”, e New Yorker, July 23, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/30/

is-poland-retreating-from-democracy.

“Israel to develop law limiting foreign gov’t funding to left-wing NGOs,” i24 News,

June 12, 2017, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/147706-170612-israel-to-develop-

law-limiting-foreign-gov-t-funding-to-left-wing-ngos; Marissa Newman, “Netanyahu

vows Knesset push to limit NGOs’ foreign funding,” e Times of Israel, June 12, 2017,

https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-confirms-knesset-push-to-limit-ngos-for-

eign-funding/

Alan Craig, “Israel’s legal insecurity: e domestic and international consequences

of Israel’s increasingly transparent support for the settlement outposts” in Israel in a Turbu-

lent Region: Security and Foreign Policy (ed.) Tore T. Petersen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019);

Danny Zaken, “Netanyahu facing greater ultra-Orthodox political appetite,” Al-Monitor,

April 17, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/04/israel-netanya-

hu-election-new-coalition-ultra-orthodox.html.

Barak Ravid, ‘On Netanyahu’s Orders: Israel’s Foreign Ministry retracts criticism of an-

ti-Semitism in Hungary and slams George Soros’, Ha’aretz, July 10, 2017, https://www.haaretz.

com/israel-news/israel-retracts-criticism-of-hungary-s-anti-soros-campaign-1.5492668

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 159

European nationalist populist movements consider Israel’s

brand of ethnic nationalism – ethnocracy as Yiftachel argues

–

a model to aspire to.

The controversial Israeli nation-state law

passed in 2018 privileges the Jewish nature of the state at the ex-

pense of non-Jewish citizens, who make up roughly 20% of the

population. During the recent election campaign, Netanyahu ex-

plained on social media what this meant: “Israel is not a state of all

its citizens. … According to the basic nationality law we passed,

Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people – and only it.”

This affinity with European nationalists has offered Israel

an opportunity to undercut the normative stances taken by the

EU on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, exploiting Euroscepticism

as an instrument of foreign policy; in return, European populist

movements use their relationship with Israel to dispel accusations

of anti-Semitism.

Israel has leveraged these partners to impede

and politicise the EU policy of differentiation between products

originating in Israel and the illegal settlements.

During deliber-

ations of the EU Foreign Affairs Council in 2016, Israel enlisted

the services of Eurosceptic Greece to leak drafts of the Council’s

conclusions on differentiation and put forward Israeli suggestions

for changes to the wording, effectively acting as a “29

delegation”

Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia,

PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Oren Yiftachel, “‘Ethnocracy’: e politics of

Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” Constellations, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1999

Sharon Pardo and Neve Gordon, “Euroscepticism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,”

Middle East Critique, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2018, 402; Sternhell, “Why Benjamin Netanyahu Loves

the European Far-Right”

“Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel is ‘not a state of all its citizens’”, e Guardian,

March 10, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/10/benjamin-netanyahu-

says-israel-is-not-a-state-of-all-its-citizens.

Pardo and Gordon, “Euroscepticism as Foreign Policy”

Hugh Lovatt, “EU dierentiation and the push for peace in Israel-Palestine,” Policy

Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2016, 6-7

160 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

in the negotiating room to soften the criticism towards it. A for-

mer senior Israeli diplomat said that “the issue is not to find [a]

Eurosceptic [member state]. We always have the Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland and others. The challenge is to convince a Eu-

rosceptic EU member to operate with the same passion of Greece

and block the Union’s voting machinery.”

Recent voting records

on Jerusalem suggest this may be less and less of a challenge.

“THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY”

President Trump appears to have brought his approach to real es-

tate into politics, thinking of things in highly transactional terms,

whether trade deficits or NATO contributions. Having delivered

on issues of significance to Israel and Netanyahu, like Jerusalem

and the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights,

one could reasonably argue that in return Trump will now expect

significant Israeli concessions to the Palestinians as part of his peace

plan. However, that assumes that Israelis are the main audience for

these actions. While Netanyahu has undoubtedly reaped political

benefits from them during both of his 2019 election campaigns,

Trump’s target audience is his conservative, evangelical, and Re-

publican political base at home who have strong views on Isra-

el, and his decisions are dictated by domestic politics rather than

foreign policy. From a transactional perspective, Trump will view

continued domestic political support for his re-election in 2020,

supported by Israel, as the required quid pro quo rather than con-

cessions to the Palestinians.

Although Trump has accrued considerable goodwill and lever-

age over Netanyahu that could be used in the context of a peace

Pardo and Gordon, “Euroscepticism as Foreign Policy”, 407

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 161

initiative, he is unlikely to do so effectively for two related reasons:

first, he will not want to harm his standing with his political base,

and second, he has thus far proven himself to be a poor mediator

in this conflict, attuned exclusively to the needs of one side. Zart-

man and Rubin argue that “biased mediators … can be effective in

assisting negotiations only if they deliver the party toward whom

they are biased. In negotiation, external intervention rides the dip-

lomatic equivalent of a Trojan horse.”

By contrast, the Trump

administration’s strategy to date has focused on rewarding Israel

and taking punitive actions against the Palestinians, including

halting funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency

(UNRWA) responsible for the provision of services to Palestinian

refugees, trying to redefine which Palestinians can be classified as

refugees, closing the PLO representative office in Washington DC,

and reducing funding to the Palestinian Authority.

At the time of writing, the Trump administration’s full propos-

al for peace has yet to be presented. On June 25-26, 2019, Trump’s

son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner unveiled the first compo-

nent at the Peace to Prosperity workshop in Bahrain. More spec-

tacle than substance, the event was widely criticized for failing to

move beyond broad economic aid aspirations for the Palestinians,

for including projects that already exist or projects that have been

proposed in the past, and for ignoring Israel’s occupation which

I. William Zartman and Jerey Z. Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation”

in Power and Negotiation (eds.) I. William Zartman and Jerey Z. Rubin (Ann Arbor, MI:

University of Michigan Press, 2000), 288

Michael Hirsh and Colum Lynch, “Jared Kushner and the Art of Humiliation,” For-

eign Policy, February 12, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/12/jared-kush-

ner-and-the-art-of-humiliation/; Krishnadev Calamur, “e US Is Sidelining Itself in the

Middle East,” e Atlantic, August 31, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-

chive/2018/08/trump-palestinians-unrwa-funding/569167/.

162 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

remains a major obstacle to Palestinian economic growth.

An EU

source was critical of the plan, as it “includes numerous existing

or already proposed projects including for instance EU’s financed

Greater Gaza desalination plant. … There is no indication as to

where the money would come from and who would implement

the projects. Also, no mention of the existing impediments to the

implementation of these proposals.”

Senior US officials insist that they are taking the political as-

pect seriously, but the political component of the plan remains

unconfirmed. However, the word that has thus far been used to

describe the status of Palestinians under the future plan is “au-

tonomy”, which is a non-starter for Palestinians.

According to

those familiar with its contents, it falls short of ensuring sovereign

Palestinian statehood, seemingly consistent with the notion of eco-

nomic peace that Netanyahu himself has long advocated.

Trump

claims to want to upend traditional assumptions about how to re-

solve the conflict, but an economic dimension has been central to

previous efforts and the political vision appears to be reverting to

Loveday Morris, “Kushner presents vision of a Middle East at peace but no details

how to get there,” e Washington Post, June 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/middle_east/trump-administ...-9692-11e9-9a16-dc551ea5a43b_story.html?utm_

term=.604a82f59f2d; David Makovsky, “Jared Kushner’s all-or-nothing mistake in the

Middle East,” e Washington Post, July 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-

ions/global-opinions/jared-ku...27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_

term=.c1c9ce7701a7; Matthew Lee, “Investors at Bahrain workshop say peace is the

missing piece in US Mideast plan,” e Times of Israel, June 26, 2019, https://www.time-

sosrael.com/investors-at-bahrain-workshop-say-peace-is-the-missing-piece-in-us-mid-

east-plan/

Andrew Rettman, “EU ‘special envoy’ going to US plan for Palestine,” EUobserver,

June 24, 2019, https://euobserver.com/foreign/145254

Anne Gearan and Souad Mekhennet, “Trump peace package for Middle East likely to

stop short of Palestinian statehood,” e Washington Post, April 14, 2019; Mattia Toaldo and

Hugh Lovatt, “Has Benjamin Netanyahu won?”, Al Jazeera, March 4, 2017, https://www.al-

jazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/benjamin-netanyahu-won-170303125610296.html.

Gearan and Mekhennet, “Trump peace package”

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 163

old, outdated models of Palestinian autonomy from the late 1970s

and early 1980s.

In an open letter to current EU foreign ministers and offi-

cials published in The Guardian, a collection of 37 former Euro-

pean foreign ministers and EU officials recognize this danger and

urge the EU to reject any plan that does not meet its previously

stipulated parameters for a two-state solution: “a Palestinian state

alongside Israel on borders based on the pre-1967 lines with mu-

tually agreed, minimal and equal land swaps; with Jerusalem as the

capital for both states; with security arrangements that address le-

gitimate concerns and respect the sovereignty of each side and with

an agreed, fair solution to the question of Palestine refugees.” The

group go on to explain that while they share Washington’s frustra-

tion with the failure of previous efforts, abandoning Palestinian

statehood is not the answer, and that this will damage the prospects

of durable peace.

This does indeed appear to reflect current EU policy. The EU

attended the Bahrain workshop in a technical capacity, sending a

special representative to the Middle East peace process and a mem-

ber of the European Commission. An EU spokesperson stressed that

“our participation at the workshop in Manama does not infringe on

any of [our] very clear commitments” to creating a Palestinian state,

and would not commit the EU to supporting or participating in

Mohammed Samhouri, “Explaining Failure: How Palestinian economic potential was

denied during Oslo,” Fathom, July 2019, http://fathomjournal.org/explaining-fail-

ure-how-palestinian-economic-potential-was-denied-and-destroyed-during-oslo/; Ma-

kovsky, “Jared Kushner’s all-or-nothing mistake”. For the details of old autonomy plans, see

Seth Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A political history from Camp David to Oslo (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 2018), 117-161

“Europe must stand by the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine,” e Guardian,

April 15, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/14/europe-must-stand-by-

the-two-state-solution-for-israel-and-palestine.

164 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

the administration’s plan.

