Importance of Collection Strategy:
Ensuring Judgement Collection
By Darrell P. White and Maxx E. Sharp
[Editors note: Judge Holcomb currently
serves as a judge on the United States
District Court for the Central District of
California. He was nominated by Presi-
dent Trump in November 2019 and con-
firmed by the United States Senate in
September 2020. Judge Holcomb spent
much of his professional career in pri-
vate practice, including as a partner at
Greenberg Gross LLP and Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear,
LLP. He has a B.S. in civil engineering from MIT, an M.B.A.
from Harvard Business School, and a J.D. from Harvard Law
School. Judge Holcomb served in the United States Navy from
1980 to 1989, and was on active duty as a Commissioned Of-
ficer from 1984 to 1989.]
Q: Many past profiles about you note that you
knew you wanted to be a judge even before law
school—now that you achieved your goal, what are
your aspirations going forward?
-Continued on page 4-
Q&A with the Honorable John W. Holcomb
By Kristopher R. Wood
Winter 2023
- IN THIS ISSUE -
Q&A with District Judge John W. Holcomb
by Kristopher R. Wood .............................................. Pg. 1
Importance of Collection Strategy: Ensuring
Judgment Collection by Darrell P. White
and Maxx E. Sharp ...................................................... Pg. 1
Presidents Message by William C. ONeill............... Pg. 2
Are your Applicant Screening Tools Violating ADA?
by Connor L. Kridle and Philip K. Lem .................... Pg. 3
Post-Bruno Strategic Considerations When Bringing
or Defending a Petition to Remove a Trustee
by Lauren Strickroth ................................................. Pg. 3
The Rising Tide of ESG Litigation: An Overview
by Lisa M. Northrup .................................................. Pg. 4
Thank You to Our Report Sponsor:
Judicate West ............................................................... Pg. 12
ORANGE COUNTY
Report
t
l
a
b
TRIAL LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS
Knowing the available judg-
ment collection methods is im-
portant when setting realistic ex-
pectations for a case. This is
equally helpful for attorneys who
regularly take contingency fee
cases or operate with flexible bill-
ing arrangements. The collectabil-
ity of a potential judgment deter-
mines whether a case is worth fil-
ing and the amount of resources
that should be allocated to the
matter. Understanding the available collection methods
available to the plaintiff (and potential creditor) is perti-
nent to properly framing a case for collection.
Pre-Judgment Asset Investigation
When it comes to collection, information about the
debtors assets is pertinent to deciding whether obtaining
a judgment is worth the time and money. Thus, it is im-
portant to have a discussion about the defendants assets
with the plaintiff before filing a case. Additionally, public
information such as bankruptcy proceedings, civil litiga-
tion, judgments, and liens can be
obtained before a case is filed. This
information may reveal that a de-
fendant has outstanding liabilities
exceeding any collectable assets.
These searches can also be con-
ducted on a defendants companies,
which weighs the general character
of the defendant as it relates to
debts. If a potential defendant is
already dealing with multiple credi-
tors, then joining that list may be
an exercise in futility. However, if the Plaintiff is in-
formed and still wants to proceed, a prompt money-up-
front settlement with the defendant may be a good way to
-Continued on page 7-
Volume XXV No. 1
2
8502 E. Chapman Avenue, Suite 443
Orange, CA 92869
714.516.8106
[email protected] www.abtl.org
WILLIAM C. ONEILL, President
KENNETH G. PARKER, Vice President
ANDREW R. GRAY, Treasurer
CHARITY M. GILBRETH, Secretary
BOARD OF GOVERNORS:
Hon. William D. Claster Darren K. Cottriel
Shane P. Criqui Tamara I. Devitt
Hon. Maria D. Hernandez Hon. John W. Holcomb
Hon. Erick L. Larsh Amy Laurendeau
Khai LeQuang Hon. Douglas F. McCormick
Casey J. McCracken Hon. Layne H. Melzer
Lisa N. Neal Justin N. Owens
Michael M. Purpura Alejandro G. Ruiz
Hon. Maurice Sanchez Hon. James V. Selna
Jeffrey M. Singletary Chahira Solh
David M. Stein Joshua J. Stowell
Michael H. Strub, Jr. David R. Sugden
Vikki L. Vander Woude Peter N. Villar
Eva M. Weiler Mark B. Wilson
JUDICIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL:
Hon. Cormac J. Carney Hon. Richard Y. Lee
Hon. Linda S. Marks Hon. Thomas S. McConville
Hon. Joanne Motoike Hon. Kathleen E. OLeary
Hon. Deborah C. Servino Hon. Fred W. Slaughter
PAST PRESIDENTS:
Donald L. Morrow Thomas R. Malcolm
Robert E. Palmer Hon. Andrew J. Guilford (ret.)
Jeffrey W. Shields Michael G. Yoder
Dean J. Zipser Hon. Sheila B. Fell (ret.)
Gary A. Waldron James G. Bohm
Hon. Martha K. Gooding Richard J. Grabowski
Sean P. OConnor Darren O. Aitken
Hon. Melissa R. McCormick Mark D. Erickson
Jeffrey H. Reeves Michele D. Johnson
Scott B. Garner Mark A. Finkelstein
Daniel A. Sasse Karla J. Kraft
Todd G. Friedland Maria Z. Stearns
Matthew M. Sonne
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Linda A. Sampson
ABTL REPORT EDITOR
Richard W. Krebs
Presidents Message
By William C. ONeill
The statements and opinions in the ABTL-Orange County
Report are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of
the editors or the Association of Business Trial Lawyers of
Orange County. All rights reserved.
The great Stanford and 49ers head football coach,
Bill Walsh, once said that he never understood calling a
player an overachieverbecause either youre an
achiever or youre not.While the sentiment is a good
one, I have to respectfully disagree with the coach be-
cause being President of this organization full of
achievers and difference-makers feels a whole lot like
overachieving.
I have had a long affinity for ABTL and why it ex-
ists. My introduction to ABTL started through my
mentor, Mark Erickson. He made program attendance a
priority for his associates because he wanted us all to
see that iron sharpens iron, personal relationships mat-
ter, and professionalism and
ethics trump conniving and
foolishness.
To the associates reading
this column, understand that
the few hours that you spend
going to a dinner program or
Young Lawyers brown bag
event are much more than
simply putting in face time.
They are down payments on
your career.
And to partners reading this, encourage your associ-
ates to see the bigger picture. Show them how to get
where you are, but avoiding some of the professional
pitfalls we have overcome (often with the help of oth-
ers). Professionalism isnt just working across the
counsel table, it is oftentimes making the effort to men-
tor our professions rising leaders.
Opportunities will abound this year for that improve-
ment and mentorship through ABTL. Our dinner pro-
grams, led by Justin Owens, will be fantastic. Our An-
nual Seminar (October 11-15, 2023) will be held at The
Fairmont Orchid on the Big Island of Hawaii. As the
host chapter this year, Orange County will play a big
role shaping the Annual Seminars success. My thanks
to Vikki Vander Woude for her leadership.
Ultimately, our success as an organization depends
on active participation and respecting core values. I
would not be here today without Marks insistence that
ABTL would improve my fellow associates and me.
Lets all take that kind of mentorship role and ensure
that we improve one another and mentor the next gener-
ation of leaders too.
Will ONeill is a partner at Ross Wolcott Teinert &
Prout.
3
Are Your Applicant Screening Tools
Violating the ADA?
By Connor L. Kridle and Philip K. Lem
Acting as trustee can be a
risky business, particularly when
there is disagreement regarding
the terms of the trust. When liti-
gation arises, it is common for a
beneficiary to file a petition to
remove the trustee pursuant to
Probate Code sections 15642(a)
and 17200. Attorneys should be
aware of the risk to the benefi-
ciary of this course of action.
Probate Code section 15642, subdivision (d) permits
the court to order the petitioner to bear all or any part of
the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attor-
neys fees,if the petition for removal of the trustee was
filed in bad faith and that removal would be contrary to
the settlors intent.In June 2022, the court in Bruno v.
Hopkins, 79 Cal.App.5th 801 (2022) increased the risk to
beneficiaries. It held that the court may hold a benefi-
ciary personally liable for all attorneys fees and costs
incurred as a result of a bad faith petition to remove the
trustee.
I. The Mildred and James Francis Living Trust
In Bruno, Mildred and James Francis were married for
67 years, and had four daughters: Lynne, Gail, Jane and
Gwen. Mildred and James created the Francis Living
Trust (the Trust”). James was an attorney and drafted
the Trust himself. (Bruno, 79 Cal.App.5th at 808.)
At the death of the first spouse, the Trust directed half
of the Trusts assets to a revocable survivors trust, and
the other half to an irrevocable marital and family trust.
At the death of the second spouse, the Trust distributed
$200,000 each to daughters Lynn and Gail from the sur-
vivors trust, and the remainder of the Trust assets to
daughters Jane and Gwen. (Id.)
