Doctrine consists of fundamental principles by which military forces

Doctrine consists of fundamental principles by which military forces guide their

actions in support of national objectives. It constitutes official advice but requires

judgment in application.

This definition is explained in more detail below.

 “… fundamental principles…”

Doctrine is a body of carefully developed, sanctioned ideas which has been officially

approved or ratified corporately, and not dictated by any one individual. Doctrine

establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that commanders

use to solve military problems. It is what we believe to be true about the best way to do

things based on the evidence to date.

The term, “doctrine,” does not have a formal definition in the joint doctrine lexicon. “Joint doctrine” is

defined, however, as, “fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in

coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and

procedures” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02D, Joint Doctrine Development

System.

A PRIMER ON DOCTRINE

There is no end to the number of people who will

line up to make flippant remarks that the doctrine is

too long, too short, has too many pictures, is too

academic, is not academic enough… The acid test is

do we read it, do we understand it, and do we use it,

and DOES IT WORK? …“All else is rubbish” to

borrow from Baron von Richthofen. Our doctrine

does not mirror the Navy’s, nor the Marine’s, nor the

Army’s…it is aerospace doctrine…our best

practices…and we should not be bashful about how

we write it or what it says.

— From briefing notes by then-Brigadier

General Ronald Keys to a doctrine

symposium, 1997

 “…military forces…”

For the purposes of Air Force doctrine, this includes all Airmen, both uniformed and Air

Force civilians. These constitute the uniformed warfighters, their commanders, and the

capabilities and support that the Air Force employs. They operate across the

competition continuum and can be task-organized into the “right force” for any particular

joint operation.

 “…in support of national objectives…”

Military forces conduct operations in order to

support objectives that create continuing

advantage for our nation.

 “…guide their actions… official

advice… judgment…”

Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of

fixed rules; it recommends, but does not

mandate, particular courses of action.

Air Force doctrine describes and guides the

proper use of airpower in military operations

to achieve the joint force commander’s

(JFC’s) objectives. It is what we have come

to understand, based on our experience to

date. The Air Force promulgates and

teaches its doctrine as a common frame of

reference on the best way to prepare and

employ Air Force forces as part of a joint

force. Subsequently, doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air Force organizes,

trains, equips, and sustains its forces. Doctrine prepares us for future uncertainties and

provides a common set of understandings on which Airmen base their decisions.

Doctrine is the linchpin of successful military operations. It also provides us with

common terminology, conveying precision in expressing our ideas. In application,

doctrine should be used with judgment. It should never be dismissed out of hand or

through ignorance of its principles, nor should it be employed blindly without due regard

for the mission and current situation. Furthermore, following doctrine strictly is not the

fundamental intent. Rather, good doctrine is somewhat akin to a good

commander’s intent: it provides sufficient information on what to do, but does

not specifically say how to do it. Airmen should strive to be doctrinally sound, not

doctrinally bound.

In the current environment of great power competition, expeditionary operations and the

arena of homeland security, doctrine provides an informed starting point for the

many decisions Airmen make in a continuous series of operations. Airmen no longer

face the challenge of starting with a blank sheet of paper; with doctrine, Airmen now

have a good outline that helps answer several basic questions:

 What is my mission within the joint force? How should I approach it?

We have identified

danger, physical exertion,

intelligence, and friction as

the elements that coalesce

to form the atmosphere of

war, and turn it into a

medium that impedes

activity. In their restrictive

effects they can be grouped

into a single concept of

general friction. Is there any

lubricant that will reduce

this abrasion? Only one:

combat experience.

— Carl von Clausewitz,

On War

 What should my organization look like, and why?

 What are my lines of authority within my organization and within the joint force?

 What degrees of control do I have over my forces?

 How am I supported? Whom do I call for more support?

 How should I articulate what the Air Force provides to the joint force?

From one operation to the next, many

things are actually constant. Doctrine,

properly applied, often can provide an

80-to 90-percent solution to most

questions, allowing leaders to focus on

the remainder, which usually involves

tailoring for the specific operation. Good

doctrine informs, provides a sound

departure point, and allows flexibility.

A study of airpower doctrine should draw a

distinction between theory and practice.