In a meeting with US Secretary of State

Mike Pompeo and Kushner prior to the workshop, Mogherini ex-

pressed the EU’s willingness to work with the US on the basis of its

longstanding parameters, the implication being that they would not

support a deviation from them.

However, it is not clear that the Trump administration shares

this vision. Rather, its ambiguity towards a two-state solution and

its unquestioning support of Israel has created an atmosphere of

impunity that has helped normalize the prospect of annexation.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to clarify to Congress

what the administration’s position would be in the event of Israeli

annexation of the occupied West Bank, but has said elsewhere that

it would not contradict their peace plan.

As I have argued else-

where, the final death of the two-state solution may be the most

consequential impact of the Trump administration’s engagement

in the conflict, not necessarily because of the content of any plan

but because of the precedents that they are setting and the constit-

uencies that they are energizing into motion, which may be diffi-

cult to stop.

Rettman, “EU ‘special envoy’”

“High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini in Washington: Meets with

Secretary Pompeo and Adviser Kushner,” European External Action Service, June 19, 2019,

http://eueuropaeeas.fpfis.slb.ec.europa.eu:8084/headquarters/headquarters-home-

page/64310/high-re presentativevice-president-federica-mogherini-washington-meets-secre-

tary-pompeo-and_en

Edward Wong and Catie Edmondson, “Pompeo Refuses to Say What U.S. Would Do

if Israel Annexes West Bank,” e New York Times, April 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.

com/2019/04/09/us/politics/pompeo-israel-west-bank.html; Raphael Ahren, “As US appears

to back West Bank annexations, is its peace plan dead on arrival?” e Times of Israel, April

16, 2019, https://www.timesosrael.com/as-us-appears-to-back-west-bank-annexations-is-

its-peace-plan-dead-on-arrival/.

Eriksson, “Master of none”, 58-59

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 165

With the backing of the Trump administration, Netanyahu

has been increasingly clear about his intentions. He has disavowed

the prospect of a Palestinian state, which he has sought to prevent

throughout his political career, deeming it a threat to Israel’s ex-

istence.

During the first Israeli election campaign in 2019, he

pledged to annex illegal settlements in the West Bank, including

isolated ones outside the main settlement blocs.

While unfulfilled

election promises abound in Israel and Netanyahu has previous-

ly blocked legislation aimed at annexation, if his political survival

were at stake that may change his calculus. Such a decision would

be consistent with Likud party policy, whose central committee in

December 2017 voted unanimously in favor of the “free construc-

tion and application of Israeli law and sovereignty in all liberated

areas of settlement” in the West Bank, in other words annexation.

As Ron Skolnik has argued, Israel’s nation-state law has laid

the constitutional groundwork for these policies. The first arti-

cle states, “The Land of Israel, in which the State of Israel arose,

is the historic homeland of the Jewish people.” In line with the

longstanding Likud party platform, this suggests a territorial claim

beyond Israel’s current legal boundaries. The distinction between

the Land and the State has always been blurred, since Israel does

Under signicant pressure from the Obama administration, he did endorse the idea of

a Palestinian state in his 2009 Bar-Ilan speech, but with preconditions that circumscribed

sovereignty. is approach has also been described as a ‘state-minus’. See Neill Lochery, e

Resistible Rise of Benjamin Netanyahu (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 278-281

David M. Halbnger, “Netanyahu Vows to Start Annexing West Bank, in Bid to Rally

the Right,” e New York Times, April 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/

world/middleeast/netanyahu-annex-west-bank.html.

David M. Halbnger, ‘Emboldened Israeli Right Presses Moves to Doom 2-State

Solution’, e New York Times, January 1, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2DLmaOC; Daoud Kuttab,

‘Trump’s Jerusalem decision opens Israeli expansionism oodgates’, Al Monitor, 04/01/2018.

Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/israel-likud-an-

nex-west-bank-settlments-palestine.html.

166 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

not accept that the West Bank is occupied territory.

While the

law does not explicitly reject the possibility of a Palestinian state

in that it states that the right to self-determination in the State of

Israel – as opposed to the Land of Israel – is unique to the Jewish

people, the trajectory towards annexation may render this distinc-

tion moot.

If the rumors surrounding the political component of the

Trump administration’s peace plan are true, then there can be lit-

tle doubt that a majority of member states, led by countries like

France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United

Kingdom will reject it as it is likely to deviate from longstanding

EU positions. It remains to be seen whether the Visegrad group or

others would be willing to scupper a unanimous rejection of the

plan. As the Czech Republic argued, their potential recognition

of West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel could fit within the EU’s

two-state vision, but a peace plan that does not specify a Palestin-

ian state as a goal is less easily reconciled.

The most likely candidate to deviate from consensus remains

Hungary. During a meeting of the UN Security Council on April

29, 2019, Finland’s representative criticized Israeli behavior to-

wards the Palestinians, including in East Jerusalem, on behalf of

the EU despite a last-minute Hungarian objection. The incident,

which one frustrated EU diplomat blamed on “Hungarian intran-

sigence”, has prompted renewed discussion of a move away from a

consensus system toward one of qualified majority voting on EU

foreign policy, which would constitute a major change in inter-

Ron Skolnik, “Israel’s Nationality Law lays ground for West Bank annexation,”

Al-Monitor, August 9, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/israel-na-

tionality-law-netanyahu-annexation-west-bank.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 167

nal EU decision-making procedures.

However, the EU was able

to issue a statement on June 1, 2019, criticizing Israeli plans for

new construction in Jewish settlements Ramot and Pisgat Zeev

in East Jerusalem, suggesting that Hungarian opposition to such

statements is not uniform and may rely on broader political con-

siderations.

No explanation was provided for the objection on

April 29.

CONCLUSION

The EU will not change its policy on either Jerusalem or the two-

state solution to suit the Trump administration, Israel, or the Viseg-

rad group. Unless the decision-making system changes, the future

will continue to be one of fracture and division, with statements

critical of changes to the status of Jerusalem likely to be blocked.

The EU will not take a position that violates or undermines inter-

national law unless it is agreed between Israelis and Palestinians,

and the domestic political dynamics that determine the Visegrad

group’s relations with Israel and their position on Jerusalem are not

uniform but also seem unlikely to change in the near future.

If Trump’s plan does indeed abandon the idea of a Palestinian

state with a capital in East Jerusalem, the important question is

what practical steps would the EU be able to take to wield the

substantial leverage it holds over Israel and avert the collapse of the

two-state paradigm? With the Visegrad group and others reluctant

to place any economic or political pressure on Israel, the prospects

Andrew Rettman, “EU ignores Hungary veto on Israel, posing wider questions,” EU-

observer, May 1, 2019, https://euobserver.com/foreign/144768

“EU slams Israel’s planned East Jerusalem constructon as ‘obstacle to peace’,” e

Tmes of Israel, June 1, 2019, https://www.tmesofsrael.com/eu-slams-sraels-planned-e-

ast-jerusalem-constructon-as-obstacle-to-peace/

Rettman, “EU ignores Hungary”

168 / THE EUROPEAn (DIS)UnIOn On JERUSALEM

are not encouraging without changes in EU foreign policy making.

Moreover, Israel will do whatever it can to undercut any such steps.

As one Israeli official has put it, “we do our utmost to make sure

that the Eurosceptic countries … fight on any possible issue with

the other EU members, so that the Union heads for a crash-land-

ing.”

If this strategy continues to be successful, it would represent

a crash-landing not just for the EU, but for its preferred policy, the

two-state solution and a shared capital in Jerusalem.

Pardo and Gordon, “Euroscepticism as Foreign Policy,” 407

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 169

TURKEY’S

GLOBAL ACTIVISM AND

LEADERSHIP ON TRUMP’S

JERUSALEM MOVE

KADIR USTUN

Executive Director,

The SETA Foundation at Washington, DC

KILIÇ B. KANAT

Research Director,

The SETA Foundation at Washington, DC

CHAPTER 6

170 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

INTRODUCTION

Turkey’s policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian issue has tradition-

ally been to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict through

a two-state solution. At the same time, it is no secret that Turkey

has often highlighted the plight of the Palestinians and the injus-

tice of occupation. This approach has broadly remained consistent

throughout the terms of various governments for many decades.

In 1980, for instance, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic mission to

Israel to the ambassadorial level only to downgrade it in the same

year when Israel announced its annexation of East Jerusalem and

declared Jerusalem its “eternal capital.”

Moments of robust inter-

national efforts to create a peaceful and equitable solution to the

conflict opened up space for Turkish leadership to develop, albeit

limited cooperation with Israel.

In the 1990s, mutual threat perceptions in the region enabled

security and defense cooperation. Turkish leaders judged that co-

operating with Israel would bring additional benefits such as the

political influence of Israel in the U.S. Despite such areas of coop-

eration, however, Turkey remained sensitive to any deterioration in

the conflict, especially to Israel’s heavy-handed treatment of Pales-

“13 Key Moments in Turkish-Israeli Relations,” TRT World, 27 June 2016, https://

www.trtworld.com/in-depth/14-things-about-turkish-israeli-relations-you-didnt-

know-93510.

CHAPTER 6

171

172 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

tinians. Much of the literature on Israel-Turkey relations places an

outsized emphasis on what some scholars consider the emergence

of “Islamist” politicians in Turkey, no matter how pragmatic they

might be, as the main factor for the deterioration of bilateral re-

lations.

They often take it for granted that Turkish governments,

right or left, have had to answer to their constituencies about the

relationship with Israel while occupation continued unabated and

even deepened over the years.

This chapter analyzes successive Turkish governments’ policy

on Jerusalem within the broader framework of the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict. By discussing the pre-AK Party period, albeit briefly, this

study aims to show that continuities in Turkey’s policy toward Israel

are significant. Surely, this is not to deny the significance of much

bolder and increasingly vocal reaction of AK Party governments un-

der the leadership of President Erdoğan over the past two decades.

On the contrary, Turkey has become a major advocate for the Pal-

estinian cause in this time period in a much more effective and in-

dependent manner in recent years. Turkish foreign policy’s growing

global activism has certainly contributed to this development. While

remaining active and engaged with the Western dominated interna-

tional fora, Turkey has increasingly positioned itself as the voice of

the disadvantaged and the wronged. As the Palestinian cause persists

as a major concern for the Turkish public opinion, Turkey’s foreign

policy remains highly sensitive to the ups and downs in the peace

process. This chapter attempts to contextualize Turkey’s activism on

Jerusalem within these broader national and international trends

that have been under way over the past several decades.