At the time Mildred and James executed the Trust, the
$200,000 gifts to Lynne and Gail represented about half
of the Trusts assets. However, by 2015, the Trust assets
increased to $4 to 5 million. (Id.)
II. The Petition to Invalidate the Trust and
Remove the Trustee
After Jamesdeath, but while Mildred was still living,
their daughter Lynne learned that her distribution was
limited to $200,000. Lynne requested a copy of the
Trust. At first, Mildred did not provide it, and Lynne
-Continued on page 14-
Introduction and Background
Artificial intelligence, more commonly known as AI,
is ubiquitous. From the facial recognition software used
to open an iPhone, to the navigation system that gives
seamless directions to a new location, AI runs many of
the useful tools we rely on in our daily lives. Companies
have harnessed the power if AI to develop tools to aid
employers in the hiring process. Many employers now
use AI-powered software to
screen job candidates or even se-
lectively advertise job postings.
These tools simplify and stream-
line hiring, but they also may
subject employers to liability un-
der a range of federal, state, and
local laws. As regulatory atten-
tion continues to shift toward AI-
powered tools, employers need to
be aware of the changing land-
scape and cognizant of where
they stand.
This year saw significant advances in the regulation of
AI employment tools at nearly every level. At the federal
level, both the EEOC and the
DOJ released technical guidance,
and the EEOC initiated its first
enforcement action on the sub-
ject. The California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Council
(FEHC) (now called the Califor-
nia Civil Rights Council) released
proposed revisions of the states
employment non-discrimination
laws to address the use of AI in
the candidate-screening process.
New York City also passed simi-
lar legislation, placing certain notice and accommodations
obligations on employers and employment agencies in the
city that utilize automated employment decision tools.
If trends continue, 2023 could be another busy year for
regulators and employers who use AI in the workplace.
AI Defined
Expansive definitions of AI abound. Congress has de-
fined AI as any machine-based system that can, for a
given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions,
recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual
environments.National Artificial Intelligence Act of
-Continued on page 9-
Post-Bruno Strategic Considerations When Bringing
or Defending a Petition to Remove a Trustee
By Lauren Strickroth
4
ESG,short for
Environmental, Social, and
Governance,refers to a set of
concepts, goals, or factors that
companies and investors are in-
creasingly considering in deter-
mining and assessing a compa-
nys purpose, policies, and prac-
tices. There is no definitive list
of ESG factors and the three cate-
gories often overlap. Prototypi-
cal examples of environment,
social, and governance factors include:
E: climate change mitigation and adaptation, waste
management, energy efficiency, biodiversity,
and water conservation.
S: human rights, diversity and inclusion, wages and
benefits, racial justice, community relations, and
health and safety.
G: corporate board structure, executive compensa-
tion, anti-bribery and corruption, and corporate
reporting obligations.
ESG is still an emerging set of concepts, and there is
no international consensus regarding the standards gov-
erning ESG disclosures. The competing frameworks
include, for example, the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (“SASB”) standards, the Global Re-
porting Initiative (“GRI”) standards, and United Nations
Principles for Responsible Investment (“PRI”).
This lack of definitive industry standards, combined
with newly proposed and recently adopted legal regula-
tions in the United States, has created a situation ripe for
litigation. Several key areas of emerging ESG litigation
are discussed below.
Greenwashing Litigation
Greenwashingrefers to the practice of misrepresent-
ing the sustainability or eco-friendliness of a companys
products or services. As consumer demand for green
products escalates, companies are rushing to meet that
demand. In the rush, company messaging is at times
conflating the aspirational with the actual. Indeed, in a
recent survey conducted by Harris Poll for Google
Cloud, 72% of North American executives agreed that
their organization has overstated its sustainability ef-
forts. (https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/
google_cloud_cxo_sustainability_survey_final.pdf).
Plaintiff consumer and activist organizations have taken
-Continued on page 16-
A: Well, an appointment under Article III is a lifetime
appointment, so I want to stay for life. I love this job.
Its what Ive always wanted to do, and I want to do it for
as long as I can. Rarely does one find the perfect job, but
thats the way I feel about being a judge. Its so nice to
simply try to find the right answer without being beholden
to a clients interests. Not that theres anything wrong
with representing a clients interests—its what you all do
and what I used to do as a lawyer. But its nice to be able
just to apply the facts to law. Its like a puzzle, and Im
trying to find the right answer.
Q: Do you have a judicial philosophy?
A: Theres an old story about three grizzled baseball
umpires, probably enjoying an adult beverage after a
game and talking about the art of calling balls and strikes.
The first says, I calls em as I sees em.The second
says, I calls em as they are.And the third says, Nah,
they aint nothing until I calls em.I like that story, and
I tell it often, because it illustrates three views of reality.
The first umpire acknowledges that there is an objective
truth. The pitch is objectively either a ball or a strike, and
the first umpire does his best to identify that truth and
make the call accordingly. The second umpire also
acknowledges that there is an objective truth, but he de-
nies any possibility of error in his perception of that truth.
The third umpire denies that there is any objective truth;
his view is that I determine the truth because I alone call
it a ball or strike.
It seems to me that those are also three possible views
of the law and the art of judging. I agree with the first
one. There is an objective truth—the correct ruling under
the law—and my mandate as a judge is to seek that cor-
rect ruling as best I can.
Q: Do you have any legal mentors or heroes that
particularly influenced your career?
A: Yes, certainly. I clerked for a bankruptcy judge in
Chicago, Judge Ronald Barliant. He was (and is) a great
judge and a great man. One of the many things I learned
from him was patience. When I was clerking for him, he
would have a hearing on a motion, and I would be quick
to conclude that he should grant or deny it. He would
say, Slow down, lets look into this. Take our time, and
get it right.
He also would never interfere with a lawyers style.
Sometimes at hearings a lawyer would be really aggres-
sive or, in my view, annoying. Judge Barliant and I
would talk afterward and I would ask Why didnt you
cut him off?He would say, I never want to interfere
-Q&A: Continued from page 1-
-Continued on page 5-
The Rising Tide of ESG Litigation: An Overview
By Lisa M. Northrup
5
with a lawyers style. Thats just the way hes present-
ing. What I care about is the substance of his argument;
how hes applying the law to the facts.
From my time at Knobbe, the late Don Martens was
certainly an influence, as was the late Jim Bear. Jim was
the managing partner for many years until his retirement
in ’05 or ’06. We shared a secretary early in my career
and my office was next to his, so I got an unusual oppor-
tunity as a new associate to see how he performed as a
managing partner—especially his humanity, and his
deep concern for all the people in the firm, including
non-lawyer staff members.
I was a partner at Greenberg Gross for a year before
my nomination was confirmed. My former partners,
Alan Greenberg and Wayne Gross, are both terrific trial
lawyers. When I was there, I witnessed Alan Greenberg
win an absolutely unwinnable jury trial. It was a work
of art.
A more recent mentor is my colleague in Riverside,
Judge Jesus Bernal. After I was confirmed I spent the
first year and a half in the Riverside courthouse. While
many of my colleagues were state court judges or magis-
trate judges before becoming district judges, this was my
first time on the bench. There is a steep learning curve,
and having Judge Bernal there to bounce things off of
and to provide guidance was critical and extraordinarily
helpful. He is an amazing judge—a wise judge—and a
close friend.
Q: Are there any non-legal experiences or interests
that have served you especially well on the bench? In
what way?
A: I think my time in the Navy shaped my view of life
in general. I was 21 years old when I was commissioned
as an officer. I reported to my first ship just before 22
nd
birthday, and I immediately had a division of 50 sailors
working for me. That early opportunity to lead people
was critical to my approach to life and to the law. The
sailors under me were mostly a bunch of teenagers, and,
shockingly, they had a tendency to get into disputes and
other kinds of trouble. Id listen to one sailors version
of the events and think youre absolutely right—but
then I would talk to the second sailor and realize there is
a totally different set of perspectives and facts. One of
the critical things I gained is an appreciation that you
have to listen to both sides before making any conclu-
sion or decision.
Q: What was the biggest unexpected difference for
you between private practice and being a judge?
A: I came from a purely civil law background, and I
- Q&A: Continued from page 4-
knew there would be many new areas of law that I had
never practiced before or had exposure to before. I ex-
pected to dread cases from areas of law that I wasnt fa-
miliar with like criminal law, antitrust, class actions, and
civil rights cases. But I found that I really like them. Its
fun learning new areas of law. I learn new things every
single day. Its one of the great things about this job.
Youre constantly learning new things and constantly
being exposed to new areas of law.
Take, for example, civil rights cases. I had almost no
exposure to those cases coming onto the bench, but I
very quickly found I really enjoy them. Thats not to
trivialize these cases—some of the facts are tragic and
the outcome is extraordinarily important to the parties.
