The American
Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences
Vol.
8,
No.
3,
1991
461
The
New
World Order and
the Islamic World
Hassan
Elhag
Ali
During a triumphant speech before the Congress on September
11,
1990,
President Bush announced that the pursuit of a “new world order” would
be an objective of American foreign policy. The speech’s tone and emphasis
marked a new phase in international politics, for only a few months earlier
the
United
States and the Soviet Union, former Cold War foes, had demon-
strated
an
unprecedented level
of
cooperation
to
eject Iraq- a former Soviet
client-from Kuwait. In that speech, Bush stated that
The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare
opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out
of these troubled times, our fifth objective
-
a
new world order-
can emerge: a new era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger
in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.
An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North
and South, can prosper and live in harmony (Freedman
1991, 195).
The idea of a new world order, as it appears, entails and conveys the
collapse of the old system and the emergence of another, different one. This
paper is concerned with identifying and analyzing the premises of this new
world order. How different
are
they from the tenets of the “old” order? Or
more precisely, to use the
Economist’s words: “What
is
new? Which world?
And whose order?” (Economist, February
23,
1991,
25-26).
What are the
agendas of
this
order and
to
what extent do they reflect the interests of the
Third World? How will this new order affect the Islamic world, the Third
World,
or
”the residents of the South?”l
Hassan Elhag Ali is a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant in the Department of Political
Science, University of
North
Texas, Denton, Texas.
‘This
study
will
use the term “Third World” or the “South” when it refers
to
issues concern-
ing
all
countries of the Third World including the Islamic world. In some instances, examples
drawn from certain parts
of
the
Third
World
are
used
to
illustrate
common
phenomena
or
shared
trends.
462
The American Journal
of
Islamic Social Sciences
Vol.
8,
No.
3,
1991
The Islamic world provides an appropriate analytical framework for
studying the relationship between the powerful North and the less advantaged
South in a changing world, for it embraces a wide spectrum of geopolitical,
ethnic, and socioeconomic entities which render it more representative of
the Third World than any other region. Moreover, the region’s religious and
cultural attachments are different from those of the North. This contrast
becomes important when we realize that some parts
of
Third World, such
as Latin America, share the same religion with the North and, to a large
extent, the basic tenets of a common culture.
The Emergence
of
the New Order
One of the striking features of the new world order is the way in which
it unfolded. Although peaceful change in the international system is possible,
some students of world politics postulate the need of a world war or a
hegemonic war as the main mechanism for achieving change (Gilpin 1985;
Modelski W8). For Gilpin and Modelski, the major changes to the
international system during the twentieth century took place after World War
I
and World War
11.
In
contrast, the third transformation of the international
system came
as
a result of two factors: 1) systemic changes such as the
emergence of a global economy, the revolution in communications, and a
tendency towards democracy and market-oriented economies and
2)
the
transformation of the distribution of power within the international system
(Huntington 1991,
5).
The internal disintegration of the Soviet Union left
the United States as the only major superpower. Also, a war which was not
hegemonic, the second Gulf War, asserted and confirmed the ascendancy
of the United States as the dominant world military power.
The international order which emerged after World War I was based
on the primacy of the nation-state. Achieving and maintaining national
independence became the driving force of politics. The system that developed
after World War
11,
however, rested on a different foundation: that of ideology
(Brzezinski 1991,
3).
It seems that in the new world order which is now
emerging, economic factors will play a larger and more dominant role.
Recent events in the Soviet Union may illustrate the salience of economic
issues in international politics. Mounting economic problems in the Soviet
Union rendered the country vulnerable to Western political pressures, for
Western economic aid comes with strings attached. Converting military
industries into civilian ones, reducing military size, and showing “moderation”
on important international political issues are the trade-offs which the Soviet
Union should offer in exchange for Western aid. Another example showing
how economics has eclipsed ideology is the case of China. China’s
$10
billion
Hassan
Elhag
Ali
New
World
Order
463
annual trade surplus with the United States makes it economically vulnerable.
Thus, China may not risk its trade with the United States over issues that
do not directly affect its national interests. For both the Soviet Union and
China, issues concerning former clients and solidarity with Third World
countries have been put on hold for the time being.
The increased importance of economic power
was coupled with a relative
decline in the United States’ economic power after World War I1 (Huntington
1991,
5).