Bishku, Michael B. “How Has Turkey Viewed Israel?” Israel Aairs, 12:1, 177-194.

Aviv, Efrat. “e Turkish government’s attitude to Israel and Zionism as reected in Israel’s

military operations 2000–2010.” Israel Aairs, 25:2, 281-306. Inbar, Efraim. “Israeli-Turkish

Tensions and their International Ramications.” Orbis 55(1):132-146, December 2011.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 173

TURKISH-ISRAELI PARTNERSHIP OF THE 1990s

With the end of the Cold War, geopolitical shifts created new risks

and opportunities while spurring the formation of new allianc-

es throughout the region. The First Gulf War demonstrated the

dangers of shifting military and political balances in the Middle

East, as it resulted in heightened security concerns for Turkey. Syr-

ia’s support for a variety of terror organizations was extended to

the PKK, which was conducting major terrorist activities inside

Turkey. Israel also focused on security risks coming from Iraq and

Syria, creating a strong incentive for the military establishments

in both countries to increase their security cooperation. Turkey

found it easier to purchase advanced weapons systems from Israel

and hoped to benefit from Israeli influence in Washington as well.

Military figures that could be considered architects of the Turk-

ish-Israeli relationship of the 1990s characterized the partnership

as “ties between these two countries—democratic, pro-Western,

non-Arab—could provide the Middle East with stabilizing ballast,

which is now a vital interest of the West.”

Some public intellectuals criticized the fact that the relation-

ship with Israel had not been subjected to sufficient public scruti-

ny and could be detrimental to Turkey’s ties with regional powers

such as Iran and Egypt.

Many quarters showed skepticism about

heightened levels of military-to-military cooperation between the

Kanat, Kilic B, and Hannon, Jackson. “Turkey-Israel Relations in the New Era: Op-

portunities and Challenges.” Mediterranean Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2017): 64–86. https://muse.

jhu.edu/article/693128.

Bir, Çevik and Sherman, Martin. “Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel,” Middle

East Quarterly, Fall 2002, pp. 23-32.

Çandar, Cengiz. “e Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Triangle.” e Washington Institute for Near

East Policy, e Special Policy Reform Report 249, 15 March 2000. https://www.washing-

toninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-turkish-israeli-syrian-triangle.

174 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

two countries especially because they remained within the pur-

view of the Turkish military without civilian input or decision

making. In fact, the Turkish “government and the state bureaucra-

cy have preferred to downplay the significance of ties with Israel.”

Nevertheless, the onset of the peace process following the Oslo

Accords between Israelis and Palestinians made political situation

somewhat easier at home. By the late 1990s, the relationship had

already been upgraded to a strategic partnership, rationalized in

part by the need to respond to emerging alliances in the region,

such as the military training agreement between Syria and Greece.

The PKK terrorism reached the highest levels of violence

in the early 1990s, as Turkey started its intelligence and securi-

ty cooperation with Israel. In March of 1996, Turkish President

Süleyman Demirel became the first Turkish head of state to visit

Jerusalem since the establishment of the state of Israel. Although

Demirel had been scheduled to visit Israel in the fall of 1995, his

trip was canceled because of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in

November 1995. Demirel visited Israel in the context of suicide

bombings against the country, which triggered a one-day sum-

mit in Egypt to show a common front against terrorism. Some 27

countries agreed to join the summit with U.S. President Clinton at

the forefront of the effort. While a large number of Arab countries

joined the summit, Syria and Lebanon declined the invitation.

Having condemned the attacks on Israel, President Demirel com-

Kibaroglu, Mustafa. “Turkey and Israel Strategize.” Middle East Quarterly 9, no. 1 (Jan-

uary 1, 2002): 61–65.

Tür, Özlem. “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conict.” Israel

Studies 17, no. 3 (2012): 45-66. p.47.

Purdum, Todd S. “Summit in Egypt: e Overview; World Leaders Join in a Condemna-

tion of Terrorism.” e New York Times, 14 March 1996, www.nytimes.com/1996/03/14/world/

summit-in-egypt-the-overview-world-leaders-join-in-a-condemnation-of-terrorism.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 175

mented, “we wish to see Syria and Lebanon take their place in this

positive trend.”

In the context of a common front against terror-

ism, President Demirel touted the potential for a good relationship

between Israel and Turkey:

a hgh level of economc development, a democratc system and

a smlarty n global and regonal affars form a hard bass for

mutual cooperaton.

The collapse of peace negotiations between Israel and the

Palestinians resulted in the emergence of the Second Intifada,

which in turn, triggered a crisis in the Turkish-Israeli relation-

ship. In April of 2002, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit accused

Israel of committing genocide against Palestinians. Ecevit also

claimed that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had told him in De-

cember of 2001 that Sharon wanted to get rid of the Palestinian

leader Yasser Arafat, proven by the Israel’s ongoing heavy-handed

operations. At the time of Ecevit’s genocide statement, Turkish

citizens were in the streets demonstrating against Israeli opera-

tions, dubbed Operation Defensive Shield, in the context of the

Second Intifada. Some have dismissed it as Prime Minister Ecevit

playing to the domestic public opinion, however, Turkey’s sensi-

tivity for the Palestinian issue was unmistakable. Ahmet Necdet

Sezer, the strongly secularist Turkish President at the time, joined

Prime Minister Ecevit in condemning the Israeli operations,

which speaks to the power of public outrage. This also under-

scores the fact that the strength of the Turkish-Israeli relationship

has often been underwritten by the trajectory of the Israeli-Pales-

tinian peace process.

“Turkish President Visits Israel.” UPI, 11 March 1996, www.upi.com/Ar-

chives/1996/03/11/Turkish-president-visits-Israel/6052403801629/.

Ibid.

176 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

THE AK PARTY YEARS

During the AK Party government years in the early part of the

2000s, Turkish foreign policy assumed a whole new posture in the

region. The September 11 attacks brought U.S. allies and partners

together in an unprecedented manner. Turkey was in full support

of the U.S. pursuing terrorists as it had heavily suffered from ter-

rorism in the previous decade. The invasion of Afghanistan did not

find many detractors around the world. When it came to the inva-

sion of Iraq, however, the international public opinion was deeply

skeptical. Turkish parliament narrowly denied access to U.S. forces

to invade Iraq from the north largely as a result of public pressure.

The lesson learned for Turkey at this moment proved to be that it

could no longer simply align its foreign policy with the West. As a

result, Turkey increased its regional posture in the form of robust

diplomacy. Turkey had already forced Syria to kick out the leader

of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, and arrested him with the apparent

help of the U.S. intelligence. With the change in Syrian leadership

from Hafez Assad to his seemingly reformist son Bashar Assad,

time seemed ripe for a new opening with Syria.

Turkey quickly developed a close relationship with Syria and

used its diplomatic clout to broker a deal between Syria and Israel.

Prime Minister Erdoğan invested a lot of time and energy to devel-

op a close relationship with Syria and leverage it for peace. While

the Second Intifada had not produced the results that Palestinians

hoped for, violence was subsiding in the mid-2000s. Given his

personal, diplomatic, and political investment in finding a resolu-

tion to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Erdoğan’s efforts culminated

in a visit to Israel in the wake of the Israeli decision to withdraw

from Gaza. Erdoğan once again underlined the relevance of the

peace process for the improvement of bilateral Turkish-Israeli ties,

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 177

“I came here to contribute to the peace process.”

Erdoğan’s visit

came on the heels of a series of visits by high profile world leaders

to Israel as the geopolitics seemed to be shifting. Turkey was not

interested in missing the boat and it seemed to be the right time to

engage with both Syria and Israel to broker peace between the two

parties. As Turkey had increased its regional diplomatic activism

and a new opening for peace was on the horizon, Turkish-Israeli

relations were, once again, on a positive note. The next few years

would witness Turkish government’s diplomacy and Erdoğan’s per-

sonal investment in striking a peace deal between Syria and Israel.

However, Turkish efforts under the leadership of Erdoğan

came to a halt when Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against

Gaza in 2008, right when a Syria-Israel peace deal seemed immi-

nent. Erdoğan was deeply disturbed by the Israeli behavior and

came out with very strong words for the Israeli leadership. The

infamous Davos crisis ensued in 2009 when Erdoğan minced no

words for the Israeli President Shimon Peres and walked off the

stage.

In May of 2010, the Mavi Marmara incident, where 9

Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli security forces, represented

the height of Turkish-Israeli tensions, as the Turkish public was

outraged and turned against Israel.

The relationship appeared

beyond repair at the time and the U.S. tried to mediate between

the two sides for the next several years. Turkish diplomacy sought

to isolate Israel in international fora while downgrading its rela-

Myre, Greg. “Turkish Leader Visits Israel, Restoring Friendly Ties.” e New York

Times, 2 May 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/05/02/world/middleeast/turkish-leader-vis-

its-israel-restoring-friendly-ties.html.

“Recep Erdoğan Storms out of Davos after Clash with Israeli President over Gaza.” e

Guardian, 30 January 2009, www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/30/turkish-prime-min-

ister-gaza-davos.

Kučera, P. “Israel and Turkey: From Realpolitik to Rhetoric?” Central European

Journal of International and Security Studies 8, no. 2 (2014): 75–95.

178 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

tionship and halting all military and security cooperation mecha-

nisms. This episode showed once again that any deterioration in

the plight of the Palestinians would result in a Turkish reaction

against Israel’s policies.

Some scholars have argued that the crisis was a result of the AK

Party government’s pursuit of an “Islamist foreign policy,”

howev-

er, such arguments take for granted the long-standing tradition of

supporting Palestine by different governments of various ideologi-

cal backgrounds. Others have labeled the harsh rhetoric coming out

of Ankara “brinkmanship” and qualified Turkish efforts as “theat-

rical” while presenting the emerging tensions as a result of Turkey’s

neo-Ottoman ambitions.

These arguments similarly underesti-

mate the fact that continued sympathy for the cause of Palestine

combined with domestic political outrage over the killing of Turk-

ish citizens in international waters created an extremely powerful

incentive to push against Israel. If anything, Turkish politicians gave

a chance to diplomatic initiatives by the U.S. and the UN’s Palmer

report to be completed before taking definitive steps.