But sorting those cases out and applying, for example,
the qualified immunity doctrine, is really fascinating
from an intellectual perspective.
That said, IP cases still interest and fascinate me as
well. I enjoy Markman hearings, for example, in patent
cases. I feel like Ive got a pretty good handle on the
Lanham Act, trademark cases, and copyright cases. I
had a lot of trade secret cases as a lawyer, so I enjoy see-
ing those come in.
Q: What is something youve learned as a judge
that you wish you had known when you were in pri-
vate practice?
A: The limited time and attention that courts have to
apply to any given case. I personally look at every filing
every day. I get a report every morning of everything
that was filed in all my cases on the previous day. Now,
I may not look closely at a summons or even an answer.
But I read every new motion, every opposition, every
reply, every Rule 26(f) report—those sorts of things.
Then, the week before the hearing on a motion, I meet
with my two law clerks. If the motion is relatively
straight forward, Ill make a decision, and it will be done
pretty quickly.
So, my point is, theres not a lot of time for us to ap-
preciate nuances. As lawyers sometimes we focus on
the details, such as specific word choices to use in a
brief. But when the judge gets it, that doesnt matter at
all. What youve got to do is catch the judges attention.
Be extraordinarily overt in what youre trying to say in
your brief. This is a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, the court should grant it and dismiss the complaint
without leave to amend because there is this error that is
unfixable, and heres why.Dont bury those key points
or make your brief read like poetry, where theres some
beautiful nuance in the 15
th
stanza. Of course, there are
cases that are extraordinarily complicated and the nuanc-
es matter. In those cases, you can and should go into
-Continued on page 6-
6
detail. But be sure to tell me up front what the filing is
about, and what you want me to do.
Q: Are there any common lawyer practices you find
ineffective or counterproductive?
A: Disorganization, lack of clarity, ad hominem at-
tacks, and lack of civility. For example, failure to grant
continuances or stipulate on an issue when its not going
to hurt your case at all can leave a really bad impression.
Sometimes it comes from the client, and lawyers general-
ly have to do what their client tells them. But thats an
issue of client control, where the lawyer needs to con-
vince the client to do the right thing.
I dont want to see an ex parte application for more
time, for example, when the request is reasonable. When
I get an ex parte application, I literally stop what Im do-
ing to look at it. And if its something that doesnt war-
rant my immediate attention, its extraordinarily annoy-
ing and reflects badly on someone. Maybe on the party
filing it when it didnt need to be filed, or maybe its the
party opposing, for example, a pretty standard request for
an extension of time. I wish parties wouldnt waste judi-
cial resources like that. And it is resources, Ive only got
so much time in the day. Ive only got two law clerks
and a judicial assistant, and we really ought to be spend-
ing our time on the matters that warrant legal attention at
a high level.
Ive also been taking a harder line with my scheduling
orders in terms of sticking to the schedule. Ill generally
give the parties what they want in terms of the original
case schedule, within reason. But then, three weeks be-
fore the pretrial conference, Ill get a stipulation to con-
tinue the trial date by six months because the parties
simply didnt get everything done. My scheduling order
is not carved in stone, but it is serious. Its a court order,
and the parties are expected to adhere to it. Now, when
there is a good reason, such as lead counsel experiencing
health issues, Ill grant more time. But we didnt finish
taking discovery and were not readydoes not constitute
good cause for amending the scheduling order.
Finally, aesthetics can matter. The formatting of briefs,
line numbers aligning with text, and things like that are
easy things to get right. Now, Im not going to deny a
motion over formatting issues—Im going to deal with it
on the substance. But first impressions can matter, and
why not get the easy things right? Make your papers
look professional. Make sure theyre organized. Make a
good first impression.
Q: Do you have any tips or advice for lawyers ap-
pearing in your courtroom?
-Q&A: Continued from page 5-
A: I think I may soon modify my standing order to
provide that counsel should let the court know if there is
a relatively young or inexperienced lawyer who is going
to argue a motion. Well conduct the hearing and let
him or her handle it. Im a big proponent of letting less
experienced attorneys get some experience. And the on-
ly way theyre going to get experience arguing motions
is by doing it, so I want to encourage that. It doesnt
mean Im going to be easier on the client or the sub-
stance of the motion, but I do want to encourage parties
to let less experienced lawyers have a chance.
Many of my colleagues nationwide are also really big
on this point. I remember one case when I was in private
practice where an associate and I appeared before Judge
Otero on a summary judgment motion. It was a strong
motion, and at the start of the hearing, Judge Otero said
he wanted to hear argument from the associate. Of
course, Judge Otero told me that I could assist if the as-
sociate needed help. But Judge Otero was perceptive
enough to understand that the associate had put in a lot
of work on the motion and knew the case well. Ulti-
mately, the associate did a great job and we won. I dont
know that Im going to go that far in my courtroom—put
the junior associate on the spot. But I think itd be nice
if everyone knew that there was a chance I might.
Kristopher R. Wood is a senior
associate in the Orange County office of
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP and
is a member of the firms Complex
Litigation and Dispute Resolution
Group.
7
cut the line of creditors. Additionally, once a case is
commenced, discovery of relevant information will of-
ten lead to disclosure of information that provides the
plaintiff with a better understanding of the defendants
assets. Note that any applicable discovery related pro-
tective orders could interfere with using said infor-
mation in collection efforts, depending on the language
of the order. Thus, it is pertinent to evaluate protective
order language carefully under the perspective of a po-
tential creditor.
Preliminary Relief to Protect Collectable Assets
When dealing with a defendant who is at risk of liq-
uidating assets, the plaintiff may be able to obtain pre-
liminary relief to ensure collectible assets are available
by the time a judgment is obtained. To obtain a tempo-
rary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the
moving party must make a showing of irreparable harm
if the requested relief is not granted. (Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 527.) Insolvency or the inability to otherwise
pay money damages is a classic type of irreparable harm
supporting the issuance of an injunction as a provisional
remedy. (See California Retail Portfolio Fund GMBH &
Co. KG v. Hopkins Real Estate Group (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 849; see also Earth Island Institute v. U.S.
Forest Service, (9th. Cir. 2003) 351 F.3d 1291 (holding
degree of irreparable harm required for preliminary in-
junction increases as probability of success on merits
decreases, and vice versa.)) Additionally, in suit for a
preliminary injunction ancillary to an accounting and
dissolution of a limited partnership, preliminary injunc-
tion was properly issued as necessary to prevent
irreparable injuryto the partnership assets where it
was necessary to assure that the partnership assets
would remain intact pending an accounting and a final
hearing on the merits. (See Wind v. Herbert (1960) 186
Cal.App.2d 276.) Further, receivership of a company
can be granted “[w]here a corporation is insolvent, or in
imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its cor-
porate rights[and] In all other cases where necessary
to preserve the property or rights of any party. (Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 564(b). The plaintiff should be sure to as-
sert her rights to preserve collectable assets by request-
ing preliminary relief when necessary. Even when not
enough information is known to request a remedy like
an account freeze, a precautionary order preventing the
liquidation of funds can set up for contempt sanctions if
this order is violated.
Judgment Debtors Exam
Once a judgment is obtained, a judgment debtors
exam is a useful tool to apply pressure on a debtor and
-Collection: Continued from page 1-
to obtain complete information about a debtors assets. A
debtors exam requires a debtor to appear at Court and
answer questions under the penalty of perjury about their
finances and ability to pay the judgment owed. If a debt-
or does not appear at a debtors exam at the time, date,
and location ordered by the Court, the debtor will be sub-
ject to a bench warrant for arrest for contempt of Court.
Indeed, Californias Debtors Exam form (EJ-125) puts
the debtor on notice of this, stating: if you fail to appear
at the time and place specified in this order, you may be
subject to arrest and punishment for contempt of court,
and the court may make an order requiring you to pay
the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the judgment
creditor in this proceeding.This threat of a potential
bench warrant assists with inducing compliance. Once
the debtor appears, the presiding judge will explain the
seriousness of the exam and the debtor will be sworn in
under oath. The presiding judge may also warn the debt-
or that the creditors attorney has a right to return to the
courtroom and compel the disclosure of certain infor-
mation if the debtor refuses to answer the creditors
questions. After that, the attorney and the debtor will
leave the court room with a court reporter to begin ques-
tioning. Note that this proceeding can be recorded, so the
creditor should bring a court reporter.
The scope of a debtors exam is extended to any infor-
mation that will aid in the enforcement of the judgment
or that relates to the debtors assets or liabilities. Note
that it may be helpful to review the applicable collection
forms to determine which information is necessary. For
instance, the bank levy collection form requires the bank
name and the account number of the account sought to
be levied. Additionally, the bank levy form requests the
social security number of the debtor, thus making this
information relevant to the collection efforts. Further, the
debtors exam may extend to review of any documents
furnished by the debtor and even the review of the wallet
of the debtor. The debit or credit cards in a debtors wal-
let could also be used to cross-examine any previous an-
swers relating to the debtors bank accounts.