One explanation of the United States’ resort to the military option
in the Gulf was to offset a declining economy inside and rising economic
competitors abroad (Petras 1991). The emergence of Japan as a dominant
economic power will soon be followed by a powerful united Europe. This
may pose a threat to the United States by limiting its access to local markets
and by subjecting its companies to fierce competition in other parts
of
the
world. For this reason, Petras (ibid., 513) argues that
The U.S. war in the Gulf was in its deepest sense a means
of
changing the rules of global power: Subordinating economic
competitors into bankers of U.
S.
military conquests; converting
economic resources from markets toward war subsidies.
. .
.
It
was meant to define a new military-centered global order in which
markets, income and resource shares are defined not by
technological market power, but by political military dominance.
The
New
Patrons
With the Soviet threat subsiding, who are the likely patrons
of
the new
world order besides the United States? According to some leading American
strategists (Huntington 1991; Luttwak 1990; Brzezinski 1991), Japan, due to
its rising economic power, is the first candidate. This is posited on two factors:
1) Japan will be leading the world in areas of technology and research and
2)
this leadership will translate into increased Japanese influence throughout
the world. A second candidate is newly unified Germany. Its strength and
might lies, as in the Japanese case, in its economic capabilities. Both countries
have a history of ultranationalistic sentiments. After these two come a united
Europe and China. For these
reasons,
some American strategists
are
concerned
with the balance of power in Euroasia.
In this uni- and multipolar structure, it seems that the American
government will adopt the following strategy in order
to
maintain its dominance:
1) Prevent any single power from dominating Europe,
Asia,
or both;
2)
Prevent
the total disintegration of the Soviet Union;
3)
Limit German power by
encouraging its participation in NATO and other European international
Hassan
Elhag
Ali
New
World
Order
463
annual trade surplus with the United States makes it economically vulnerable.
Thus, China may not risk its trade with the United States over issues that
do not directly affect its national interests. For both the Soviet Union and
China, issues concerning former clients and solidarity with Third World
countries have been put on hold for the time being.
The increased importance of economic power was coupled with a relative
decline in the United States’ economic power after World War
I1
(Huntington
1991,
5).
One explanation of the United States’ resort to the military option
in the Gulf was to offset a declining economy inside and rising economic
competitors abroad (Petras
1991).
The emergence of Japan as a dominant
economic power will soon be followed by a powerful united Europe. This
may pose a threat to the United States by limiting its access to local markets
and by subjecting its companies
to
fierce competition in other parts of the
world. For this reason, Petras (ibid.,
513)
argues that
The U.S. war in the Gulf was in its deepest sense a means of
changing the rules of global power: Subordinating economic
competitors into bankers of
U.
S.
military conquests; converting
economic resources from markets toward war subsidies.
.
.
.
It
was meant to define a new military-centered global order in which
markets, income and resource shares are defined not by
technological market power, but by political military dominance.
The
New
Patrons
With the Soviet threat subsiding, who are the likely patrons of the new
world order besides the United States? According to some leading American
strategists (Huntington
1991;
Luttwak
1990;
Brzezinski
1991),
Japan, due to
its rising economic power,
is
the first candidate. This is posited on two factors:
1)
Japan will be leading the world in areas of technology and research and
2)
this leadership will translate into increased Japanese influence throughout
the world. A second candidate is newly unified Germany. Its strength and
might lies, as in the Japanese case, in its economic capabilities. Both countries
have a history
of
ultranationalistic sentiments. After these two come a united
Europe and China. For these reasons, some American strategists
are
concerned
with the balance of power in Euroasia.
In this uni- and multipolar structure, it seems that the American
government will adopt the following strategy in order to maintain its dominance:
1)
Prevent any single power from dominating Europe, Asia, or both;
2)
Prevent
the total disintegration of the Soviet Union;
3)
Limit German power by
encouraging its participation in NATO and other European international
Hassan
Elhag
Ali
New World Order
465
Issues of Information
and
Culture
Third World countries feel culturally and socially vulnerable to the
complete domination of Western culture and traditions (Holsti
1982,
9).
The
Islamic world faces such a security challenge when it is faced with the
penetration and domination of the Western media, which introduces and
presents Western social norms,
ways of life, and behaviors in a way that renders
the indigenous culture inferior and second-class.
Amadou Mahtar MBow, the former secretary general of UNESCO, once
observed that “freedom is meaningless if it is a one-way flow of information”
(Vidyarthi 1988, 25). By these remarks, MBow is referring to the current
situation of the international information flow. In a UNESCO report dealing
with the international flow of information, Mowlana (1986, 21) notes that
News flows from developed (North)
to
developing (South) countries
follow a vertical direction. Horizontal flows do exist within the
North and within the South, though there is significantly less volume
of flow within the latter; while there exists a good deal of news
flow from South
to
North,
its volume is unsubstantial in comparison
with the flow from North to South.