Following the fallout of the bilateral relationship, Turkish

Foreign Ministry regularly denounced Israeli settlement expan-

sion activities in East Jerusalem. In December of 2009, for ex-

ample, the Foreign Ministry expressed concern about “Israel’s an-

nouncement that nearly 700 settlement units will be constructed

in East Jerusalem.” Calling such actions contradictory to inter-

national law, Turkey called on Israel to refrain from “unilateral

steps regarding such issues that will be taken up in the final status

Banu Eligür (2012) Crisis in Turkish–Israeli Relations (December 2008–June 2011):

From Partnership to Enmity, Middle Eastern Studies, 48:3, 429-459.

Ben Lombardi. “Turkey & Israel Brinkmanship & e Grand Strategy of the Erdoğan

Government.” Levantine Review 1, no. 1 (1 May 2012): 7–22.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 179

negotiations.”

In December of 2012, Ankara condemned the

newly announced Israeli settlement plans for 1,500 apartments

in East Jerusalem by stating, “we harshly condemn this manner

of Israel, which deliberately damages the ground for a permanent

and just peace in the region through illegal settlement activities

that overstep international law.”

Such declarations had been re-

peated many times, pointing to Turkey’s consistent commitment

to the US-backed peace process framework that saw the resolution

of the status of Jerusalem as part of the final status negotiations.

This continuous and firm commitment to the parameters of the

peace process represented the backbone of Turkish diplomacy,

with Turkish politicians mincing no words for what was seen as

Israel’s heavy-handed treatment of Palestinians and violations of

the peace process.

In addition to calling out Israel on its security operations, Tur-

key was especially sensitive to violence in and around holy sites in

Jerusalem. In the context of the collapse of peace talks between

Israel and the Palestinian Authority in April of 2014, renewed vi-

olence and clashes between Israeli security forces and the Palestin-

ian civilians

drew Turkey’s ire. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan was

particularly vocal over Israel’s military operations in Gaza and the

holy sites in East Jerusalem, restricting the access and movement

of Muslim worshipers. Erdoğan spoke out against such moves and

“From Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Aairs.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of For-

eign Aairs, 29 December 2009, www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-242_-29-december-2009_-press-re-

lease-regarding-the-israel_s-announcement-that-settlement-units-will-be-constructed-in-

east-jerusalem.en.mfa.

“Ankara Condemns Israeli Settlement Plan.” Hurriyet Daily News, 20 December 2012,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-condemns-israeli-settlement-plan-37246.

“Israeli-Palestinian Violence in 2014 – Timeline.” e Guardian, 18 November 2014,

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/18/israel-palestinian-violence-timeline.

180 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

emphasized that attacking the Masjid al-Aqsa in the city was like

attacking the Kaaba in Mecca, the holiest site for Muslims. By em-

phasizing the importance of Masjid al-Aqsa as a holy site not only

for Palestinians but for all Muslims, President Erdoğan continued

his efforts to highlight the centrality of Jerusalem for the Muslim

world as a whole.

The religious significance of Israeli settlement

plans as well as consideration of various laws in the Israeli parlia-

ment, including one restricting call for prayers in mosques,

con-

tinued to be the source of Turkish criticism up until today.

In the meantime, U.S. efforts to find a rapprochement through

an Israeli apology and compensation for the Mavi Marmara vic-

tims continued. President Obama was finally able to convince Is-

raeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to deliver the apology

during a visit to Israel at the end of 2013. However, despite several

news reports about restoring ties,

a final deal was announced in

June 2016 that involved an Israeli apology, compensation for the

victims, and humanitarian aid for Gaza. Since the Mavi Marmara

incident in May of 2010, the economic and civilian relationship

between the two countries continued, albeit in a less than robust

fashion. It is important to note that even the apology deal did not

prevent Turkey from highlighting the plight of the Palestinians

and opposing Israeli policies aimed at deepening and making per-

manent the occupation. This policy of continued support for the

Palestinian cause and Jerusalem remained a constant even after

“Turkey Declares Protecting Al-Aqsa Its Mission.” Hurriyet Daily News, 8 November

2014, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-declares-protecting-al-aqsa-its-mission-74043.

“We Won’t Allow Call for Morning Prayers to Be Silenced in Jerusalem: Turkey’s Er-

doğan.” Hurriyet Daily News, 8 May 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-wont-al-

low-call-for-morning-prayers-to-be-silenced-in-jerusalem-turkeys-Erdoğan-112878.

“Israel and Turkey Agree to Restore Diplomatic Ties.” e New York Times, 17 December

2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/middleeast/israel-turkey-mavi-marmara-gaza.html.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 181

the Israeli apology and throughout both the Obama and Trump

administrations.

TURKEY’S ACTIVISM AGAINST

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

Donald Trump had openly expressed his intention on the cam-

paign trail during the 2016 U.S. presidential race to recognize Je-

rusalem as Israel’s capital and move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv

to Jerusalem.

While this was a policy legislated by U.S. Congress

in 1995,

it was not implemented by subsequent administrations

as it would damage the prospects of the peace process. Every U.S.

administration since then had adopted the policy of leaving the

status of Jerusalem to final negotiations. President Trump was in-

tent on keeping his promise largely for domestic political reasons

such as playing to his evangelical base and receiving unconditional

support from pro-Israel lobbying groups as well as the Netanyahu

government by moving the U.S. embassy to “the eternal capital of

the Jewish people.”

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

was already turning the support for Israel in U.S. politics into a

partisan issue with his close relationship with U.S. evangelicals and

Republican candidates during the Obama administration. Trump’s

pronouncements on Jerusalem in addition to his strong support

for Netanyahu were a dream come true for the Israeli government,

serving to reverse decades of U.S. policy on final status negotia-

“Donald Trump to Netanyahu: Jerusalem Is Israel’s Capital.” Time, 26 September

2016, www.time.com/4507432/donald-trump-israel-jerusalem-capital-netanyahu/.

Dole, and Robert J. “S.1322 - 104th Congress (1995-1996): Jerusalem Embassy Act

of 1995.” Congress.gov, 8 November 1995, www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/sen-

ate-bill/1322.

Moten, Abdul Rashid. “US Embassy in Jerusalem: Reasons, Implications and Conse-

quences.” Intellectual Discourse 26 (1), 5-22. https://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/

index.php/islam/article/view/1112. p.13.

182 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

tions. However, the embassy move served to isolate the Israeli gov-

ernment and the U.S. administration in the international arena.

Turkey was quick to play a leading role in mobilizing the in-

ternational reaction against such a consequential and potentially

dangerous move. Prior to President Trump’s Jerusalem decision,

President Erdoğan warned his counterpart by calling Jerusalem a

“red line” for Muslims.

France, the EU, Arab League, Saudi Ara-

bia, and Egypt all warned against the detrimental impact of such

a move but the Turkish President was the most vocal one on the

issue.

Immediately following Trump’s Jerusalem declaration, Tur-

key led the effort to create a voice of unity among Islamic countries

by bringing together Muslim leaders at an emergency meeting of

Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in Turkey on December

13, 2017.

Representatives of 57 member countries attended the

extraordinary summit to discuss a single agenda item: “the U.S.

decision to recognize Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel

and to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.”

Leading the

calls for recognition of Palestine as a state in response to President

Trump’s Jerusalem decision, President Erdoğan also declared that

Turkey intended to open an embassy to Palestine in East Jerusa-

lem.

This could, in fact, mean the end of Turkey’s decades old

“Jerusalem: Turkey Warns Trump against Crossing ‘Red Line’.” BBC News, 5 De-

cember 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42232158.

“Turkey Taking ‘Strongest’ Stance against Jerusalem Move.” Anadolu Ajansı, www.

aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-taking-strongest-stance-against-jerusalem-move/992515.

“Turkey Calls for Recognition of East Jerusalem as Capital of Palestine.” TRT World,

19 December 2017, www.trtworld.com/jerusalem/turkey-calls-for-recognition-of-east-jeru-

salem-as-capital-of-palestine-13253.

Kireçci M. Akif. “Turkey’s Leadership in the Jerusalem Crisis.” Insight Turkey 20, no.

2 (2018): 67-79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26390308.

“Turkey Hopes to Open Embassy in East Jerusalem, Says Erdoğan.” e Guardian, 17

December 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/17/turkey-hopes-open-embas-

sy-east-jerusalem-Erdoğan.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 183

diplomatic position that the status of Jerusalem should be decid-

ed as part of the final status negotiations. Erdoğan called on “all

countries supporting international law to recognize Jerusalem as

the occupied capital of Palestine.”

Turkey also bolstered its diplomatic efforts to bring together

an emergency session at the United Nations. Faced with the pros-

pect of international isolation, the Trump administration threat-

ened countries intending to vote in favor of condemning the U.S.

decision.

Ahead of the vote on Trump’s Jerusalem decision at the

UN, Erdoğan strongly criticized the Trump administration who

was threatening to cut aid to countries voting against the U.S.

declaration. Erdoğan said, “Mr. Trump, you cannot buy Turkey’s

democratic will with your dollars.”

The final tally of the UN vote

(128-9) in the emergency session

that rejected the U.S. decision

on Jerusalem proved to be a diplomatic disaster in the form of clear

international isolation for the Trump administration. President Er-

doğan led the international efforts to condemn the Trump admin-

istration’s Jerusalem decision at the UN at a time when Turkey was

still interested in repairing ties with the U.S. after the last couple

of troubling years with the Obama administration. This willing-

ness to confront the U.S. in the international arena indicates the

significance of Jerusalem for the Turkish leadership as well as for

the Turkish public.

“Muslim Leaders Call on World to Recognize East Jerusalem as Palestinian Capital.”

Reuters, 13 December 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel-oic/muslim-lead-

ers-call-on-world-to-recognize-east-jerusalem-as-palestinian-capital-idUSKBN1E70KM.

“UN Jerusalem Vote: US ‘Will Be Taking Names’.” BBC News, 20 December 2017,

www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42424666.

“Erdoğan Says U.S. Can’t Buy Turkish Support on Jerusalem.” Reuters, 21 December

2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel-turkey-idUSKBN1EF1I3.

“UN Votes 128-9 to Reject US Decision on Jerusalem.” Deutsche Welle, 21 December

2017. www.dw.com/en/un-votes-128-9-to-reject-us-decision-on-jerusalem/a-41892757.