Theory is less constrained by limited

empirical context, and designed to

encourage debate and introspection with an

eye towards improving military advantage. It

is part of a vital, iterative investigation of

what works under particular circumstances,

and why. Theoretical discussion is critical to

a successful military. This publication does

not present a comprehensive theory for

airpower. Instead, it focuses on time-tested

military principles and validated concepts,

grounded in experience and Service

consensus. This is the heart of doctrine.

Finally, a study of airpower doctrine should

also distinguish between doctrine and public

affairs-like pronouncements concerning the Air

Force’s role. Some have been developed with an eye towards facilitating the public’s

and Congress’ informed perceptions of the Air Force’s role and value. Others have been

made in a strategic planning context (e.g., a “vision-mission-goals” development

process) that are a normal part of formal, long range corporate planning. Such

statements are not enduring and not doctrine; they should be viewed in the context in

which they were created.

Although air officers have

not been prolific writers, they

have expressed their beliefs

freely… In fact, one may

almost say that the Air Force

has developed an oral rather

than a written tradition.

— Frank Futrell, Ideas,

Concepts, Doctrine: Basic

Thinking in the United States

Air Force, 1907 - 1960

POLICY, STRATEGY, AND DOCTRINE

The term “doctrine” is frequently (and incorrectly) used when referring to policy or

strategy. These terms are not interchangeable; they are fundamentally different.

Because policy and strategy may impact each other, it is important to first understand

their differences before delving into a discussion of doctrine.

 Policy is guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be

accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues and not

others. Thus, while doctrine is held to be relatively enduring, policy is more mutable,

but also directive. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership,

political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy may be

expressed in such broad vehicles as presidential executive orders. Within military

operations, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules

of engagement (ROE)—what we may or may not engage with kinetic and non-kinetic

capabilities, or under what circumstances we may engage particular targets.

 Strategy defines how operations are to be conducted to accomplish national

policy objectives. Strategy is the continuous process of developing and applying

ways and means to overcome particular challenges and achieve strategic ends

(objectives). Strategy provides an overarching construct for conducting activities to

create and maintain an advantage, while considering risk.

 Doctrine presents codified best practices on how to accomplish military goals

and objectives. It is a storehouse of analyzed experience and wisdom. Military

doctrine constitutes official advice, but unlike policy, is not directive.

In practice, as leaders develop strategies for particular contingencies, political,

economic, or social considerations may dictate strategic and operational approaches

that modify or depart from accepted doctrine. As an example, doctrine may support

long-range, air-to-air engagements beyond visual range, or high altitude interdiction of

surface targets, both using long-range sensors; ROE, however, may require visual

identification of all targets before firing due to political concerns over friendly fire or

collateral damage. If policy seriously affects the application of doctrine, military

commanders should describe for political leaders the military risk and consequences of

those adaptations. However, because armed conflict is an instrument of policy, military

commanders should ensure that policy governs the employment of military power and

thus tailor their operations accordingly.

USES OF DOCTRINE

One way to explore good doctrine is to use a “compare and contrast” model to walk

through some key issues. This technique also amplifies that doctrine should be written

broadly, allowing decision makers latitude in interpretation and flexibility in application,

yet be specific enough to provide informed guidance. This technique also illustrates the

use of doctrine in explaining contentious issues and how doctrine can be used to think

more effectively about the best means to integrate various aspects of military power and

organization. In the following discussion, there may be overlap among some of the

principles expressed; this is desirable in that often there are different aspects or

nuances to a particular issue. In doctrine, language is important. Finally, the following

discussion presents an Air Force perspective; not all Services may entirely agree with

these points.

Doctrine is about warfighting, not physics. This principle specifically addresses the

perceived differences between operations in all domains. The separate domains require

exploitation of different sets of physical laws to operate in, but are linked by the effects

they can produce together. To achieve a common purpose, airpower capabilities need

to be integrated. Therefore, Air Force doctrine focuses on the best means to obtain

warfighting effects regardless of the domain in which a platform operates. As an

example, Airmen should be concerned with the best means of employing intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, not whether a particular ISR

platform is airborne or in orbit. This is requisite to achieving true integration across any

given collection of forces.

Doctrine is about effects, not platforms. This focuses on the desired outcome of a

particular action, not on the system or weapon itself that provides the effect. For

example, doctrine states that Airmen should seek to achieve air superiority, but doctrine

does not focus on which platforms should be used to create that effect. A parallel

example of this is seen in the recognition that bombers are not “strategic,” nor are

fighters “tactical.” Similarly, it does not matter if an F-16 or a B-52 accomplishes a given

task, or whether a particular platform is manned or unmanned, or whether a C-17 or a

C-130 delivers a certain load; the outcome of the mission, the objective achieved, is

what’s important. Thus, Air Force doctrine does not explicitly tie specific weapon

systems to specific tasks or effects.