The flow of information which molds world opinion and contributes
to
the shaping of cultural and social norms and behavior is increasingly coming
under the control
of a few Western media corporations. Bagdikian notes that
five media giants now dominate the important channels of the world’s mass
media: i.e., newspapers, magazines, books, broadcast stations, movies,
recordings, and video cassettes. These are: 1) Time Warner Inc. (USA), which
publishes magazines with a world readership of about 120 million and owns
a number of large book publishing companies. Among its holdings are the
world’s second largest record company (WCI) and cable TV’s
HBO
and
Cinemax;
2)
Bertelsman (Germany) specializes in satellite TV, book publishmg,
and records. Moreover, it publishes about forty magazines in fifteen countries
spread over four continents;
3)
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation
Ltd.
(Australia) owns an empire of newspapers in North America, Asia, Europe,
and Australia.
In
addition
to
that, Murdoch Owns the largest satellite television
system in Europe, Fox Broadcasting (the fourth largest TV network in the
United States), Harper and
Row
Publishers, and TV Guide, which has a
circulation
of
17 million;
4)
Hachette-SA (France)
is
the world’s largest
producer of magazines (seventy-four in ten countries) and is the world’s largest
publisher of reference
books;
and
5)
Capitol CitiedABC, Inc. (USA), with
less global outreach, owns ABC-TV, eight
local
TV
stations,
twenty-one radio
stations, a chain of nine daily newspapers, and Hollywood
Studios.
It also
466
The American Journal
of
Islamic Social Sciences Vol.
8,
No.
3,
1991
owns Word, Inc., the country’s largest publisher of religious materials
(Bagdikian
1989, 807-11).
This Western domination of the international mass media leads to the
marginalization of other cultures. A certain set of norms and values is fused
into movies, television and radio programs, plays, and music. Media not only
contributes to the promotion of social progress, economic development, and
international understanding, but it can also fuel hostility, fan national strife,
and incite territorial disputes (Vidyarthi
1988,
7).
International understanding
would be better enhanced by accepting cultural and social diversity at the
global level, not by denying and ignoring it.
This Western domination is conducted under the rubric of the free flow
of information. But competition between unequals certainly works to the
advantage of the powerful partner. Bagdikian
(1989, 812)
puts the argument
more eloquently
:
True freedom of information requires three conditions: the
opportunity to read and watch anything available; a diversity of
sources from which to choose; and media systems that provide
access for those who wish to reach their fellow citizens.
The Islamic world is highly dependent on Western media. Table
1
shows
television programs imported to selected regions of the world, while table
2
represents films imported to selected Islamic countries. These UNESCO
statistics underscore the cultural vulnerabilities of the Islamic world.
Table
1:
Television Programs Imported from the West and the
United States to Some Regions of the Third World,
1983.
To
Africa
Arab Region
Latin America
Percent from Percent from
the West the
US.
80
59
81
47
32
77
Percent from the
Arab region
28
Source: UNESCO.
World
Communication
Report.
Vendome, France: Imprimerie des
Presses Universitaires de France,
1989,
147.
Hassan
Elhag
Ali New World Order
467
Table
2.
Films Imported by Selected Islamic Countries and Their
Origins.
Year
1984
1985
1983
1984
To
Egypt
Algeria
Indonesia
Turkey
From
USA, France, Italy
USA, France, UK
India
USA, France, Italy
Hong Kong
USA, France, Italy
Percent
74.5
51.4
17.9
47.5
30.6
64.5
Source: UNESCO.
World
Communication
Report.
Vendome, France: Imprimerie des
Presses Universitaires de France,
1989,
399.
The other issue area of concern to both the Islamic and the Third worlds
is economic development, the backbone of which is capital. An international
order eager to attain harmony and prosperity should seek a more equitable
distribution of resources. The world is now divided between those who live
in destitute poverty and those who enjoy affluence and prosperity.
The Islamic world suffered a great drain of its natural resources during
the period of colonialism, for raw materials and cheap labor were transferred
to the industrial North. Some might argue that capital transfers
from
the North
to the South have already been taking place in shape of aid, loans, and invest-
ment by multinational corporations. Upon closer scrutiny, however, this argu-
ment turns out to be of limited utility.
Let us first examine the debt issue. In 1986, the Third World shouldered
about $1 trillion worth of debt, $360 billion of which belonged to the Islamic
world. By 1990, Third World debt reached $1,300 billion (ONeill 1990, 1).