184 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

In addition to the OIC and UN meetings, President Erdoğan

raised the issue at every opportunity while lobbying world leaders

including the Pope.

Despite past criticism of the Pope for some of

his remarks on the events of 1915, Turkey found common ground

on the issue of Jerusalem with the leader of the Catholic Church,

who agreed that any change to the status of the city should be

avoided. The Jerusalem issue was so central that President Er-

doğan’s visit to the Vatican was the first by a Turkish president

since 1959.

Erdoğan continued to raise the profile of the Jerusa-

lem issue in order to rally support against the U.S. administration’s

decision. The Turkish leadership on the issue made some of the

Arab countries including Jordan and Saudi Arabia uncomfortable,

according to news reports, as they worried that Turkey’s influence

in East Jerusalem was increasing and it was forcing these countries

to take a stronger stance. The somewhat formalistic objections to

Trump’s decision by these countries were widely perceived as pay-

ing lip service

in contrast to vocal Turkish criticisms. According

to some scholars, the majority of Arab states did not ultimately

care about Trump’s decision as they were more concerned with

their mutual regional priorities with Israel, such as Iran, the Mus-

lim Brotherhood, and the Arab Spring.

The Israeli leadership was

also reportedly worried about increased Turkish financial support

“Turkish President Heads to Italy to Discuss Jerusalem with Pope.” Reuters, omson

Reuters, 4 February 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-pope-turkey-idUSKBN1FO0QK.

“Pope, Erdoğan Discuss Shared Opposition to U.S. Move on Jerusalem.” e Wall

Street Journal, 5 February 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pope-Erdoğan-discuss-shared-

opposition-to-u-s-move-on-jerusalem-1517847626.

Efron, Shira, e Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations. RAND Corporation, 2018.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2445.html. p.31

Hamid, Shadi. “e Jerusalem announcement won’t really hurt America’s Arab alliances.”

Markaz, e Brookings Institutions, 7 December 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/

markaz/2017/12/07/the-jerusalem-announcement-wont-really-hurt-americas-arab-alliances/.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 185

as well as Turkish citizens traveling to East Jerusalem to join the

pro-Palestinian protests.

Turkey’s activism was not limited to international diplomacy

but included direct pressure, as the Turkish leadership had threat-

ened to “cut ties with Israel if necessary” shortly before President

Trump’s Jerusalem decision.

Some Israeli leaders dismissed Tur-

key’s stance and personally attacked President Erdoğan, claim-

ing that Jerusalem had been the capital of Israel for thousands of

years.

Unfazed by such criticism, Turkey continued its pressure

campaign and recalled its ambassadors to Israel as well as the U.S.

in the wake of the opening of the American embassy in Jerusalem

and the killing of dozens of Palestinian protesters by Israeli military

forces.

Calling President Trump’s decision a “huge mistake” and

seeing “nothing to gain” by the move, President Erdoğan said, “East

Jerusalem is the capital city of Palestine.” He pointed out the inter-

national opposition to the move by stating that “the United States

is losing true friends right now.”

In the midst of violence on the

ground sparked by the opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem

“Turkey’s Strongman Tries to Overtake Saudi Arabia as Biggest Champion of Palestin-

ians.” Newsweek, 29 June 2018, www.newsweek.com/turkey-strongman-Erdoğan-tries-over-

take-saudi-arabia-palestinians-biggest-1002698.

“Will Erdoğan cut ties with Israel over Jerusalem?” Al Jazeera English, 14 December

2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/words-Erdoğan-jerusalem-is-

rael-171212113605165.html.

“Israel hits back at Turkish leader over threat to sever ties.” Times of Israel, 5 December

2017, https://www.timesosrael.com/israel-hits-back-at-turkish-leader-over-threat-to-sever-

ties/. See also Landau, Noa, and Reuters. “Israel Fires Back at Turkey: Jerusalem Has Been the

Jewish Capital for 3,000 Years.” Haaretz.com, 24 April 2018, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/

israel-jerusalem-has-been-the-jewish-capital-for-3-000-years-1.5627774.

“Turkey recalls ambassadors to Israel and United States.” Al Jazeera News, 14 May

2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/turkey-recalls-ambassadors-israel-unit-

ed-states-180514200635590.html.

“Erdoğan Calls Jerusalem US Embassy Move ‘Huge Mistake’.” CNN, 9 May 2018,

www.cnn.com/2018/05/09/europe/Erdoğan-interview-becky-anderson-intl/index.html.

186 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

and during a press conference alongside the British Prime Minister

Theresa May during his visit to the U.K., President Erdoğan said:

The US clams to be powerful. You are powerful, but you are

not rght. Hstory wll not forgve you. Ths s the fact that we

wll observe n the future … Israel wll not be forgven. That’s

what we are gong to wtness n the future too. It all bols down

to the fact of makng a choce – are we gong to sde wth the

strong or sde wth those who are rght?

Turkey continued to take every opportunity to highlight its

strong stance on Jerusalem around the world. For example, in sup-

port of the reversal of Paraguay’s decision to move its embassy to

Jerusalem, Turkey decided to open an embassy in Paraguay.

another occasion, in March of 2019, the Turkish Foreign Min-

istry criticized several country representatives’ statements of in-

tent to move their embassies to Jerusalem made during an AIPAC

conference in Washington.

In June of 2019, Turkey, once again,

harshly criticized Israel’s announcement of further settlement ac-

tivity in East Jerusalem. Interestingly, in this instance, the Turkish

Foreign Ministry’s statement qualified the settlement announce-

ment in the context of Israel’s “aim to erode the status of Jerusalem

and destroy the vision for a two-state solution.”

Official Turkish

“Turkish President Erdoğan Says ‘History Will Judge’ US Decision to Move Israeli

Embassy.” e Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 16 May 2018, www.inde-

pendent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/turkey-Erdoğan-us-theresa-may-press-conference-israe-

li-embassy-human-rights-a8353321.html.

“Turkey to open Paraguay embassy after policy shift on Israeli capital.” Reuters, 6 Sep-

tember 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-paraguay-turkey/turkey-to-open-para-

guay-embassy-after-policy-shift-on-israeli-capital-idUSKCN1LM33H.

“Turkey Voices Concern over Proposed Jerusalem Embassy Moves.” Daily Sabah, 25

March 2019, www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/03/25/turkey-voices-concern-over-pro-

posed-jerusalem-embassy-moves.

“Turkey Slams Illegal Israeli Settlement in E. Jerusalem.” Anadolu Ajansı, 1 June 2019,

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-slams-illegal-israeli-settlement-in-e-jeru-

salem/1495022.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 187

statements usually condemned settlement activity as an obstacle

to a two-state solution but ever since the Trump administration’s

embassy decision, Turkey has perceived these efforts as tied to the

status of Jerusalem as well.

While the international debate on Jerusalem has waned and

the Arab world leaders continue to sidestep the issue in order

not to damage their relationship with the Trump administration,

President Erdoğan continues to highlight the issue as well as the

Israeli occupation while maintaining a good personal relationship

with President Trump. Rejecting what he called a “fait accompli

in Jerusalem,” Erdoğan highlighted the issue again in Tajikistan’s

capital Dushanbe during an international gathering.

Most re-

cently, in September of 2019, President Erdoğan devoted a sig-

nificant portion of his address to the UN General Assembly to

criticism of Israel’s continued occupation and settlement activity

in Palestine. Erdoğan said:

Where are the borders of the State of Israel? Is t the 1948 bor-

ders, the 1967 borders, or s there any other border? … How

can the Golan Heghts and the West Bank settlements be sezed,

just lke other occuped Palestnan terrtores, before the eyes of

the world f they are not wthn the borders of ths state? … Tur-

key wll contnue to stand by the oppressed people of Palestne

as t has always done so untl today.

Turkey condemns Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes.” Anadolu Ajansı, 23 July

2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-condemns-israeli-demolition-of-pales-

tinian-homes/1539475.

“Turkey rejects ‘fait accompli’ in Jerusalem: Erdoğan.” Daily Sabah, 15 June 2019,

https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/06/15/turkey-rejects-fait-accompli-in-jerusa-

lem-Erdoğan.

“Erdoğan’s Historic Palestine Speech at UN Echoes Worldwide.” Daily Sabah, 26 Sep-

tember 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/09/26/Erdoğans-historic-pales-

tine-speech-at-un-echoes-worldwide.

188 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

CONCLUSION

This chapter has outlined the evolution of Turkey’s Israel policy

over the past several decades with a particular focus on the status of

Jerusalem. I have argued that the issue of Palestine has been a high-

ly sensitive topic for the Turkish public and the bilateral relations

between Turkey and Israel have been punctuated by developments

in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. These have served as con-

stant features of the bilateral ties regardless of which Turkish gov-

ernment was in power. At the same time, the increasing strength

and influence of Turkish foreign policy in the region in the past

two decades have made the Turkish approach to the issue much

more relevant. While Turkey tried to play the role of a mediator

between Syria and Israel in the early 2000s, the failure of Turkish

efforts as a result of Israel’s Cast Lead Operation in 2008 led to

consistently vocal criticism of Israel’s settlement activities in the

ensuing decade.

By the time President Trump had announced his intention to

declare Jerusalem the capital of Israel and move the U.S. embassy

to the city, Turkey had been at loggerheads with Israel for several

years. The Mavi Marmara incident in May of 2010 could only be

resolved in 2016, and even then, there was no love lost between

the two sides. Economic relations persisted but Turkey continued

its international critique of Israel’s actions on the ground. Mu-

tual areas of interest in the energy arena were explored but there

did not seem to be any serious push to strengthen the relation-

ship. President Trump’s Jerusalem decision and the embassy move

made the Turkish-Israeli relationship even more difficult. Turkey

recalled its ambassador to Israel and the U.S. demonstrating the

significance of the issue for the Turkish leadership. Just as Turkey

was vocal about Israel’s settlement activity and continued occu-

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 189

pation, Trump’s decision was met with a highly energized diplo-

matic effort by President Erdoğan to rally the international com-

munity against the fait accompli. All this was happening while the

US-Turkey relationship was experiencing several serious tensions

due to the two countries’ Syria policies and a host of bilateral legal

issues. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 systems was also mak-

ing things complicated for Trump in his dealings with the U.S.