Post-Judgment Asset Investigation
In some situations, like a default judgment, a creditor
might not be able to find the debtor in order to serve him
with notice to appear at a judgment debtors exam. In
this situation, an asset search conducted by a private in-
vestigator may be the best available option to obtain in-
formation concerning a debtors assets. It is important to
ensure that the private investigators findings are made in
compliance with the law, such as the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act (GLBA) Section 313.15 (a)(2)(ii). Additional-
ly, it is important to ensure that the private investigator
-Continued on page 8-
8
obtains this information in a Court admissible manner.
Many private investigators are commonly used for this
reason and will have no issue with making these repre-
sentations to attorneys to provide peace of mind that the
information can be used for collection purposes.
Bank Levy
The Plaintiff may be surprised to learn that, after ob-
taining a judgment, the Plaintiff is permitted to collect
the judgment directly from the debtors bank account(s).
Learning this information can potentially alleviate the
Plaintiffs concerns of inability to collect and help the
Plaintiff understand the power of a legal judgment.
A bank levy is a collection method conducted by the
Sheriffs Department, wherein the Sheriff will serve le-
gal notice on a bank and collect funds due under a judg-
ment directly from the debtors bank account. When at-
tempting to obtain a bank levy, it is important to note
that a Writ of Execution must be signed by the Court per-
mitting the Sheriff to begin the transfer of property under
the judgment.
After the writ is obtained, the creditor must send the
Sheriff instructions for each bank account sought be lev-
ied. Note that the applicable Sheriffs Department is
based on the location of the bank designated in the Sher-
iffs instructions. For instance, if a bank in Orange Coun-
ty is served with the levy, then the Orange County Sher-
iffs Department must receive the Sheriffs instructions.
These instructions may vary between jurisdictions and
are generally accessible from the Sheriffs website. Also,
while some banks accept service at any branch, other
banks have set locations for service for the entire State of
California. The California Department of Financial Pro-
tection and Innovation maintains an easily accessible list
of designated locations for service of a legal process at:
https://dfpi.ca.gov/central-locations-for-service-of-legal-
process/. If a bank does not appear on the State of Cali-
fornia website, it can likely be served at any branch.
(Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 684.115(b) [“Should a financial
institution required to designate a central location fail to
do so, each branch of that institution located in this state
shall be deemed to be a central location at which service
of legal process may be made, and all of the institutions
branches or offices located within this state shall be
deemed to be a branch or office covered by central pro-
cess.”].)
When serving the bank levy, the Sheriff will also
serve the debtor with notice of levy to inform the debtor
that the levy is occurring. Upon re ceiving this notice the
debtor has the right to object to the levy. The debtor can
object and argue that funds should be exempted from
collection to the extent necessary for the support of the
-Collection: Continued from page 7-
judgment debtor and the spouse and dependents of the
judgment debtor.(Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.225.) Al-
so, the debtor is automatically protected from a levy to
the extent that it would reduce her account below $1,788.
(Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.220.)
Vehicle Levy
Similar to a bank levy, a creditor may request the
Sheriff to levy and subsequently auction the debtors ve-
hicle to satisfy a judgment. This collection device goes
beyond the monetary realm and will apply significant
pressure on the debtor. To serve a vehicle levy, there is
no requirement to exhaust all possible monetary collec-
tion methods, thus this method could potentially be used
to induce a payment of the full judgment amount if the
debtor has a compelling reason to remain in possession of
the applicable vehicle (i.e. luxury vehicle or classic car).
Note that if the property to be seized is in a private place,
such as a garage or fenced lot, the Sheriff cannot seize it
without a private place court order issued pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure § 699.030 unless the debtor vol-
untarily surrenders it. Thus, when conducting a debtors
exam be sure to request the debtor to identify locations
where his vehicles are stored to determine whether a pri-
vate place order is necessary. Also, a vehicle levy may
require the creditor to pay the Sheriffs office to store the
vehicle.
Property Lien
A property lien provides the creditor with the oppor-
tunity to secure her judgment using the debtors real
property. To secure a lien against real property, the credi-
tor must obtain a signed Abstract of Judgment from the
Court. Then, the creditor must record this Abstract of
Judgment with the recorders office in the county where
the property is located. A lien will remain on the property
for 10 years, but can be re-extended if necessary. The lien
will permit the creditor to collect on his judgment when
the when the debtor refinances or sells the property. If the
debtors property is foreclosed upon, keep in mind that
the debtors mortgage company(ies) may hold first priori-
ty in terms of payment on said lien. Note that mortgage
and property tax liens will almost always take priority
over judgment liens, so this collection method may not
lead to any recovery on an underwater property.
Wage Garnishment
Wage garnishment permits a creditor of a consumer
debt to take a percentage of a debtors wages to satisfy a
judgment. This order will go directly to the debtors em-
ployer, thus avoiding having to deal directly with a debt-
or. The percentage of wages that a creditor can garnish
depends on the type of debt as well as federal and state
garnishment limits. Title III of the Consumer Credit Pro-
-Continued on page 9-
9
tection Act (CCPA) prohibits an employer from dis-
charging an employee whose earnings have been subject
to a garnishment for one debt. But Title III does not pro-
tect an employee from discharge if the employee's earn-
ings have been subject to garnishment for a second or
subsequent debt. (See 15 USC §1671 et seq.; 29 CFR
Part 870.) Thus, creditors should be cognizant of wheth-
er there an existent creditor already has a garnishment in
place.
Collection from International Defendants
For Defendants located outside of the United States
or who maintain bank accounts in other countries, it is
pertinent to gather information concerning the location of
their assets. When it comes to collection, the location of
the assets determines the applicable entity involved with
collection. While the Hague Convention permits service
of complaints in many jurisdictions outside of the United
States, there is no guarantee of enforcing a United States
judgment in jurisdictions outside of the country. Still, if
the debtor owns tangible assets in the United States, such
as real property, this can provide a method for judgment
enforcement via property lien, even if a defendant is not
in the United States. Relating back to preliminary relief,
when dealing with a defendant with significant assets
outside of the United States, ensure that the plaintiff as-
serts her right to obtain preliminary relief preventing the
irreparable harm that would occur due to conduct such as
transferring assets out of the United States (i.e. moving
money offshore).
Importance of Assessment of Collection
There are many collection devices available, thus it
is important to evaluate a wide variety of potential assets
and revenue sources for any defendant or potential debt-
or. In doing so, attorneys can set realistic expectations
for collection for their clients. This is equally helpful for
attorneys who regularly take contingency fee cases or
operate with flexible billing arrangements. If you are un-
sure whether a case has collection potential, you can con-
tact Kimura London & White LLP.
Darrell P. White, co-founding partner at Kimura
London & White LLP, specializes in business trials and
commercial litigation. (949) 474-0940 or
dwhite@klw-law.com
Maxx E. Sharp, litigation associate at Kimura London
& White LLP, handles commercial litigation matters.
(949) 474-0940 or msharp@klw-law.com
-Collection: Continued from page 8-
2020 § 5002(3). Similarly, the proposed revisions put for-
ward by the FEHC define an automated-decision sys-
tem(ADS) as any computational process, including
one derived from machine learning, statistics, or other
data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, that
screens, evaluates, categorizes, recommends, or otherwise
makes a decision or facilitates human decision making
that impacts employees or applicants.Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 2, § 11008(d) (revisions proposed July 28, 2022).
Such broadly defined key terms give regulators a wide
net, sweeping in many ubiquitous technologies. For ex-
ample, the above definitions would encompass a wide
range of tools currently used by many employers, such
as: resume screening software, facial or vocal recognition
software, software that uses a question-and-answer for-
mat to make predictive assessments of applicant fit,
software utilized to test physical or mental dexterity or
cognitive abilities, software used to assess personality
traits or emotional intelligence, and potentially many
more.
EEOC and Algorithmic Fairness
The Initiative
In 2021, the EEOC launched an agency-wide initiative
to ensure that the use of software, including artificial
intelligence (AI), machine-learning, and other emerging
technologies used in hiring and other employment deci-
sions comply with federal civil rights laws that the EEOC
enforces.EEOC Launches Initiative on Artificial Intelli-
gence and Algorithmic Fairness (Oct. 28, 2021), https://
www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-launches-initiative-artificial-
intelligence-and-algorithmic-fairness. The EEOC explained
that this Algorithmic Fairnessinitiative would
examine more closelyhow technology like AI is fun-
damentally changing the way employment decisions are
made.Id.