One of the most noticeable consequences of Third World debt is the adverse
flow of capital. From 1981 to 1985, Latin American countries suffered a net
capital outflow of about $30 billion annually (Wesson 1990,420). Some coun-
tries paid out more in interest than the original amount of debt. Brazil, for
example, “which owed $53 billion in 1980, has paid $105 billion in interest
and still owes $115 billion” (ibid., 421).
Turning to the investment issue, statistics show that the recycling of capital
is confined to the industrial North. Money generated by the more affluent
countries eventually ends up again in the
North
for reinvestment and expansion
purposes. For example, foreign direct investment in the United States jumped
from $47.7 billion in 1983 to
$n
billion in 1986 and to $160.2 billion in
1989 (Salvatore 1991, 101). In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa suffered a decline:
468
The American
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of
Islamic
Social
Sciences
Vol.
8,
No.
3.
1991
net capital flows2 dropped from $18.3 billion in 1981 to $15.1 billion in 1987
(Taylor 1990, 11).
The Arab world, a region of vital importance to the industrialized coun-
tries (especially the Gulf), received very limited amounts
of
investment.
Of
the $253.9 billion direct Japanese investment abroad (as
of
March 31, 1990),
only $3.404 billion (or 1.34 percent) was invested in the Arab world, while
$105 billion (or 41 percent) was invested in the United States (Kuroda and
Hatanaka
1991, 92).
These examples underscore the economic disparity between the North
and the South. Any world order which fails
to
address these fundamental
issues of concern
to
tw-thirds
of
the world’s population will ultimately hamper
its goals
of
achieving peace, harmony, and prosperity.
Political
Impact
on
the Islamic World
As
regards the future relations
of
the Islamic world with the West, some
Western strategists (Luttwak
1990; Taylor 1991) have assumed a conflictual
relationship. Luttwak provocatively portrayed the Islamic world as a radical,
highly
militarized
region which, without apparent reason, can easily attack
its neighbon. In an article published in
Commentary,
he argues that the North-
South conflict might replace the East-West confrontation
by
rotating the front
lines of hostility by
90
degrees. He further notes:
And because for all Europeans
-
Russians very much included
-
the adjacent South is largely Islamic, the %-degree solution is
that much more plausible, given the exasperated rejection
of
Western
cultural penetrations by many Muslims, and the violent extremism
of
some
(Luttwak
1990, 17).
Luttwak continues
to
describe North African and Middle Eastern countries.
He states:
A
denuclearized and substantially demditarized Europe could hardly
coexist safely with heavily armed powers just across the Mediter-
ranean, some equipped with long-range missiles (ibid.,
18).
In a further negative characterization of Islamic behavior, Luttwak (ibid.,
17)
argues that “violence on a large scale is present wherever Islam meets
non-Islam.”
2Capital
flows
to
Africa include donations, loans, and investments
Hassan
Elhag
Ali
New
World
Order
469
Taylor (1991) characterizes the Islamic-Western schism as being less
militarily threatening than Luttwak’s depiction. He introduces a new dimen-
sion to
the
conflict,, that of ideology, when he states that
In the future, both mass emigration to the West and anti-Western
ideologies, probably based on Islam, could
be
appeahg. The region
represents few direct military threats to Europe at the moment
(1990, 138).
A military confrontation between the West and the North Africa-Middle
East region in which these countries pose a challenge to the North is not
objectively present at the time being. Most nations of North Africa and the
Middle East depend on the North for their military hardware and training.
Moreover, the West’s strategy is to prevent any Islamic country from going
nuclear. The “nuclear club” is an exclusive entity for the big powers, whereas
admission for others is selective. With the Soviet Union disintegrating, Western
powers have expressed concern that independent Muslim Soviet republics
may take a nuclear arsenal with them “at last confronting the world with
the long-dmided ‘Islamic bomb,”’ as
Newmeek
puts it (September
9,
1991,22).
One of the questions that has a direct impact on the Islamic world and
needs further examination is the position and role of the Islamic republics
in the Soviet Union. The Central Asian republics occupy a strategic location
between Russia and China. Although these republics’ current political and
economic situation
may
force them
to
find some ties with Moscow, the future
is by no means certain. Islamic activism is increasing, especially after the
legalization of the Islamic Renaissance party on September
9,
1991.