Congress. Erdoğan was unfazed when it came to Jerusalem and

he led the efforts to isolate and condemn this decision in various

international fora.

President Trump’s Jerusalem decision triggered protests on the

ground, resulting in the loss of many Palestinian lives killed by

Israeli security forces. Palestinians were not interested in calling

for another Intifada over the issue, as Israel had already become a

de facto apartheid and calls for a one-state solution were already

on the rise. The opposition to Trump’s decision by the Arab world

leaders and Europe seemed to lack muscle to be able to coordinate

a significant international effort that could reverse the decision. In

contrast, Turkey has been highlighting the issue at every opportu-

nity. In President Erdoğan’s statements, Jerusalem does not feature

as simply a negotiation item in the peace process but a holy site

that all Muslims have a duty to protect. His efforts to both inter-

nationalize the issue and make it a top agenda item for the Muslim

countries have borne fruit in terms of creating a diplomatic com-

mon front. Declaring East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine has

become another consistent theme and bolsters the position of the

Palestinians in the future.

Clearly, a resolution of the conflict has never appeared so far

out of reach as today. Nevertheless, Turkey’s leadership on the issue

has brought much exposure and clarity to the issue, preventing

190 / TURkEy’S gLObAL ACTIVISM AnD LEADERSHIP On TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

potential further destabilizing moves similar to Trump’s Jerusalem

move. International isolation on the matter has not served well

either the U.S. administration or the Netanyahu government.

Turkey will most likely continue this line of diplomatic activism

on Jerusalem and the Israeli occupation in the foreseeable future.

While it has not resulted in a reversal of the U.S. decision, it has

ensured that the Muslim countries oppose the move as a common

front. This dynamic, created in large part by Turkey’s activism and

leadership on Jerusalem, highlights the moral bankruptcy of the

occupation and strengthens the position of Palestinians.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 191

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM

DECISION

MARK PERRY

Author and Journalist

CHAPTER 7

MA JOURNEÉ CHEZ ARAFAT:

AND THE WAGES OF PAIN IN

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN

CONFLICT

192 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

ARAFAT

In the late Spring of 2004, at the height of the Second Intifada, I

would spend many of my days navigating my way from the hotel

where I was staying in East Jerusalem (it was just outside the Da-

mascus Gate) to the Mukata, the hilltop headquarters and walled

compound of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, which housed

the offices and living quarters of Yasser Arafat, the PA’s president.

On one of those days, in late April, I found myself facing Arafat as

he walked into his office. His appearance that early April morning,

and each time I met him, was the same: the head scarf wrapped (as

he said) in the shape of Palestine and the unadorned khaki uniform

(he had, it was said, eight of them in all), that he’d worn since his

days in exile in Tunisia. Arafat was a late riser, so I thought I would

have to wait for him to appear, but there he was. He was as sur-

prised to see me as I was to see him.

“How did you get here?” he asked, and his eyes were wide –

disbelieving. I thought the answer was obvious: “I took a taxi,” I

said. He shook his head, slightly irritated, because he thought I was

making a joke: “No, I mean, how did you get here?” I was puzzled,

but then understood what he was asking, and smiled. I wanted to

say that being unaware of danger is not the same as being imper-

vious to it, but I settled on something easier: “It’s really not that

hard,” I explained. “You just have to be careful.” This satisfied him

and he let it go with a nod, and motioned me to a seat beside him

at the long table used for his typical late-night marathon meetings.

CHAPTER 7

193

194 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

Having settled in and putting on his glasses (which he rarely wore

in public), he grabbed a stack of papers and newspaper clippings,

compiled for him by his aides the night before, and began to leaf

slowly through them. This was typical of our meetings: he would

read a clipping, then slide it towards me. On occasion he would use

his index finger, thumping it on a clipping he thought particular-

ly important, but without uttering a word, and I would dutifully

read what he gave me. This was his way of beginning our political

discussions, which were often lengthy – and regularly interrupted

by the arrival of other guests or members of his staff, and almost al-

ways by Nabil Abu Rudeineh, his assistant and constant presence.

I remember that, on that particular April day, I was sweating

profusely, because the weather was unseasonably hot, and because I

had had a particularly difficult time negotiating the multiple road-

blocks that sealed off Ramallah from the rest of the West Bank, and

from Jerusalem. Arafat’s greeting of me with his question (“how

did you get here”) reflected that. Then too, as Arafat knew, in order

for me to meet with him I had to not only navigate the various Is-

raeli checkpoints between Jerusalem and Ramallah, I had to spend

the last minutes prior to my arrival dodging a particularly threaten-

ing tank, a dusty brown behemoth, that was churning up the road

outside of his compound. The tank, an Israeli Merkava, wound its

way in circles outside of his headquarters – making a total circuit

in something under two minutes, while bouncing up and down on

the hills of a dirt track that had once been an expansive paved road.

The road had been destroyed in 2002, at the height of the Second

Intifada, and the Mukata invaded by Israeli soldiers accompanied

by Israeli bulldozers. The bulldozers then proceeded to level almost

For an account of Yasser Arafat’s stay in the Mukata, see also: “Arafat Among the

Ruins,” David Rie, e New York Times Magazine, April 25, 2004.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 195

all of the buildings of the Mukata, except for Arafat’s headquarters,

which housed Arafat and his aides, as well as senior PLO official

Hani al-Hassan, whom I had known for many years. I communi-

cated with Hassan by telephone during this April 2002 crisis, on

one occasion hearing the ping-ping-pint of bullets as they struck

the walls of Arafat’s headquarters. The IDF had withdrawn from

the compound since, along with the bulldozer, leaving the tank –

and its monotonous but intimidating circuit. The tank served its

purpose, as a constant reminder to Arafat that his nemesis in Israel,

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (who had once laid siege to him in

Beirut, many years before, and who hated him) could end his life

at any moment.

The result of all of this was that to get inside the Mukata, it

was necessary for me to time the tank’s endless circuit and sprint

for the gate of the compound, hoping that the security officials in-

side would notice my arrival – and open the gate. I never thought

this journey was particularly dangerous until, on that particular

April morning, a Palestinian taxi driver waiting at the Kalandia

checkpoint leading into Ramallah greeted me with a shake of his

head. “There’s a siege on,” he said. I nodded my understanding,

then directed him to Arafat’s headquarters, with its specter of the

Israeli tank. The driver looked at his colleagues as if to ask them

what he should do, but they shrugged. He looked back at me.

“Okay,” he said. “Get in.” The driver let me off on the corner op-

posite the Mukata’s iron gate: “I won’t go in there,” he said, and I

nodded my agreement, paid him, and jumped to the curb. The rest

was easy: I sprinted across the road to the compound’s gate, which

swung open soundlessly – then made my way to the second floor

of his offices. The bleary-eyed guards nodded in my direction, but

seemed disinterested in my arrival.

196 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

BALANCING THE SCALES

I visited Mr. Arafat often, but on this occasion he seemed particu-

larly reflective and so, after putting aside his papers, he looked at

me and raised his eyebrows. “Yes?”

During my previous visit, several weeks earlier, I had said that

I wanted to speak with him about two topics: the collapse of the

Camp David talks, back in early September of 2000, and the incep-

tion of the Second Intifada, shortly thereafter. Mr. Arafat’s English

was good, but broken by staccato sentences which he issued when

he wanted to make a point, and often accompanied by personal

reflections on his views on the people he was mentioning. These

were long asides, but always interesting. His favorite phrase, “and

by the way” was often accompanied by a raised finger – a habit of

emphasis. Thankfully, Nabil Abu Rudeinah, a sometime translator

for some of Mr. Arafat’s more complicated presentations, joined us

as the conversation was beginning, along with two cups of coffee.

And so, with this, Arafat began.

“I remember at the end of Oslo, when Mr. Rabin and I had

signed the agreement in Washington, I went to Mr. Clinton and

we had a discussion about what would happen next,” Arafat said.

“And I told Clinton that in order for the agreement to succeed I

would need his help. I said that the conflict was out of balance,

because the Israelis were strong and we were weak. The scales fa-

vored them.” At this point, Arafat placed his hands in the air,

demonstrating the scales, with one dipped well below the other.

“Like this,” he said, “and he dipped his one hand further. “I told

Clinton that I would call him from time to time when I needed

his help, to rebalance the scales, and he promised that he would

call [Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin or [Prime Minister Ehud]

Barak and tell him ‘Arafat needs your help and I want you to

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 197

help him. And in those phone calls Mr. Clinton would rebalance

the scales. He would weigh in on my side. This happened several

times, and Mr. Clinton would keep his word and Rabin would

follow his request.”

He continued: “I did not want to go to Camp David,” he

said. “I told Mr. Clinton that I was not ready, my people were not

ready. And there was no preparation. I needed political help to

make the deal, but no one in the region even knew what Clinton

was planning. And so, the talks failed and I told Clinton ‘this is

not my fault. You cannot blame me.’ But he did. And then, Ariel

Sharon marched in Jerusalem, on the Temple Mount and there

was a lot of violence. And because almost all of those killed in

its first days there was pressure on me to respond. So, I called

Mr. Clinton and told him ‘you have to tell the Israelis to stop

the killing. You have to rebalance the scales.’ But he told me he

would not do anything. He blamed me for Camp David and he

was angry. So, I thought about what to do. Remember: when I

came here the Israelis gave me a list of people, people they called

terrorists, to arrest and put in jail. And I did it, because that was

the agreement. I kept that agreement, though it was painful. But

I had to make a decision. I had to respond, to do something. And

so, when Clinton said he would not rebalance the scales, I took

the keys out of my desk and I opened all the jails.” At this point,

he made a gesture with his hands, as if turning the keys in a lock.

“And I rebalanced the scales.”

is is the conversation as I remember it, and recreated from the notes I took fol-

lowing the meeting, which I then converted into a typed memo for my own les. Several

months later, Arafat repeated this explanation on Oslo and the beginning of the Second

Intifada with a colleague working with me at the time, and he related it to me. What Arafat

told my colleague was, in almost every detail, a repeat of what he told me during our April

2004 meeting.