Doctrine is about using domains, not owning domains. This illustrates the importance

of properly using a domain to obtain the best warfighting effects, not of carving up the

battlespace based on Service or functional boundaries. Focusing on using a domain is a

vital first step to integration of efforts. “Ownership” arguments eventually lead to

suboptimal (and usually at best tactical) application of efforts at the expense of the

larger, total effort.

Doctrine is about how to organize, not organizations. Modern warfare demands

disparate parts of different Services, different nations, and even differing functions within

a single Service be brought together intelligently to achieve unity of command and unity

of effort. However, merely placing different organizations together in an operational area

is insufficient to meet these demands. A single, cohesive organization is required with

clearly defined lines of command and commanders with requisite authorities at

appropriate levels. Doctrine explains why certain organizational principles are preferred

over others and describes effective command relationships and command authorities;

this facilitates the rapid standup of joint and Service organizations during rapidly evolving

situations. Ultimately, doctrine is not about whether one particular element of a joint

force is more decisive than another, nor about positing that element

as the centerpiece of joint operations; it’s the total, tailored joint force that’s decisive.

Getting to that effective joint force requires organizing smartly and a thorough

understanding of Service and joint doctrine.

Doctrine is about synergy, not segregation. True integration of effort cannot be

achieved by merely carving up the operational environment. While segregation may

have some benefit and may appear the simplest way, from a diverse joint force

command and control (C2) viewpoint, it may actually hinder the overall effort. It

guarantees that the whole will never be greater than the sum of its parts. For example,

Airmen should have access to the entire theater of operations to maximize their ability

to achieve joint force commander objectives; they should not be restricted from any

area due to unnecessarily restrictive fire control measures. Also, segregating the

battlespace into smaller areas of operation may create competition for scarce, high-

demand, low-density capabilities and reduce combat effectiveness.

Doctrine is about integration, not just synchronization. Synchronization is “the

arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum

relative combat power at a decisive place and time” (Department of Defense [DOD]

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Integration, by comparison, is “the

arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by

engaging as a whole” (DOD Dictionary). Synchronization is, in essence, deconfliction in

time and space between different units. It is a useful means to plan and execute

operations and to prevent friendly fire. However, it doesn’t scale up to the operational

level and hence is not the best means for achieving the maximum potential of a joint

force. Synchronization emphasizes timing, while integration considers priority and effect

to be both efficient and effective with scarce resources. Synchronization is bottom-up;

integration, on the other hand, starts at the top with a single cohesive plan and works

downward. Synchronization is an additive “sum of the parts” model, while integration

may produce exponential results.

Doctrine is about the right force, not just equal shares of the force. This addresses

the proper mix of Service components within a joint force. Some believe that a joint

force requires equal participation of all the Services. This is an incorrect view. As has

been said, “joint warfighting is not like Little League baseball, where everybody gets a

chance to play.” Any given joint force should be tailored appropriately for the operational

task. Some operations will be land-centric, others air-centric, others maritime-, space-,

cyberspace-, or information-centric. The composition of the joint force and the tasks

assigned its various elements should reflect the joint force commander’s assessment of

the situation.

SOURCES OF DOCTRINE

Doctrine should be based on critical analysis and the lessons of operations rather than

driven by rapidly changing policies, promising technologies, individual personalities,

budget battles, and politically trendy catch-phrases. Doctrine should not be written to

backwards-justify a policy position or codify a uniquely-tailored organization.

Doctrine reflects operationally proven best practices with full consideration of what has

worked poorly. In those instances in which experience is lacking or difficult to acquire,

doctrine may be developed through analysis of exercises, wargames, and experiments.

We should also consider the military experience of other nations and non-defense

organizations.

Doctrine development is never complete. Any given doctrine document is a snapshot in

time-a reflection of the thinking at the time of its creation. Innovation has always been a

key part of sound doctrinal development and continues to play a central role. Doctrine

should evolve as new experiences and advances in technology point the way to the

operations of the future.

Three constantly evolving variables affect

doctrine: theory, experience, and

technology. Sound doctrine strikes a

balance among all three.