In 1989,
there were only 160 working mosques; now there are more than
5,000,
and
ten more mosques
are
opening every day
(Economist,
September 21, 1991,
One result of
this
dominant Islamic sentiment may be to seek a way
to
redirect the orientations of the republics toward the South. Such a develop-
ment would have a great geopolitical as well as psychological impact. As
far as
the
geopolitical aspect is concerned, the Islamic frontier would then
extend
to
the borders
of
Russia and China. Nuclear technology and capabili-
ty
would
be
transferred to the Islamic world. Whether the Afghan
Mujiihidsn
would succeed in their attempt
to
overthrow the communist regime in Af-
ghanistan or not,
the
future of communist
rule
in that country would
be
ex-
tremely
remote.
Moreover, these transformations
may
also have a direct
beamg
on Kashmir and may possibly lead
to
its people being allowed
self-determination.
Concerning the psychological factor, central Asia once represented the
cultural
and
spiritual heart of the Islamic world. Cities such as Bukhara,
58-60).
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The American Journal
of
Islamic Social Sciences
Vol.
8,
No.
3,
1991
Tashkent, and Samarqand were centers of knowledge, culture, and various
arts. With their reintegration into the Muslim ummah, a surge in Islamic
activism would be expected throughout the region, especially in such secular
states as Turkey.
Two other areas of concern
to the Islamic world are the Gulf and Palestine.
The Gulf contains one of the world‘s most desirable commodities: oil. In-
dustrialized countries depend on the Gulf area for this oil. Japan, for exam-
ple, imports almost all of its oil from the Islamic world
(70
percent from
the Gulf and more than
20
percent from Indonesia). The United States im-
ports about
25
percent of its oil from the Gulf. More importantly, the largest
amount of oil reserves in the world resides in the Gulf. Of the almost one
trillion barrels of oil reserves,
720
billion
are
found in the Gulf
(Dalhs
Mom-
ing
News,
October 14, 1991,
6).
Any interruption in the supply
of
oil from the Gulf is considered by
the West
to
be a direct threat to its continued well-being. The second Gulf
War proved that the United States will not allow a single power
to
control
the flow of oil. The United States’ strategy in this regard is to prevent Iran,
Iraq, or Saudi Arabia from dominating the Gulf area. One of the obvious
consequences of the Gulf War is the complete dependence of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the small emirates on the United States for both security and
protection, which highlights the fragility
of
the Arab interstate system. The
fi-agility of
this
system became even clearer with the collapse of the “Damascus
Declaration.” Another significant ramification of the Gulf War, one closely
connected with the first, is the complete collapse of the concept of Arab
nationalism and pan-Arabism. The foundations of the idea were severely shaken
by the invasion of one Arab country
by
another and the subsequent polarization
of the Arab world into two antagonistic camps. This means that some Arab
governments, especially those of Iraq and Syria, may seek another base for
the legitimation of their continued rule.
The other area of concern
to
the Islamic world is Palestine. The Palestin-
ian issue was used
by
many Arab governments to mobilize the population
and generate political support. Many Arab regimes have in the past based
their legitimacy around the Palestinian problem. Therefore, stability in the
Middle East is connected with settling the Palestinian problem.
Conclusion
It seems that the new world order, at least as far as many actors at dif-
ferent levels in the Islamic world (i.e., states, organizations, or individuals)
are concerned, does not mean change for the better, for the issues which
it raises are not of major concern to those actors. Issues of external military
\
Hassan
Elhag
Ali
New
World
Order
471
threats, nuclear deterrence, and balance of power are not urgent issues for
most Islamic world actors. What many Islamic countries are concerned about
are issues such as internal violence, hunger, and refugees. In addition, both
the Islamic and the Third worlds are quite coricerned with economic develop-
ment and the flow of information. When Third World countries proposed
a new world information order and a new world economic order, they were
faced with fierce opposition on the part of the West. For the Western in-
dustrialized nations, preservation of the status quo means the continuation
of
their dominance.
For a world which wants to live in harmony and peace, an incorporation
of these information and economic concerns into the overall framework of
the new world order is crucial. With the present situation of disparity be-
tween the North and the South, poverty and, as a result, violence will become
increasingly endemic to the South. Brzezinski puts the argument more suc-
cinctly when he notes:
With nuclear weapons inhibiting the recourse to war among the
leading powers, global politics are becoming in some ways similar
to
American urban centers: a mixture of interdependence and ine-
quality with violence concentrated in the poorer segments of the
society
(1991,
5).
A world hoping to live in harmony, peace, and prosperity needs a more
equitable distribution of resources. More tolerance and understanding of others’
cultures and belief systems is not only desirable, but needed.
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