The Agencys First Enforcement Action
In its first major undertaking following the announce-
ment of the initiative, the EEOC brought an enforcement
action against online tutoring software company iTutor-
Group. See EEOC v. iTutorGroup, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-
02565 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2022). The company (composed
of three integrated entities) hired thousands of United
States-based tutors each year to provide remote online
tutoring to students primarily residing in China. Id. at 2-3.
iTutorGroup job applicants, as a component of the hiring
process, were required to list their birthdates and age. See
id. at 5. Unbeknownst to applicants, iTutorGroup had
programmed their application-gathering software to auto-
matically reject female applicants aged 55 or older and
male applicants aged 60 or older. The lawsuit was
-Applicant Screening: Continued from page 3-
-Continued on page 10-
10
Responsibility for Vendor-Designed and Vendor-
Administered Tools
The guidance also noted that in many casesan em-
ployer would be held responsible under the ADA for its
use of an AI tool, even if such a tool was designed or
administeredby another entity. Id. For example, an em-
ployer may be subject to liability for tests that discrimi-
nate against disabled individuals even if the test was de-
veloped by an outside vendor.Id. Situations where em-
ployers grant vendors the authority to act on their behalf
could also provide a basis for ADA liability, such as
through the administration of noncompliant AI tools in
the hiring process. See id.
Common Ways AI Tools May Violate the ADA
The guidance focused on three common waysthe
use of an AI tool could subject an employer to ADA lia-
bility: (1) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,
(2) “screening outa disabled individual, and (3) an inad-
vertent medical examinationof a job applicant.
1) Individuals with disabilities may require
specialized equipment [or] alternative tests or test-
ing formatsto allow a more accurate assess-
ment.Some employers may inadvertently fail to
provide necessary reasonable accommodations by
relying on AI tools that fail to take into account the
testing subjects potential disability. For example,
an individual with limited manual dexterity may
find it difficult to take a knowledge testwhich
relies on something like a keyboard or trackpad to
manually input data. Absent some sort of undue
hardship, the applicant should be provided an alter-
native version of the test, such as one allowing oral
responses.
2) AI tools may automatically screen outan individ-
ual with a disability who is able to perform the es-
sential functions of the job with or without accom-
modation. The EEOC explained that screening
outcan occur in a variety of ways, such failing to
take into account special circumstances or failing to
measure what is intended to be measured because
of someones disability. For example, a chatbot
programmed to elicit applicant information may
inadvertently reject all applicants with a significant
gap in employment that may had been caused by a
disability. The EEOC also provided the example of
a video interviewing tool that analyzes applicant
speech patterns to assess problem-solving skills
which may screen out an individual with a speech
impediment. Additionally, a common personality
testdesigned to screen for successful employees
may negatively score an individual with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder who struggles to ignore
-Continued on page 11-
brought after an over-55 applicant who was
immediately rejecteddiscovered she could get an in-
terview if she provided a fake, younger age. Id. The
EEOC utilized this information to discover that the iTu-
torGroup software had already automatically rejected
more than 200 applicants on the basis of their age. Id. at
6. EEOC Chair Charlotte A. Burrows explained that “[t]
his case is an example of why the EEOC recently
launched an Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Fair-
ness Initiative.EEOC Sues iTutorGroup for Age Dis-
crimination (May, 5, 2022), https://www.eeoc.gov/
newsroom/eeoc-sues-itutorgroup-age-discrimination. She went
on to note that workers facing discrimination from an
employers use of technology can count on the EEOC to
seek remedies.Id.
The Agencys First Guidance
Only one week after the iTutorGroup enforcement
action, the EEOC released its first guidance related to
employer use of AI. This non-binding, technical guid-
ance added color to the Algorithmic Fairness initiative
and provided employers with several guidelines in mak-
ing AI-assisted employment decisions, especially as it
relates to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Specifically, the guidance demonstrated the EEOCs
expansive view of the issue, explained the potential for
employer liability due to vendor software, provided ex-
amples of how AI could violate the ADA, and endorsed
several ways employers can better comply with the
ADA while using AI tools. See EEOC, The Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Use of Software, Algo-
rithms, and Artificial Intelligence to Assess Job Appli-
cants and Employees (May 12, 2022), https://
www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/americans-disabilities-act-and-use
-software-algorithms-and-artificial-intelligence?
utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=
govdelivery&utm_term.
Broad Scope
The guidance defined software,” “algorithms,and
artificial intelligencequite broadly. Id. For example,
the guidance warned that such ubiquitous technologies
as: resume scanners that prioritize applications using
certain keywords”; “virtual assistantsor chat bots
that ask job candidates about their qualifications; video
interviewing software that evaluates candidates based on
their facial expressions and speech patterns; and widely-
used testing software that provides job fitscores for
applicants or employees regarding their personalities,
aptitudes, cognitive skills, or perceived cultural fit
based on their performance on a game or on a more tra-
ditional test,could create ADA liability. Id. Such
broadly defined key terms sweep many tools used by
employers into the EEOCs expanding regulatory pur-
view.
-Applicant Screening: Continued from page 9-
11
job applicants or employees questions likely to
elicit information about a disability or questions
seeking information about an individuals physical
or mental impairments or health.
5) Ensuring AI tools maintain focus on essential func-
tions of the job. The EEOC emphasizes that AI
tools should only measure abilities or qualifica-
tions that are truly necessary for the joband meas-
ure those qualifications directly, rather than by the
way of characteristics or scores that are correlated
with those abilities or qualifications.
See id.
The EEOCs enforcement action and detailed guid-
ance demonstrate that the Algorithmic Fairness initiative
has teeth and these combined actions may signal the
EEOCs enforcement priorities going forward.
The DOJs Guidance
On the same day that the EEOC released its guidance,
the DOJ released its own related guidance. Entitled
Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and Disability Dis-
crimination in Hiring,the DOJ guidance largely mirrors
the EEOCs. While they almost entirely overlap in sub-
stance, the combined effort provides a clear indication
that federal law can and will be applied to employer use
of AI. See DOJ, Justice Department and EEOC Warn
Against Disability Discrimination (May 12, 2022), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-eeoc-warn-
against-disability-discrimination.
State and Local Regulation
California
On March 15, 2022, the FEHC (now the Civil Rights
Council) released draft revisions to Californias non-
discrimination laws expanding liability to employers that
use, or vendors that distribute or administer, a wide range
of employment-screening tools or services that use an
automated-decision system(an ADS”) like AI. Cal.
Code Regs. tit. 2, et seq. (revisions proposed Mar. 15,
2022). The Council later released a subsequent version of
the proposed revisions on July 28, 2022. Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 2, et seq. (revisions proposed July 28, 2022).
The revisions proposed by the FEHC, like the EEOC
guidance, are broad and define key terms in expansive
fashion. For example, the proposed revisions define an
automated-decision system(ADS) as any
computational process, including one derived from ma-
chine-learning, statistics, or other data processing or arti-
ficial intelligence techniques, that screens, evaluates, cat-
egorizes, recommends, or otherwise makes a decision or
facilitates human decision making that impacts employ-
ees or applicants.July 28 Proposed Revisions § 1108(e).
-Continued on page 13-
distractions. While the test may be generally valid
and predictive, the guidance cautions that it might
not accurately predict whether the individual still
would experience those same difficulties under
modified working conditions such as a quiet work-
station or permission to use noise-cancelling head-
phones.
3) Many AI tools pose disability-related inquiries
or ask for information that qualifies as a medical
examinationbefore any conditional offer of em-
ployment. This misstep can create liability regard-
less of the disability status of the applicant. An
employer may violate the ADA if an AI tool re-
quests information about an applicants medical
conditions or physical restrictions or if it explicitly
asks if the applicant has a disability. An AI tool
may conduct an improper medical examination
if it seeks information about an individuals phys-
ical or mental impairments or health.The AI
screening tool may lawfully pose questions that
might somehow be related to some kinds of men-
tal health diagnoses,such as whether the individ-
ual is generally optimistic.However, if the tool
uses a question like this to screen out an individual
because of a disability (like Major Depressive Dis-
order), it may still be found to violate the ADA
because the tool would disqualify an applicant
who may otherwise be able to perform the essen-
tial functions of the job.
Practical Tips for ADA Compliance
The guidance does not foreclose employer use of AI
tools in hiring and concludes by endorsing several ADA-
compliant mechanisms to guide employers. These exam-
ples include:
1) Providing notice before performing an AI assess-
ment. Specifically, the EEOC recommends that
employers provide information in plain language
and accessible formatsconcerning the traits that
the algorithm is designed to assess, the method by
which those traits are assessed, and the variables
or factors that may affect the rating.
2) Training staff to better recognize and process ac-
commodations requests or more easily provide
alternative means of testing or application intake.
3) Providing transparency in the application process,
such as by giving clear instructions that the appli-
cant may request reasonable accommodations.
4) Performing due diligence on software used by the
employer or administered by an outside vendor in
the applications process to ensure it does not ask
-Applicant Screening: Continued from page 10-
12
13
Recordkeeping obligations are also broadened. Under
the new regulation, employers and covered third-parties
will be required to maintain records of the assessment
criteriautilized by an ADS tool. Id. at § 11013(c)(5).