 Theory is an excellent starting point,

but doctrine based solely on theory

may not survive contact with reality. An

example of this is the Army Air Corps’

advocacy of daylight precision

bombing; bombers initially had neither

the necessary precision nor the

survivability required to implement the

theory. On the other hand, theory can

support technological investment and

experimentation, as in the German

Wehrmacht’s decision in the interwar

years to pursue air-ground integration.

A good grasp of operational art can

provide the flexibility to adapt new

theories within real-world situations,

and prevent doctrine from becoming

dogma.

 Experience plays a major role in

doctrine formulation, while too great a

reliance on past experience leaves one

open to always fighting the last war.

Experience must be tempered with

current realities to develop future

plans. New technology can provide

solutions to long-standing problems, as

the advent of mobile, mechanized

forces and aviation overcame the

stalemate of trench warfare. Theories

of war, appropriately taught, should be

[Doctrine] reflects an official

recognition of what has usually

worked best from observation

of numerous trials. These may

be reports of actual combat

operations, or they may be

limited to tests, exercises, and

maneuvers. Only when

necessary will doctrine consist

of extrapolations beyond actual

experience of some sort, for

example, in the use of nuclear

weapons where the nature of

the weapon normally precludes

the gathering of experience in

any but the most limited sense.

— Maj Gen I.B. Holley,

Technology and

Military Doctrine

open to reinterpretation in light of current circumstance. The US military experienced

this in the formulation of strategy and doctrine for irregular warfare.

 Technology constantly evolves, but by itself is not a panacea. While technology

may be good at providing single-point solutions, technology should be acquired with

due consideration for operational art and design, taking into consideration theory

and experience; sound reasoning must accompany realistic projections of what

capabilities will actually be available to warfighters. Discussion in the 1990s of the

“revolution in military affairs” pointed to a similar interplay of ideas involving

technology, organization, and doctrine, and held that all three were necessary to

achieve a “revolution.” Thus, technology should not be acquired in isolation.

LEVELS OF DOCTRINE

The Air Force implements doctrine at three levels: basic, operational, and tactical.

These levels speak to the intellectual content of the doctrinal concepts, not to the

architectural structure of doctrine publications.

 Basic doctrine states the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and

guide the proper use, presentation, and organization of forces. It describes the

“elemental properties” of airpower and provides the Airman’s perspective. Because

of its fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine provides broad and

continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are organized, employed, equipped,

and sustained. As it expresses broad, enduring fundamentals, basic doctrine

changes relatively slowly compared to the other levels of doctrine. As the foundation

of all doctrine, basic doctrine sets the tone and vision for doctrine development for

the future. Air Force basic doctrine provides the essence of what we are as a

Service, what makes us distinct from the other Services, and the focus of what

unique or special expertise and capabilities we provide to a JFC. Basic Service

doctrine by its nature and design is expected to be Service focused.

 Operational doctrine contained in Air Force doctrine Publications (AFDPs) describe

more detailed organization of forces and applies the principles of basic doctrine to

military actions. Operational doctrine guides the proper organization and employment

of forces in the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad functional

areas, and operational environments. Operational doctrine provides the focus for

developing missions and tasks to be executed through tactical doctrine. Doctrine at

this level changes more rapidly than basic doctrine, but usually only after deliberate

internal Service debate. Because operations are conducted by the Air Force Service

component to a joint force, operational doctrine will be the most closely aligned with

Joint doctrine. Regardless, Air Force operational doctrine will present an Airman’s

perspective on how to best organize and employ airpower to accomplish the JFC’s

objectives.

 Tactical doctrine describes the proper employment of specific Air Force assets,

individually or in concert with other capabilities, to accomplish detailed objectives.

Tactical doctrine considers particular objectives (e.g., stopping the advance of an

armored column) and conditions (threats, weather, and terrain) and describes how

Air Force assets are employed to accomplish the tactical objective (B-1 bombers

dropping anti-armor cluster munitions). Air Force tactical doctrine is codified as

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in Air Force TTP (AFTTP) 3- series

manuals. Because tactical doctrine is closely associated with the employment of

technology and emerging tactics, change will likely occur more rapidly than other

levels of doctrine. Due to their sensitive nature, many TTPs are classified.

TYPES OF DOCTRINE

There are three types of doctrine: Service, joint, and multinational.