198 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

FATAH

Just four months after this April meeting with Arafat, in August

of 2004, I returned to Jerusalem and the West Bank and had my

last meeting with him at the Mukata. While only four months had

lapsed, and while the tank that had once circled the Mukata was

gone, Arafat seemed more isolated than ever. The week before my

visit he’d celebrated his birthday and so when I greeted him I asked

him if he’d enjoyed the day, noting that in America we celebrate

the occasion with a cake. Did he have a cake? I asked. His eyes got

big, he raised his forefinger, nodded his head and told me that he

needed to show me “something special.” He grabbed my hand and

escorted me up a flight of stairs to an arched and open overlook that

led from his office to the offices of the legislative council (which

were in an adjoining building), fished in his khaki coat and brought

out a small electronic camera. “Look,” he said. “This is my birth-

day present. It’s almost a miracle.” He pointed the camera towards

the west and began to take pictures, then adjusted the lens before

handing it to me, explaining that he’d received the camera from his

aides. “Look there,” he said, pointing. “You can see Tel Aviv.” And

it was true, in the shimmering distance and through the haze it was

possible to make out the high rises of the Israeli metropolis. I hand-

ed the camera back to him, smiled, and noted that the tank that

had once made a circuit of his compound was gone. “Yes,” he said,

and was silent for a moment. “It is nothing.” I nodded. “Maybe,” I

responded, “but I still worry about you.” He shook his head in dis-

agreement. “It is not so bad,” he told me. “I am here, in Ramallah,

amongst my own people, and only eight miles from Jerusalem.”

We were joined then by Jabril Rajoub, whom I knew only slightly.

Arafat handed Rajoub the camera and then, in an unusual show

of affection, grabbed him and gave him a head rub using the bare

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 199

knuckles of his right hand. “My friend look at my camera,” he said.

In November, after a short illness, Arafat died.

Yasser Arafat was not a man of peace, but he was a sophis-

ticated thinker. And he was a political realist. His calculus, from

the time of the founding of Fatah until his death (in November of

2004), was that, while the struggle against Israel might take many

forms, the use of force was always a part of the Palestinian calculus.

“The one thing that Israel understands is pain,” he had told me,

in Arabic, during one of my first conversations with him, back

in Tunis in the early 1990s. “And, by the way, it works.” He was

right, though Israel was not the only target of Palestinian violence.

Fatah gained respect and admiration in the Arab world after fight-

ing the IDF to a bloody draw during the Battle of Karameh (with

28 Israeli soldiers killed), in Jordan in 1968, challenged the power

of King Hussein of Jordan in 1970 (in what came to be known as

“Black September”), planned and carried out the Munich Massa-

cre in 1972, launched a series of high profile international airline

hijackings in its wake, fought the Israelis to a standstill outside of

Beirut (in 1982), provided much (but not all) of the leadership

for the First Intifada in the West Bank, Israel and Gaza in the late

1980s and early 1990s – and then launched the bloody, but inde-

cisive Second Intifada in 2000. But now, in April of 2004, Arafat’s

strategy of exacting “pain” on Israel seemed to have run its course

– with a series of bloody standoffs between Fatah’s Al Aqsa Mar-

tyrs’ Brigades and the IDF in the major cities of the West Bank.

Then too, not only were the Palestinian people exhausted by the

fighting, but a rising cadre of young Fatah members (led by politi-

cal rivals Marwan Barghouti and Mohammad Dahlan in what was

then called the Higher Committee), had tired of Arafat’s rule, and

the corruption that surrounded him.

200 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

ABBAS

Just as crucially, not everyone agreed with Arafat’s political philoso-

phy; a number of sharp internal fights had occurred over his strat-

egy throughout Fatah’s history – and most particularly in Lebanon

when, having faced off against Israel, Arafat had returned from exile

to lead a bloody response to an internal uprising – led by a break-

away faction in Fatah. But there were also other, if quieter, dissent-

ers. Among them, particularly during the Second Intifada, was Ara-

fat colleague Mahmoud Abbas – now more publicly referred to as

Abu Mazen, Arafat’s successor as head of the Palestinian Authority.

Abbas was one of the founders of Fatah, and a central figure in Pales-

tinian politics. While he never openly questioned Arafat’s leadership,

it was clear to his Fatah colleagues that he believed Arafat’s strategy

against Israel was undermining the Palestinian cause. Abbas was an

odd-man-out among the Fatah elite, who were political activists and

liked nothing more than speaking before large crowds and political

rallies. Abbas could not equal their high profiles, and he didn’t try.

Instead, he worked carefully, slowly and out of the public eye to shift

Fatah from a revolutionary organization into a finely tuned polit-

ical structure that would provide constituent services and respond

to Palestinians looking for peace. When Arafat died, after a short

illness, in November of 2004, Abbas stepped in as his replacement.

“At the time, nobody knew Abbas at all,” Nader Said, a poll-

ster at the West Bank’s Arab world Research and Development

Center told reporters Grant Rumley and Amir Tibon. “Abbas was

always in the background. He was never a populist. He was not a

people’s person. He didn’t care—not in a bad way—but it’s just

not his style. Unlike Arafat, who was always out there, always say-

ing the right things, the sloganeering. Abbas is not into that. He

doesn’t give a damn about that.” All true: but when Arafat died,

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 201

the PA leadership decided that they would pick Abbas, Arafat’s

nominal second-in-command, to lead them. The choice was not

unanimous, but it was entirely predictable. Abbas had not only

been with Fatah from the beginning, he had a new strategy that,

his supporters said, would bring peace – and a Palestinian state.

The differences between Arafat and Abbas were stark, as if they

had come from different political movements. Where Arafat was

effusive and outgoing, Abbas was quiet, but determined. But he

was also wily – and underestimated by his Palestinian colleagues.

During the Second Intifada, Abbas quietly oversaw a strategy group

inside the Palestinian Authority that focused on using the rule of

law and economics as a counter to Israel – and to Arafat’s strategy.

He monitored and supported the group, whose mandate was to

focus on final status negotiations with Israel, while building the

professional capacity that, he believed, would be needed once the

violence of the Second Intifada ended. This Negotiations Support

Group was a heady mix of think-tankers, strategists and lawyers who

not only offered a counterpoint to the violence that had marked the

last five years of Arafat’s leadership – but that operated without the

knowledge of Arafat or those around him. When I mentioned the

Negotiations Support Group to Arafat in the year before his death,

he turned on me: “I have heard of this group,” he said. “But who are

they?” At the same time that Abbas was building a group around his

new strategy, he solidified his support inside of the Fatah Central

Committee as a reformer. It was time, he argued, for the PA to focus

on education, the economy, democratization and the demilitariza-

tion of the Intifada. But the true centerpiece of Abbas’s political

philosophy was his belief that Arafat’s strategy of accepting the use

of violence was counterproductive: as the violence increased, Abbas

believed, the chances for a Palestinian state receded.

202 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

In the first few years following Arafat’s death, Mahmoud Ab-

bas was able to solidify his power – replacing nearly two-thirds of

the senior Palestinian leadership, and requiring those who served

at the PA’s highest leadership positions to assume control of the

most prominent constituent portfolios. Additionally, at the same

time that Abbas tamed the most radical Fatah armed groups (he

actually campaigned for election in 2005 while walking beside the

commander of the Al Aqsa Brigade in Jenin), he built (under U.S.

auspices) a police force that curtailed Palestinian attacks on Israe-

lis, but that also dampened internal dissent to his rule. In effect,

Abbas’s lower profile throughout his career made his ascension to

power all the easier, and quickly made him a favorite of Washing-

ton. Speaking in the White House Rose Garden in May of 2005,

then-President George Bush praised Abbas’s embrace of democracy

and rejection of terror.

As crucially, Bush implied that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

would end only when Palestinian demands were satisfied, and reit-

erated the U.S.’s long-standing call for an end to Israeli settlement

expansion. And so, it was that, within two years of Arafat’s death,

it seemed that Abbas had accomplished the impossible: he was in

the midst of successfully “demilitarizing” the Second Intifada, had

won election as Arafat’s successor, had reformed the Palestinian

ruling elite, had begun the process of shaping a new and more

professional Palestinian security service, and had garnered a White

House invitation and the blessing of a sitting president. “We will

stand with you, Mr. President,” Bush told Abbas in May of 2005,

“as you combat corruption, reform the Palestinian security services

and your justice system, and revive your economy.”

President Bush and Palestinian President Abbas together in the White House Rose

Garden, May 26, 2005. http://archive.peacenow.org/entries/archive807

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 203

But in the years ahead, as the U.S. focused on the problems

caused by the Bush administration’s intervention in Iraq and as the

hoped-for revival of a substantive Israeli-Palestinian peace process

slipped slowly from view, and second and more sobering reality

took hold – and one that inadvertently endorsed the Arafat strate-

gy. For while Abu Mazen bought into a peace process supported by

the United States and received the blessing of a U.S. president for

his efforts, the peace process that he gambled would succeed if only

Palestinian violence would end, slipped slowly away. And the reason

that it did so was because the scales of the process that he endorsed

were as out-of-balance as it was when Yasser Arafat appeared at the

White House with Yitzhak Rabin in September of 1993.

TRUMP

It is in the context of this history that Donald Trump’s December

6, 2017 declaration recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel

(and his decision to move the U.S. embassy there), can be best un-

derstood. Trump’s declaration was condemned throughout much

of the Arab world and was met with deep skepticism by America’s

European allies. It seemed to portend the final end of the already

paralyzed and nearly non-existent U.S. mediated Israeli-Palestinian

peace process, while confirming what was, and has been for many

years, Washington’s worst-kept non-secret: that the United States

is not only Israel’s lawyer (as former State Department negotiator

Aaron David Miller phrased it), but also its realtor. It is important

to note, however, what the declaration did not do: it did not lead

to regional instability, it did not spark rioting in large areas of the

West Bank or in Gaza, it did not trigger a diplomatic crisis among

Arab leaders, it did not lead to widespread resignations among

U.S. diplomatic professionals – and it did not unseat a quiescent

204 / TRUMP’S JERUSALEM DECISIOn

Palestinian Authority, nor threaten the standing of PA President

Mahmoud Abbas.