Though assessment criteriais undefined, it could in-
clude such wide-ranging information as data used to cre-
ate the algorithm used by the ADS tool, data provided by
applicants or employees in the hiring process, and data
created by function of the ADS tool. Employers and cov-
ered third-parties would be required to maintain records
of this data for four years, double the current law. Id. at §
11013(c).
The FEHC held a meeting on March, 25, 2022, to dis-
cuss the proposed revisions. FEHC, FEHC: March 25,
2022 Meeting, YouTube (March 25, 2022), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-bOSVkR14A. At this meeting,
the Council reiterated that its regulatory purview in this
area is expansive and important. See id. It also endorsed
the view that these revisions were devised to sweep in
potential claims made under both intentional discrimina-
tion and disparate impact theories. See id. The Council
did not provide a timeline for adoption of these revisions,
but signaled that this was the end goal. See id.
Other States and Localities
California is not the only state interested in regulating
employer use of AI. Illinois has enforced notice and con-
sent requirements on employers who use AI video-
interview software since 2019. See 820 ILCS 42/1 et seq.
Maryland has a similar law, restricting the use of facial
recognition software during preemployment interviews
without the consent of the applicant. See Md. Code Ann.,
Lab. & Empl. § 3-717. And in December 2021, New
York City enacted legislation, effective January 2023,
requiring employers or employment agencies in the city
to notify employees or candidates of the use of
automated employment decision tool(AEDT) in the
application process or for internal assessment. N.Y.C. LL
144. The law also requires the appointment of an inde-
pendent auditor to conduct an audit of any AEDT prior to
its use. See id. On September 19, 2022, the New York
City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection
published proposed rules to aid in implementation of the
law. N.Y.C. DCWP, Notice of Public Hearing and Op-
portunity to Comment on Proposed Rules, (Sept. 19,
2022), https://rules.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/
uploads/2022/09/DCWP-NOH-AEDTs-1.pdf. If the past few
years are any indication, states and localities are pursuing
regulatory agendas potentially even more far-reaching
than that of the EEOC.
Conclusion
The ubiquity and use of AI can create liability for una-
ware employers. Recent actions by regulators at the fed-
-Continued on page 14-
The proposed revisions provide several examples of
employer use of an ADS. These largely mirror the
EEOCs list of AI tools and includes:
1) Directing job advertisements or other recruiting
materials to targeted groups;
2) Screening resumes for particular terms or patterns;
3) Analyzing facial expressions, word choices, and
voices in online interviews;
4) Computer-based tests that include questions, puz-
zles, games, or other challenges;
5) Predictive assessments about an employee or appli-
cant, or measuring skills, abilities, and/or other
characteristics, including but not limited to dexter-
ity, reaction-time, or other physical or mental abil-
ities or characteristics; and/or
6) Tests or questionnaires measuring personality
traits, aptitudes, cognitive abilities, and/or cultural
fit.
See id.
The proposed revisions then connect this expansive
view of AI tools to the states pre-existing antidiscrimi-
nation framework. Under the revised framework, the use
of ADS in a manner that is intentionally discriminatory,
or in a facially neutral way that results in a discriminato-
ry impact, would be unlawful.
Employers are not the only parties affected by the
FEHCs proposal. The proposed revisions also extend
liability to third parties that act as agents of an employer
through the provision of employment services such as:
recruiting, applicant screening, hiring, payroll, benefit
administration, evaluations and/or decision-making re-
garding requests for workplace leaves of absence or ac-
commodations, or the administration of automated-
decision systems for an employers use in making hiring
or employment decisions that could result in the denial
of employment or otherwise adversely affect the terms,
conditions, benefits, or privileges of employment.Id. at
§ 1108(a). The proposed revisions also further expand
the definition of employment agencyto include any
person that provides automated-decision systems to an
employer, provides services involving the administration
or use of those systems on an employers behalf, or oth-
erwise acts on the employers behalf using automated-
decision systems.Id. at § 1108(i). They also create
wide-ranging aiding and abettingliability for anyone
engaged in the advertisement, sale, provision, or use
of an ADS tool if the use results in unlawful discrimina-
tion. Id. at § 11020(a)(1).
-Applicant Screening: Continued from page 11-
14
At trial on the bifurcated issue of forgery, three expert
witnesses testified in Lynnes case in chief. The experts
opined that pages 1 and 31 of the Trust differed from
pages 2 through 30. For example, pages 1 and 31 were
written on different paper, had different line, spacing and
font, had an inconsistent number of staple holes suggest-
ing pages had been removed and replaced, and had more
disturbed paper fibers than pages 2 through 30. (Id at 811
-12.)
The trial court did not find Lynnes expert testimony
compelling. It ruled that Lynne failed to prove the trust
instrument was altered, and concluded that the evidence
did not support Lynnes claim that her mother and sisters
conspired to alter the Trust. (Id at 813.)
The sole issue heard at the trial was whether the Trust
was forged. There is no indication that the trial court
considered any other causes of action or the other two
grounds for Lynnes request to remove the trustee. Yet,
the trial court entered judgment in Mildreds favor on the
entire petition. (Id at 814, 822.)
IV. The Trial Courts Award of Attorneys Fees
and Costs
Following entry of judgment, Mildred, Jane, and
Gwen filed a motion for attorneys fees and costs under
three theories: (1) courts broadequitable powers; (2)
Probate Code section 15642, subdivision(d); and (3)
Code of Civil Procedure, section 2033.420. The Court
granted the motion in full based on its equitable powers,
and awarded Mildred $331,274 in fees, and Jane and
Gwen $497,762.50 in fees. The trial court also granted an
award of costs in the amount of $27,035.89 to Mildred
and $69,218.20 to Jane and Gwen. (Id at 814-15.)
V. The Court of Appeals Decision
Lynne appealed the trial courts order arguing that the
trial court erred when it ordered her to pay attorneys fees
in excess of the value of her potential share of the Trust.
Lynne argued that the trial courts jurisdiction is limited
to the property of the Trust estate, and it lacked jurisdic-
tion to hold her personally liable for any amount of fees
over and beyond her interest in the Trust. Lynne also
argued that the trial court erred when it found she insti-
gated the litigation in bad faith. (Id at 815-16).
The Bruno court affirmed the trial courts order, but
on different grounds. It concluded that the trial court did
not have the equitable powers to award attorneys fees in
excess of Lynnes share of the trust assets. The Bruno
court instead found that Probate Code section 15642,
subdivision (d) permitted the court to impose personal
liability on Lynne for attorneys fees and costs incurred
by Mildred, Jane, and Gwen, assuming the other require-
-Continued on page 15-
filed a petition to compel Mildred to produce a copy.
When Lynne received a copy of the Trust, she re-
tained an expert to evaluate it. The expert noted differ-
ences between the first and last pages of the Trust versus
the remaining pages, and recommended obtaining an
original copy to evaluate further. (Id at 810.)
After the preliminary expert analysis, Lynne amended
her petition. She added a cause of action to remove Mil-
dred as trustee and to declare the Trust a forgery.In
support of the claim to remove Mildred, Lynne alleged
that Mildred breached her fiduciary duty by: (1) waiting
nine years after Jamess death to comply with Probate
Code section 16061.7; (2) failing to provide a copy of
the Trust upon Lynnes request; and (3) forging and
producing forged copies of the Trust instrument and
James’[s] Will.” (Id at 810-11.)
III. The Bifurcated Trial
Mildred, Jane, and Gwen opposed the petition, and
brought a motion to bifurcate the eighth cause of action
to invalidate the Trust as a forgery. It does not appear
that the cause of action to remove Mildred was included
in the initial bifurcated phase. (Id at 811.)
-Trustee: Continued from page 3-
eral, state, and local levels demonstrate increasing regu-
latory scrutiny. Employers will need to stay aware of the
changing landscape and nimbly balance desired efficien-
cy with potential risks. They should carefully evaluate
the AI tools they use or are considering using for these
risks, consult with vendors who design and administer
these tools, and review all of their procedures for both
applicants and employees to ensure legal compliance in
this fascinating but evolving area.
Connor Kridle is an associate in Payne & Fears LLPs
labor and employment and insurance coverage practice
groups. Connors labor and employment practice includes
representing employers in all types of matters ranging
from single-plaintiff lawsuits to large class or representa-
tive actions.
Philip Lem is a partner of Payne & Fears LLP where he
represents management in a multitude of labor and em-
ployment and business litigation matters. Phil has substan-
tial experience defending wrongful termination, discrimi-
nation, harassment, retaliation, and whistleblower claims
by employees. Phils business litigation practice covers
complex matters involving breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, unfair competition, and copyright and
trademark infringement.