 Service doctrine outlines Service capabilities and guides the application of Service

forces. It presents the Service’s view of the best way to organize and employ Service

forces to accomplish oint force commanderJFC objectives.

 Joint doctrine, as it applies to airpower in joint all-domain operations, describes the

best way to integrate and employ air and cyberspace capabilities with land, maritime,

space, and special operations forces in military action. It presents the Joint view of

the best way to employ forces to accomplish JFC objectives regardless of which

Service provides them.

 Multinational doctrine, as it applies to airpower, describes the best way to integrate

and employ US air forces with the forces of allies in coalition warfare. It establishes

principles, organization, and fundamental procedures agreed upon between or

among allied forces. When developed as a result of a treaty, as in North Atlantic

Treaty Organization doctrine, multinational doctrine is directive.

DOCTRINE, EMERGING DOCTRINE, OPERATING CONCEPTS, AND

VISION

The doctrinal maxims of this document are based on

experience, hard-won with the blood of Airmen, and

tempered by advances in technology. If properly

employed, doctrine can lead to great success, and if

ignored, can lead to disaster. Therein lies the

challenge: doctrine should convey the lessons of the

past to guide current operations, but should still be

flexible enough to adapt to change. Yet while forming

that baseline for current operations, doctrine also

provides a roadmap for future thinking. One way to

put this relationship into perspective is to understand

the different uses of vision, operating concepts,

emerging doctrine, and doctrine.

If placed along a continuum, doctrine, emerging

doctrine, operating concepts, and vision provide a

model for thinking about future technology, operating

A hiatus exists

between inventors who

know what they could

invent, if they only knew

what was wanted, and

the soldiers who know,

or ought to know, what

they want, and would

ask for it if they only

knew how much science

could do for them.

— Winston Churchill,

The Great War

constructs, and doctrine in a coherent temporal framework.

 Doctrine is focused on near-term operational issues and describes the proper

employment of current capabilities and current organizations. Doctrine

addresses how best to employ, how to organize, and how to command today’s

capabilities. Doctrine is examined and validated during training, exercises,

contingency operations, and times of armed conflict. Exercises, wargaming, and

experiments allow us to test emerging doctrinal concepts and better align predicted

capabilities with sound operational practices. Experience during conflict refines

doctrine in real time. Encounters with unpredictable adversaries often highlight

doctrinal gaps and provide fresh perspectives on historic and future challenges.

 Emerging doctrine generally drives force development in the two to seven

year time frame. Still not proven as extant practice, it examines an operating

concept for doctrine development. Emerging doctrine is further developed and

refined to drive future operational and tactical doctrine. Emerging doctrine

combines operating concepts with near-term practical approaches within the current

context of doctrine. Experiments, wargames, and historical study, when honestly and

rigorously conducted, are useful methods for evaluating emerging doctrine and

providing a basis for doctrinal considerations.

 Operating concepts generally look out from seven to fifteen years, and

postulate reasonable operating scenarios that, through a combination of

analysis and the use of descriptive examples, examine a range of issues such

as employment, operating environment, C2, support, organization, and

planning considerations. As new technologies mature to the point where their

performance can be reasonably bounded as a new, separate system or part of an

existing system, they are examined within the framework of an operating concept.

Depending on their purpose, operating concepts can speak to the present, near

future, or distant future. Operating concepts define the parameters of envisioned

capabilities. Like emerging doctrine, experiments, wargames, and historical study

are useful methods for evaluating new operating concepts.

 Vision statements describe key operating constructs and desired operational

capabilities well in the future, usually fifteen years and beyond. Vision serves to

focus technology investments toward achieving these capabilities. Emerging

concepts and technologies are best investigated through experimentation and

wargaming techniques. As future concepts are envisioned, it is important to also

examine doctrine to support these potential capabilities. Vision provides the basis for

wargaming, and the results of wargaming may point to doctrinal considerations

requiring further examination.

Using doctrine, emerging doctrine, operating concepts, and vision, the Air Force can

look toward the future and consider the long-term impacts of advanced technologies

such as directed energy weapons, new unmanned systems, joint C2 systems, and

conceptual advancements. As this framework builds from the general (long-term) to the

specific (near-term), Airmen can investigate a wide range of doctrine, organization,

training, materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities issues at the appropriate point

during technology development, concept exploration, and systems acquisition.