From Trump’s point of view, on the other hand, the Jerusalem

decision made perfect political sense: it tied this administration’s

Middle East program to America’s closest ally in the region, it so-

lidified the president’s support among his core base of Republican

voters (and especially among Christian evangelicals), it signaled

to America’s European allies that the U.S. could, and would, act

unilaterally and it deepened the emerging divisions inside the pro-

gressive movement inside the Democratic Party between Israel’s

supporters and their antagonists. And while Trump’s Jerusalem de-

cision was condemned in the Arab world, it did not change the

calculus of the group of America’s Arab allies, from Egypt to Saudi

Arabia, the UAE and Jordan. Finally, the reaction to Trump’s Je-

rusalem decision seemed to confirm what many had already con-

cluded: that peace between Israelis and Palestinians is no longer

the crucial challenge to America’s credibility that it was during the

forty years that followed the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.

In fact, Trump’s declaration has had a more profound im-

pact in Ramallah than it ever did in Washington. PA President

Mahmoud Abbas was surprised by Trump’s decision and thereafter

struggled to shape an appropriate and substantive response. But

thus far, Abbas and his senior advisers have been unable to mount

the kind of public campaign that would roll-back the Jerusalem

decision, or garner the kind of strong international condemnation

that would place it in jeopardy. The PA’s inability to do so is of

a piece with its other failures: its inability to roll back settlement

activity, build a viable economic structure to attract large scale in-

ternational investors (which would, in time, attract powerful allies

to its cause), mount an international campaign that would isolate

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 205

the U.S. from its most important Arab allies (or at least convince

them to distance themselves from America) – or provide a diplo-

matic counter that would force the Israeli government back to the

negotiating table. Instead, Mr. Abbas has continued to insist that

the reignition of the peace process depends on his success to pro-

vide quiet in the West Bank, at the same time that he vainly works

to unite the Palestinian polity. Abbas is thus faced with this reality:

the most substantive response to Israeli unilateral activities comes

from the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, an initia-

tive which he and his aides have, in turn, either airily dismissed

or completely ignored. The lesson, thus learned in Washington

and around the world, is obvious: there is no price to pay in tak-

ing unilateral actions that punish the Palestinian Authority – or

reward Israel.

And it is this lesson that has the greatest impact on the leaders

of the Palestinian Authority, for it places in stark relief the differ-

ences between the Arafat and Abbas strategy for achieving their

dream of a Palestinian state. For while Abbas, as he has made clear,

will not abandon his no-pain strategy when it comes to dealing

with Israel, the Jerusalem decision has sewed abiding doubts among

his followers, and among the Palestinian public, that the path he

has chosen will ever succeed. It shows that Arafat was right: that

the use of force must be a part of the Palestinian calculus, that the

one thing that Israel understands is pain. So, it is that while Presi-

dent Trump’s decision on Jerusalem might look like good news to

Israel’s supporters in the U.S., and good news inside the office of

Israel’s Prime Minister, it is actually bad news for Israel. For while

the price of the decision will not be paid tomorrow, or next week,

and perhaps not even until Mr. Abbas passes from the scene, it will

be paid. And it will be bloody.

Kadir Üstün is the Executive Director at the SETA Foundation at

Washington, D.C. Previously, Dr. Ustun was the Research Director at

the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C. He currently serves as an

Assistant Editor of Insight Turkey, an academic journal published by the

SETA Foundation. Dr. Ustun holds a PhD in Middle Eastern, South

Asian, and African Studies from Columbia University and a Master’s

degree in History from Bilkent University. He has contributed to various

SETA reports and his writings have appeared in various publications such

as Insight Turkey, Al Jazeera English, Hurriyet Daily News, Daily Sabah,

Mediterranean Quarterly, and Cairo Review of Global Affairs among others.

He is also co-editor of edited volumes History, Politics and Foreign Policy

in Turkey, Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy, and Politics

and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.

Kılıç Buğra Kanatis the Research Director at the SETA Foundation at

Washington DC. He is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Penn

State University, Erie. Dr. Kanatreceived his PhDin Political Science from

Syracuse University; a Master’s in Political Science from Syracuse Univer-

sity; a Master’s in International Affairs from Marquette University.He was

awarded the Outstanding Research Award and Council of Fellows Facul-

ty Research Award at Penn State, Erie. He participated in Future Leaders

Program of Foreign Policy Initiative.  Dr. Kanat’s writings have appeared

inForeign Policy, Insight Turkey, The Diplomat, Middle East Policy, Arab Stud-

ies Quarterly, Mediterranean Quarterly, Journal of South Asian and Middle

Eastern Studies, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,andJournal of

Muslim Minority Affairs. He is a columnist at Daily Sabah. He is the author

ofA Tale of Four Augusts: Obama’s Syria Policy.

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE / 207

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Cecilia Baeza is the Research Director of Noria and the co-founder of

RIMAAL (transnational academic network on Latin America and the Arab

World). She is also a member of the Editorial board of Mashriq & Mahjar.

Cecilia’s areas of expertise include the transnational agency of migrants and

diasporas, forced migration in the Middle East, and reception and integra-

tion policies in Latin America. She has worked mainly on Palestinians in

Chile, Honduras, and Brazil; her current research focuses on the integra-

tion of Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Brazil. She received her PhD in

political science at the Paris Institute of Political Science (Sciences Po) and

is Associate Researcher at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo

(PUC-SP), Brazil. During her career, Cecilia has taught and carried out

fieldwork in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hondu-

ras, the Dominican Republic, and Palestine.

Guilherme Casarões is a lecturer at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São

Paulo, Brazil. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Political Science from

Universidade de São Paulo and an M.A. in International Relations from

Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Programa San Tiago Dantas). He

has published many peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on Brazilian

Foreign Policy, Latin American Politics, Middle Eastern Affairs, and Mul-

tilateralism. Among his works are “So far but yet so close: Brazil and the

Middle East” (USEK, 2015); “Brasil y Turquía: hoy sócios, aliados maña-

na?” (Bahçeehir Üniversitesi, 2015); “The place of Israel and Palestine in

Brazilian foreign policy” (História, 2014); “Itamaraty’s Mission” (Cairo Re-

view of Global Affairs, 2014); “Itamaraty on the Move” (Bulletin of Latin

American Research, 2013). He was a visiting fellow at Tel Aviv University

and Brandeis University.

Jacob Eriksson is the Al Tajir Lecturer in Post-war Recovery Studies in

the Department of Politics at the University of York. His research interests

include conflict resolution, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Middle Eastern

politics and security, and post-war recovery. His first book,Small-state Me-

diation in International Conflicts: Diplomacy and Negotiation in Israel-Pal-

estinewas published by IB Tauris in 2015, and he has published multiple

journal articles and book chapters on different aspects of the Israeli-Pales-

tinian conflict. He is the editor, together with Dr. Ahmed Khaleel, of Iraq

after ISIS: The challenges of post-war recovery, published by Palgrave in 2019.

208 / kADIR ÜSTÜn IS THE ExECUTIVE DIRECTOR AT THE SETA FOUnDATIOn AT WASHIngTOn, D.C. PREVIOUSLy, DR. USTUn WAS THE RESEARCH DIRECTOR AT THE SETA FOUnDATIOn AT WASHIngTOn D.C. HE CURREnTLy SERVES AS An ASSISTAnT EDITOR OF InSIgHT TURkEy, An ACADEMIC JOURnAL PUbLISHED by THE SETA FOUnDATIOn. DR. USTUn HOLDS A PHD In MIDDLE EASTERn, SOUTH ASIAn, AnD AFRICAn STUDIE

Lara Friedmanis the President of the Foundation for Middle East

Peace (FMEP). With more than 25 years working in the Middle East for-

eign policy arena, Lara is a leading authority on U.S. foreign policy in the

Middle East, with particular expertise on the Israeli-Arab conflict, Israeli

settlements, Jerusalem, and the role of the U.S. Congress. She is published

widely in the U.S. and international press and is regularly consulted by

members of Congress and their staffs, by Washington-based diplomats, by

policy-makers in capitals around the world, and by journalists in the U.S.

and abroad. In addition to her work at FMEP, Lara is a non-resident fellow

at the U.S./Middle East Project (USMEP). Prior to joining FMEP, Lara

was the Director of Policy and Government Relations at Americans for

Peace Now, and before that she was a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, serving

in Jerusalem, Washington, Tunis and Beirut. She holds a B.A. from the

University of Arizona and a Master’s degree from Georgetown’s School of

Foreign Service; in addition to English, Lara speaks French, Arabic, Span-

ish, (weak) Italian, and muddles through in Hebrew.

Yousef Munayyer is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Insti-

tute. His focus is on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, U.S. policy toward Israel

and Palestine, and regional dynamics that are affected by, or impact, them.

Munayyer directs the U.S. Campaign for Palestinian Rights and is a con-

tributing policy analyst for the Arab Center, Washington, D.C. Previously

he directed the Jerusalem Fund and Palestine Center, a DC-based center fo-

cused on Palestine policy. His writings have been widely published in major

print and online news outlets and he has regularly been asked to comment

in radio and television appearances in the United States and internationally.

Mark Perryis the author of ten books on American history and for-

eign policy including Grant and Twain: The Story of an American Friendship,

Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and

Peace, Talking to Terrorists: Why America Must Engage with Its Enemies, The

Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur, and

The Pentagon’s Wars: The Military’s Undeclared War Against America’s Presi-

dents. Perry is a military and foreign affairs analyst whose articles have ap-

peared in theNation,Foreign Policy,Washington Post, andPolitico. He is a

former adviser to Yasser Arafat.

EDİTED BY KADİR ÜSTÜN, KILIÇ B. KANAT

TRUMP’S JERUSALEM MOVE

Making Sense of

U.S. Policy on

the Israeli Palestinian

Conﬂict

TRUMP’S

MOVE

JERUSALEM

Edited by Kadir Üstün, Kılıç B. Kanat

resident Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusa-

lem as the capital of Israel and move the U.S.

embassy to the city prompted this edited volume.

Trump had already promised to make this move

on the campaign trail but most of the foreign policy experts

did not expect him to go forward with the idea as quickly as

he did. Many judged that it would most likely be a prom-

ise unkept and the decades-old U.S. policy would hold. The

Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 recognized the city as the

capital of the State of Israel and called for Jerusalem to

remain an undivided city. However, all the U.S. administra-

tions left the issue to be resolved between the parties as

part of the final status negotiations. Prior to Trump’s de-

cision, most experts considered the peace process to be

real in name only with very little prospect for a two-state

solution. In this sense, Trump’s decision was essentially a

nail in the coffin of the peace process. The U.S. was finally

openly admitting what many critics argued for a long time,

that is, the U.S. would side with Israel.

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