-Applicant Screening: Continued from page 13-
15
Probate code section 15642, subdivision, (d) states “. . .
the court may order that the person or persons seeking the
removal of the trustee bear all or any part of the costs of
the proceeding, including reasonable attorneys fees.
15642, subd. (d), emphasis added). Neither the appellant
nor the Bruno court addressed the meaning of the term
proceeding.However, the Bruno courts holding sug-
gests that section 15642 gives the court statutory authority
to order the payment of fees incurred in the defense of the
entire petition, and not just the removal claim.
As a result, it is best practice for counsel to carefully
consider whether a removal claim should be part of a
broader petition. If there ae multiple claims and causes of
action in the petition, a more conservative approach is to
bring the removal action in a separate or subsequent peti-
tion. In the event the court finds the request to remove is
brought in bad faith, it potentially prevents the trial court
from ordering the petitioner to pay attorneys fees for a
larger and broader action.
B. Liability for Fees and Costs of All Responding
Parties
In addition paying fees related to the entire action, the
trial court also ordered that Lynne pay attorneys fees and
costs all the parties who opposed the petition. In uphold-
ing the trial courts order on different grounds, neither the
appellant nor the Bruno court specifically addressed
whether 15642, subdivision (d) supports awarding attor-
neys fees to both the trustee and beneficiaries. The ruling
implies that it is permissible, and therefore both trustees
and beneficiaries should seek fees under the section.
C. Exercise Caution if Claims are Bifurcated
The trial court in Bruno only tried the issue of whether
the Trust was forged. Yet, following the bifurcated trial on
this limited issue, the trial court entered judgment in Mil-
dreds favor without considering the other bases for re-
moval. A cause of action to remove a trustee is frequently
bifurcated, and Bruno demonstrates that counsel should
object to a ruling on the petition as a whole. It is unclear
whether the Bruno court would have upheld the award of
attorneys fees under 15642, subdivision (d) if Lynne ob-
jected to the entry of judgment and raised that issue on ap-
peal.
VI. Conclusion
The court is committed to protecting a trustors intent
from bad faith challenges. Post-Bruno, counsel should
reconsider their strategy when bringing or defending a pe-
tition to remove a trustee.
Lauren Strickroth is a partner of Sheppard Mullinichter
& Hampton LLP. She is a business litigator, who focuses
her practice on trust, estate, and fiduciary litigation.
ments of the statute were met. (Id at 817, 821-22.) The
Bruno court reasoned that section 15642, subdivision (d)
is specifically designed to protect the trust and its bene-
ficiaries from bearing the cost of a bad faith challenge,
and therefore supports the imposition of personal liabil-
ity. (Id at 820.)
The Bruno court also found that the trial court did not
err in determining that Lynne acted with improper pur-
pose in seeking to remove Mildred on the basis she
forged the Trust instrument. (Id at 828.) As a result, it
affirmed the trial courts fee and cost award in full under
section 15642, subdivision (d). (Id.)
VI. Implications and Questions Post Bruno
The most obvious lesson from Bruno is that counsel
should carefully evaluate the evidence before attempting
to remove a trustee. Courts frown upon using a claim to
remove the trustee as leverage to gain an advantage re-
lated to the trust. (See e.g. Kleveland v. Siegal & Wolen-
sky, LLP 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 545). Therefore, counsel
should ensure there is evidence to support each verified
allegation in the petition, and that the alleged breaches
of fiduciary duty are clear and significant. Bruno
demonstrates that three testifying experts may not be
enough to prevent a finding of bad faith. Regardless of
the evidence supporting removal, it is best practice for
counsel to advise the client that there is a possibility that
a petition to remove a trustee may result in personal lia-
bility for all the partiesattorneys fees and costs.
There are other implications of the Bruno decision
that are less obvious, and are not squarely addressed by
the opinion. These issues include: (1) Lynnes liability
for fees and costs related to the entire action, and not just
those attributable to the removal claim; (2) Lynnes lia-
bility for both the trustees and beneficiariesfees and
costs in the entire action; and (3) the degree of caution
that should be exercised when a trust litigation case is
bifurcated.
A. Liability for Fees and Costs Related to the Entire
Petition
The trial court ordered Lynne to pay attorneys fees
and costs incurred in defense of the entire action based
on the courts equitable powers, and did not limit the
order to only the portion of fees allocable to the removal
cause of action. The Bruno court found that the trial
court lacked authority under equity to impose attor-
neys fees and costs,and instead upheld the judicial
action under section 15652, subdivision (d). (Bruno, 79
Cal.App.5th at 816, 818; citing Willis v. City of Carls-
bad 48 Cal.App.5
th
1104, 1128 (2020).)
-Trustee: Continued from page 14-
16
connection with the third-party best aquaculture practices
certification symbol. See Rawson v. ALDI, Inc., No. 21-
cv-2811, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88511 (N.D. Ill. May
17, 2022). While both the symbol and slogan appeared
on the front of the package, the court explained consum-
ers may not connect the slogan with the certification be-
cause of the separation by space and color design.
Not many greenwashing cases have yet made it to the
class certification stage. One case that did make it to that
stage involved claims that Keurig falsely advertised its
coffee pods as recyclable. The court granted plaintiffs
class certification motion. Smith v. Keurig Green Mt.,
Inc., No. 18-cv-06690-HSG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120863 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2022). Keurig is now waiting
for court approval of a $10 million class settlement.
For companies looking to assess their advertising, the
Federal Trade Commission (the FTC”) has issued a set
of Green Guides designed to help companies avoid mak-
ing misleading environmental claims. While not binding
precedent, courts frequently look to the Green Guides
when analyzing environmental marketing claims and sev-
eral states incorporate the Green Guides into their laws.
The FTC last revised the Green Guides in 2012, but an-
nounced it plans to update the Green Guides in 2022.
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-08-05/
pdf/2022-16863.pdf).
In addition to issuing regulatory guidance, the FTC oc-
casionally pursues greenwashing actions. For example,
in April 2022, the FTC announced a combined $5.5 mil-
lion proposed settlement with Walmart and Kohls that
also included proposed injunctive relief impacting the
companiesfuture advertising. (https://www.ftc.gov/
business-guidance/blog/2022/04/55-million-total-ftc-
settlements-kohls-and-walmart-challenge-bamboo-and-
eco-claims-shed-light). The settlement arose from alle-
gations that the companies engaged in misleading adver-
tising of products as made from bamboo and therefore
environmentally friendly and sustainable, when in fact
the products were made from rayon, which involves a
manufacturing process that includes chemicals hazardous
to the environment. The upcoming release of the updated
Green Guides may spur the FTC to increase its scrutiny
of companieseco-friendly advertising statements mov-
ing forward.
While greenwashing focuses largely on the environ-
mental aspect of ESG, also on the horizon may be an in-
crease in class actions lawsuits alleging pinkwashing or
bluewashing, which focus more on the social aspect of
ESG. Pinkwashingrefers to when a company is pro-
moting its products or services as aligned with
LGBTQIA+ values when the company fails to have ade-
quate LGBTQIA + values and labor policies.
-Continued on page 17-
notice and are increasingly focusing their attention on
launching class actions asserting false advertising and
unfair competition claims grounded in allegations of
greenwashing.
The targeted companies are wide ranging. Dutch air-
line KLM is facing a class action lawsuit over its adver-
tising encouraging consumers to Fly Responsiblyto
create[e] a more sustainable future,clothes retailer
Hennes & Mauritz LP (“H&M”) is defending against
allegations of false and misleading use of
environmental scorecardsfor its products called
Sustainability Profiles,and Burts Bees recently re-
solved a case involving its “100% naturaladvertising
following the courts denial of its motion to dismiss.
In some instances, companies have obtained early dis-
missals. For example, a court recently granted a motion
to dismiss alleging the “100% recyclablelabels on sin-
gle-use plastic bottles supplied by defendants Coca-
Cola, Blue Triton Brands, and Niagara Bottling were
false and misleading. See Swartz v. Coca-Cola Co., No.
21-cv-04643-JD, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209641 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2022). In addition, Allbirds Inc. prevailed
on its motion to dismiss a class action complaint attack-
ing allegedly false advertising statements regarding the
environmental impact of its wool shoes. See Dwyer v.
Allbirds, Inc., No. 21-CV-5238 (CS), 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71055 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2022).
Yet, the risks facing companies remain substantial. In
many instances, courts have permitted actions to proceed
after rejecting classic defenses to false advertising
claims. For example, Kroger Co. argued its advertising
of sunscreen products as reef friendly was mere puffery
and the court denied its motion to dismiss. See White v.
Kroger Co., No. 21-cv-08004-RS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEX-
IS 54273 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2022).
