The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for

126 Book Reviews JFQ 78, 3

Quarter 2015

the authors of the study disregarded the

heroism of the 369

and produced a

document that was blatant in its racism.

The chief was advised to maintain

racial segregation and to ensure that all-

black fighting units were commanded by

whites. The study concluded, incorrectly,

that blacks believed themselves to be

inferior to whites and that they were “by

nature” subservient, lacking “initiative

and resourcefulness” because, as stated

in the report, “[t]he cranial cavity of the

Negro is smaller than the white; his brain

weighs 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for

the white.” Most damning, however, was

the illogical argument that “[i]n physical

courage . . . the American Negro falls well

back of the white man and possibly be-

hind all other races.” This statement flew

in the face of the numerous black soldiers

who had served with honor in the Civil

War, Indians Wars, and Spanish-American

War and were awarded congressional

medals of honor in recognition of their

courage and valor. (No medals of honor

were awarded during the 20

century for

World War I.) The report was prepared

by the entire student body and faculty at

the Army War College in 1924 and 1925

with nine additional iterations appearing

prior to the start of World War II; the

same racist notions were included in each

report. The United States in general—

and the U.S. Army in particular—paid

a steep price for allowing the country’s

deeply entrenched racism to define—and

limit—the use of a courageous, deter-

mined, and highly capable fighting force

in World War II.

Harlem’s Rattlers is a soundly re-

searched and documented history that

all Americans—and especially military

officers—should read.

JFQ

Dr. Alan L. Gropman is Professor Emeritus in

the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National

Security and Resources Strategy at the National

Defense University.

The Modern Mercenary:

Private Armies and What

They Mean for World Order

By Sean McFate

Oxford University Press, 2014

235 pp. $29.95

ISBN: 978-0199360109

Reviewed by T.X. Hammes

t their peak, contractors com-

prised more than 50 percent

of U.S. personnel in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Furthermore, despite

complaints about contractor perfor-

mance, the Pentagon has stated that

contractors will make up half of any

future U.S. force deployments. Why?

Because they work. This reality requires

defense professionals to seek a deeper

understanding of what contractors

do and the implications for future

conflict—making Sean McFate’s The

Modern Mercenary a very timely book.

In it, he not only carefully examines

contractors, but also describes the

changing international environment in

which they will operate.

McFate does not claim his book

covers all aspects of contracting. Rather,

he focuses on the most controversial ele-

ment: private military companies or, in

his words, “the private sector equivalent

of combat arms.” As he notes, the most

disturbing aspect of the Pentagon’s

increasing reliance on contractors is “the

decision to outsource lethal force.” He

places these companies in two categories.

Those that directly apply military force

are “mercenaries,” while those that train

others to do so are “enterprisers.” These

categories represent two distinct mar-

kets. Mercenaries exist as a free market

in which each individual sells his or her

services directly to the buyer, offering

the means of war to anyone who can

afford it. Enterprisers represent a medi-

ated market in which the company is an

arbitrator between the individual and the

buyer. Essentially, the company recruits

and organizes personnel to fulfill specific

mission/contract requirements as defined

by the buyer. For good business reasons,

enterprisers are more discriminating in

both the clients and tasks they accept.

Unfortunately, if business demands, en-

terprisers can easily slip to the mercenary

side of the scale.

McFate does not see mercenaries

and enterprisers in the same light. Using

Somalia as a case study, he argues that

free market mercenaries are likely to

contribute to increased instability and will

not improve a state’s chances of success.

In contrast, enterprisers offer a state an

opportunity for success. He uses Liberia

as a case study where, as a DynCorp

employee, he participated in raising and

training the new Liberian army. However,

his argument for enterprisers is weak-

ened by the lack of success in Iraq and

Afghanistan despite the presence of doz-

ens, if not hundreds, of enterprisers.

In one of the most interesting aspects

of this intriguing work, McFate applies

the concept of neo-medievalism—the

belief that the world is becoming

increasingly non–state-centric and mul-

tipolar—to describe the emerging global

security environment. While states will

remain major players, overlapping au-

thorities and allegiances will have major

impacts on how and why wars are fought

and who fights them.

In this environment, McFate states,

“the private military industry has a bright

future. This multi-billion-dollar industry

JFQ 78, 3

Quarter 2015 Book Reviews 127

will not simply evaporate once the United

States withdraws from overseas deploy-

ments such as Afghanistan. In fact, the

opposite will occur: contractors will help

fill the security vacuum left by US forces.

. . . Already, private military companies of

all stripes are seeking new opportunities

in conflict zones in Africa, the Middle

East, and Latin America.” He notes

four trends that are driving this global

expansion. First, private companies are

resilient and strive to grow. They will be

assisted in that growth by the next two

trends: globalization and indigenization.

Globalization is driving military con-

tracting to seek overseas markets. At the

same time, the numerous third country

nationals who were hired by U.S. firms in

Iraq and Afghanistan will take their new

business and technical skills home and

indigenize the market. Finally, the market

will bifurcate into two major categories:

mediated and free-market segments.

McFate’s meticulously researched

and well-presented work concludes that

“private military actors worsen security

in a free market such as Somalia but

increase it in a mediated market such

as Liberia and under the right market

conditions could even prove a powerful

tool for the United Nations and oth-

ers.” This reviewer found McFate’s two

categories useful, but they understate

the complexities of modern military con-

tracting. The reader must understand

that McFate is really describing a spec-

trum from pure individual mercenary to

major corporate enterpriser.

McFate concludes by cautioning

that the:

United States has limited regulation of

and oversight over the private military

industry despite employing it widely. This

creates opportunities for abuse by contac-

tors as firms subtly steer client decisions in

favor of profit over policy goals, altering

strategic outcomes in the process. The objec-

tives of [private military companies] and

their clients will differ, just as those of the

condottieri and the provveditori did in the

Middle Ages.

If he is right about the growth of mili-

tary contracting—and current Defense

Department policy indicates he is—any

U.S. forces deployed overseas must

expect to work with, and perhaps fight

against, armed contractors. It is a subject

that requires our professional attention,

and The Modern Mercenary is a great

place to start.

JFQ

Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research

Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research,

Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the

National Defense University.

Meeting China Halfway:

How to Defuse the Emerging

U.S.-China Rivalry

By Lyle J. Goldstein

Georgetown University Press, 2015

400 pp. $29.95

ISBN: 978-1626161603

Reviewed by Christopher Nelson

hina is on the minds of many

today. In fact, an informal term

has been coined for the group of

scholars and defense officials who spend

most of their waking hours thinking,

talking, and writing about China. They

are so-called China Watchers. In no

other foreign policy realm is a similar

term used with such frequency. This

alone should give everyone pause.

Watching for what, exactly?

With “watchers” there comes read-

ers. There is an unending stream of

books and magazine articles on China.

Of course, this is both frustrating and

promising. It is frustrating because there

are too many books to choose from;

many of us simply do not have the time

to read, let alone to think about many of

these issues. It is promising because with

more minds turned to the challenges

and opportunities of a rising China,