Courts have also expressed deep skepticism when
companies appeal to the broader context of the at issue
advertising. StriVectin Operating Co. argued its adver-
tising of sunscreen products reading REEF SAFE*
SUNSCREENis literally true because an asterisk on
the back of the package is followed by fine print stating
that the product does not contain two particular ingredi-
ents that are widely thought to harm coral reefs. The
court labeled this rejected argument absurdexplaining
a company cannot escape liability for a misleading state-
ment by stating in fine print on the back thats not actu-
ally what we mean.Locklin v. StriVectin Operating
Co., No. 21-cv-07967-VC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52461 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2022). Additionally, a court
rejected ALDIs argument that its Simple. Sustainable.
Seafood.advertising is not misleading when read in
-ESG Litigation: Continued from page 4-
17
trating more of its efforts on pursuing perceived ESG re-
lated violations based on existing regulations.
On April 28, 2022, the SEC announced it charged Vale
S.A., a publicly traded Brazilian mining company, with
making false and misleading claims about dam safety
prior to the collapse of one of its dams. (https://
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-72). The SEC
alleged that Vale S.A. manipulated multiple dam safety
audits, obtained fraudulent stability certificates, and mis-
led investors about the safety of the collapsed dam
through its ESG disclosures.
More recently, on November 22, 2022, the SEC
charged Goldman Sachs Asset Management, L.P.
(“GSAM”) with violating Section 206(4) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-7. (https://
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-209). The SEC
alleged that GSAM failed to have any written policies
and procedures for ESG research, and that even once pol-
icies and procedures were established, GSAM failed to
consistently follow them. GSAM agreed to pay a $4 mil-
lion penalty.
If and when the SECs proposed rules become final, the
SEC is likely to further increase its focus on ESG-related
disclosures by investment advisers and funds.
Securities Shareholder Litigation
In addition to the headline grabbing event driven share-
holder litigation following an environmental disaster or
other event, shareholders are also bringing derivative ac-
tions alleging securities fraud against companies fre-
quently paired with breach of fiduciary duty claims
against officers and directors based on a companys ESG
disclosures.
Recently, many of these lawsuits have focused on alle-
gations that a company misrepresented its commitments
to diversity and inclusion, such as by disclosing a goal of
increasing board diversity and then failing to act on this
goal. Thus far, companies and directors, including in
suits involving Qualcomm, Oracle, and the Gap, Inc.,
have largely been successful in obtaining early dismis-
sals. See Kiger ex rel. Qualcomm Inc. v. Mollenkopf, No.
21-409-RGA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220509 (D. Del.
Nov. 15, 2021); Lee v. Fisher, No. 20-cv-06163-SK,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82804 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021);
Klein v. Ellison, No. 20-cv-04439-JSC, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97965 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2021). The Gap deci-
sion, however, is pending appeal before the Ninth Cir-
cuit.
More recently, a plaintiff securities class action filed in
June 2022 targets Wells Fargo and some of its directors
and officers for allegedly misrepresenting its commit-
-Continued on page 18-
Pinkwashingalso refers to companies with advertising
aimed at showing support of breast cancer awareness
and research, when the companies continue to sell prod-
ucts with cancer-causing ingredients or otherwise fail to
take action to genuinely support reducing breast cancer.
The term bluewashinghas been used to describe com-
panies promoting the United Nations Global Compact,
including its human rights and labor standards, but at the
same engaging in child labor, slavery, or other human
rights violations and/or failing to take any real measures
to improve in these areas.
SECs Proposed Rules and Enforcement
The Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC”)
proposed several rules in 2022 directed toward helping
protect investors against greenwashing.
One of the proposed rules would amend Rule 35d-1
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (referred to
as the Names Rule”). The current Names Rule requires
a fund to invest at least 80% of its assets in alignment
with a particular investment focus.However, the 80%
requirement does not apply to a funds investment
strategy.” (https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/lee-
names-rule-statement-052522). The proposed rule elim-
inates this confusing distinction so that the 80% rule re-
quirement will apply whenever a funds name suggests a
fund concentrates in particular investments. (https://
www.sec.gov/rules/other/2020/ic-33809.pdf). As a re-
sult, the proposed rule restricts funds aiming to attract
investors as an ESG-focused fund from using ESG,
sustainable,” “green,or other terms in the fund name
without actually having an investment strategy that pri-
oritizes the relevant, named factors in making invest-
ment decisions.
Another proposed rule aims at enhancing the disclo-
sure and reporting requirements for funds regarding their
ESG investment strategies and practices. (https://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ia-6034.pdf). For
example, all ESG focused funds that consider green-
house gas emissions as part of their investment strategy
would be required under the proposed rule to disclose in
the funds annual report the funds portfolio carbon foot-
print and weighted average carbon intensity.
Similarly, the SEC also proposed a rule that would
enhance the disclosure and reporting requirements for
investment advisers pertaining to an advisers ESG strat-
egies. (https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/33-
11068.pdf).
In addition to these proposed rules, in 2021 the SEC
launched a Climate and ESG Task Force within the Di-
vision of Enforcement and has already started concen-
-ESG Litigation: Continued from page 16-
18
Antitrust Litigation
Following a discussion about ESG policies at a Sep-
tember 2022 hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Con-
sumer Rights, five senators issued a letter on November
3, 2022 to dozens of law firms. The letter advised the
firms of a duty to fully inform clients of the risks they
incur by participating in climate cartels and other ill-
advised ESG schemes.” (https://
www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
cotton_grassley_et_altolawfirmsesgcollusion.pdf). More
specifically, the letter calls out as a particular concern the
collusive effort to restrict the supply of coal, oil, and
gas, which is driving up energy costs across the globe
and empowering Americas adversaries abroadand ad-
vises Congress will increasingly use its oversight pow-
ers to scrutinize the institutionalized antitrust violations
being committed in the name of ESG, and refer those vi-
olations to the FTC and the Department of Justice.
Accordingly, companies engaging in concerted action
and entering into collaboration agreements, even in pur-
suit of an ESG goal, could risk a violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Hopefully this will not dissuade com-
panies from participating in industrywide ESG efforts,
but companies should take appropriate precautions to
mitigate potential risks.
Concluding Thoughts
Companies and their counsel should anticipate that
both plaintiffs and regulatory agencies will continue to
pursue ESG claims and likely with an increased zeal
moving forward. Companies can proactively manage and
minimize their litigation risk by engaging in an ongoing
review of their ESG advertising, disclosures, policies,
and practices. Companies additionally may benefit from
reviewing their insurance policies with an eye towards
any exclusions that may apply to ESG specific issues and
false advertising claims generally.
Lisa M. Northrup is a shareholder at Stradling Yocca
Carlson & Rauth. Her practice focuses on complex
commercial and white collar matters including contract
disputes, business torts, securities litigation, and class
action defense.
ment to diversity in the workplace. See Ardalan v. Wells
Fargo et al., 3:22-cv-03811-TLT (N.D. Cal. June 28,
2022). The plaintiff class alleges that in 2020, Wells
Fargo introduced a policy requiring that at least 50% of
interviewees represent a historically underrepresented
group with respect to at least one diversity dimension for
most posted jobs with compensation greater than
$100,000 per year. Then, in May 2022, the New York
Times published its article At Wells Fargo, a Quest to
Increase Diversity Leads to Fake Job Interviewsreport-
ing that for many openpositions a candidate repre-
senting a historically underrepresented group would be
interviewed, but the job would have already been prom-
ised to someone else. Wells Fargos stock dropped fol-
lowing publication of this article leading to this lawsuit.
Defendants likely will file a motion to dismiss in spring
2023 following filing of a new complaint by lead plain-
tiff.
Plaintiff shareholders are unlikely to be discouraged
by these early defeats, and there is a general expectation
plaintiffs are likely to continuing pursuing these and oth-
er theories moving forward.
ERISA Litigation
On November 22, 2022, the United States Department
of Labor released a final rule, Prudence and Loyalty in
Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights.” (https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-
ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/final-rule-
on-prudence-and-loyalty-in-selecting-plan-investments-
and-exercising-shareholder-rights.) While clarifying
how ERISAs fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty
apply to the selection of investments, the final rule pro-
vides that a fiduciarys duty of prudence may include
consideration of ESG factors when evaluating invest-
ment options and the financial benefits of investing in
companies focusing on pursuing positive ESG.
The final ESG rule arrives at a time when many inves-
tors and asset managers have an increased interest in
ESG investing at the same time there is a growing anti-
ESG movement. Notably, Larry Fink, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of BlackRock, Inc., has been
outspoken about supporting ESG, including in his well-
publicized Letters to the CEOs in recent years. (https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-
fink-ceo-letter). Recently, however, Floridas chief fi-
nancial officer announced Florida is pulling $2 billion in
assets managed by BlackRock over concerns that
Blackrock is prioritizing ESG over higher returns for
investors. (https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/
florida-pulls-2-bln-blackrock-largest-anti-esg-
divestment-2022-12-01/).
-ESG Litigation: Continued from page 17-
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